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INTRODUCTION
Rural transformations form a crucial part of the story of
developing capitalism in the political economy of
"1
industrialising South Africa. This thesis examines such 
transformations in the establishment of a rural reserve for 
Africans within a segregated and class divided society in 
Zululand. In the first half of the twentieth century, Zulu 
leaders and state segregationists re-moulded significant 
legacies from the pre-colonial past in order to dominate 
the people and the economy of the reserves. Zululand, 
therefore, provides a valuable focus for a study of the 
racial and class cleavage between Africans and whites; and 
of the stark contrasts not only between the strength and 
resilience of pre-colonial African states and the 
fragmented and overcrowded twentieth century reserves but 
also between commercialising white farmers and the mass of 
impoverished Zulu.
Rural society in Zululand, however, was not simply unevenly 
bifurcated between Africans and whites. White interests 
were often divided between the component parts of the state 
at local and national levels and between the various 
fractions of capital.^ At the same time white rule and the 
penetration of capitalism intensified the extant 
differentiation in Zulu society between chiefs and headmen 
and commoners and between older men and women and younger 
men.^ Moreover, mission-educated 'progressives' and the 
conservative ruling elite often had contending interests as 
did Zulu leaders and the state.^ Patterns of alliance and
7
conflict varied with different times and at different 
places, often with ambiguous results. More importantly, 
Africans played a vital part in shaping both state policy 
in the reserves and the relationship of whites outside them
n
to Zulu society. This thesis attempts to understand the 
complexity and diversity of the local political economy and 
social stratification based as it was on the intersection
o
of class and race.
GEOGRAPHY, CLIMATE AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
Zululand can be divided into three main geographical zones:
Q
southern, interior and northern (see map). The climate is 
generally sub-tropical, with dry cool winters and wet hot 
summers. Rain normally falls heavily between November and 
March and lightly between April and October. Pre-colonial 
human settlement, agricultural and pastoral production 
adapted to these conditions. Normally, Africans tilled the 
land and planted maize, corn, sorghum and a variety of 
beans and pumpkins just before the summer rains. There are 
often two growing seasons in coastal areas of the north. 
Harvesting and the clearing of bush for cultivation usually 
takes place from February to May. Zulu herdsmen moved 
cattle across the various regions seasonally in order to 
gain access to the best grazing.
The southern coastal plain is approximately twenty miles 
wide, extending from the Thukela river north to the Mfolozi 
river, and is traversed by a series of rivers and streams 
which provide well-watered valleys and flood plains. There
8
are relatively fertile, though sandy, soils with a limited
capacity for holding moisture in the Eshowe, Mtunzini and
Lower Umfolozi (Empangeni) districts. Regular, plentiful
rains, averaging over 40 inches a year ensure that, unless
drought strikes, people can farm intensively. This coastal
area has a nearly sub-tropical climate with hot, humid, wet
summers and temperate dry winters. Before white
colonization, Zulu settlement of this area was limited due
1 Dto the prevalence of malaria and cattle diseases. u
The interior zone is comprised of the Nquthu, Nkandhla, 
Entonjaneni (Melmoth), Nongoma, and Mahlabatini districts. 
The uneven terrain consists of low river valleys, thorn and 
bushveld plains, and steep, rugged hills. The lower plains 
provide 'sweetveld' and mixed grasses for summer cattle 
grazing and the upland areas provide 'sourveld' for winter 
grazing. As Guy has argued, the Zulu maintained these 
grazing areas only through continued intervention to 
prevent the encroachment of dense bush and tree growth. The 
zone is well-watered, receiving 30 to 40 inches of rain a 
year, and provides a range of fine grazing areas. It is 
relatively free from endemic cattle and human diseases. 
Frost occasionally settles on the high hills during the 
relatively cool winters, but the long warm summers provide 
good growing seasons. The Zulu concentrated their 
settlement in this area in order to make use of the fertile 
soil and, prior to white settlement, the wide range of good 
pastures.
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In the Ingwavuma and Ubombo districts of northern Zululand 
the low-lying coastal plain has sandy soils and the 
vegetation is mostly thornveld and sub-tropical palms. This 
region suffers from very dry winters and very hot summers. 
It experiences drought far more often than the southern and 
interior zones. Zulu settlement here was generally sparse 
except along the relatively fertile Pongola river flood 
plain and the well-watered lower portions of the Lebombo 
mountains. Cultivation is difficult, and Africans relied on 
food supplements from abundant local sources such as fish 
and on trade in palm wine produced from the ilala plant.
ZULULAND AROUND THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
In the nineteenth century, Zululand was one of the last and 
most powerful of the pre-colonial South African kingdoms. ^  
In 1879, the British imperial and Natal colonial military 
conquest of the Zulu set the scene for the more intensive 
capitalist penetration of the region than previous the 
trading based on pre-capitalist production had a l l o w e d . -*-2 
Well before 1879, however, Natal colonists had developed 
interests in the land, labour and resources of Zululand. 
Although there is considerable debate over the timing and 
relative impact of environment, demography and trade in 
Zulu state formation and the 'mfecane' or Zulu diaspora of 
the early nineteenth century, the Zulu had established a 
cohesive political system by the late 1860s and Natal 
settlers had undoubtedly developed economic and trade links 
with it well before 1900.^
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By the twentieth century Zululand had already been shaped
by a long process of interaction with whites which had
reduced the customary area of Zulu occupation and limited
their expansion.-*-^  By 1879, the core of the Zulu kingdom
lay north of the Thukela river. Before the Anglo-Zulu War,
the Zulu king, Cetshwayo kaMpande (1826-1884), claimed
Zululand's western boundary extended along the Umzinyati
(Buffalo) river to the Drakensburg mountains and from there
1 Rdeep into the Transvaal. The British fixed the western
border in 1879 as part of the ultimatum they presented to
the Zulu which led to the war.^ To the north the Zulu were
now also hemmed in by the African polities of the Swazi and
Maputa, although by the 182 0s, the Zulu had established
their hegemony in the region and had subordinated the
1 7Maputa into a tributary relationship.
During the 1880s, the British reconstructed the territory
and African society within it through indirect
administration and by establishing loyal 'aliens' in the 
1 ftregion. Mercenaries m  the war against the Zulu, the 
'white1 chief John Dunn (1835-1895) and chief Hlubi of the 
Tlokoa, settled in Eshowe and Nquthu to act as a buffer 
against any recrudescence of Zulu power. These chiefs and 
their imported followers altered the regional economy by 
monopolising trade routes, embracing elements of 
'civilising1 mission Christianity, and advancing
V 1 Qprogressive' farming and cattle trading.  ^ African 
settlers, attracted by these developments, increased the 
population density in the area substantially.
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In 1883, as a result of British policy which sought to
undermine Zulu cohesion by encouraging factional conflict,
a devastating civil war erupted. During the war, the young
Zulu king, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo (c.1868-1913), offered
Afrikaner mercenaries from the Transvaal an unspecified
part of Zululand in exchange for their support against his
rival, chief Zibhebu of the Mandlakazi. This contravened
the Zulu custom which was supposed to prevent rulers from
o nalienating land held m  trust for the people.
Having crushed the Mandlakazi, the Afrikaners established 
the New Republic (ceded to Natal in 1902 following the 
Anglo-Boer war) on fertile grazing lands in central and 
western Zululand and expanded their settlement into the 
'Proviso B' area of Entonjaneni, in the heart of Zululand, 
and hundreds of African families were forced off the 
land. 2-*- Those that remained were subjected to rent and 
labour dues. Moreover, the settlers restricted Zulu 
seasonal grazing movements. Although the royal family and 
their followers, the Usuthu, were victorious in battle, 
tensions between them and the Mandlakazi continued into the 
twentieth century.
The majority of Zulu families on white farms in these 
northern Natal districts endured irksome labour tenancy 
agreements and a few may have found opportunities to farm 
and keep stock on favourable terms for a time. As Beinart 
and Delius argue, African tenants managed to avoid the 
worst exactions of landlords.  ^ The uneven development of 
capitalist agriculture in these upland areas allowed some
12
tenants to keep substantial cattle-herds and to farm
intensively after they rendered their three to six month
labour service. Others refused to work for their landlords
and paid cash rents before travelling to the urban areas to
7 7earn wages from white employers. J During the 192 0s, 
however, white farmers expanded their cultivation, 
increased their cattle holdings, and exploited their labour 
more ruthlessly. With the powers available to them under 
the 1913 Natives Land Act, which segregated the ownership 
of land in favour of whites, and under the Masters and
Servants legislation, they evicted thousands of African 
tenants from their farms, forcing them into the reserves.^
At the turn of the century, the Zulu political economy was
based on customary agriculture organised in basic
productive units or homesteads, on the trade of ivory and
9 Rskins, and on migrant wage labour. ^ While the colonial
Natal state, which annexed Zululand in 1897, sought to
maintain certain continuities with the pre-capitalist
system of chiefly land control and homestead production, a
critical difference with the past was, as Guy argues, the
diversion of African 'surplus' labour from the confines of
the old Zulu kingdom into the wider developing capitalist
economy. D Following the conquest, young Zulu men,
especially from the southern districts, increasingly left
the territory in search of wage labour. They sought cash to
purchase cattle needed for lobola (bridewealth) and to buy
a range of goods now used in the homestead, including
ploughs and hoes for cultivation, cloth and some basic food 
7 7staples. In 1903, the advent of local rail transport
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improved the movement of men and goods into and out of 
Zululand and reduced the cost of store-bought food which
o o
helped alleviate periodic food shortages.
Natal imposed a variant of indirect rule on the Zulu and 
governed through chiefs who were under the control of local 
magistrates (native commissioners [NCs], under the Native
0 QAffairs Department [NAD] from 1910). The new government 
sought to cover the cost of administration and drive young 
Zulu men into wage labour through the imposition of taxes, 
first a 14s. hut-tax in 1888 and then, in 1905, a decidedly 
unpopular poll tax on all males not liable for the hut-tax. 
These were an added burden to homestead productivity as 
some families struggled to meet the high tax rates through 
the sale of agricultural produce. Moreover, chiefs, male 
homestead heads and officials ensured their continued 
control over the male youth through the collection of taxes
o n
and by controlling labour migrancy.
Homestead production, nevertheless, remained the mainstay 
of the Zulu economy. Family subsistence and accumulation
o i
were based on cultivation and cattle-keeping. x Cattle were 
a productive and reproducing form of storeable wealth. 
There was a gendered division of labour activities, with 
men working in animal husbandry and related activities such 
as ploughing, and women providing food through agricultural 
work. * To a large degree, male migrant labour was
"3 "3predicated on female capacity to maintain homesteads. J 
Patriarchal control of homesteads and of the division of 
labour also related to access to land. Male household heads
14
strictly controlled the allocation of arable plots to wives 
while chiefs and their deputies controlled settlement on a 
district basis.^
Although African settlement varied regionally, most 
communities in the south and interior were congested 
because of settler land expropriations in the 1880s and 
1890s. Thus, as demographic pressures increased, the Zulu 
were forced to use all available land for cultivation by
"3 IT
1900. J Arable land was scarce m  Nquthu, Nkandhla, Melmoth
and Eshowe and they used hillsides for cultivation and
grazing since they avoided lower valleys due to the
prevalence of malaria or tsetse fly. Moreover, leading
members of the royal family and men of status controlled
the better pastures in the upland areas of the interior
districts for their own cattle, thereby denying commoners
8 7more arable or grazing land.
In 1896-1897, the devastating stock disease rinderpest
wiped out over 80 per cent of Zulu cattle. Until herds
recovered in the 1910s, most families were without draught
oxen, and even 'progressive1 farmers, reverted to hoe 
7 Qcultivation. * In 1902, southerners, especially the 
mission-educated, owned more ploughs, with one to every ten 
families than northerners, who owned only one for every 24 
families. Because of their heavy cattle losses, some 
southerners hired draught oxen from neighbouring white 
farmers, and paid for ploughing services out of the sale of 
produce, but they did so increasingly with cash earned from 
mi grant 1abour.^  ^
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Re-stocking after cattle epizootics was an uneven process.
In the congested districts of Nquthu and Nkandhla people
tended to restock with less costly goats and sheep. While
these animals reproduced more rapidly, Africans did not
consider them as valuable as cattle. ^  The less fertile
northern districts provided for rapidly increasing herds.
In Nongoma, Mahlabatini and the north, grazing was more
widely available and land was in less demand for controlled
agriculture than in the south. This was due, in part, to
the less favourable climate, and in part because chiefs had
better control over the less densely populated land there
and could therefore provide their cattle with larger
pastures. Moreover, the terrain and uneven capitalist
penetration shaped local responses to restocking. Hlubi's
people in Nquthu, for example, accumulated sheep, which
were well-suited to the hilly area, in order to take
advantage of the trade with white farmers and the local
A 0market for wool.
METHODOLOGY AND THEMES
Although there are a number of important studies concerned 
with the foundations of society in twentieth century 
Zululand, much remains undone.^ Recent work in particular 
has considered the construction of Zulu ethnicity and 
nationalism and their relation to the state during the 
early twentieth century.^ These works are, however, 
largely concerned with political developments, and less 
with a detailed examination of the material basis of Zulu 
society in the reserves. They have tended to conflate the
16
experience of African tenants in the white-farming
districts of northern Natal with that of Africans in the 
4 Rreserves. J As they suggest, circumstances differed 
markedly between the white farms and the reserves and this 
thesis therefore concentrates on the latter.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Natal segregationists, seeking to
overcome the problems of industrialising society, changed
their earlier perception of Zululand as a threatening
military kingdom and turned to contributing to the African
construction a distinctly conservative Zulu n a t i o n a l i s m . ^
The M.P. for Zululand and leading sugar-planter, George
Heaton Nicholls, was a major proponent of segregation,
especially for Natal-Zululand. His 'adaptionist1 policy
aimed, in part, to lessen the competition between planters
and urban industry for Zulu labour by advocating the
'retribalisation1 of Africans under a strong, conservative
Zulu paramount in the reserves in the hopes of increasing
the state's control of the forces of change in the
4 7capitalist context. It is, therefore, important to
examine the material underpinnings of reserve society,
especially as they related to chiefly rule, in order to
understand how capitalism developed in an increasingly
differentiated society and in what ways segregation
4developed m  Natal. °
This thesis could not have been written without the work of 
earlier scholars on rural South Africa in the late 
nineteenth century. Studies of rural polities torn asunder 
by imperial armies, colonial conquest and alien rule enable
17
an understanding of the continuities and contrasts between 
the precolonial political economy controlled by Africans 
and that dominated by the white state and capital.^ 
Equally important are those works which examine rural 
history and the transformation of African society in the 
twentieth century. Beinart, Bradford and Bundy, for 
example, present a nuanced theoretical approach to the 
patterns of dominance and struggle in the countryside with 
an emphasis on 'Africanist1 historiography in an effort to 
recapture the history of local people in the wider scope of 
rural transformations and these were useful for this
study. While Bradford and Bundy's studies raise important 
questions about the conflicts between white farmers and 
Africans over land and resources which are relevant to 
Zululand, Beinart and Bundy's findings about the nature of 
stratification and conflict in rural South Africa are 
confirmed in many aspects of the Zulu case s t u d y . I n
Zululand, however, a detailed examination of the ruling 
strata of African society has shown important differences 
from Pondoland and the Eastern Cape in the way chiefs and 
headmen dominated the local economy.
There is a need, however, for more local histories of rural 
communities during the first half of the twentieth
ir "i
century. J In order to understand the nature of rural 
change, South African historians need to overcome what 
often appears as a polarised history in which cohesive pre­
colonial societies are conquered and then undermined by 
capitalism only to emerge much later as impoverished labour
reserves. Detailed accounts of the 1930s and 1940s, as the
18
effects of developing segregation policy were felt all over
rural South Africa, are particularly sparse. Without this
foundation, research on the 1950s and 1960s, the era of
formal apartheid, for which archive material is now
available, will be distorted. Moreover, more attention
should be paid to the dynamics of the implantation of
capitalism in the countryside.^ Only then will we have a
more complete picture of the forces and conflicts that have
5 5shaped contemporary South Africa.
The 193 0s and 1940s were chosen as the focus of study 
because this was a time of crisis in rural South Africa. 
The combined impact of world-wide depression and 
environmental collapse during repeated severe droughts 
prompted an intensified state intervention which sharpened 
the conflict between Africans and the state as well as 
between contending groups in Zululand. Moreover, as the 
white state consolidated its power, and supported 
commercialising white farmers, who had come to dominate 
much of the countryside by the 192 0s, a variety of 
conflicts smouldered in the reserves, ready to erupt.^
With the exception of the 1906 Bambatha rebellion, the 
timing of widespread resistance to the state in Zululand 
was perhaps somewhat later, and less forceful, than in 
other rural areas such as the Transkei and the Orange Free 
S t a t e . I n  Zululand conservative chiefs, assisted by the 
state, largely prevented wide-scale opposition to their 
rule. Resistance was fragmented in Zululand, and popular 
movements such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers
19
Union (ICU) made few inroads into the reserves in the 
1920s.Nevertheless, the serious tensions between the 
state and Africans, refracted through chiefs and local 
officials, had emerged by 1930.
During the 1930s and 1940s the state developed new policies 
in an attempt to respond to African discontent and it 
defined its efforts through the ideology of conservation
and 'development'. These efforts, however, exacerbated 
existing tensions in rural society. The state's
interventions in order to rebuild the reserves and prevent 
environmental degradation were, as Beinart has shown, more 
than a means of underpinning a migrant labour force through 
improved agriculture.^ The ideas, which officials
developed and implemented, often brutally, as 'betterment'
programmes in the 1940s, comprised an ambiguous mix of 
paternal concern for impoverished Africans, the desire to 
inculcate 'primitive' cultivators with 'progressive' 
techniques, and the official imperative to manage
production in the reserves while defusing African 
opposition.^
Between 1930 and 1950, these concerns intensified as
'liberal' segregationists sought ways to provide a stable 
home for a 'contented' African peasantry in the reserves. 
Following from the findings of the 1930-1932 Native 
Economic Commission (NEC), Senator Edgar Brookes, the noted 
Natal 'liberal' academic, headed the Union Government's 
Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC) which
considered ways of overcoming the rapidly deteriorating
20
reserve economies.^ The council's efforts, as with those 
of the later Tomlinson Commission, which also made 
proposals for the 'socio-economic development’ of reserve 
areas were in vain, however, since the state was not 
prepared to incur the expense of improving African areas.^
Central aspects of change were common to Zululand and other 
parts of South Africa, especially the Transkei.^ There was 
an increased reliance on entrenched patterns of labour 
migrancy. For many Zulu in the reserves, subsistence 
agriculture declined and eventually collapsed, forcing them 
to turn to the wider market for food. The state, both at 
local and national levels, intensified its control of 
people and their land. Mission-education imbued a growing 
number of Africans with the idea of 'progressive 
civilisation1 and its concomitant technology. And, there 
were further changes in consciousness: in the way Zulu
perceived themselves in relation to chiefs, the state and 
other Africans.
The creation and perception of ethnicity are recurrent 
themes in the thesis. Officials and the Africans in 
Zululand repeatedly referred to 'differences’ between 'the 
Zulu’ and other Africans. Officials compared politics and 
government in Zululand and the Transkei, often in derisory 
fashion, in order to motivate the Zulu to accept state 
policy. Similarly, labour recruiters, white farmers and 
their allied agents in government, differentiated between 
groups of Africans to rationalise employment practices or 
to force them into particular types of employment.
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Moreover, the Zulu distinguished between themselves and
other workers in order to defend their interests against
Athose competing against them for wages and resources. *
The idiom used was that of 'traditionalism' yet there was
an essential modernity in 'traditionalism' which, in the
case of the Zulu, allowed people to shape social practices
to maintain continuity of form but with a changed
substance.^ The Zulu patriarchy often appealed to invented
'tradition' to assert their hegemony over women and
commoners and to control relations of production. As
Beinart and Bundy have argued for the Transkei, so in
Zululand, the use of 'defensive traditionalism' by chiefs
was a crucial feature of regional politics.^ Chiefs often
managed to gain popular support in part because they tried
to defend their followers against the demands of state and
capital by harking back to an idealised 'glorious' and
'independent' Zulu past. The development of a unique Natal-
Zululand brand of 'Zulu' nationalism fed into wider
fi 7inventions of 'tribal' identities in South Africa. 
Paradoxically, at the same time, Zulu chiefs and members of 
the royal family were increasingly used in the state's 
attempts to implement policy and to defuse rural
C Q
struggles.
The following chapters attempt to explore the political 
economy of Zululand. In the spirit of Gluckman's Analysis 
of a Social Situation and Marks's The Ambiguities of 
Dependence, the thesis focuses on specific episodes of 
change in Zululand in order to consider conflict and
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cohesion in African society.^ These 'typical' situations 
are specific to the local processes which shaped Zululand, 
and yet are also related to the wider history of southern 
Africa. They also resonate with features of change 
throughout Africa.
The first chapter considers the delimitation and
expropriation of African land. By looking at the state's
development of a series of fragmented African reserves it
attempts to show how the burgeoning Zulu population,
already congested in the southern and central areas by
white settlement, faced further crowding as sugar-cane
farmers moved into Zululand. At the turn of the century,
the Zulu in this area numbered over 200,000. Between 1921
and 1946, the African reserve population rose from 255,000
to nearly 400,000. This large increase was, in part, due to
the massive number of African evictions from white farms in
7 nsouthern Zululand and neighbouring northern Natal.
As important for the political economy in Zululand,
however, was the state's policy of segregated land
settlement. The government privileged white commercial
farming over African agriculture by providing whites with
dramatically better financial and infrastructural support.
Although there was some debate in official circles about
the need to develop 'progressive' African farmers in the
rural areas, the exigencies of indirect rule and white
concerns about the possibly explosive nature of African
71society suffering severe impoverishment undermined this. 
Moreover, Natal settlers had 'hungry eyes’ for the fertile
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coastal belt in Zululand. The advent of commercial sugar
farming in Zululand fuelled their desire to wrest as much 
productive land away from the Zulu as possible. As one 
official noted in 1914:
Twenty years ago, one was looked upon as a madman 
to go down to the Umfolozi [Mfolozi river] during 
the summer months, and to-day people are growing 
sugar cane there.
The state, therefore, sacrificed most safeguards towards
African land, and particularly towards individual tenure
which might have supported the independent peasantry
envisaged under the 1913 Natives Land Act, by allowing
Natal settlers to gain control of most of the productive
7 "3land m  Zululand.
Constraints on African land-holding had profound
implications for the way in which white agriculture
developed and African subsistence production declined.^ 
The forces of the state, commercial agriculture and chiefly 
rule all subordinated individual African production. Not 
only did sugar-cane farming make intensive use of all the 
available land outside the reserves in the south; chiefs 
also worked to prevent their followers from gaining a stake 
on land outside their control. Thus, it was only a few 
members of the ruling class and their agents who managed to 
accumulate wealth and status through production in the 
reserves.
The next chapter on chiefly authority argues that with the 
support of the central government in Pretoria, a re­
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constituted African ruling class consolidated its hold over 
the land and resources in the reserves. However, the Usuthu 
(supporter of the hereditary royal family) leaders, Solomon 
kaDinuzulu (1913-1933) and his brother Arthur Edward 
Mshiyeni kaDinuzulu (1933-1948), the sons of Dinuzulu 
kaCetshwayo, the first Zulu king to live under colonial 
rule, only partially resurrected the institution of the 
Zulu monarchy. ^ ^ They were limited, on the one hand, by 
distortions caused by South African segregation which did 
not, and could not accommodate complete territorial, 
political or economic autonomy. On the other hand, they 
were constrained by their ambiguous position between the 
demands of state and capital and the those of their 
followers. Commoners and 'progressives' increasingly 
distanced themselves from the ruling elite as Solomon, 
Mshiyeni and their fellow chiefs embraced power derived 
from the state more openly.
Chiefly authority in Zululand was, however, in flux. Zulu
kings and chiefs were, by custom and practice, supposed to
order the subsistence economy through a redistributive
rationale which bound them to their followers through
7 f \reciprocal obligations. ° Formal and informal white
capitalist penetration fundamentally altered these features
of chiefly authority by first destroying the cohesion of
the Zulu state under an Usuthu monarch and then
incorporating atomised and competing chiefdoms into a
7 7colonist-dominated Natal m  1897. The number of chiefdoms 
in Zululand fluctuated over time. While the pre-conquest 
kingdom was comprised of roughly 2 6 interdependent
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chiefdoms under king Cetshwayo, the British settlement of
1879 removed disloyal chiefs and reconstituted the remains
of the old kingdom under 13 appointed chiefs. Natal
colonialism further eroded hereditary chiefly authority by
reducing the old kingdom to three districts in 1883.^®
Although the 'Bambatha rebellion' in 1906, to some extent,
moderated the Natal administration's approach to African
affairs, many officials remained wary of royal chiefly
power in Zululand. Moreover, none of the expropriated land
7 9was restored to chiefs.  ^ Thereafter, appointed chiefs 
struggled to win popular support and many hereditary chiefs 
struggled to balance their quest for official recognition 
with the desire to maintain mass appeal.
It is not entirely accurate to characterise all chiefs as 
homogeneously conservative. Not only did they often take up 
contradictory positions, depending upon the timing and 
context of change, but they also left room for other
leaders to manoeuvre in the interstices of their followers
on .divided loyalties.There were political, economic and
ideological aspects to this struggle of 'minor' players to
ft  1 •capture popular support. This examination of the contests 
for chiefly authority attempts to show how those men with 
less 'official' power came to dominate local politics.
Although the story of agricultural production and the
African peasantry in Natal and Zululand is largely one of
decline, the story of the cattle economy in Zululand is one
ft 7of remarkable resilience.  ^ There was a veritable 
'population explosion' from natural increase in the cattle
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herds in the Zululand reserves. In 1895, prior to intensive 
white settlement, there were estimated to be about 200,000 
African-owned cattle in Zululand. In 1898, following the 
devastation of rinderpest, the Zulu were said to have fewer 
than 60,000 cattle. Over the next twenty years the herds 
recovered and reached their pre-rinderpest level by 1921. 
Thereafter, the Zulu concentrated shrewdly on increasing 
their wealth in cattle with dramatic results and the herds 
'exploded' to about 700,000 cattle.®®
Guy has argued that:
It seems impossible that the pre-colonial peoples 
of south-eastern Africa could have established a 
long term ecological equilibrium with their 
environment; a society without scientific knowledge 
of plant life or the means to control grazing and 
cattle movements by fencing or to store and pump 
water, could avert pasture deprivation.®^
It seems clear, however, that the Zulu overcame their 
apparent lack of 'scientific knowledge', the 'inevitable' 
degeneration of pastures, and even greater constraints on 
herd increases. In the context of further reductions of 
grazing land and stricter controls on the movement of 
cattle in the twentieth century than before, Zulu herdsmen 
managed their cattle well, often demonstrating practical 
wisdom that can be considered 'indigenous science'.®®
Although the introduction of modern stock-disease 
prevention, which was principally aimed at maintaining 
white-owned herds, undoubtedly played an important part in 
the herd recovery, it also served to accelerate the
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patterns of differential ownership of cattle because 
Veterinary Department measures for disease control came 
with a cash cost. Moreover, cattle-owners adapted the 
production and exchange of cattle to concentrate the herds 
in their own hands and to exploit a rapidly commercialising 
market.
The chapter on labour focuses on created and perceived 
identities in the Zulu work-force and their relation to 
sugar-cane farming. Both the state and Africans had a stake 
in the 'ethnic specialisation1 of labour. The Zulu used 
ethnicity to try and secure relatively better paid jobs on 
the South African gold mines or in other urban areas. More 
importantly for the Zululand farmers, they used it to avoid 
the worst exactions of poorly-paid work on sugar farms 
where appalling conditions prevailed.^ The story of Zulu 
labour migration and its wider implications, however, have 
not been considered here in depth. This is, in part, 
because the thesis concentrates on the relatively 
unexplored features of work on commercialising 'industrial1 
sugar-cane farms, and in part because important aspects of 
Zulu labour migration to the urban areas have been covered
o 7
by Atkins, Hemson and Jeeves.
The uneven development of capitalist agriculture in South 
Africa was crucial for labour relations in the countryside,
and this was particularly true for the Zululand sugar
ft ft .plantations.00 Sugar was a significant product for South
Africa's drive toward agricultural self-sufficiency, and
the largely self-regulating sugar industry enjoyed
28
q  q
considerable state support with little official scrutiny.  ^
The powerful Zululand sugar-planters1 lobby presented a 
formidable and united front against the forces of change 
and improvement in the sugar industry. Although the lobby 
attempted to align its demands for state support with those 
of the least competitive of its members, the new, under­
capitalised farmers struggled to develop and compete with 
established farmers and urban industries for African 
labour.
The Zulu were especially resistant to both state and
farmers' efforts to direct them into agrarian labour. The
sugar planters were, therefore, forced to turn to the same
strategies, and face the same problems, of a migrant labour
system as the mines.^ This chapter, therefore, considers
questions relevant to the wider historiographical debate
over the nature of segregation and labour migrancy: What
opportunities were there for wage employment in the
countryside? To what degree did capitalist agriculture
transform the labour market in the reserves? Could rural
employment have stemmed the tide of Africans flowing into 
Q1the cities? In addition, the chapter attempts to re­
capture some of the complexity and diversity of the 
communities in and around the sugar plantations adjacent to
q  o
the reserves where migrants and residents interacted.
The crisis caused by drought, depression and agricultural 
decline in the 193 0s is considered in the next two 
chapters. During the 193 0s, because of extreme want in 
Zululand, the state and NAD officials finally challenged
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the claim made by urban industry, and particularly the 
sugar planters, that Africans could be paid low wages since 
they met subsistence needs from reserve production. Thus, 
the meagreness of reserve agriculture was laid bare. 
African producers suffered from the reduced availability of 
land, unequal state support for white agriculture and 
unfair competition from sugar planters. While some well- 
placed Zulu in the reserves profitably exploited the few 
market opportunities, there were tensions over land between 
these 'progressive1 producers and conservative chiefs on 
the one hand, and between un-competitive whites struggling 
to compete on world markets and Africans on the other.
The repeated droughts of the 193 0s and 1940s caused severe 
food shortages in the reserves and finally put paid to the 
'myth1 of reserve subsistence.^ If it were not for state 
intervention and the market in food, possibly thousands 
would have died from starvation. Yet various groups of 
Africans had differential access to food. Although the 
threat of famine loomed large for most reserve residents, 
the dynamics of social stratification, and the effects of 
capitalist development meant some wealthier Zulu had 
greater 'entitlements’ to food.
The entitlement approach to famine, as articulated by Sen 
and briefly stated here, argues that during famine people 
exchange a number of different endowments or services that 
they own or control for access to food. If their control of 
these entitlements, such as cultivable land, wage labour, 
or the production of goods to sell or trade, changes, then
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their entitlement to food also changes. Thus, a wage 
labourer who loses his or her job cannot command the same 
entitlement to food through purchase as before. Similarly, 
a cultivator who loses land can no longer produce either 
food to eat or other products to exchange for food. These 
entitlements are shaped by local factors in the political 
economy and depend on legal and social relations. In the 
Zululand case, they also often depended on conditions 
imposed by the state and capital. For the purposes of the 
chapter on famine, it was the overall loss of entitlements 
to land or jobs, and a decline in the value of wage 
entitlements, which made the majority of Zulu susceptible 
to food shortages. Thus, the position of commoner Zulu 
contrasted with the ability of wealthier chiefs and whites 
to maintain their entitlements to food without incurring 
the massive debts faced by commoners.
The most important and, it would seem, under-researched 
aspect of food supplies in the reserves was the developing 
white dominated market for food in rural South Africa.^ 
The commoditisation of food by large, well-capitalised 
agricultural concerns and white store-keepers shaped the 
relative levels of food entitlement for the Zulu. By the 
193 0s, government-stipended chiefs, wage labourers and 
women running homesteads had differing access to food 
according to the cash or produce they controlled. Thus 
there were gender and generational differences in 
entitlements since people's access to food during a famine 
was determined more by cash inputs which were controlled 
predominantly by male household heads and less on
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agricultural inputs or gathering which were controlled by 
96women.
In Zululand, as with famines or the threat of famine 
elsewhere, subsistence was not necessarily undermined by 
overall food shortages, but rather by problems of supply, 
delivery and unequal access.^ Indeed, overall food 
production in South Africa, particularly of maize which was 
a staple food for the Zulu, rose while Africans struggled 
to find enough to eat. The component parts of the state 
reacted in an ambiguous fashion to food shortages in the 
reserves. While, on the one hand, local NAD officials tried 
to improve Africans' access to increased food supplies, on 
the other hand, the Pretoria regime attempted to increase 
its control in the reserves by providing work-relief 
schemes and by mobilising labour.
State intervention and 'betterment' schemes were the result 
of increasing official concern about the 'impending 
collapse1 of agricultural and pastoral production in the 
reserves.From the 193 0s, governments throughout Africa 
tried to increase food production and improve existing 
'primitive' cultivation and cattle management in order to 
stabilise local economies for increasingly impoverished
QQ . ,
Africans. Against the background of rising tensions m  
the urban areas and concerns about the impact of 
industrialisation on 'traditional' African society, the 
South African state convened the 1930-1932 Native Economic 
Commission (NEC) to consider how to lead Africans towards
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'civilisation' and a viable segregated political 
economy.100
Although the commission made important recommendations for
bringing Africans above an established 'poverty line1 and
for their protection from famine, the state never
implemented the proposals which envisaged a huge
1 D1expenditure of funds to save the reserves from rum.1UA 
Instead, the NAD followed a new remit: to apply current
'scientific' ideas to existing patterns of production, 
particularly through extensive measures for cattle 
improvement and intensified management of the reserves, 
especially in light of the 'evils' of African 
'overstocking' and perceived soil degradation. The Zulu, 
however, steadfastly resisted these efforts to control the 
remaining elements of reserve production.
The problems of 'betterment' bring the discussion back to 
the issue of land holding and the nature of segregation. As 
the NAD sought to increase the capacity of the reserves to 
meet African subsistence, it returned to the idea of 
developing a class of 'progressive' African farmers; 
peasants who would grow food efficiently and provide for 
fellow reserve residents. Central to this, however, was the 
creation of individual plot-holders who would have an 
incentive to produce food and would not be undermined by 
'retrogressive' chiefly authority and communal land tenure. 
This approach was contradictory to the maintenance of 
chiefly authority, based as it was on chiefs control of 
communally held land. Since the South African state was
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committed to rule through the chiefs and an ideology of 
segregation by the 193 0s, and it viewed Zululand as a model 
territory for the practical application of these policies, 
it is not surprising that local officials never succeeded 
in supporting individual 'master farmers' Instead, the
picture which emerges is of the consolidation and 
enhancement of chiefly wealth and power in contrast to the 
impoverishment of commoners within the reserves and the 
acceleration of white production and increased power 
outside the reserves.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE DELIMITATION AND EXPROPRIATION OF ZULULAND
In August 1902, the Joint Imperial-Colonial Zululand Lands 
Delimitation Commission commenced segregating African and 
white lands north of the Thukela River and relegated 
African people to a series of reserves. For over twenty- 
years before the delimitation, Natal colonists had looked 
to the valuable grazing lands, fertile coastal plains and 
potential mineral resources in Zululand for their 
expansion. Having won responsible government in 1893, white 
Natalians pressured the British imperial government, the 
conqueror-cum-guardian of the Zulu, to open the British
n
colony of Zululand to white settlement. Imperial 
authorities believed that handing Zululand over to Natal 
was the most expedient means of maintaining British 
strategic interests in the region and a way to get Natal 
support for their scheme for federating South Africa.^
With imperial acquiescence, the Governor Sir Walter Hely- 
Hutchinson, passed the Natal Act for the annexation of 
Zululand (No. 37 of 1897), which provided the colonial 
government with access to land, control of resources and 
the right to define the development of road and rail 
networks in Zululand. Together these tied the Zulu to a 
pattern of migrant labour.^ The Act also set up a 
delimitation commission to define white and African land- 
holding in the territory. More importantly, it allowed 
Natal to control the delimitation commission; the limited 
deference to imperial 'humanitarian' concerns for the Zulu
46
was the provision of one 'imperial' representative. 
Africans could only hope that the British would guarantee a 
judicious land settlement. The Colonial Office gave the 
commission a cryptic and often ambiguous remit, which 
specified that it find sufficient reserve land for the Zulu 
with 'liberal allowance for the existing population1 and 
for its natural increase in years to come1, leaving the
C
remaining land for white settlement. These instructions 
made no reference as to what area this might constitute, 
except for the provision of a 10,000 acre reserve for the 
descendants of the late government-appointed 'White Chief
n
of Zululand1, John Dunn.
Sir John Dartnell, a Pietermaritzburg surveyor, represented 
imperial Britain on the commission. Charles Saunders, Chief 
Magistrate and Civil Commissioner for Zululand from 1897, 
and later knighted for his service, represented the Natal 
Government. By 1910, Saunders was also a large land owner 
and prominent Zululand sugar farmer influential in shaping
o
Natal land policy m  Zululand. Considering Natal 
government pressure to alienate the whole of Zululand for 
white settlement, Dartnell and Saunders managed to delimit 
relatively substantial reserves for A f r i c a n s .  ^ The 
constraints imposed by Natal, however, forced the 
fragmentation of Zululand into disparate reserves, which 
prevented Africans from developing land outside set areas 
of communal tenure and 'tribal' chiefly control.
Although Marks considered him an 'able and impartial 
administrator of the paternalist stamp’ Saunders, by far
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the more prominent and influential member of the two-person
i ncommission, was an ambiguous figure. u Publicly, he 
championed the cause of 'traditional' African rights to the 
land and the development of the reserves as a colonial 
moral duty. This did not prevent him and Dartnell from
frequently acquiescing to settler demands for land in 
Zululand. From 1902 until 1904, the commission made an 
extensive tour and survey of the country, collecting 
written and oral evidence from white settlers; yet it
merely informed Africans of its objectives, and pointed out 
areas delimited for their occupation, without listening to 
any evidence from them.
Saunders and Dartnell had a biased approach to the 
delimitation, based loosely on precedents set by Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone for the creation of 'tribal' reserves 
in Natal, and which favoured the entrenchment of settler
rights to land both inside and outside the reserved
1 ?  • . . .  areas. J Natal, under its Prime Minister, G.M. Sutton, had
an overriding influence over the commission's activities
and like most Natal governments of the time, its policies
were based on an ideology of segregation which sought to
further settler accumulation at the expense of Africans.
Sutton felt he had to secure control of fertile land in
Zululand in order to maintain crucial political support
from potential settlers and especially the burgeoning sugar
farmer's lobby.
The delimitation commission operated in a jurisdictional 
twilight. Although British officials had some influence,
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Natal had an advantage in familiarity with, and proximity
to, Zululand. Moreover, the colonial office chose not to
exercise its power to prevent Natal from making land grants
to whites, and it left the commission's instructions
purposely vague to allow local officials to circumvent
1 fimetropolitan humanitarian pressure. D Initially, the
commission was to delimit only the coastal belt until the
British issued further instructions. Imperial officials
wanted to gauge the effect of the work on the Zulu and to
1 7prevent any African resistance. Effectively, Natal pre­
empted on-going colonial office approval of the 
delimitation by urging the commission to complete its work
without delay and the whole of Zululand was carved up by
1 ftwhite surveyors rapidly.
In order to provide for the 'development' of Zululand the
commission allowed for white settlement of the best land
wherever possible. Saunders and Dartnell allocated for
whites a huge extent of the well-watered coastal belt along
the proposed rail-line from the Thukela River, Zululand's
natural southern boundary, north to Somkele in what became
1 ftthe heart of the sugar cane belt. J Along the coast they
threw open the most fertile land available around St. Lucia
Bay and on the banks of the Mhlathuze River. In many
instances, they mis-represented African population
densities by including in the total area reserved for
Africans portions of districts, especially in Mtunzini,
7 nwhich were uninhabitable due to malaria.
49
The commission felt it was impossible to remove entire
communities from land they had occupied for generations
without causing great disruption. Saunders noted that
distinct pledges had been given to the Zulu that their land
would not be taken away by the British Government. He
argued these pledges were . . . known and remembered well
[by the Zulu]; they were given publicly and that is why if
we break faith with these people, it will be a fatal
91thing1. Thus the commissioners claimed that they could 
not conscientiously succumb to settler pressure for the
expropriation of land necessary for African survival:
. . .we have been met on all sides by [whites] who 
appear to be labouring under the impression that 
all the Commission was required to do was 
indiscriminately throw open the whole of the lands 
suitable for European occupation, irrespective of 
the interests of the Natives occupying those 
lands... It is also noticeable that in all the
published criticisms of the settlement, not a voice 
appears to have been raised in the Natives' 
interest.^ 2
On the contrary, white Natalians criticised the commission
vociferously. In a special editorial, the Natal Witness
argued that whites were 'fighting for’ the worst land in
Zululand while a large proportion of the best land was left 
9 9to Africans. J The commissioners responded by pointing out 
that only a small portion of Zululand was considered 
suitable for whites; the rest of the country was rugged, 
broken and riddled with malaria and stock diseases. They 
also reminded the public that the best portion of 
Zululand's farming and grazing land had already been 
alienated to Afrikaners in Vryheid and 'Proviso B 1 in the 
1880s.^ According to Saunders: '...those who are under the
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impression, as many appear to be that [Zululand] consists 
throughout of undulating plains suitable for European 
occupation are sadly mistaken'.^5 Nevertheless, despite 
resisting their excessive demands, the commission 
accommodated much of the settler desire for land.
Natal also put considerable pressure on Saunders and 
Dartnell to hasten the delimitation after the delays caused 
by the Anglo-Boer War. They, therefore, recommended that 
white occupation commence while the rest of the country was 
delimited, not only to placate agitated Natalians, but also 
to prepare Africans gradually for white settlement. They 
argued that it would be to the advantage of Africans 
throughout Zululand if they experienced, 'by degrees’, the 
impact of delimitation, ' . . . which they will probably not
o 7
thoroughly grasp until European occupation commences'.
The commissioners made every effort to accommodate white 
farming interests, often at the expense of Africans. 
Assuming that no African would develop an interest in 
intensive farming, they opened up those lands for white 
settlement which they felt were best suited to commercial 
farming. They often adjusted the reserves by curtailing 
African occupation of open level ground and adding land 
they considered more appropriate for African cultivation. 
The areas substituted were ' . . .broken and not so well 
adapted to European occupation, but better suited to Native 
wants and mode of life, [with] sufficient grazing ground on 
the hills and good garden land in the valleys'.
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Saunders and Dartnell allocated reserves on fertile land in 
areas of dense African settlement only as a necessity. 
Thus, Saunders defended the fairly generous reserve 
allocation for Chief Ngwanasi's people around Kosi Bay on 
the grounds that a large settled community had resided 
there for generations and had come under British rule 
voluntarily.^ He believed, however, that settlers would
*3 Q
acquire the land with British approval at a later time. u 
In the lower-lying areas of Ingwavuma and Ubombo the soil 
was sandy and arid except on the Pongola river flood plain. 
They, therefore, delimited a wide strip of land on either 
side of the river for white settlement, thereby preventing 
Africans from expanding their grazing land or settlement on
•3 1
the coast.
An even more contentious issue which foreshadowed the later
Natives' Land Act (No. 27 of 1913) was the hotly debated
proposal that Africans be allowed to purchase land outside
the reserves. In the event land purchase was to be racially
exclusive: only whites were allowed to buy free-hold land
in areas delimited for them and Africans could not purchase
land in Zululand at all. Natal also controlled the form of
tenancy on white-owned land (see below) which pre-dated the
1913 Act, but which had the same effect of supporting
emerging white commercial agriculture while subordinating
the African peasantry.  ^ In Zululand this policy was not,
as Bundy has argued for Natal, to extinguish a vibrant
share-cropping peasantry (which barely existed at the turn
of the century) but to prevent an African peasantry from
3 3developing on land sought by whites. J
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After districts were delimited, chiefs and induna 
petitioned the commission for permission to purchase land 
adjoining their apportioned reserves.^ Before his 
appointment as commissioner, Saunders had felt that 
Africans should be encouraged to become freehold owners of 
their land and that some portion of Zululand should be set 
aside for Africans to acquire individual title on the same 
basis as in the Glen Grey area in the Cape.^^ This belief 
was consistent with later NAD policy to promote 
'progressive' African development outside the reserves. ° 
Saunders argued that Africans wished to buy land for a 
number of reasons including a reverence for particular 
burial sites or family land, to maintain access to wood and 
wild game for food, and population increase. Many Africans, 
especially chiefs, simply wanted outright title so that
o *7
their land could not be interfered with. As m  Natal it 
was likely that, if allowed, Africans in Zululand would 
purchase land on a communal or syndicate basis to overcome
o o
rising prices. ° Natal, however, prohibited the Zulu from 
purchasing land on either a communal or an individual 
basis.
In September 1903, the commission reported that the Zulu 
were concerned about the possible influx of Indians into 
the territory:
They [Zulu] trusted that the land being thrown open 
would be occupied by Europeans and not people of 
other coloured races; that if they were to be 
deprived of their tribal lands for the benefit of 
the latter, they should feel compelled to protest 
most strongly.
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The commissioners suggested that the Zulu meant 
specifically the Indians who had settled and farmed 
intensively in coastal Natal. Whatever the possible Zulu 
prejudice, there was a strong settler prejudice against 
Indians. From the 1890s, Natal tried to prevent Indians, 
who often competed with white traders, from settling in 
Zululand by prohibiting their residence there unless they 
were employed by whites as servants.^ Moreover, local 
officials could refuse to grant Indians the right the 
purchase land without giving a reason, thereby avoiding a 
delicate racial issue.^
More important than the alleged African aversion to Indian 
settlement was the Natal Prime Minister's view that the 
occupation of land in Zululand by whites and Africans 
'...side by side on equal terms [was] most disadvantageous 
to the settlement of the country1. ^  This view coincided 
with developing national policy aimed at territorial 
segregation articulated by the South African Native Affairs 
Commission, 1903-1905, (SANAC).^ As Legassick has argued, 
in its drive for a unified national 'native1 policy, white 
South Africa considered segregation a means of 
'disentangling' Africans and whites which Union leaders 
perceived to be degrading and an encumbrance to the 
progress of both races. This was especially so in Natal.^
Yet Zululand complicated this policy since it set the 
precedent for further 'entanglements' through the local 
control of land segregation and settler alienation of 
African land; this contrasted with the protectorate model
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in which African regions were incorporated intact.^ As the 
staunch federalist Lionel Curtis argued, if '...more 
Zululands are to be handed over to more Natals1 , it would 
make a 'mess1 of national policy.^ Natal, however, had no 
intention of governing Zululand without access to land 
there, or of allowing Africans to purchase land there, even 
from willing whites.
In this area the commission succumbed to Natal pressure and 
retreated from its original defence of African rights to 
purchase land, using the Indian 'menace' as their excuse:
As it is of paramount importance to the Natives
that people of Asiatic extraction should be very 
strictly precluded from acquiring land... and if 
the only possible means of ensuring this will be to 
restrict Natives in a similar manner, we think that 
it is in the interest of the Natives that they
should suffer to that extent....^
Although Indian settlement could have been prevented in 
other ways, the British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, permitted the prohibition of 
African purchase because the commission was strongly 
against Indian settlement and it was a convenient
A Q
justification for preventing African land-purchase. 
Thereafter, in support of white traders and store-keepers,
the Natal and Union Governments assiduously prevented
Indians from gaining any foothold in Zululand.^
Saunders soon had second thoughts on this issue. By 1904, 
when he gave evidence to the SANAC, which set down new 
proposals for rigid territorial segregation, many of which 
were later incorporated in the 1913 Land Act, he stated:
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I say that the Native is a British subject, and
that the land which we pledged ourselves we would
not take away we are taking away and allowing
Europeans to buy. Why should not the Natives have
the same right to buy their own land as 
R nEuropeans?.
Saunders already knew the answer to his question, since the 
government of Natal had already decided that the issue of 
African land purchase would not in any way be contingent on 
the findings of the SANAC.*^
Settlers criticised the small area of land thrown open for 
whites in the productive high-lands of Zululand's interior. 
The commissioners, possibly concerned about provoking a 
hostile reaction from Africans, -although, as Marks has 
shown, in this they failed- maintained their position on 
the issue of large reserve allocations in southern 
Zululand.^ They argued there was no justification for the 
wholesale removal of Africans from the densely populated 
districts of Nquthu and Nkandhla which were so congested by 
19 03 that some African families were already moving onto 
white-owned farms in the Transvaal where they paid rents of 
up to £5 on top of a 14s. hut tax.^ The commissioners also 
pointed out that the Natal government had encouraged many 
loyal Africans, including chief Hlubi of Basutoland and his 
followers, to settle in these districts as a buffer between
the colony and the Zulu Kingdom; to remove them would be an
• • • 54injustice.
The Natal Prime Minister was far from content with the 
commission's findings. Contradicting his own earlier
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argument that the juxtaposition of white and African 
settlement would be disadvantageous, he proclaimed:
The delimitation of such large continuous areas of 
the country, practically unbroken by European 
settlement, cannot but mitigate against the 
development of the land. . . whereas a fair 
proportion of European occupation would form a 
direct civilizing agency towards uplifting the 
tribes. ^ 5
Clearly, Sutton was prepared to employ any expedient to 
gain more land for white Natalians.
The commissioners, however, were aware of the firm imperial 
conviction that chiefly authority should be maintained on 
the land. The powerful chief Somkele of Hlabisa, for 
example, was saved from 'extinction' when his lands, which 
were part of the proposed area for white development of the
C f.
St. Lucia coal fields, were included in the reserves. D 
Moreover, Natal provided chief Siteku with land in 'Proviso 
B' at a cost of £3,000 in order to preserve his integrity 
as a member of the Zulu royal family and in the hopes of 
preventing an Usuthu uprising in the area.^ In the long 
term, however, the state was unable to ensure political 
support from the chiefs by providing them with land because 
the government never made enough land available.^ From the 
192 0s through the 1940s, most chiefs and leading members of 
the royal family remained frustrated in their repeated 
calls on the government for more land.-^
By the end of its deliberations in 1904, the commission had 
dramatically reduced the area of land for African 
occupation, although the effect varied regionally. Africans
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were relegated to 21 reserves ranging in size from 640,000 
acres of poorly-watered, sandy land in Ubombo to only
10.000 acres of densely populated, though relatively 
fertile, land in Mtunzini. Few of the reserves were 
contiguous, and this restricted African mobility and 
grazing since people were isolated by corridors of white- 
owned farm land. Of the 3,881,991 acres delimited for 
Africans, only 1,429,000 acres were set aside in the most 
densely-populated districts of Nquthu, Nkandhla, Mtunzini, 
Entonjaneni (Melmoth) and Eshowe.^ The commissioners 
delimited 2,452,991 acres for the rest of the Zulu, roughly
80.000 out of 200,000 people, leaving the 2,100 white 
settlers with a total of 2,769,114 acres.^ These figures 
are, however, somewhat misleading and were misrepresented 
by the commission's report. Although the commissioners 
suggested that each Zulu man and woman was allocated over 
17 acres, there was considerable regional variation. For 
example, in Ubombo the average amount of land per capita 
was reduced from 41 to 25 acres and in Eshowe from 14 to
fi 012.5 acres.  ^ In addition, in Hlabisa, the commission, 
under pressure from conservationists, excluded Africans 
from the large Mkuzi game reserve and left them with only 
low malarial valleys.^
As we have seen, the commissioners tended to treat the Zulu 
as un-differentiated subsistence farmers. There were, 
however, a substantial number of mission-educated Christian 
Africans [amakholwa; kholwa] who were trying to participate 
in the new political economy. They believed that 'progress' 
and the 'civilising' virtues of Christianity needed to
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triumph over 'tribalism', and they had established a series
of mission communities in southern Zululand in the 1860s
and 1870s. The kholwa had erected substantial 'European-
style1 homes, sent their children to mission schools and
64farmed the land intensively. Yet the commission allowed
them few land rights despite petitions from white
f\ ^missionaries and kholwa leaders. 3 The Natal government was
hostile to the kholwa and to their hopes of gaining
individual rights.^ It granted specific title outside the
reserves to only two of the 37 missions in Zululand, and
approximately 2 00 kholwa families in Eshowe were left under
6 7the jurisdiction of reserve chiefs.
Outside mission stations, Christian Africans suffered from
the anti-kholwa bias of the Natal authorities and the
predilections of local officials for chiefly control.
Despite their pleas to be allowed to buy land outside the
reserves this was refused. Officials treated all Africans
as 'uncivilised1, regardless of their 'progress1 or their
ability to purchase land. For example, the NAD refused
William Washington Ndhlovu, a kholwa exempted from Natal's
codified 'Native' law, and later influential in local
politics, (see below) permission to sell permanent
buildings he had erected on land outside the delimited
6 8Eshowe mission to the new white owner. Unlike Zulu huts, 
these building were of mortar and stone and immovable. Yet, 
the commission had previously recommended that Africans who 
built European-style houses and employed 'superior' 
techniques in cultivation should be entitled to fair
Qcompensation for their improvements. y Saunders, in his
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capacity as CNC, contradicted his findings as a land
commissioner by refusing to allow Ndhlovu to sell his
buildings, arguing that 'He knew any expense he incurred in
7 Dimprovements he incurred at his own risk.1 u
Moreover, all kholwa on reserve or open lands were subject
71 •to chiefly authority. Local officials believed Africans
who sought individual land tenure were subversive of
chiefly authority, and a threat to orderly administration.
To ensure chiefly control, Saunders, in his capacity as
CNC, circumvented the Natal rule that kholwa monogamists
living in European-style houses be exempt from hut-tax. He
ordered that kholwa remaining on land outside the reserves
be charged a sum equivalent to the hut-tax, to be collected
by chiefs at the same time and in the same manner as the 
7 7regular tax.  ^ The object of the rent was not simply to 
generate more income: the new rent-tax was a means of
bolstering the chiefly authority necessary for indirect 
rule.
There was one exception to restrictions for individual land
tenure outside the reserves and this was at the Impapala
7 7American Zulu Mission m  Eshowe. J The Impapala lands were 
occupied by kholwa who had emigrated to the area from Natal
7 4 . .m  1886. The delimitation made no provision for this 
community of seventy families since their settlement 
conflicted with schemes for white sugar-cane farms. 
Saunders argued that these people had 'settled here 
entirely for their own personal gain’, and although the 
state granted them permission to build substantial homes
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and churches, he believed that this could 'hardly be taken
7 Rin any sense to have constituted [a] mission station'. D
The community at Impapala was, however, relatively well
educated and drew attention to its plight. In 1905, G.H.
Hulett, an Eshowe farmer of the wealthy Hulett sugar
family, took up their cause in order to develop an African
sugar cane-growing scheme and petitioned Natal to give them
7 fisecure individual title to the land. In 1907, an 
editorial in the African paper Ilanga Lase Natal focussed 
on the Impapala community and quoted its leader 
Mdhlo1ongwana Shandu.
We have from time to time advised that there must 
be no repetition of sacrificing one's self by the 
shedding of blood: we again say that ye, our
people, put down your weapons, look for money, and 
hoard it up. . . because money is power. It is money 
which will secure for you many of your rights. It 
will bring about the sub-division of the Reserves 
into individual holdings, also your obtaining 
licences for trade, also the permission to purchase 
land.77
Recognizing the great loss that these people would suffer
if their lands were sold, the Governor, Sir Mathew Nathan,
arranged for the purchase of the land in 1909, sub-divided
it into thirty-acre plots and issued the kholwa occupants
21-year leases. The Trust was to recover the costs of
survey and purchase through lease revenues from the 
7 Rresidents. ° By 1918, however, most Impapala residents 
struggled to cover the combined costs of rent and fees, 
which averaged £4. 16s. a year.7  ^Within a few years, close 
to half were in arrears and many were slipping from the 
ranks of those who could live off the land. By 192 8, when
61
the NAD had already considered resettling the lots with 
'alien natives... of the right class [who would] by their 
example do more to further the interests of civilisation 
than years of persuasion by Europeans', 28 tenants had to 
abandon their homes and move into the r e s e r v e s . ^  
subsequent petition by the remaining lot-holders to reduce 
the rents and get freehold title was turned down and the
O -I
community collapsed.
In addition to farms, the commission granted whites further 
rights in the reserves as store-keepers and squatters. Of 
the 89 store sites in Zululand at the time of the 
delimitation, 64 fell within African reserves, many in 
Nquthu and Nkandhla and the commission granted them all
o n
extended leases.^ Initially, store-keepers m  more remote 
areas could not rely entirely on trade with Africans. C.E. 
Pearse, a trader in Mahlabatini, argued, for example, that 
he needed a large grazing area and land to cultivate since 
'The trade with Natives in these out of the way places, 
without the assistance of cattle running and mealie 
grounds, is not sufficient to maintain a family in the way 
they should live before the Natives.1®^  Following 
delimitation, store-keepers flooded the reserves to take 
advantage of generous store site leases. In 1911 alone, the 
state approved 29 new 100 acre store leases for the
o /
reserves.^ Subsequently, store-keepers made substantial 
profits by selling food to Africans suffering from rapidly 
declining reserve agriculture.
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Friction between Africans and the store-keepers ensued 
almost immediately as the latter converted their holdings 
into small farms and encroached on African gardens and 
grazing areas. Natal's Governor had to issue instructions 
that Africans were to have complete rights to graze and 
cultivate land outside the store sites and that the cattle 
allowances for whites did not allow them to graze herds on 
African land. He felt that to restrict African cultivation 
around the stores would '... convey to the Native mind that 
he was debarred from all cultivation1 and that this would 
be contrary to African welfare.®^
WHITE SETTLEMENT
For the first time since the 1850s, Natal had more open 
land for whites than was immediately needed.®® From 1907 to 
1910, the colony established eight white settlement schemes 
which alienated nearly 200,000 highly productive acres of
p n
land from African use. White sugar-cane farmers moved 
into the coastal portions of Eshowe and Mtunzini apace, 
forcing the removal of hundreds of African families. 
Settler stock farmers in the inland districts of Nkandhla 
and Nquthu made less intensive use of their new land, only 
gradually expanding cultivation on small plots and 
therefore ejected or re-located Africans on a piecemeal 
basis. Most Africans expelled from white farms moved onto 
un-leased Crown land or into adjacent reserves increasing 
pressure on the land.®®
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In order to discourage absentee land holding and to prevent 
the bottling-up of African labour, their leases prohibited 
whites from charging cash rents to any African tenants who 
remained on their farms.Foreshadowing similar provisions 
in the 1913 Land Act, the government also sought to prevent 
share-cropping arrangements, but as with the operation of 
the Act on the highveld, many under-capitalised farmers 
ignored the rules and charged rents ranging from £1-4, and 
a few carried on s h a r e - c r o p p i n g . ^  on many farms, labour 
tenancy was standard and whites often imposed cash fees on 
their tenants before allowing them to take migrant labour
g  -i
contracts. A These arrangements, however, were short-lived, 
and after the passage of the 1913 Act and as sugar-cane 
farmers made more intensive use of the land in the 192 0s, 
few Africans remained on white farms in Zululand. By the 
193 0s labour tenancy in Zululand was limited as was rent 
tenancy which was concentrated mainly in the small white 
stock-farming communities of Entonjaneni and Nkandhla.92 
Many poor white farmers were against anti-squatting 
legislation however. It was only in the 1930s that the 
state was able to force farmers to compete with the mines 
and urban industry for 'free' wage labour under the 
provisions of the Native Trust and Land Act of 193 6.^^ The 
193 6 Act was intended to 'finally' segregate land (see 
below) and ended any possibility of Zulu individual tenure 
by forcing Africans into a variant of communal tenure. This 
made it more difficult for them to engage in 'progressive' 
farming. ^  in 1927, the SNA, J.S. Allison, argued that the 
removal of Zulu into the reserves should be done on a 
'tribal' basis to ensure chiefly authority and
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The first to go should be those natives living on 
private farms; but here we are arrayed against the 
solid mass of Natal opinion [ie. white farmers who 
wanted to hold African labour] , and we may have to 
wait till the squatting provisions of the Natives' 
Land Bill [ie. the 193 6 Act] become law and beginQ c:to operate.
This faced reserve chiefs with a crisis on two levels. On 
one level, it was increasingly difficult for hereditary 
chiefs to provide their followers with suitable and 
sufficient garden or grazing land. Thus, chief Nkomo of 
Eshowe, a long-standing hereditary chief, complained to the 
state that his landed 'inheritance' had been given out to 
Africans who were not his relatives and that he was unable
Q C
to apportion it to his sons. He claimed that, at a time 
of land shortages, this new policy discouraged his people 
from accumulating property when they knew it might be given 
to others. ^  Chief Zimema of Eshowe, who was not granted 
official status by the government in post-rebellion 
Zululand, stated that he
could not obtain any money to pay taxes- even in a 
time of scarcity he could not obtain any food for 
his children. . . he had no place in which he could 
act as chief similar to those who were below his 
rank. The Government had made it possible for 
people who were below him to make something by 
virtue of the position of chief which they hold.^®
In the overcrowded southern reserves, appointed chiefs 
filled their wards with loyal followers, often from the 
surrounding white farms or Natal. In contrast, 'loyal' 
chiefs appointed in the wake of the Bambatha rebellion, had 
considerable power to favour loyal followers in land 
settlement.
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On another level, both hereditary and appointed chiefs lost
authority over followers who remained on white-owned farms.
In Melmoth, where whites had settled since the mid-1880s,
chief Siteku found it increasingly difficult to order out
followers for work on Natal government road-works under the
isibhalo system. ^  His induna (headman, see below ch. on
chiefs), Mlonyeni, observed that 'As soon as the Chief was
about to call out boys they immediately ran off to a farm;
the white man then interfered and set the Chief's order at
defiance. ' As these young men struggled to avoid the
extraction of their labour by the state, they also denied
their chiefs the value of their labour to supply tribute
and taxes, thereby increasing the burden of cash
procurement on women, children and older men. As Cope has
argued, this emerging class of independent male youth, the
abaqhafi (a pejorative term for those who drink heavily),
challenged the power of the state and the chiefs over
1 n ilabour and revenue.
At the age of 74, Makondo KaNdhlovu expressed great
dissatisfaction with the competing demands on Africans 
which he felt contributed to the unravelling of Zulu 
society.
We cut away wild forests for sugar plantations and 
towns; we dig your roads.... We are made to live on 
farms and pay rent, and we are imprisoned if we
cannot pay. . . . Where is that government or king
which owns no land? Why are individuals able to
oust government subjects from the soil? Why are we 
put to trouble with respect to farms with [their] 
numerous regulations..? Let that land which is 
government land appear and let us black people 
build and dwell thereon and enjoy some rest. The 
Natives belong to one ruler; they may not be owned 
by everyone and a n y o n e .
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Zululand Districts, c. 1930
j Administrative Centres 
1 1. Nquthu Township 
I 2. Nkandhla Township 
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1 5. Empangeni Township 
j 6. Melmoth Township 
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THE ZULULAND 'TRUST'
The restrictive system of African land occupation laid down
by the 1904 delimitation commission pre-dated later
1 n-?
national land policies. After Union, the land question 
loomed large on the white 'national1 government's agenda, 
yet little changed in Zululand: the principles of Natal's
brand of segregation in the reserves were set in the 
Zululand Native Trust in a deed of grant on 6 April 
1909. This specified that all reserve and un-alienated
crown lands were vested in a board of trustees, replacing 
the Zulu King as sole authority over the land, with the 
Natal governor acting as principal trustee for the British 
government. The trust was later transferred to the 
executive office of the Governor-General of the Union under 
the 1913 Act and then incorporated into the Natives Land 
and Trust Act in 1936.^^
State trustees now controlled land use and occupation in 
the reserves and on the adjacent crown lands where many 
Africans still resided. Officials could admit or eject 
Africans from the land, or allow whites into the reserves, 
although in practice they left chiefs in control. Moreover, 
they could alter or re-define reserve boundaries and 
chief's 'tribal wards', a practice which altered the basis 
of communalism and which was confirmed in the 193 6 Act.^^ 
Through the trust, Natal gained wide-ranging powers, 
ostensibly construed for the betterment of Africans, to 
alienate even more land for white use including rights to
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land for roads, railways, and irrigation, all material 
resources and rights to create outspans for white-owned
i no ,
cattle. None of these rights, however, required it to
-inn
compensate Africans.
THE RESERVES AND 'NATIONAL' LAND POLICY
Between 1914 and 1918, the Pretoria government convened the
Native Lands Commission (Beaumont Commission, 1916) and the
Natal Natives' Land Committee (Evans-Chapman Committee,
1918) to re-consider the land issue, inter alia in 
11 nZululand. Under the relatively enlightened chairmanship
of Sir William Beaumont, the Native Lands Commission
enquired into what areas of land should be added to the
111existing reserves.111 In 1918, the Evans-Chapman Natal
Natives' Land Committee, chaired by the Natal writer and
segregationist Maurice Evans, considered Beaumont's
119findings and tabled a dissident report. x As part of the 
effort to implement the 1913 Natives' Land Act, these 
bodies represented two opposing ideologies related to the 
land issue.
On the one hand, the 'liberal' Beaumont commission
advocated the protection of Africans through secure,
communally-heId reserves. While, as Wolpe and Lacey have
argued, this approach partly arose out of the desire of
mining capital to maintain the reserves, the policy was 
119more complex.-LXJ Dubow has shown how the development of 
segregation can be seen as a more generalised state 
response to the problems of industrialising South Africa,
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and the legislation implemented between 1913 and 193 6 was
intended to deal with the perceived political threat posed
114by Africans without a stake m  land. On the other hand,
the Natal committee represented the interests of white
farmers like the highveld maize growers described by
Keegan. The 'progressive1 and better capitalised sugar
planters in Zululand supported both the enforcement of
those sections of the Act that released labour, and strict
limits on any extensions to the reserves which included
116potential white farms.
In addition to confirming the Zululand reserves demarcated 
in 1904 and the 1913 scheduled additions, Beaumont 
recommended a substantial increase in land for the Zulu. 
Dissenting from his fellow commissioners, he argued that 
Africans should not be prevented from purchasing land 
outside the reserves in Zululand in terms of the 1913 Act 
because this was against Britain's intentions and Zulu 
understandings, and some scope was needed for 'progressive'
1 1 f iAfrican farmers.110 Beaumont also contended that the 
reserves should be enlarged to accommodate the present 
African population and those yet to come in through 
evictions and natural increase. He recommended additional
areas for the reserves on the basis of existing development
117 •and settlement patterns. Where the Beaumont commission
scheduled substantially larger reserve areas in northern
Zululand, however, they found very little extra land for
Africans in the south: just over 15,000 acres within
Zululand proper, held by a few mission-educated families
liftsuch as the Kuzwayos m  Melmoth. xo
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The Union government only allowed the Beaumont commission 
not to consider for inclusion in the reserves land already
i 1 n
communally occupied by Africans. Africans and concerned
whites stressed to the Beaumont commission the importance
of confirming the existing reserves and the urgency of
finding additional land wherever possible, but especially
in the congested southern districts.  ^ Saunders was
remarkably critical of the 1913 Land Act and any possible
further alienation of African land. He believed, that the
enforcement of the Act in relation to.rent tenants on white
farms would mean 'the removal of [Africans] wholesale and
that would lead to a native convulsion. 1 He somewhat
belatedly regretted that, while a delimitation
commissioner, he had given Africans the impression that
they would be able to purchase land outside the reserves.
If I had been aware of this restriction [which, as 
has been established, he was] I personally should 
not have agreed to the quantity of land being 
thrown open to European occupation that we did.-*-^
Following the 1906-08 Bambatha Rebellion, local officials 
tried to prevent increased immigration into the reserves, 
and to rectify white misconceptions about the availability 
of land in Zululand. The new CNC, R.H. Addison, supported 
Saunders1 s view and felt that there was no need to enforce 
the 1913 Act in Zululand since labour tenancy agreements 
established on the majority of white farms were still in 
operation, and sufficient labour was available to 
whites. Many whites were able to raise African rents, 
knowing that Africans would hesitate to leave rent tenancy
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arrangements since, under the 1913 act, they could only go 
onto other farms as labour tenants.
Africans were primarily concerned with the loss of their
land to white farmers, and with finding extra land outside
the reserves. Harkening back to the pledges repeatedly made
to the Zulu by British officials, chief Nkantini stated:
'Having been conquered we are the Government's fowls and we
19 4look to the Government to give us a piece of land.'
Chief Ngokowana from Mtunzini, where a large area of
African land had been taken up by white sugar farmers,
argued, 'There is no land left. The whole of the coast has 
been taken up by farmers. I do not know where all my people
1 n C
can go to. 1 D There was also a distinct concern about the 
terms of tenancy. Hoye, a kholwa African from Eshowe, 
asserted,
All the land is now owned by Europeans, but we are 
not complaining about that. What troubles us is 
that we will not be permitted to rent land from 
white people... If natives are all to go together 
in one place there will not be sufficient room.^^
Africans on reserve and crown land in the north expressed
similar fears over the threat of white expansion and
19 7consequent congestion m  the reserves. * '
Beaumont argued that while the area scheduled for 250,000
Africans under the 1913 act amounted to 3,887,100 acres the
actual area of land they occupied was 4,525,747 acres and
1 9 ftthat an effort should be made to address this problem. 
Over 42,000 Africans lived outside the reserves on land 
they had occupied for generations and of these only 9,581
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were on private farms owned and occupied by whites. Despite 
strong settler protests, Beaumont managed to add 298,000 
acres to the scheduled reserves bringing the total 
recommended area up to 4,185,600 acres while still leaving 
2,465,505 acres for 4,000 whites.
These additions were, however, recommended areas only and
not immediately included in areas for African occupation.
Despite Sir William's dissent and the relatively small area
added by his commission, Natal whites were outraged, and
white farmers in Zululand railed against his
recommendations. The Zululand Planters' Union, led by
George Heaton Nicholls, was the most vociferous critic. It
condemned Beaumont for not having enquired north of the
Mfolozi River and for not considering potential sugar-cane
1 ^  nland adequately. Claiming that £11 million could be
generated from the open lands in Zululand, the union 
complained of 'the danger of allowing an asset equal in 
importance to that of the Witwatersrand itself, to be
1 "3 1
thrown away’. Saunders, now a Melmoth farmer, once again 
contradicted his earlier views, suggesting that too much 
land was being added to the reserves. Referring once more 
to the delimitation he stated, 'in my opinion we allowed 
the natives enough land... We delimited on a liberal scale, 
and we thought we delimited suf f icient' . The general
consensus among whites who gave evidence was that the 
reserves were more than adequate for 'inefficient' African 
cultivators.
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The Evans-Chapman committee laid down far stricter 
conditions than Beaumont and based its findings only on
what it considered actual 'beneficial African
occupation'.^'* Although directed by Pretoria to provide 
for the needs of expanding African communities over the 
next ten years, the committee argued that African
pastoralism could be restricted and closer settlement 
effected.^ 4  was concerned to exclude Africans from
areas of possible sugar-cane farming or with irrigation 
potential. Its enquiry was far more comprehensive than 
Beaumont's, but it was obviously biased towards Natal
settler interests. In contrast to Beaumont's enquiry, only 
seven Africans were consulted by the Natal committee and 
their views were muted because they were only questioned 
about specific blocks of land or the farms they resided 
on.135
The Natal committee considerably pared down Beaumont's 
recommendations. It argued that no land should be restored 
to Africans in the Ingwavuma-Ubombo region because of its 
agricultural potential, although two white store-keepers 
were the only settlers in this arid region. Nor did it 
allow for the addition of any land in the highly desirable 
southern districts. The total area of 3,840,341 acres 
recommended as additions to existing reserves in Natal and 
Zululand by Beaumont in 1916 was reduced by the Natal 
committee to 934,340 acres; less than 200,000 acres of this 
were scheduled as additions to the area of 3,887,100 acres 
of reserves in Zululand.According to the NAD, this left 
close to 1,300 African huts, containing an average of 3.3
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people each, on crown land which could be thrown open to 
whites.
Evans and Chapman made a concerted effort to dispel white 
liberal and Zulu concerns that Africans from other parts of 
the country would be moved into Zululand, arguing that the 
Prime Minister, Louis Botha, had stated that no such policy
i on
existed. In effect, however, they contradicted this by
not recommending the addition of any reserve land in the
neighbouring northern Natal districts of Ngotshe, Vryheid
and Babanango. They argued that there was no need for
scheduled land in those districts since they were
contiguous to large Zululand reserves in Nongoma and
Mahlabatini and that those reserves were delimited in full
anticipation of African refugees moving in from Natal.
The only suggestion that the Evans-Chapman committee made
to alleviate African congestion on the land was to withdraw
the prohibition on African rent-tenancies, perhaps in the
hope that under-capitalised whites who needed an immediate
141income from the land could get established.
The most telling blow for Africans in Zululand came in 1918 
when Edward Dower, the 'liberal' Secretary for Native 
Affairs, stated that the government was prepared to 
consider African applications to purchase land outside the
reserves only in areas recommended by both Beaumont and
14 9Evans-Chapman. This was undoubtedly a sign of the
pressure on a weak and fragmented NAD to accept reduced
reserves in order to provide more land for commercialising
1 / -2
white agriculture. J Nevertheless, Dower and the NAD
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embraced the provisions of the 1913 land act which provided 
'progressive' Africans with the right to buy individual 
plots outside the reserves.
The Natal committee, however, preferred to substitute
'neutral' areas, where Africans and whites would compete
for land purchase, in place of Beaumont's additions to the
reserves; yet no 'neutral' areas were included in Zululand.
This meant, in effect, that absolutely no land was
1 4 8available for African purchase in Zululand after 1918.
In 1927, when chief Ngobese of Nquthu proposed instituting
a 'tribal' levy to purchase farms which adjoined his 
overcrowded ward, the CNC, C. Wheelwright, refused on the 
grounds that the land did not fall within a 'Native' area. 
Moreover, Wheelwright argued, under the proposed Natives' 
Land Act amendment bill the need to find accommodation for 
Africans evicted from white farms was more pressing than 
providing additional land for Africans already 'fully 
located' in the reserves. Indeed, the trickle of
families ejected from Vryheid and Babanango in the 1910s 
became a torrent from what chief Mgixo of Nongoma called a 
'yawning crack which empties forth human beings' during the 
1920s and 1930s.147
By 192 0, the incorporation of additional land into the
reserves was controlled by the Union Parliament Senate
Select Committee on 'waste lands', which primarily dealt
14 8with land that whites were not prepared to settle. In
1920, only 21 mission school sites were added to the 
reserves and these provided no land for cultivation, cattle
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grazing or African habitation. The Select Committee simply
continued the government policy of favouring whites by
providing new settlers with 100-acre store sites in the
14 9reserves, thus further expropriating African land. 
Although many whites acknowledged the inadequacy of the 
reserves and almost every African protested against it, no 
additional land was provided for already congested 
communities. After 192 0, the Zululand reserves remained 
fixed as isolated blocks of crowded and poor land where 
conditions for subsistence deteriorated steadily until the 
1930s when crisis struck.
All that saved Africans was their tenacity and ability to 
survive on marginal land. Through the 192 0s, white settlers 
in northern Zululand experienced a series of ignominious 
failures in experimental cotton- and cattle-farming and 
left the r e g i o n . The government settled returned 
soldiers along the Pongola River in Ubombo, and supported 
irrigation for cotton farms in Hlabisa in the early 1920s, 
on land the Beaumont had recommended for inclusion in the 
reserves. -^1 The NAD was forced to remove over 250 African 
families from these settlement areas and close to 1,100 
people reluctantly moved into adjacent reserves between 
1922 and 1928. African 'squatters', however, remained on 
most of the crown land in northern Zululand, through the 
1920s and early 1930s.
Although most whites either refused to move into these arid 
low-veldt areas or abandoned their lots after only a few 
years, Africans were still ordered to make room for further
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white settlement. Paradoxically, in 1935, just before the
implementation of the Native Trust and Land Act, A.J.
Turton, NC at Mahlabatini, informed Africans along the
Pongola River of what he later called the 'shocking theft’
1 54-of their land to prepare them for white settlement. 
Somewhat fortuitously for African 'squatters’, however, the 
tide of white settlement and government land policy was 
turning. In 1937, Heaton Nicholls, in his capacity as 
Native Affairs Commissioner, recommended that the crown 
lands of northern Zululand, on which whites could no longer 
make a living, revert back to Africans. ^ 5  Nicholls argued 
there was a need for
. . . an effective economic development of the whole 
of this Northern Zululand area under a system of 
native peasant production. The growth of a 
contented native peasantry means the maintenance of 
the necessary native labour for the mines upon 
which South Africa depends for its existence.-*-^
As he saw it, one aim of segregation was to guarantee a 
rural political economy which could sustain the long-term 
reproduction of migrant labour. The alternative would be a 
costly and politically volatile African work-force settled 
in the urban areas.^^ He therefore urged the government to 
abandon the 'unprofitable and impolitic enterprise’ of 
white settlement and replace them, not with reserve 
Africans suffering congestion, but with 'detribalised’ 
Africans who were crowding the urban areas and threatening 
class and social upheaval.Nevertheless, African peasant 
settlement schemes remained unfulfilled, but in 1950 some
200,000 acres of land in Ingwavuma and Ubombo reverted back
'ICQ
to the trust giving some security to 'squatters’. Over a 
million acres of former African land recommended by the
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Beaumont Commission had still to be returned to Africans in 
Natal and Zululand.
Although Africans did not feel the full impact of the land 
lost immediately, they could not use land outside the 
reserves, and were restricted to land use and occupation on 
a communal basis under chiefly authority. It appears that 
the delimitation Commission could not have reserved as much 
land for Africans as they did without sacrificing African 
development outside the reserves. Pressure from Natal and 
the pro-settler bias kept the delimitation, and Africans, 
in check. If Africans attempted to break free of the 
communal society and chiefly control, they were restricted 
by the state. As Saunders argued, 'To free such people from
all tribal control would be fraught with dangerous
1 f t  nconsequences ’ . -LDU
These conditions set the stage for a few chiefs and 
wealthier Zulu to augment their wealth and power with state 
support. The majority of the Zulu in the reserves, however, 
were increasingly overcrowded, impoverished, and forced to 
rely on migrant wage labour as reserve agriculture declined 
with the rise of white sugar-cane farming. Thereafter, 
crisis struck and state efforts to shore-up the crumbling 
reserves failed to improve conditions for Africans. Land 
shortages remained a severe obstacle to development for the 
Zulu except for chiefs who, with state support, overcame 
constraints on accumulation in the reserves by exploiting 
their control over land and cattle. As will be argued 
below, chiefly authority in the reserves was the mainstay
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of the white administration, and the 
chiefs and communal land control 
stratification in Zulu society.
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the land settlement of Zululand in 1905. It is an extremely 
detailed and useful document. See NAP, Natal Colonial 
Papers (NCP), Vol. 8/3/65, Report of the Joint Imperial and 
Colonial Commissioners: Zululand Lands Delimitation
Commission, 1902-1904 (ZLDC) (Pietermaritzburg, 1905). The
following discussion is based on my 'The impact' but see 
also, A.J. Christopher, 'A note on the opening of Zululand 
to European Settlement', Historia, Vol. 16, 1975, pp. 201- 
208 and his Ph.D., 'Natal a Study in Colonial Land 
Settlement', University of Natal, 1969, T. Davenport, 'The 
Fragmentation of Zululand, 1879-1918’, Reality, Sept. 1979, 
pp. 12-15, Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, ch. 4, Laband and 
Thompson, 'The Reduction of Zululand’, pp. 233-248, C. 
Ballard, 'Sovereignty', pp.90-93, no author, 'Beginnings of 
the Natal Sugar Industry: The Opening of Zululand', SASJ,
Vol. 33, April 1949, pp. 157-163. For the impact of the 
delimitation on specific areas and communities in Zululand 
see C. Ballard, 'The Dunn Reserve, 1895-1948; A Case Study 
of Segregation and Underdevelopment in a Reserved Land 
Category', University of Natal, collected seminar papers, 
Department of History workshop, 'Natal and the Union, 1909- 
1939’ and Unterhalter, 'Religion1, ch. 2.
For the negotiations over the annexation see NCP,
Zululand Government House files (ZGH), 785, 1894, British
Colonial Office, Confidential Print (C.O.), 427/26/3993,
Memo on the annexation of Zululand, 2 0 Feb. 1894 and Marks, 
Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 101-104.
 ^ C.O. 427/26/3993, Governor to Secretary of State, 12 
April 1894 and ZGH, 778, Z 623/97, Governor's report, 8
Oct. 1897.
 ^ For the role of white commercial agriculture in shaping 
settlement patterns see G. Pirie, 'Railways and Labour
Migration to the Rand Mines: Constraints and significance1, 
JSAS, Vol 19, No. 4, Dec. 1993, pp. 713-730 and P.
Richardson, 'The Natal Sugar Industry in the Nineteenth 
Century', in Beinart, Delius and Trapido, Putting a Plough, 
pp. 129-175.
cr
The Zulu repeatedly applied to British authorities for 
protection of their land. See below and Marks, Ambiguities, 
pp. 11-12 and pp. 15-41.
 ^ZLDC, pp. iv, 11.
n
Ibid. pp. v, 6. For Dunn's unique role and his remarkable 
legacy see Ballard, John Dunn.
o
See the Natal Almanac and Registry, 1905
(Pietermaritzburg, 1906), pp. 712 and 833-834. In 1904, due
81
to an illness, Dartnell was replaced by R.H. Beachcroft 
another Natal surveyor. See ZLDC, p. vii.
 ^ See my, 'The impact’, ch. II and NCP, Zululand Government 
House Files (ZGH), Vol. 779, Z 8/1898, Governor to Natal 
SNA, 7 Jan 1898 and NAP, Secretary For Native Affairs, 
minute papers and original correspondence (SNA), Vol. 
1/1/282, Z 419/98, SNA’s report on Zululand, 24 Aug. 1898, 
and the Zululand Archives (ZA) , Vol. 23, undated memo by 
the Governor of Natal, W. Hely- Hutchinson, probably 1902.
10 Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 108.
1 1 For a discussion of African rights to the land see 
variously, King Cetshwayo’s comments on land in C. de B. 
Webb and J.B. Wright, (eds.), A Zulu King Speaks, letter to 
Sir H. Robinson, 2 9 March 1881, p. 49, 86, 90-91, Webb and 
Wright, James Stuart Archive, Vol. 2, statements of Mayinga
Ka Mbekhuzana and others on African land rights, pp. 257-
2 59, Vol. 3, Statements of Mjobo Ka Dumela, p. 141 and Vol. 
4, Statements of Ndukwana Ka Mbengwana, pp. 311-315. For 
the Colonial view see for example the Natal Native Affairs 
Commission, Colony of Natal, Blue Book on Native Affairs, 
1902, p. 2, the Zululand Native Trust Deed of grant
contained in LDE, Vol 719, 8388, 6 April 1909 and K.
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London, 1966), 
pp. 105-107.
12 See ZLDC, pp. 2-3.
See British Colonial Office, Confidential Print (C.O.), 
Vol. 179, 212/21864, 7 June 1900 and D. Welsh, The Roots of 
Segregation. Native Policy in Natal, 1854-1910 (Cape Town,
1973), pp. 20-22, 54, and A. Atmore and S. Marks, 'The 
Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth Century: 
Towards a Reassessment1, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 3, 1974, pp. 1-2 0.
For Sutton's background as a Natal Midlands farmer see
B. Guest, 'Towards Responsible Government, 1879-93’, in 
Duminy and Guest, Natal and Zululand, pp. 233-248, pp. 242- 
243. See also J. Lambert, 'African Purchases of Crown Lands 
in Natal, 1880-1903’, SAJEH, Vol. 3 No. 1, March 1988, pp. 
45-60, pp. 57-58 and H. Slater, 'Land Labour and Capital in 
Natal: The Natal Land and Colonisation Company, 1860-1948’, 
JAH, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1975, pp. 257-283, p. 265.
See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 12 6-12 8 and A. 
Duminy, 'Towards Union, 1900-1910’, in Duminy and Guest, 
Natal and Zululand, pp. 402-427.
C.O. 179, 212/21864 Saunder ’ s Report, 7 June 1900 and
C.O. 879/86/764, No. 343, Governor of Natal to Secretary of 
State, 14 March 1904. See also Davenport, 'Fragmentation', 
T. Davenport and K. Hunt, The Right to the Land (Cape Town,
1974), p. 29 and E. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of
82
Natal, Second Edition (Pietermaritzburg, 1987), p. 186.
^7 ZLDC, Prime Minister to Commission, 7 Aug. 1902, p. vi- 
vii.
^8 Ibid. and see Davenport, 'Fragmentation1, p. 14.
19 ZLDC, p. 5.
^9 See ZLDC, p. 2 69 and for unhealthy areas see ZA, Vol 23, 
R396/97, report on Zululand lands, 31 Jan. 1897.
2  ^ Report of Evidence of the South African Native Affairs 
Commission, 1903-1905, (SANAC) Vol. 3 (Cape Town, 1905), p.
768.
22 ZLDC, p. 46. For an example of whites' criticisms of the 
delimitation see The Natal Witness, article entitled 'The 
Delimitation of Zululand1, 25 Jan. 1905, a copy of which 
can be found in SNA, Vol. 1/1/316, No. 4-27.
7 3 See article cited above.
9 A For this loss of land see for example J. Guy, 
Destruction1, pp. 181-185, my 'The Impact, pp. 42-60, 
Laband and Thompson, 'The Reduction', p. 204 and S. Munro, 
'The Zululand-Transvaal Boundary Dispute, 1854-18791 B.A. 
Honours thesis Natal, 1980.
25 ZLDC, p. 44.
26 ZLDC, p v and see C.O. 179, 212/21864, Saunders Report, 
7 June 1900.
27 ZLDC, p. 6.
28 Ibid.
29 For the 'Maputans' under British rule, see my, 'The 
Impact', pp. 114-123 and P.R. Warhurst, 'Britain and the 
partition of Maputaland, 1857-1987' in University of Natal 
Conference papers, 'Natal and Zululand History', Vol. 3, 
pp. 1-2 8 and P. Harries, 'History, Ethnicity and the 
Ingwavuma Land Deal: The Zulu Northern Frontier in the
Nineteenth Century’, JNZH, Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 1-27 and his
'Labour Migration from Mozambique to South Africa', Ph.D. 
London, 1983, ch. 2, which is now published as Work, 
Culture and Identity. Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and 
South Africa, c. 1860-1910 (Johannesburg, 1994).
89 See ZLDC, p. 12. Kosi Bay had previously been considered 
by both the Boers and the British as a possible naval port. 
See D. Schreuder, The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877- 
1895 (Cambridge, 1980) p. 76-78 and R. Robinson and J. 
Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, Second Edition 
(London, 1983), pp. 215-216.
83
31 ZLDC, pp. 11-12.
33 The literature on the act is vast. For this point see 
for example, C. Bundy, Rise and Fall, pp. 89-115, 241-243, 
Lacey Boroko, pp. 121-141, Keegan, Rural Transformations, 
pp. 2-3, 43-48, 110, 178-182; 'Crisis' pp. 371-399 and 'The 
Sharecropping economy, African Class formation and the 1913 
Natives' Land Act in the highveld maize belt.', in Marks 
and Rathbone, Industrialisation, pp. 195-211, Murray, Black 
Mountain, pp. 112-120.
”3 "3
For this effect on the highveld see Keegan, 
'Sharecropping' and Rural Transformations, pp. 18-21. For 
Natal's drive to contain African peasants on African-owned 
land see V. Harris, 'Black-owned land and White farmers and 
the state in Northern Natal, 1910-1936', JNZH, Vol. 10, 
1987, pp. 51-76, p.52 and Lambert, 'African purchases', pp. 
48-52 and Slater, 'Land, Labour'. For the relative absence 
of a share-cropping peasantry in Zululand see Bundy, Rise 
and Fall, fn. No. 1, p. 192.
34 ZLDC, pp. 12, 15, 33.
33 C.O. 179, 212/21864, Saunders Report, 7 June 1900.
33 See Dubow, Racial, p. 42.
37 SANAC, Vol. 3, Saunders' evidence, p. 758.
33 Ibid. and see J. Lambert, 'African Purchases'. Verne
Harris has argued that Africans purchased land individually
in northern Natal only after 1910 when they were better 
capitalised. See his 'Black-owned land, White Farms and the 
State in Northern Natal, 1910-1936', JNZH, Vol. 10, 1987,
pp. 51-7 6 and 'Land, Labour and Ideology: Government land 
Policy and the Relations between Africans and Whites on the 
Land in northern Natal, 1910-1936', M.A. Thesis Natal, 
1984, pp. 45-48.
3Q , ,
ZLDC, p. 13. There is not scope m  the thesis to 
consider Dunn's descendants adequately, but there were 
tensions between these mixed-race people and the Zulu over 
land and between them and the state over their initial 
classification as 'Native'. See Ballard, John Dunn, CNC 
42A, N2/8/3 (27), NTS 7775, 98/335, and for the Nunns, a
similar family, see 1/NGA, 3/3/2/9, 2/60.
4  ^ See ZGH Vol. 768, Z319/96, Governor to Secretary of
State 12 March 1896. In 1904, Natal was instructed not to 
proscribe Indians eo nominee from buying land in Zululand. 
This was due to M.K. Gandhi's agitation for Indian rights 
in Zululand. See C.O. 879, 86/764, No. 43, Secretary of
State to Governor, 14 March 1904. For Gandhi's support of 
the Indian cause in Zululand see ZGH, Vol. 7 68, Z23 8,
Gandhi to Governor, 10 Jan. 189 6 and 7 Feb. 189 6 and M.
84
Swan, [Tayal], Gandhi: The South African experience
(London, 1985), pp. 40-41, 88-90. For further discussion of 
Indians in Natal and Zululand see below, chapter on labour 
and J. Beall and M. North-Coombes, 'The 1913 Disturbances 
in Natal: The Social and Economic Background to "Passive
Resistance"1, JNZH, Vol. 6, 1983, pp. 48-81.
44 C.O. 879, 86/764, enclosure 1 in No. 36, C.M. Sutton to 
Secretary of State, 15 Oct. 1903.
42 Ibid.
42 For the importance of the SANAC (1903-1905) in shaping 
segregation policy and the links to the 1913 act see M. 
Legassick, 'British Hegemony and the Origins of segregation 
in South Africa, 1901-14', in Beinart and Dubow, 
Segregation, pp. 43-59.
44 Ibid. p. 53.
4 5 See I. Edwards, Protectorates or Native Reserves? A 
political and constitutional survey of the High Commission 
Territories in South Africa (London, 1956), pp. 10-12.
4- fi Legassick quoting Curtis in 'British Hegemony1 p. 55.
4  ^ C.O. 879, 86/764, enclosure 1 in No. 40, Saunders to
Governor, 16 June 1904. For later Union arguments in 
reverse, to restrict Africans on land outside the reserves 
because Indians could not get rights, see U. Mesthrie, 
'Indian Responses in Natal to Non-European Unity Moves, 
1927-1945', JNZH, Vol. 12, 1989, pp. 73-89, pp. 81-82.
4® Ibid. No. 41, Lyttelton to Acting Governor Bale, 14 
March 1904.
4 9 See for example CAD, Department of Native Affairs Files 
(NTS), Vol. 2706, 12/301, CNC to SNA, 6 Feb. 1924, Minister 
of Posts and Telegraphs to F.S. Malan, Minister of Mines 
and Industries, 3 0 Oct. 1924, Killie Campbell Africana 
Library (KCAL), Files of the Natal Agricultural Union 
(NAU) , KCM, 30034, resolutions of 27 April 1932. See ch. 6 
on famine for a further discussion of racial exclusivity in 
rural trading and NTS 2706, 12/301, Sun Life Assurance Co.
to SNA, 3 0 Oct. 1934 and CNC Campbell to SNA, 19 May 1948.
SANAC, Vol. 3, p. 772. The date of Saunders' evidence 
was 25 May 1904, the decision of the Lands Delimitation 
Commission to restrict Indian and African land rights in 
Zululand was 16 Jan. 19 04, some 5 months before the above 
evidence. For the political background to the elaboration 
of segregationist policy see Dubow, Racial, pp. 29-50.
See C.O. 879, 86/764, No. 44, 29 March 1904, minute of
Natal Ministers on the Land Delimitation.
85
5^  See Marks, Rebellion, especially ch. 4.
55 See ZLDC, pp. 32-34 and Natal Witness, 25 Jan. 1905.
5^  ZLDC, p. 34. For these African settlers and colonial 
manipulation of southern Zululand settlement as a bulwark 
against the Zulu see Guy, Destruction, pp. 101-122.
55 C.O. 879, 86/764, No. 53, Sutton to Governor, 16 Sept.
1904.
56 See ZLDC, pp. 34-35.
57 Natal bought the farm 'Goedetrouw1 in 1894 for Siteku 
and his people owing to congestion in Mahlabatini. See SNA 
1/1/428, 1063/09, minute by J. Stuart, of the Stuart
Archive fame, 21 June 1910 and ZLDC, p. 283. H.O. 
Samuelson, Natal's Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, 
believed the purchase had been a political measure. See 
SANAC, Vol. 3 p. 13 9.
5® See Bradford, A Taste pp. 95-107.
ir  Q
See for example Union of South Africa, Record of 
Evidence before the Native Economic Commission (NEC) 193 0- 
32 [I have used a microfilm copy of evidence supplied by 
the University of the Witwatersrand held at SOAS, 
University of London], evidence of Chief Solomon 
KaDinuZulu, pp. 6551-6552 and Union of South Africa, Record 
of Evidence before the Commission for the Socio-Economic 
Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South 
Africa, [Tomlinson] , 1952 held at CAD, K-20 [the K series
contains unpublished commission reports and evidence], Vol. 
33, evidence of chief Mshiyeni KaDinuzulu, pp. 2065-2067.
50 The total area of Zululand was estimated at 6,651,105 
acres. The total population in 1905 was approximately
200.000 people with an estimated 20,000 men outside at 
work. The five most densely populated districts held
140.000 people. See Appendix and SNA Vol. 1/1/471, 
2762/1910, report on Zululand, 12 Sept. 1908.
f 1 Statistics compiled by the author from, U.G. 7-'19, 
Report of the Native Affairs Department for 1919 and Lacey, 
Boroko, p . 3 81.
The Commission collectivised the density figures into 
areas for the coastal, middle and upper belts of Zululand. 
This did not accurately reflect the varying densities in 
each district. See ZLDC, pp. 268-270.
f 7 For the history surrounding the game reserve issue in 
Zululand see below, ch. on the cattle economy and F. 
Vaughan-Kirby, Chief Game Conservator for Zululand, 'Game 
and Game Preservation in Zululand1, South African Journal 
of Science, Vol. 18, March 1916, pp. 203-207, Zululand Game
86
Reserve Conservator 'Report of the Conservator for 1935’, 
Journal of the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of 
the Empire, Part 30, Jan. 1937, pp.88-93 and Brookes, 
'Playing the Game. The Struggle for Wildlife Protection in 
Zululand, 1910-1930', M.A. Thesis, Queen's, Kingston, 1990, 
pp. 68-83. For the wider issues relating to colonial 
conservation see especially W. Beinart, 'Introduction: The 
Politics of Colonial Conservation' in a special issue of 
JSAS, Vol. 15, no.2, Jan, 1989, pp.143-162 and Anderson and 
Grove, Conservation, pp. 10-12
6  ^ For the establishment of the Eshowe mission station 
(1852) and the Entumeni mission station (1859) under 
Norwegian missionary Hans Schreuder see ZLDC, pp. 16-3 0 and 
for the development of Christian African communities see N. 
Etherington's fascinating Preachers, Peasants and Politics 
in Southeast Africa, 1835-1880: African Christian
Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand (London, 
1978), pp. 72-80, 110-112 and E. Brookes, A Century of
Missions in Natal and Zululand (Durban, 193 6).
66 See for example ZLDC, pp. 16-18 and SANAC, evidence of 
H.E. Colenso, pp. 401-404 and Rev. D.A. Bryant, pp. 805- 
814.
66 Natal's Master of the Supreme Court, H.C. Koch, stated 
that Christian Africans exempted from codified law in 
Zululand 'gave us endless trouble. They came in as a sort 
of advanced guard for certain classes of missions... and 
they wanted the right to possess land. They made a charge 
against me that I would not allow them to worship God 
because I would not grant them land'. See SANAC, Vol. 3, p. 
126.
67 ZLDC, p. 38.
6® See NCP, Resident Magistrates Files, Eshowe (RM ESH) , 
Vol. 3/2/5, E966/03, Boast to CNC, 17 Nov. 1903. For more 
details on Ndhlovu's remarkable career see below and Cope, 
'Royal Family', pp. 46-48. For the Natal code of 'native' 
law see Rogers, Native Administration, pp. 201-212 and 
Dubow, Racial, pp. 111-118.
69 See ZLDC, p. 41.
7  ^ RM ESH, Vol. 3/2/5, E966/03, Saunders' minute, 21 Dec.
1903.
7  ^ Ibid. E562/04, Saunders to all RMs, 21 Jan. 1904.
72 Ibid.
7 3 For a brief discussion of the American Zulu Mission see 
J. Smith, Zulu Crusade. The Salvation Army in Natal and 
Zululand (London, 1945), pp. 98-101. For other missions 
twentieth century Zululand see for example B. Sundkler,
87
Zulu Zion (Uppsala, New York, 1976), Lee, A.W. , Once Dark 
Country. Recollections and Reflections of a South African 
Bishop (London, 1949). J Comaroff and J Comaroff, Of 
Revelation and Revolution. Christianity, Colonialism and 
Consciousness in South Africa, Vol. 1 (Chicago, 1991).
7 4 LDE 719, 83 88, memorandum on the Impapala lands, 1 Feb.
1911.
73 SNA 1/1/368, Saunders minute, 11 July 1905.
78 Ibid and see, U.G. 22-'14, Report of Evidence of the 
Natives Land Commission (Pretoria, 1914) p. 484, CNC 102A 
N2/2/2 (9), 74/1 file on Impapala lands and see below, ch.
on 'betterment' for the failure of these lots.
77 'The People of Mpapala have been deprived of their
holdings', article in Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 May 1907, in 
SNA 1/1/368, 1375/07.
78 LDE 719, 8388, Secretary for lands to Acting SNA, 2
Sept. 1911.
79 See CNC 102A N2/2/2 (9), 74/1, CNC to NC Eshowe, 5 March
1918 and outstanding revenues for Impapala, 1916-18.
8  ^ ibid. See NC, Eshowe to CNC, 2 8 April 1919 and Rodseth 
to CNC, 3 0 May 192 8 .
o i
Ibid. petition of E. Mtetwa, M Shandu and N. Ngema, 13 
June 1928 and reply of CNC, 16 June 1928.
82 ZLDC, p. 46.
83 Ibid. p. 247.
8  ^ CAD, LDE, Vol. 719, 8388, minute by H. Burton, Min. of
Lands, 1 June 1911.
83 C.O. 879/86/764, No. 77, Governor McCallum to CNC, 20 
May 1905. Other significant resrictions on African land use 
and access to natural resources included strict Crown 
Forest regulations which prevented the Zulu from using 
local forest products. For a further discussion of these 
issues see Beinart, 'East Griqualand1, pp. 288-289; CNC 
143/1913, 1786/13, SNA to Chief Conservator of Forests, 9
Feb. 1914 and Chief Conservator to SNA, 18 Sept. 1914 and 
NCP, Magisterial Reports, 1902 (Pietermaritzburg, 1903), 
Report of the Forest Ranger, p. 36. See also RM Mtunzini, 
Vol. 3/3/3, DD 300/1903, RM to CNC, 12 Sept. 1903 and the 
ZLDC, pp. 38-46. For further discussion of forestry and 
conservation issues in Zululand see the Association for 
Rural Advancement (AFRA) , Special Report No. 6, Maputaland: 
Conservation and Removals, (Pietermaritzburg, 1990).
8  ^ See ZLCD, pp. 38-45 and Christopher, 'The Opening’, p.
88
211.
®7 See Christopher, 'Natal', pp. 150-155.
See for example RM, MEL, Vol. 3/2/10, PB856/1907,
Magistrate to Secretary of Lands, 20 Sept. 1907, RM ESH, 
Vol. 3/2/5, NAD report on African removals, 27 Feb. 1906. 
For the impact on Africans see my 'The Impact', pp. 177-182 
and evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 
1906-07 (Pietermaritzburg, 1908) [NNAC] of Chiefs Mayime,
Msutu, Maweni and Gadeleni of Nquthu, pp. 8 64-867; Chiefs 
Siswana and Sitshitshili of Nkandhla, pp. 868-872; Chiefs 
Nkantini and Dumezweni of Melmoth, pp. 872-877.
9^ See Christopher, 'Natal' p. 188.
See for example NNAC, evidence of Maqiyana, p. 874. For 
the nature of tenancy and the persistence of tenancy 
arrangements which favoured under-capitalised farmers see 
Keegan, 'Sharecropping' and Lacy, Boroko, pp. 12 5-133
Q 1 ^ See NNAC, evidence of Ngandeni, p. 887 and Webb and 
Wright, James Stuart, Vol. 1, p. 251.
92 African tenants on white-owned farms in Zululand 
numbered approximately 15,000 in 1911 and 12,000 in 1946, 
both small fractions of the region's total population. See 
U.G. 42-55 Report of the NAD for 1911 (Pretoria, 1955), p. 
113 The majority of agricultural labourers living on white 
farms were paid a wage only and received no rights to land. 
They were classified as inhabiting industrial compound in 
the 1951 census and numbered close to 23,000 in 1946. See 
R. Smith, 'Native Farm Labour in Natal', SAJE, Vol. 9, 
1941, pp. 154-175.
Q "3
See Dubow, Racial, p. 52.
Q A
See Murray, Black, p. 12 5, Davenport and Hunt, The 
Right, p. 98, and T. Davenport 'Can Sacred Cows be Culled?. 
A historical review of land policy in South Africa with 
some questions about the future', Development Southern 
Africa, Vol. 4, No. 3, 19 87, pp. 388-400, p. 394.
95 CNC 85A, Nl/1/4, (X), part I, Allison to CNC, 14 Nov.
1927.
q  c
NNAC, evidence of Nkomo, p. 888. This ran counter to the 
pre-colonial custom of succession and inheritance. See E.J. 
Krige, The Social System of the Zulus (Pietermaritzburg, 
1950) , pp. 180-181.
97 NNAC, p. 889.
q  o
Ibid. evidence of Induna Mgidhlana, p. 895.
q  q
For a discussion of this forced labour system which was
89
only loosely based on pre-colonial elements of chiefly 
labour extraction see Marks, Rebellion, pp. 43-45, 132-133, 
Guy, 'Destruction and reconstruction', and Unterhalter, 
'Religion1, p. 386, For another southern African equivalent 
see C. van Onselen, Chibaro, African Mine Labour in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933 (London, 1976), p. 99.
100 2VWAC, p. 873. See also evidence of chief Nakantini, p. 
873 .
101 Cope, 'Royal Family', p. 58.
1 n 7 Webb and Wright, The James Stuart Archive, Vol. 3, p.
155.
i  n 3 •The land issue m  South Africa is central to race
relations and the impoverishment of Africans and much has
been written on it. For the state's land policy for
Africans and its relation to Natal-Zululand see variously,
H. Bradford, A Taste, pp. 23-34, 55-59, Brookes and
Hurwitz, Reserves of Natal, Davenport, 'Sacred Cows', 388-
400, Bundy, Rise and Fall, ch. 4 and conclusion, Dubow,
Racial pp. 92-117, Lacey, Boroko, pp. 56-60, 80-85, M.
Legassick, 'Capitalist Roots of Apartheid’, Review article
in JAH, Vol. 25 No. 3, 1984, pp. 356-359, P. Wickens, 'The
Native Land Act of 1913: A Cautionary Essay on Simple
Explanations of Complex Change', SAJE, Vol. 49, No. 2,
1981, pp. 105-119, and Surplus People Project, Forced
Removals in South Africa, Vol. 4, Natal (Cape Town, 1983),
pp. 17-35. For contemporary views see for example, M. Evans
of the Evans-Chapman Commission, 'Natives in Natal in
Relation to the Land', Report of the South African
Association for the Advancement of Science, Vol 15, 1918,
pp. 235-246.
104 See LDE, 719, 8388, copy of the Trust, 6 April 1909 and 
1 June 1911 and see SNA 1/1/428, 1063/09, draft of
Governor-General's powers for the Trust, 25 June 1910. The 
sovereign rights of the Governor-General over Zululand land 
and chiefs was a protective legacy of the Imperial factor, 
and pre-dated, by 11 years the powers specified in the 
Native Affairs Amendment Acts. For the development of 
segregated reserves in Natal see Welsh, The Roots, pp. 8- 
10, 88-101.
See SNA 1/1428, 1063/09, Deed of Grant, 25 June 1910
and see copies of later incorporations in LDE 719, 8388, 10 
Sept. 1912 and 2 8 June 193 6 .
As of 1924, approximately 15,000 Africans lived on 
crown land in Hlabisa and Ingwavuma still un-alienated by 
whites. See CNC files, second series (A), Vol. 40A, N10/1/2 
(X) , hut tax return for 1924. Figures are based on huts 
containing an average of three people each. For more 
general impressions of the land issue see C.O. 879/115, 
1024 Sir Rider Haggard's letter to Lewis Harcourt, M.P., on
90
his tour through Zululand and Rhodesia, 1 June 1914.
1 n 7-LU/ See Davenport, 'Sacred Cows’ p. 393 and Legassick, 
'Capitalist Roots’, p. 358.
-*-^ 8 lde, 719, 8388, copy of the Trust, 1 June 1911 and see 
SNA 1/1/428, 1063/09, draft of Governor-General1s powers 
for the Trust, 25 June 1910.
109 Ibid.
-^-*-0 See U.G. 22-’14, Report of Evidence of the Natives Land 
Commission (Pretoria, 1914) U.G. 19-’16, Report of the 
Natives Land Commission [Beaumont Commission] (Pretoria, 
1916), U.G. 34-’18, Report of Evidence of the Natal Natives 
Land Committee, 1918 (Pretoria, 1918) and U.G. 35-’18 the
Report of the Natal Natives Land Committee (Pretoria, 
1918). Most of the secondary sources consider the Beaumont 
Commission's findings to have been fairly generous compared 
with the later local committees. See for example, The 
Surplus People Project, Forced Removals, Vol. 4, pp. 2 9,34, 
Beinart, 'East Griqualand’ pp. 298-301, Lacey, Boroko, p. 
3 81 and C. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa; A 
Study of Land and Franchise Policies Affecting Africans, 
1910-1960 (Pietermaritzburg, 1962), pp. 14-18.
111 U.G. 19-’16, pp. i-v.
See U.G. 34-’18, Report of the Local Natal Natives Land 
Committee (Pretoria, 1918). In fact there were two Natal 
Committees, one chaired by M. Evans and T. Chapman and the 
second under G. MacKenzie. Mackenzie's Committee edited the 
Evans-Chapman report of evidence and submitted a final 
report in 1918. Un-edited versions of the Natal evidence 
can be found in LDE 719, 83 88 and Union Government SNA file 
II/5/5, correspondence on the Natives Land Act, 18 Oct. 
1917. For Evans views and background see his The Native 
Problem in Natal (Durban, 1906), Black and White in South 
East Africa. A study in Sociology, second edition (London, 
1916) and 'Natives in Natal’. See also Marks, Ambiguities, 
p. 4.
1 1 3 See H. Wolpe 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in 
South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid’, Economy and
Society, Nov 1972, Vol 1, No. 4. pp. 425-456 and Lacey, 
Boroko, pp. 126-133.
1 1 4 Dubow, Racial, pp. 52, 8 8. For the wider implications
of this in a comparative framework see J. Cell, The Highest 
Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in
South Africa and the American South (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 
14-23.
11C
Keegan, 'Sharecropping', p. 204.
1 1 f t U.G. 19-'16, Beaumont's separate dissenting report, pp.
91
41-42 .
117 Ibid, pp. 22-23, 39-41.
443 See Ibid and Lacey, Boroko, p. 3 81 and U.G. 19-'16, p. 
41.
119 U.G. 19-116, pp. 1-4.
42  ^ See for example U.G. 22-'14, pp. 422-495.
121 Ibid. pp. 476-477.
122 Ibid. p. 479.
423 See for example U.G. 35-'18, p. 106.
124 Ibid. p. 488.
423 Ibid. pp. 488-489.
126 Ibid. p. 490.
127 Ibid. pp. 492-494, 496.
423 U.G. 26-'16, p. 25. Africans in Zululand occupied 
519,272 acres of crown land, 15,180 acres of trust acquired 
farms and 9,472 acres on mission reserves. The African 
population of the reserves was estimated at 214,010 and 
those outside the reserves at 42,130.
129 Ibid. p. 42
43® U.G. 34-'18, Report of the ZPU, p. 263-270.
131 Ibid. p. 269.
132 Ibid. p. 279.
133 See U.G. 34-'18, pp. 1-6.
134 Ibid.
See U.G. 35-'18, evidence of Mbiya Kuzwayo and chiefs 
Nkantini, Sinxi, Dumezweni, Sijulu and Nqodi which spans 
only pages, pp. 108-112.
136 See U.G. 35-'18, p. 113 and SNA II/5/5, C.E. Dent, 
written evidence to the Committee, 7 Sept. 1918.
13 7 The statistics m  the report are extremely confusing as 
large tracts were scheduled for additions in collectivised 
areas covering both Natal and Zululand. The figures appear 
to show that 124,828 acres were set for Ingwavuma-Ubombo 
and 169,781 acres in Melmoth, Nkandhla and Eshowe and only
9,000 acres adjacent to the township at Nquthu. These are
92
estimates based on the Committee's recommendations of land 
not to be included in African areas, thus no extra land was
set for the southern districts. See U.G. 35-' 19, U.G. 19-
'16 and Lacey, Boroko, p. 3 81.
433 CNC Vol. 266, 2140/16, CNC estimates of 5 Jan. 1917, 16
Jan. 1917, 2 June 1917 and 22 Dec. 1917.
139 U.G. 34-'18, p. 15.
140 Ibid. p. 17.
141 Ibid. p .  1 9 .
443 See for example RM Eshowe, 3/4/3/1, circular 825/13, 24 
July 1918. For Dower's approach see Dubow, Racial, pp. 80, 
96.
443 See Dubow, Racial, pp. 61, 88, Lacey, Boroko, pp. 12 6- 
12 8 and see Beinart, Pondoland, p. 6 .
444 SNA II/5/5, SNA to CNC 12 Oct. 1917 and see Dubow, 
Racial, p. 88.
443 See SNA II/5/5 SNA to CNC 18 Oct. 1918 and Brookes and 
Hurwitz, The Native Reserves, p. 12.
446 1/NQU, 1/1/5/30, 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/2, CNC to NC, 13 Dec.
1927.
147 Marks first made this point in Ambiguities, p. 94 and 
see NEC, evidence of Mgixo, p. 1686 The flood of refugees 
continued into the late 1940s. See evidence of R. Ashton, 
NC, Nongoma before the Tomlinson Commission, p. 4610 and H. 
Bradford, A Taste of Freedom, p.105.
443 See S.C. 10-1920, Union Government, House of Assembly, 
Senate Select Committee on 'Waste Lands', Report on Native 
Areas for 1920, p. iv.
449 Ibid. pp. 10, 12, 32, 56 and 57.
433 See, SASJ, Vol. 3, Nov. 1919, p. 875, no author, 
'Zululand To-Day', The Sun and Agriculture Journal of South 
Africa, Vol. 17, 192 6 , pp. 881-883 Brookes, 'Playing the 
Game', LDE-N 37A 307/11, Annual Report of the Inspector of 
White Lands for Zululand, 1936/37.
434 See NTS 3279 1343/307 Copy of Report of the Native 
Affairs Commission on the Natives Trust and Land Act in 
Natal and Zululand, 23 March 1937.
433 Ibid. CNC to NC Hlabisa 18 March 1921. See also NC 
Hlabisa to NC Mahlabatini, 8 Dec. 1921 and 10 June 1925.
433 See CNC 108A N7/9/2, 94/4, CNC' s report to the NEC, 30
93
Aug. 1932.
See 1/MBT, NC' s files and correspondence for 
Mahlabatini, 3/3/3/8, N7/8/12, 94/4, NC to CNC, 2 Feb.
1935, and 'The Rape of Tongaland', article in the Natal 
Mercury, 18 May 1982, quoted in The Surplus People, Forced 
Removals, pp. 91-92 For Heaton Nicholls and the compromise 
of extended African rights to land in exchange for the loss 
of the limited franchise for Cape Africans see his 
autobiography, South Africa in My Time (London, 1961), 
Marks, Ambiguities, pp. 41-42, 132-133, Dubow, Racial, p.
165-171, and below in this thesis.
155 NTg 3279 1343/307 Copy of Report of the Native Affairs 
Commissioners, Heaton Nicholls and W.R. Collins, on the 
Natives Trust and Land Act in Natal and Zululand, 23 March 
1937.
156 Ibid. p .  1 0 .
-*-5^ See Cope, 'Royal Family', pp. 427-429. For the wider 
debates over labour reproduction at this time see Wolpe, 
'Capitalism' and Murray, Black Mountain, pp. 125-128.
158 NTg 3279 1343/307, NAC report, 23 March 193 7 and see 
Dubow, Racial, pp. 52-53.
159 NTS 3279 1343/307, SNA to CNC, 14 Nov. 1949.




Although chiefly authority in modern Zululand has been
characterised as inherently 'conservative', a closer
examination of chiefs and induna reveals a varied group of
men with a nuanced and complex range of responses to the
often contending economic and administrative forces
-1
dominating life in Zululand. The erosion of chiefly 
authority was uneven and contradictory. On the one hand, 
many chiefs in Zululand suffered the loss of legitimate 
customary power and prestige in the eyes of their people 
during the process of their co-option by the white 
administration since 'A chief is a chief by the people’. 
On the other hand, however, chiefs and induna ('tribal1 
headmen, chiefs' officials)3 benefited from the material 
advantages of chieftaincy both as a product of their 
continued customary role in society and their role as paid 
civil servants in the white administration. In broad terms, 
while the chiefly elite of Zululand aligned themselves with 
the forces of the state and capital and rejected the 
alternative trajectory of resistance afforded by 
maintaining popular political support, the induna carved 
out an important role in the local political economy, 
independent of chiefs.
This chapter focuses on social stratification in the 
unravelling of 'traditional' chiefly authority, and 
changing African politics in a racially and class divided 
society.^ After a discussion of the background to chiefly
95
authority the chapter deals with the role that the state 
assigned to chiefs in the white administration, chiefs' 
administrative powers, local councils and segregation,
radical1 politics and chiefly control of land, and the rise
of the induna.
THE BACKGROUND TO CHIEFLY AUTHORITY
Distinctions should be made about the nature of the state 
at the local and central levels as it related to the 
reconstruction of chiefly authority in Zululand. As Beinart 
has pointed out, the state needs to be disaggregated if the 
conflicting interventions of its component parts are to be 
understood.-* In this way the actions of local officials can 
be seen, if not in diametric opposition to the main thrust 
of state policy, at least on occasion to undermine 
particular efforts to shore up chiefly authority. Although 
after 1910, the Natal Native Affairs Department (NAD)
underwent a protracted transfer of power to the Department 
of Native Affairs in Pretoria, it still retained a large 
degree of local autonomy in dealing with African affairs. 
While in theory, the NAD sought to harness chiefly 
authority to the administration, in practice it was unable 
to render chiefs more accountable to the state.
Nevertheless, the state relied on chiefs at the most 
fundamental levels of its administration. This reliance 
developed, in part, because chiefs still retained a certain 
degree of popular legitimacy and, in part, because of the 
white desire to prevent an educated class of aspiring 
African petty bourgeoisie from threatening their hegemony.^
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An important theme in the recent studies of the complex 
nature of African politics during this period is the drive 
by African leaders, both 'radical' and conservative to 
operate in the same ideological space through the 
appropriation of a reconstituted Zulu nationalism. During 
the 1920s, conditions in Natal and Zululand facilitated the 
rapid spread among rural labourers and squatters of the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Natal (the ICU 
Yase Natal, hereafter ICU), under A.W.G. Champion's 
leadership.^ The ICU's popular support came from the mass 
of oppressed tenants being driven from white farms where 
they competed with expanding white agriculture and stock 
herding.
The ICU vied with lesser rural movements such as M. L.
Maling's Abaqulusi Land Union (named after a faction of
fiercely loyal supporters of the Zulu monarchy) which drew
its support from landless chiefs in northern Natal and
members of a discontented kholwa elite.^ These popular
political organizations also drew support from impoverished
homesteaders who realised the inability of chiefs to
provide them with sufficient land or represent their
grievances over state intrusions in the rural areas. Though
the ICU made some inroads in Zululand, the convergence of
interests between the state and the chiefs to stem the tide
of 'radical' disaffection which threatened their rule
1 nensured it had a limited formal presence m  the reserves. 
The rejection of the ICU and embrace of state support by 
Zulu chiefs meant they refused to take up the vital role 
that commoners accorded them. ■L
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In contrast to the mass support for these 'radical'
organizations, Inkatha kaZulu mobilised support from the
conservative Natal African intelligentsia and royalist
chiefs in order to bolster Zulu nationalism, provide
funding for the deeply indebted Zulu king, Solomon
KaDinuzulu, and press for state recognition of his
'paramountcy'. The conservative Hamba Kahle (to go
safely) politics of Inkatha appealed to chiefs particularly
in the areas of least capitalist penetration in the
reserves. J Here, too, however, the nature of local
authority needs to be disaggregated. Chiefs can not be
simply characterised as either loyal to the government or
staunch resisters on the side of the rank and file.^
Within Zululand, chiefs shifted from oppositional positions
in relation to the state to collaborationist strategies
aligned with powerful settler interests and particularly
G.N. Heaton Nicholls and the parliamentary
1 Rsegregationists. ^
CHIEFS AND THE ADMINISTRATION
During the first decades after 1900, the state relied
heavily on chiefs in Zululand. As the NAD attempted to
legitimize an increasing number of administrative practices 
through the use of chiefs, it was disposed to accept 
applications for official chieftancies from men who could 
claim hereditary status and who could provide a
counterbalance to the royal house because Natal still 
perceived it as a threat to its hegemony in the region. By 
1917, 'indirect rule1 accommodated no fewer than 91
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1 firecognised and acting chiefs over 85 groups in Zululand. 
The rise in the number of chiefdoms, combined with a 
correspondingly large increase in the number of induna, 
precipitated wide-spread civil strife and administrative 
chaos as competing factions vied for control of the 
land(see below).
The NAD, however, attempted to prepare chiefs to run a 
modern administration. The Zulu National Training Institute 
(ZNTI), conceived in 1918 by the CNC, C.A. Wheelwright, and 
with the support of prime Minister Botha as a 'civil 
service college for chiefs', was a prime example of the 
convergence of the interests of the state and chiefs and 
was intended to help chiefs bridge the gap between
insufficiencies of 'tribal rule’ and the exigencies of
1 7modern Zululand. Initially the NAD enlisted the aid of
the Anglican Church of the Province of South Africa to
develop the school along lines acceptable to the
administration. ° The church offered Rev. L.E. Oscroft as
1 Qprincipal for the school it hoped to control. When the 
ZNTI opened in 1920, however, it was under the direct 
control of the NAD, possibly to lessen the influence of the 
missionaries, as part of the state's commitment to 
developing segregation.
The curriculum of the Institute was directed specifically 
at chiefs' and induna's sons, to develop their leadership 
skills for future incorporation in the white 
administration. The importance of the school to the NAD was 
reflected in the large proportion of its budget devoted to
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9 nconstruction and operating costs. u By 1930, it boasted 66 
students, a carpentry shop and garden plots. All of this 
was designed to encourage 'progressive' leadership skills 
among the chiefs of the future and their obedience to the 
white government. The re-fashioning of chiefly authority, 
however, was insufficient to counteract the challenge to 
chiefs' authority from the mission-educated youth of 
Zululand and from urbanised Africans.
Solomon himself recognized the need to educate the chiefs
to keep abreast of modern developments. He believed that
the ZNTI was an excellent institution and '...the best
weapon that the authorities could possibly have placed in
our hands'. However, he also felt that the school placed
too much stress on academic 'book learning' and not enough
on practical learning and developing farming skills. x
These skills, he hoped, would enable the chiefs to address
those in opposition to the tribal system by educating
chiefs to deal with the same fundamental issues that
2 o'progressive' Africans used to threaten their authority. 
Thus, modern education was utilised as a tactic to shore up 
the 'traditional' authority of the chiefs. In a contrived 
letter of thanks from the pupils of the Institute to the 
SNA in 193 0, some of the elements of indirect rule were 
clearly laid out.
We are being taught obedience and loyalty to the 
Laws of the Government... When we leave here we 
shall with all our strength try to rule our people 
in ways which will please the Government, to put 
down rebellion, superstition and other useless 
things... The government found us killing one 
another, but it reconciled us and taught us to live 
as friends. 3^
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In broader terms, however, chiefs proved resistant to
formal education in agricultural or academic skills. Both
these forms of training threatened the underpinnings of
chiefly authority at different levels. At one level,
intensive agriculture undermined chiefly control of land;
at another, western education, so closely associated with
Christian missions, threatened to divorce chiefs from their
role as religious and spiritual leaders at a time when they
were struggling to re-capture the ideological elements of
Zulu culture.^ Indeed, western education had had little
impact on the chiefly class and, as of 1939, only five
chiefs in Zululand could both read and write in Zulu or
English and formal education for chiefs was not 
25increasing.
Part of the reason why chiefs did not receive academic
education was because of a shift in the government's policy
for the reserves. Following the drought of the early 1930s,
the NAD was convinced of the rapid deterioration of the
reserve economy and was committed to improving African
rural areas. At a native commissioners conference in 1936,
the SNA, D. Smit, advocated re-directing the meagre NAD
budget of £1 million to improving African agricultural
production to meet subsistence needs (see chapter on
' Betterment'). ^  A central proposal of this new programme
was to train all classes of Africans in agriculture. For
the Zululand chiefs this meant that specialised leadership
training would no longer be provided and, following trends
in colonial policy in British East Africa, their sons would
2 7be educated along with the children of commoners. In
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Zululand this new policy was signalled by the closure of 
the ZNTI and the establishment of the Vuma and Tokazi 
agricultural demonstration farms for all classes in Zulu
o o
society at Eshowe and Nongoma, respectively, m  1935. °
Moreover, the NAD located these new training sites away
from the royal kraal at Mahashini in order to lessen the
2 9influence of the monarch over the chiefs' sons.
Despite such egalitarian gestures, however, the practice of
protecting hereditary chiefly authority in the
administration continued. Although, in 1946, the post-war
Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC), railed against
the hindrance to progress presented by chiefs, and
recommended they be given more 'progressive education',
they maintained that 'It would be impracticable to exclude
from chieftanship the rightful heir in order to promote
o nsomeone who was more educated or efficient.'
To a certain extent, the legacy of a pre-colonial chiefly 
status within Zulu society translated into de facto 
recognition by the state for hereditary chiefs. Following 
the appointment of Wheelwright as CNC in 1916, the central 
government openly expressed its willingness to accept the 
Zulu royal family's role in Zululand.^ Moreover, certain 
hereditary chiefs of high standing in pre-colonial Zulu 
society received substantial cash stipends, though the NAD 
could and, in the case of Solomon, did punitively cut the 
stipends for alleged disloyalty.^ 2 Solomon was paid £500 
per annum, chief Manzolwandhle Zulu got £250, chief 
Nkantini Zulu of the Melmoth district was accorded £60 and
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Ngwanase Tembe of the separate Maputan kingdom received 
£100. J In contrast, and as a testament to the greater 
powers of Zululand chiefs as perceived by the NAD, no chief 
in Natal received more than £45.^
During the 1920s, however, commoner disaffection with 
appointed chiefs led the NAD to make concerted efforts to 
refine and reconstruct chiefly authority. Though a largely 
unresolved issue, the amalgamation of existing 'tribes' was 
one strategy whereby the state attempted to manufacture 
legitimacy. During the later 1920s and into the 1930s, a 
number of Zululand chieftaincies were collapsed in areas 
where their followers resided on lands taken up by whites. 
The SNA directed Natal's CNC, Wheelwright, to depose petty 
chiefs who had no hereditary status and who were appointed 
without recourse to 'recognised tribal custom’ if they 
moved into the reserves from white lands.^ Wheelwright 
replied that such a policy would undermine the valuable 
administrative 'custom' of allowing all the chiefs to 
exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction whether they were 
hereditary or appointed. D Nevertheless, the number of 
Zululand chiefs was reduced from a 192 0 peak of 100 down to 
67 recognised men scheduled for government stipends in 193 7 
in order to give them the appearance of greater legitimacy 
in the eyes of the people.^
It is significant that, quite apart from these stipends, 
chiefs had new sources of income and, by the 192 0s, a 
number of powerful Zulu chiefs no longer relied entirely on 
pre-colonial forms of material support. Indeed, most who
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could drew money from wage labourers on the Rand or the
"D Q
Natal coal mines. ° Although the accumulation and sale of 
cattle was an important source of wealth for some chiefs of 
status especially in times of economic stress, those who 
drew substantial stipends from the state were less 
dependent on pre-capitalist relations of production in the 
reserves than lesser chiefs and induna who relied on 
agricultural and pastoral production to maintain their
"3 Q
wealth and status. ^
Patriarchal status, however, did not ensure a monopoly over
re-fashioned tribute collections. Both Solomon and his
successor as regent, his brother Arthur Edward Mshiyeni
KaDinuzulu, were at pains to prevent lesser members of the
royal family and assorted impostors from drawing on cash
tribute. David, Solomon's brother, eclipsed from life in
the royal homestead, spent most of his time in Durban and
Johannesburg claiming money as the true heir to his father
Dinuzulu.^  Similarly, Mshiyeni's half-brothers Ntontoza
and Isaac supported themselves entirely from cash and
cattle collections in Natal during the 1930s when Africans
tended to identify with the perceived stability of the
monarchy during a period of economic stress in the rural
areas.^ It was, moreover, perhaps fitting that after all
of Solomon's philandering Lilian Zulu, though no relation
to the royal family, should pose as his widow to collect 
A 9tribute. The important point here, as Shula Marks has 
argued, was the fact that chiefs of status could still 
extract cash tributes in a context where their formal
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powers were apparently diminishing and they were being 
increasingly marginalised by the state.^
By the later 193 0s, however, the Natal NAD no longer 
believed in the maintenance of a hierarchical system of 
chiefs in Zululand. In 1937, the CNC hoped to remedy 'an 
anomalous state of affairs1 by providing stipends to the 
lesser Zululand chiefs, who, unlike their Natal 
contemporaries, had never received money from the state and 
had been for 'many years... languishing in the 
wilderness1 . ^  A new schedule of stipends was drawn up,
based not on hereditary status or royal affiliations, but 
on a more equitable graduated scale of remuneration 
according to the number of tax-payers in a chief's ward. 
The intention of the new schedule was to counteract the 
accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a few 
chiefs of status.^ There is, however, no direct evidence 
that chiefs attempted to enlarge the membership of their 
ward in order to take advantage of increased stipends,
although they remained intent on expanding their control 
over land which could have had the same effect (see 
below).^
The intention of the stipends was unequivocally stated by 
the CNC:
For the first time in our history Zululand Chiefs
are all brought within the fold of Government paid
servants [my emphasis]. That is a notable pledge of 
the goodwill of the Department, which will afford 
the Zulu Chiefs much satisfaction.^
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The importance of affording chiefs material gain was not
lost on the CNC. At least part of the intention of the new
system was to lessen the temptations of corruption, for
which Solomon had become notorious, and to put a stop to
A Rthe excessive fines imposed by chiefs. Indeed, the few 
chiefs who received substantial stipends were known for 
their decadent lifestyles and their inability to live 
within their budgets, although these were probably more 
effects of the payments, rather than their cause. Chief 
Manzolwandhle Zulu, for example, having reached the 
staggering weight of 32 6 lbs. in 1933, requested an 
increase in his stipend for taxi fares to attend official 
meetings although he owned a car.^
Chiefs welcomed the proposed stipends claiming that they 
were no longer able to support themselves on court fines or
c n
the extraction of tribute. u There was, moreover, an 
underlying tension in chiefs' reliance on the very visible 
and often punitive collection of fines since many were 
ultimately enforced for white, and not Zulu, social ends. 
Furthermore, some chiefs abused their judicial powers 
indiscriminately by exacting fines for contrived or 
imaginary offences. According to one magistrate, in such 
cases the fines 'found their way into the capacious pockets 
of the chiefs1 and people knew they were '...the victims of 
thinly veiled extortion1 .
In 193 6, such excesses led the state to set limits on fines 
which further constrained chiefs. By proclamation No. 73 of 
that year, the government tried to limit chiefs' fines to
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£5 for offences committed in the reserves by followers and 
to £2 for those committed outside them.^ This £3 
difference was probably made in an attempt to lessen the 
centrifugal forces caused by white land control and urban 
employment which were driving Africans outside the reserves 
further from chiefly control. By the late 1940s, in an 
effort to avoid association with the unpopular state some 
chiefs argued that commoners' fines should be paid directly 
to white officials. ^ 3 Generally, however, the imposition of 
fines remained a financial mainstay of chiefly authority.
Unwilling to grant official recognition to the Zulu 
monarchy, (owing partly to Natal objections and partly to 
Solomon's unstable character) however, the state had 
recourse to what Marks has termed the 'manufacture of 
consent1 It attempted to maintain the hegemony, which 
their agents, the chiefs were rapidly losing, by holding 
its own grand indaba (large gathering or affair in which 
policies could be 'discussed') to bolster chiefly 
authority, albeit in a racially subordinated position.
During Smit's tour of Zululand in 193 5, a number of 'loyal' 
chiefs were awarded with the (British) King's Silver 
Jubilee Medal in recognition of their long years of service 
to the state. The ancient chief Zimema Mnguni of Mtunzini, 
though ostensibly pleased to receive the award, questioned 
Smit, 'Does this medal really come from the King? Does it 
not come from Pretoria? ’ Zimema’s enquiry revealed the 
distinction in Africans' minds between the Union government 
and their former conquerors-cum-guardians, the British
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imperial government. Many Zulus grasped at reconstructed 
notions of Victorian 'liberal1 protection, still embodied, 
in the office of the Governor-General and the image of 
British monarchy. On occasion, this captured the 
imagination of commoners and supplanted the Zulu monarch as 
the defender of African interests. The tensions between 
the opposed interests of the state and the Zulu labouring 
class as refracted through Solomon, and later Mshiyeni 
were, however, evidence of the growing divide between 
chiefs and commoners.
LOCAL COUNCILS AND SEGREGATION
Considering the incompatibility of limited representative 
councils with chiefly authoritarian structures it is not 
surprising that Zululand, the model region for 
segregationists, should have posed such a challenge to the 
state for the implementation of the local council system. 
Mooted throughout the 192 0s, proposals for the 
implementation of local Advisory Boards under the Native 
Affairs Act, No. 23 of 1920, and later district and local 
councils under the Native Administration Act No. 3 8 of 
1927, highlighted the tensions between Zululand chiefs and 
the state's desire to restructure the administrative 
framework of the reserves. Here, too, contradictions in the 
thrust of policy had the potential to undermine chiefly 
authority at a time when chiefs were all too aware of the 
threat posed by more popular radical organizations like the 
ICU.57
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Part of the problem with the state's attempt to introduce 
councils centred on the fragmented nature of politics in 
Zululand. As in Pondoland, royalist chiefs and the 
paramount in Zululand struggled to gain official 
recognition of their elevated status.Hereditary chiefs 
faced the constant threat that they would be removed, and 
perhaps more importantly, that their lineal rule would be 
truncated. They would not willingly accept a variant of 
local government in which popular democratic sentiment 
could dilute, or even undermine established chiefly 
authority. Moreover, chiefs were suspicious of the proposed 
councils since some NCs welcomed the idea of 'native 
advisory boards' as a means of sidelining irksome chiefs 
into 'ex officio’ positions.Contrary to the state's 
preferred policy of establishing a single central council 
in which all chiefs could be incorporated, the Natal 
administration favoured local district councils, also 
envisaged under the 1920 Act. This had the advantage, from 
Natal's point of view, of preventing any accretion of 
authority by Solomon.
Although Wheelwright deferred to the Pretoria 
segregationists by 'keeping an eye on1 the fledgling 
Inkatha movement with a view to incorporating it and 
Solomon wholesale into the administration as an advisory 
council, events conspired against this.^ Solomon's drunken 
descent, and more importantly his financial venality, 
persuaded the Natal authorities to reject a general council 
in which his leadership '... with control over a revenue of
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£35,000 a year provided by the taxation scheme would be 
fi 1disastrous 1 .
Given rising rural African disaffection and the threat of
the ICU, local officials had the justification they wanted
to establish an adapted form of council system which would
embody the convergence of interests of local white capital
and the Zulu chiefs. ^  Solomon had, after all, publicly
denounced the ICU, although he also distanced himself from
the state by stating that he found 'fault with the
f  3authorities for allowing this wickedness to go on1. J Along 
with members of Natal's conservative African 
intelligentsia, he appeared willing to conform to the 
desires of state and capital to stamp out radical 
politics.^
Natal hostility to the idea of a de facto Zulu paramount 
controlling a general council continued into the 1930s. In 
1929, the recently appointed CNC, T.W.C Norton, maintained 
Wheelwright's objections to Solomon and a general council. 
Norton felt that there was a great risk of 'a certain 
person [i.e. Solomon] gathering the reins of authority into 
his own hands if a general council were formed’ . He argued 
that, contrary to Heaton Nicholls' view, Solomon would not 
serve as a bulwark against the spread of communism and the 
ICU since radicals could easily control an official 
'Paramount' who was so deeply embarrassed financially.^
In contrast, Heaton Nicholls was firmly convinced that the 
forces of 'democratic radicalism1 could best be thwarted
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with the institutionalisation of a 'tribal council'. As he
stated with reference to the role that the regent Mshiyeni 
could play in such a council,
The safety of the Government lies in the fact that 
the tribal council, in contradistinction to the 
Bunga [the Transkeian Territories General Council], 
consists of hereditary chiefs whose position 
ultimately depends upon their loyalty to the 
Government... whereas in the Bunga, the members are 
all elected and seek to strengthen their position 
amongst the electorate in the approved democratic 
style by adopting an aggressive attitude towards
the Magistrates and the Government.^
Nevertheless, Natal pressed for limited local democratic
councils in all Zululand districts in order to check the
potential centralisation of power in Solomon's hands. In
1929, the NAD arranged for Solomon and other leading Zulu
chiefs to travel to Umtata to see the Transkei Bunga at 
7work. Despite growing popular support for the councils 
among commoners, Solomon and the chiefs, as well as John
Dube, celebrated Natal elder statesman, editor of Ilanga
Lase Natal and, by then, increasingly conservative, and an 
ardent supporter of Inkatha, all rejected the concept of
the Bunga's elected officials out of hand.
The state, however, ensured the chiefs were under no false 
assumptions about their purely consultative role in the 
administration. In 1932, the Minister of Native Affairs, 
E.G. Jansen, warned chiefs in Natal and Zululand that there 
was no point in them putting forward propositions that they 
knew could not be accepted by the government since whites 
held an overriding interest in African affairs. He
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pointedly remarked that ' . . . this being a constitutional
c q
country after all, the final say rests with Europeans1. ^
Although the exercise of the Umtata trip was repeated in
1933, just prior to Mshiyeni's installation as regent over
the Usuthu, the NAD seemed no closer to convincing Zululand
7 nchiefs or Pretoria to make way for elected officials.
Indeed, Mshiyeni was never to preside over a council,
either at the local level in his home district of Nongoma,
or at the regional level for all of Zululand. Instead, in
1937, he was appointed to an advisory position as African
71nominee to the powerless Natives Representative Council.
Through the early 1940s, Mshiyeni maintained close ties
with the Natal African intelligentsia who were developing
Zulu ethnic nationalism through the newly founded Zulu
Cultural Society (an off-shoot of the Natal Bantu Teachers
Association and aligned with Inkatha's earlier 
7 7philosophy).  ^ In 1937, he was encouraged by H.C. Lugg,
Natal's CNC, to accept nomination as patron of the society
in order to foster the '... wholesome traditions, customs
7 7and rules of etiquette' of Zulu culture. J Still acutely
aware of the Natal hostility to Zulu aspirations for
recognition of the monarchy, the society couched its
activities in purely cultural terms while steadily lobbying
the central government to elevate Mshiyeni1s status. In a
letter to the CNC, the society's secretary C.J. Mpanza,
foreshadowing the resurrected Inkatha under chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, explained that the '...matter
[Mshiyeni's role as patron] is not at all being treated as
7 Apolitics, but purely from a Zulu cultural point of view'.
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Mshiyeni was eventually elevated to the status of 'Acting
Paramount Chief of the Zulu1. He served in that role until
1948, when he lost a bitter and government manipulated
dispute to Cyprian for the 'official' succession in which
the SNA intimated to royal advisers that the state was more
'comfortable' with the successor who was '...a younger man,
7 Sbetter able to serve the interests of the government'.
The key tension underlying the introduction of local
councils was that chiefs feared any form of democratic
institution which would undermine their authority while the
Natal administration and the settlers were concerned that a
central council would give power to the royal family.
Nevertheless, the state hoped to use chiefs and the council
to implement improvement schemes in the reserves. Chiefs,
however, were hostile to the programme of 'progress' and
development set out in the state's reserve policy which
7 f\threatened to undermine their control of land.
Part of Solomon's professed objection to the implementation
of a council system for Zululand related to the manner in
which democratic institutions highlighted the lack of
formal education among chiefs.^ Although E. Braadvedt
pointed out at an official meeting that most chiefs were
intelligent even if they were not educated, Solomon was
thought to be 'surprised that the chiefs in the Bunga could
read and write and that men whom [he] so despised as so
7 8below [the Zulu] were ahead of them1. Solomon could
hardly have been reassured by the CNC’s attempts to 
convince him of the virtues of a council.
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I pointed out that when the [Bunga] began it was 
among the Fingoes who were then as ignorant and 
conservative as the Zulus are now and I attempted 
to appeal to his pride of race by suggesting that 
he would not like to see the Zulus linger so far
7  Qbehind the Cape Natives. ^
Thus, the state repeatedly tried to play upon perceived,
created or real ethnic divisions when governing through the
chiefs, believing that this would not only appeal to the
Zulu, but facilitate the implementation of reserve 
ft npolicy. As Beinart has argued, chieftaincy provided the 
final piece of a complex jigsaw of social control which 
provided the means for bolstering rural attachments and 
ethnic identities.
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS AND LEGAL JURISDICTION
Chiefly administration was fine tuned under the Native
Affairs Act of 1920 and the Native Administration Act, No.
38 of 1927. This legislation, along with the Native Affairs
Amendment Acts (No. 27 of 1926 and No. 15 of 1927), gave
clear definition to the segregationist ideal by dividing
ft 7white and African political and cultural systems.^ 
Ironically, the application of this legislative dualism to 
Zululand eroded the real and symbolic continuities of 
chiefly authority. There were inherent contradictions in a 
policy which attempted to establish the supposedly firm 
pre-colonial discipline in a white-dominated
administration. Chiefs now derived their power from the 
white state and yet were expected to maintain hegemony and 
legitimacy in African society of their own accord.
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Although all Zulu chiefs had the power to try both civil 
and criminal cases, most crimes of a serious nature, such 
as stock theft, murder and 'faction fights, those involving 
family relations, such as seduction and adultery, and all 
crimes involving whites were controlled by the NAD.®^ By 
contrast, in Natal, proper, only about half -114 of 208- of 
the chiefs had both civil and criminal jurisdiction. At 
least one Natal chief hoped chiefs outside Zululand would 
be granted the same powers since they faced the same
O /
challenges to authority.
The state enhanced chiefs' jurisdiction under Government 
Notice 73 of 193 6 in order to cope with the crumbling 
fabric of patriarchal society. Chiefs were given the power 
to try a wider range of offences relating to the perceived 
problems of an unravelling society and threats to the 
maintenance of the homestead economy including contempt of 
chiefs and their courts; seduction; abduction of females; 
adultery; harbouring females from fathers and the improper 
behaviour of females by wandering or leading an immoral 
life. As Marks has argued, capital, the state and Zulu 
patriarchs had a stake in maintaining control over women in 
the countryside, especially during the 193 0s when 
depression accelerated the movement of independent 
unmarried women to towns.
Officials still considered women to be the cornerstone of 
rural agricultural production needed to subsidize the 
maintenance of migrant labour. They believed chiefly 
control of women would ensure the return of young men to
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the reserve. The designation of women as legal minors under
the revised Natal Code of Native Law had the desired
effect. One young Zulu teacher, an example of a small but 
growing number of wage earning women in the 193 0s, who had 
saved £45, complained there was little point in struggling 
to work outside the homestead since her earnings would be 
lost to her as she was a legal minor. 'It does not belong 
to me really. If I do not spend it my father will take the 
lot, or otherwise my [future] husband will later on.' Both 
her chief and the NC advised her that the money belonged to
her 'guardian' and she gave it over to her fiance so he
o c
could purchase lobola cattle for their marriage.00 
CHIEFS AND RECRUITMENT FOR THE WAR
Chiefs used recruitment drives for African soldiers during 
the 1940s to attempt to bolster their control over the male 
labour of Zululand. When the NAD introduced country-wide 
recruitment campaigns for Africans to enlist in 1940, 
Mshiyeni demonstrated his 'allegiance' to the state by 
requesting that officials call on Zulu chiefs to fill the 
ranks of the Native Military Police contingent with their 
followers.^
Chiefs, however, were disappointed in the recruitment 
meetings which were attended predominantly by women, 
children, and a few elderly unemployed men. Moreover, they 
were nervous about losing both prestige and the opportunity 
to command their young male followers. Zululand chiefs 
requested that they be empowered by the Government to
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'order' and 'force' their men out to enlist for the army in
O O
accordance with the pre-colonial custom of the kings. ° 
Natal's CNC, Lugg, supported the request arguing:
Our Zulus do not understand such tame methods [as 
voluntary recruitment] in times of crisis as they 
do not fit with the Zulu psychology, whereas an 
order to serve certainly does. [A further advantage 
Lugg claimed was that] ...The responsibility would 
be upon the Chiefs and not upon the Government, and 
would be in keeping with their own recognised 
custom.
Nevertheless, the Minister of Native Affairs agreed, in 
principle, to the chiefs' request but no powers of arrest 
were granted, largely to ensure that enlistment proceeded
q  n
with a degree of popular consent.
Despite Mshiyeni's claims that, contrary to police reports 
and the low number of Zulu enlisting particularly from 
Zululand, all the Zulu were firm in their loyalty to 
'...the Government and the British Commonwealth' and were 
willing, as he was, '...to lay down their lives in helping 
fight against the Germans' the state maintained pressure on
Q1 .him. 1 Officials made veiled threats to him to fulfil the 
Government's demands for recruits. The NC at Nongoma, 
anxious that the Zulu not lose an opportunity for national 
recognition, cautioned Mshiyeni that 'We must not waste 
time otherwise the requirements will be filled from 
elsewhere'. Similarly, Lugg told him that if his people did 
not come forward in appreciable numbers, the gap in
x Q 9manpower would have to be filled from 'beyond Natal'. 
Thus, he implied that the Mpondo, so often held up for 
derisory comparison with the Zulu, would be given the 
police powers and glory that Mshiyeni desired for the Zulu.
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At recruitment meetings, however, many men in the crowds, 
such as Willie Zulu of the Eshowe mission station and 
acting chief Silwanetshe Ndhlovu, protested that they were 
cowards and would not fight without guns against 
aeroplanes. They claimed they were prepared instead to
Q -3 .
purchase the weapons of war for cash. J Not surprisingly, 
conservative chiefs considerably tempered their support for 
recruitment at public meetings. As the NC at Eshowe 
reported, 'Not a single [hereditary] Chief spoke. They hung 
their heads and never uttered a word [in favour of 
recruitment]'.^ In Nkandhla, young men, no doubt aware of 
the hollow rhetoric of comparison with other ethnic groups, 
sardonically argued that the government had failed to 
educate the Zulu and that they were ...ignorant and 
unfitted to perform work undertaken by other tribes'. If 
Mshiyeni and the chiefs desired to enlist, they challenged,
x Q ^they had better do so and leave them alone'. J
Chief Mshiyeni, under considerable pressure from the state 
to provide recruits commensurate with the status he 
claimed, and suffering the debilitating effects of severe 
diabetes, was forced into an invidious position. Exhibiting 
all the ambiguity associated with the Zulu kings, Mshiyeni 
appealed to commoners in a lengthy article in Dube's 
newspaper Ilanga. He offered those who joined his 
Impumalanga (rising sun) regiment special training in the 
use of 'Big guns, war tanks, armoured vehicles, rifles and 
motorcycles'.^ He had, no doubt, attempted to capture the 
popular imagination with the symbols of military dominance
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which had 'enthralled audiences’ in Pondoland in the 
1920s.^ Moreover, Mshiyeni attempted to link voluntary 
army service with land, an issue central to Africans in the 
reserves. He admonished the Zulu that 'You can never hope
Q O
to possess land if you continue to remain cowards.1^
On the one hand, Mshiyeni1s appeal was strongly condemned 
by army officials who would not countenance providing 
African soldiers with arms and for his allowing the 'arch 
agitator of the Union’ and former ICU leader, Champion to
Q Qattend a recruitment drive m  Eshowe.  ^ On the other hand, 
Mshiyeni, like Solomon, was rejected by most of the rural 
rank-and-file, though he still maintained some popularity 
among Durban workers.Millenarian rumours abounded that 
Mshiyeni’s father, Dinuzulu, was not dead, that a pig had 
been placed in his coffin, and he had been secreted away by 
the Germans to later return and oppose white South 
Africa.1(^ 1
Yet Mshiyeni and other chiefs derived special benefits and 
material gains from their association with the state's 
recruitment drive. Colonel E. Stubbs, the Director of Non- 
European Army Services, complained that Mshiyeni was 
'...either unable or unwilling to fulfil his grandiloquent 
promises' of providing 'even hundreds let alone thousands 
of men’ despite having been lavishly entertained by the 
Defence Department and a special military band sent through
i no
Nongoma at his request. By 1941, a number of other
conservative Zulu chiefs, including prominent members of 
the Usuthu and Mandhlakazi, applied to the government to
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join the ranks of official recruiters. On the basis of 
their supposed 'influence1 among the Zulu, Mciteki Zulu and 
Matole Buthelezi were appointed as recruiters with salaries 
of £10 a month each in addition to their annual stipends, 
and were issued uniforms and vouchers for travelling
1 n -d
expenses. In November of 1941 alone, Mshiyeni managed to 
accrue over £31 in expenses and ensured that four of his 
personal retainers received food, uniforms, and small 
salaries while attending him at the Eshowe recruiting 
camp.1^4
Mshiyeni's prestige steadily ebbed through 1942 as he 
failed to turn out the desired number of recruits from 
Zululand. Mshiyeni's failed efforts had the effect of 
reversing some defence force staff opinions of Zulu martial 
prowess. Thus, after a tour of recruitment centres in 1942, 
Staff Sergeant R. E. Symons commented that the Natal 
districts near the lower Drakensberg Mountains
...contain quite a number of Natives with basuto 
[sic] blood in their veins, and being practically 
outside Mshiyeni's sphere of influence, should 
prove a good field for recruiting.1^
Finally, in 1944, Mshiyeni himself expressed fears that a 
'great opportunity for the Zulu to take their rightful 
place of glory in the Union1 had been lost because of poor 
recruitment. Privately, however, he confided that, with a 
drought and famine threatening, it was perhaps not the 
ideal time to press his people to give up their young men 
to the war effort.
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CHIEFS, RADICAL POLITICS AND THE LAND
The most important issue shaping chiefly authority in
twentieth century Zululand was control of land. As Bradford
has argued, the success of the ICU in northern Natal was
due, largely, to the inability of chiefs on white-owned
farms to provide land. 'Even Solomon... was defied on a
massive scale [and] traditional leaders were being deserted
for new men promising farms for the price of a ticket [i.e.
i  n 7membership m  the ICU]1. The apportionment of land m
the reserves, held under communal tenure for Africans under
the 1913 Natives Land Act and the 193 6 Natives Trust and
Land Act, was the only means by which chiefs could ensure
loyalty, and therefore control over the productive
i  n ftcapacities of the people. In order to maintain their
hegemony, within the reserves at least, chiefs favoured 
loyal followers in allocating land while independent-minded 
peasants were at a disadvantage. Archdeacon Lee believed 
that agricultural progress was undermined in Zululand since
Wherever you find a progressive native who settles 
down to farm his lands adequately, and gets good 
crops, you will always find the local native chief 
will put two or three people around the boundary of 
this land and they will filch away the land from 
him. . .Obviously the thing is for the strong man to 
drive this man away from the land and to give the 
chief possession of it.-*-^
Similarly, Rev. Oscroft complained that Solomon placed 
loyal followers all around the ZNTI in order to hem in the 
cultivated land.-^^ In 1935, chief Mshiyeni, despite his 
missionary-influenced education, objected to proposals for 
a mission hospital at the ZNTI site, claiming that the
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missionaries used aggressive tactics to extend their
111farming plots and he wanted his gardens back. ±-L
The advent of cash-crop farming, whether by whites or 
Africans, challenged chiefly control over communal land 
holdings. For chiefs, 'progressive' African homesteads 
meant the development of commercial peasant production,
with the profit motive driving people to expand the area
119 •under cultivation. -L^  This had also been their experience
with white farmers in the cane belt along the coast and on
the western fringes of Zululand. Large tracts of land
alienated by whites left less for distribution to Africans
for subsistence purposes. The wave of 'progressive' farming
by kholwa which found support in the state's 'betterment'
policies in the 1930s threatened to alienate further areas
of the reserve from communal occupation, and thus, chiefly
authority.
The expulsion of Africans from white-owned farm land also
posed a series of challenges to chiefly authority.
Population congestion in the reserves rose steadily during
the 1920s and 1930s as natural increase combined with a
113flood of refugees from northern Natal farms. J Congestion 
heightened tensions between competing factions as chiefs 
attempted to accommodate more people. Although chief Mgixo 
of Nongoma conceded that he might eventually have to refuse 
refugees the right to reside in his ward, he felt he was 
bound to help them as '... after all, we are of them and 
they are of us...1 Moreover, in some circumstances, it 
was to the advantage of chiefs to enhance their power by
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providing people with land to encourage their loyalty and 
extend their area of influence and the potential for 
tribute. Despite attempts by the NAD to wrest control of 
land apportionment away from chiefs and induna, in the late 
1940s, Natal's CNC, R.P. Campbell, noted that many 
aggressive chiefs still placed followers in land disputed 
by other chiefs; the resulting 'faction fights1 caused
11C
considerable bloodshed and strife.
During periods of social dislocation and economic stress 
the accommodation of 'surplus' people proved a great 
challenge to chiefs. Faction fights over land were reported 
to be more intense and numerous during the drought and 
malaria epidemic of the early 1 9 3 0 s . I n  1932, for 
example, chief Siduna of Eshowe complained to the local NC 
that armed conflict between his followers and those of a 
rival chief, Zalaba, over land was a result of Zalaba's
ejecting new African settlers and encouraging them to 
settle in Siduna's crowded ward. In his defence, Zalaba
protested that there was no more 'fever free' or habitable
117land m  his ward.11 Moreover, refugees from white-owned 
farms, radicalised by their bitter experiences, added to 
discontent in the reserves and, in turn, challenged the 
chiefs for land reform. And, as the Zulu nationalist
politician M.L. Maling noted: 'The cry of the evicted
tenants was taken up by the Natives who had not been on
farms, and in that way the wave of discontent spread.'
With the aid of African political leadership, popular 
resistance to chiefly control of land did, on occasion,
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expose the self-aggrandizing tendencies of chiefs in 
relation to the land. Although, as suggested above, chiefs 
did not countenance commercial production among reserve 
dwellers, when pressured by the state and white farmers, 
they were not above ensuring their own material benefits 
from land expropriations. When white sugar farming expanded 
during the 192 0s the Zululand Sugar Milling Company at 
Empangeni persuaded chief Mncinzeni Cebekhulu to accept a 
marginally larger area of low-lying, drought prone and 
tsetse-infested land, already abandoned by white settlers, 
in exchange for his clan's fertile land adjacent to a 
stream.-*--*-9 Mncinzeni and his induna moved into the farm 
houses left by whites while pressing the NAD for more land 
for his people. -^0 The Chief and induna received £12 6 and
between £40 and £60 respectively as a cash compensation for
the huts and garden land vacated; however, the rank-and-
file refused to recognize the exchange or accept any
121money.
In 192 5, the exchange of land at Empangeni came to the 
attention of Petros Lamula and Josiah Gumede, the new
'radical1 leader of the Natal Native Congress who had
19 9ousted John Dube as president. In the second half of the 
192 0s, as the ICU spread into rural Natal under the 
leadership of A.P. Maduna, mission-educated Lamula, who had 
founded the United and Independent Zulu National Church of
Christ, paved the way for Maduna1 s ICU in Zululand by
publicly drawing attention to repression in the
1 9*3
countryside. By 1927, his millenarian message and
protests over cattle-dipping and landlessness coincided
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with the founding of fledgling ICU branches in southern 
Zululand.124
Lamula levelled a series of criticisms at Mncinzeni in 
particular, and the Zululand chiefs in general, concerning 
the alienation of the people's land and warned the chiefs 
of the rising tide of disaffection among migrant workers in 
Durban who still claimed a stake in the Zululand
reserves.12  ^Lamula and Gumede then proposed a meeting with 
Mncinzeni, who, hoping to assuage his people, did not 
refuse the offer and he joined his followers at the
Norwegian Mission station at Empangeni to discuss the
1 9 fsissue. At the gathering Lamula called for African unity 
over the land issue and Gumede attacked the other district 
chiefs for refusing to attend. Gumede went on to speak of 
the changing political circumstances in South Africa and 
the broken promises of Queen Victoria and the English 
Natalians.
This does not speak well of the English... When the 
last election took place we were all afraid of 
General Hertzog [the newly elected Prime Minister 
and leader of the Afrikaner National Party] We 
thought that many things would happen, and that the 
Government would be much harder on the Natives. I
was surprised to find that the SAP [The English-
dominated South African Party whose leading Natal 
parliamentarian was Heaton Nicholls], the 
Englishmen, are responsible for the taking of this
fertile land... Now my friends let us make friends
with the Dutch [the Afrikaners] . Always side with
19 7the King that rules.
In November 192 5, not long after this meeting, an
unspecified number of Mncinzeni1s followers left the new
location and returned to re-occupy their old sites on land 
the milling company had not yet cultivated. The squatters
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then struggled to re-establish themselves as cane crops
hemmed them in and local officials harried them for taxes
and dipping fees. Finally, in 1932 at the height of the
drought, pressured by the milling company, the chief and
the NAD, the recalcitrant homesteaders accepted the meagre
1 2 ftcompensation offered and removed to the new location. 
Nowhere in the records of this exchange is there any
evidence to suggest that Mncinzeni seriously considered 
aligning himself with his followers or the nationalist 
African politicians against the dominant forces of state 
and capital.
As has been argued above, the ICU faced formidable 
obstacles in Zululand from the rural aristocracy and the 
state which both had an interest in suppressing threatening 
political forces. Chiefs, sugar planters, and local 
officials moved quickly to condemn and break down any
support for the ICU in the reserves. Solomon's public 
denunciation of the ICU combined with white repression and 
beatings of African farm workers and state proscription of 
ICU leaders effectively snuffed out the ICU in the reserves 
by the end of the 192 0s. It had, in any case, internal
I OQ
reasons for its demise by then. ^
CHIEFS VS HEADMEN
An important part of the transforming Zulu political
culture was the interposition of induna in the new
1 Tf]administration. Beginning m  the 1920s, the Natal NAD
exacerbated the growing trend in administrative 'leap-
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frogging' and shifting alliances in Zululand by enhancing 
the powers of induna. NCs, hostile towards aristocratic 
chiefly authority, often circumvented chiefs altogether by 
using induna. Just as chiefs often appealed beyond local 
officials to the higher authority of the Secretary of 
Native Affairs, or even the exalted, though ultimately
hollow, authority of imperial officials, commoners and 
induna disregarded chiefs and appealed to local
of f icials. -^1 As Wilfred Ngobese, a 'native constable1 and 
'unofficial' induna (see below) who worked to undermine the 
authority of the appointed chief Isaac Molife in Nquthu, 
stated, 'How can we "hlonipa" [custom of showing respect
and deference to 'tribal leaders'] the chiefs if they do 
not "hlonipa" the Native Commissioners?1
In 192 5 there were only seven induna, mostly loyal to their 
chiefs, in Zululand with the authority to try civil and
criminal cases. By 1936, however, local officials relied 
heavily on these petty officials and most chiefs' wards had 
at least two or three officially 'recognised' induna who 
could try cases. In the ensuing struggle between local 
officials and chiefs for control of induna as 
intermediaries between the administration and the people, 
the forces of state power and social change tipped the 
balance in favour of the i n d u n a . I n d u n a  could challenge 
chiefly authority in a variety of ways. A chief who 
accepted government policy uncritically left room for an 
induna to gain popular support. A chief's absence from the 
district and his neglect of popular interests also bred 
contempt for him in the eyes of followers. Moreover, the
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more people and the greater the process of 
individualisation in a chief's ward, the more susceptible 
he was to the ursurpation of his authority by an 
independent induna.
While the larger political forces at work in Zululand 
focussed attention on the role of chiefs and the royal 
family, behind the scenes induna went about the business of 
local administration. Often their contradictory relations 
with local officials had far greater impact on the day-to- 
day lives of Africans than the more sweeping, bolder 
gestures of nationalist-minded African political leaders. 
Inevitably, after the tumult of a grand indaba, after the 
land deals were done, and after pledges and largely empty 
promises were made by chiefs, kings, and white officials, 
it was the induna who had to contend with people on the 
ground, to move them and apportion land, to collect tax, 
and often, though not coincidentally, secure for themselves 
an improved footing in the political economy.
During the drought and depression of the 193 0s, increasing 
numbers of 'aristocratic' chiefs set off for the urban 
areas and the Rand mines to augment their incomes through 
'tribal' subscriptions. Chief Matole Buthelezi of 
Mahlabatini, for example, was absent on 'tribal collection 
tours' in the Melmoth wattle plantations and Dundee coal
I TC
mines for over four months a year between 1931 and 1934. 
Such was the extent of these extended collection tours and 
the disruption they caused to the work-place that the South 
African Chamber of Mines called on the NAD to cease issuing
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chiefs with outward passes to the Rand. That the
Depression made African employment in urban areas all the 
more tenuous during this period no doubt ensured that 
migrant workers continued to contribute money as a form of 
insurance for a place in the reserves. For the majority of 
Africans in the reserves, however, the vacuum of local 
leadership and control caused by chiefs' neglect was often 
filled by enterprising induna.
By 193 5, some NCs, such as E. Braatvedt of Nongoma, railed
against the repeated absences of the chiefs. Probably
responding to the de facto role that many induna had
assumed, he recommended that various induna and 'tribal
deputies’ be entitled to charge for the 'chiefly services’
such as land allocation that they performed, albeit at
lower rates than chiefs. With the advent of
administrative reform under a proclamation in 193 6, which
threatened to further entrench chiefly control of
communally held land, local officials advocated doing away
chiefs altogether. They recommended replacing chiefs with
paid 'headmen' who, they hoped, would be more responsive to
administrative demands and, because of their education,
better able to cope with the increasingly complex nature of
1 ^  ftrural politics.
Mission-educated induna, whether acting in an official 
capacity, or simply exploiting new niches in the political 
economy as unofficial induna or abanumzana (household- 
heads, some of which owed their position as important 
community leaders to heredity and seniority, see below),
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played a crucial role in re-configuring reserve 
communities. As la Hausse has shown, in some instances, 
aspiring leaders combined their literacy with a grasp of 
popular culture and consciousness to exploit commoners for
i oq
cash and cattle. However, these same skills also proved 
invaluable to local officials. A certain command of English 
and a tacit acceptance of state policy in the reserves 
allowed some kholwa induna to appear 'with the confidence 
of an individual well-versed in the ways of the coloniser' 
and act as mediators of, if not outright propagandists for 
chiefly authority.
As chiefs were discredited in the eyes of commoners for
their less ambiguous embrace of powers derived from the
white state, many induna increasingly represented the
interests of commoners and manoeuvred in the interstices of
divided loyalties. Induna were responsible for the day-
to-day implementation of NAD policy in the reserves. They
were seen at the dipping tanks, the magistracy, and as
constables at local jails. They were, moreover, faction
leaders at beer drinks, weddings, and inevitably at the
forefront of agitation for expanded territory or protests
against reserve regulations and laws, often without the
14 9knowledge of their chiefs. ^  Induna were not simply a 
homogeneous strata of lesser 'tribal officials’. There were 
those who gained official recognition through allegiance to 
chiefs, and others who achieved popular support, for a 
time, by opposing the ruling elite. Among this group, 
moreover, were many unfulfilled heirs to chieftaincy and
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others who aspired to chieftaincy through alliance with the 
local native commissioners.
Through the later 1920s and early 1930s, the affairs of the 
Usuthu in Nongoma were handled mostly by Gilbert Zulu, 
uncle to Mshiyeni and adviser to Solomon. Solomon, who 
tried only three civil cases in Nongoma between 193 0 and 
1932, frustrated the administration of the NC, E.N. 
Braadvedt, with a decadent lifestyle and long absences from 
home.-*-^ In 1932 , he sought a remedy to Solomon's 
dereliction by conferring the power to try civil cases on 
Gilbert and two other prominent induna. Solomon's neglect 
of local affairs while he sought financial support outside 
the reserves proved troublesome for his successor.-'-^ 
Gilbert rose in power and prominence during the 193 0s to 
the point where Mshiyeni was forced to strike back. Aware 
of the NC' s antagonism, and that the NAD was unlikely to 
remove an efficient and important official induna from 
office, Mshiyeni resorted to accepted Zulu custom by 
'smelling out' Gilbert and his accomplice, Madwanguluka 
Shandu, as abathakati (witches). Both men were
eventually driven from the district, not by the force of 
the state, but by a social mechanism still regulated by
1 Aftchiefly authority.^0
Other Zululand chiefs could no longer command such control 
over custom. In the southern districts, where the forces of 
individualisation were strongest, alliances between the new 
induna and the native commissioners often completely 
undermined the chief s. In Nquthu for example, chief
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Molife, son of the appointed chief Hlubi, ran foul of local 
officials for resistance to soil reclamation and 
'betterment' schemes (see below chapter on 'Betterment'). 
Despite considerable support from the NAD in Pretoria, 
Molife was eventually suspended as chief, possibly for 
perpetuating the popular myth that he had forced the 
removal of NC, F.W. Ahrens, because he disregarded chiefly 
authority. Although Molife's opposition to reserve 
policy no doubt played a part in his replacement by a 
kholwa induna, Madola Miya, a clan elder and staunch 
supporter of Molife, pointed to other factors:
Why has the tribe not been informed about its 
chief? Why has Macalini [i.e. Wellington Buthelezi 
-the induna selected by the NC] -merely because he 
owns a butchery- been selected? . . .we have all 
along been hearing that Macalini has aspirations to 
the position. There is no cessation of meat which 
is conveyed to the Native Commissioner. Sheep too 
are driven to him for slaughter.
Although there is no evidence to support Madola's claim, 
his criticism pointed to an underlying tension between 
kholwa induna and commoners over the accumulation of wealth 
through the sale of livestock which local officials often 
facilitated. By the 1930s, one feature of commoner
impoverishment which stood in stark contrast to the few 
wealthier induna with large numbers of sheep or cattle, was 
the control of too few or no livestock to support a family.
There is, moreover, evidence of a maverick group of induna
who aspired to be leaders by rejecting official sanction
from chiefs and the state, preferring to seek their
1 S1legitimacy m  popular support or hereditary status. 
Throughout the 192 0s and into the 1940s chiefs appealed to
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local officials for support in subordinating these 
'unofficial1 induna (more accurately umnumzana, a respected 
man of standing; community leader with high kinship
1 CT
status) who usurped court duties, collected fines and 
fees for land allocation, recruited labour for the mines 
and claimed their position through hereditary status. Chief 
Bhokwe of the Mandlakazi in Nongoma, described by an 
official as '...weak, clouded by alcohol, and under the 
advisement of wholly unsavoury characters who [were] 
siphoning off the people's cattle for the king1, claimed he 
was falling deep into debt since two powerful abanumzana 
were usurping his right to try civil cases and keeping the 
fines for themselves. -*-5 3 The fact that the NAD cut Bhokwe's 
stipend from £300 to £175 for failing to follow official 
orders may also have been a factor in his claimed 
impecuniosity.
Chiefs and local officials alike were largely powerless to
control these men in areas where they enjoyed popular
1 54support. Mdumeli, a leading umnumzana m  chief Biyela
Zalaba's ward in Eshowe, refused to attend meetings or
carry out the chief's orders and organised 'faction fights'
at weddings to test the resolve and powers of the appointed 
15 5chief. An unsuccessful hereditary claimant to the
chieftancy of the Biyela ward, Mdumeli had no official 
recognition or support from the chief. Although he had 
acted as regent during Zalaba's minority and had some 
hereditary claim to leadership, Mdumeli was pushed aside 
when the 'rightful heir’ (i.e. a man who had some claim to 
status and, more importantly, was acceptable to the NAD)
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Zalaba, came of age. Mdumeli aggressively rallied his 
commoner supporters to press land claims against 
neighbouring chiefs with whom Zalaba had made peace. One 
such chief, Lukulwini Biyela, complained bitterly of 
Mdumeli's tactics and called on the NC to remove him from 
the area:
In such circumstances in the old days, the 
unsuccessful claimant to a chieftanship was slain. 
There could be no peace otherwise. Now-a-days a man 
is killed by being moved where he cannot do 
harm.-^6
Although Mdumeli was relocated to a ward in Hlabisa, his
agitation for land on behalf of impoverished commoners set
1 R 7a precedent for following community leaders. J
By the later 193 0s, strife mounted between competing 
factions in the Biyela ward under the newly appointed chief 
Mhlakaza. The chief's principal induna, Mlomonka Sibaya, an 
NAD constable, wielded considerable official power. He did
1 CO
not, however, have the support of the ward abanumzana.
At a meeting held to discuss increased violence and
'faction fights' eighteen men appeared claiming status as
ward leaders, but only ten were officially recognised
headmen, and of those the NC, J.P. Rawlinson, considered
seven as only 'minor induna'.^59 Rawlinson complained that
too many 'unofficial' leaders were vying for power and that
'These men [whose fathers were men of standing prior to
colonial rule] are under the impression that the post of
i finInduna is hereditary.’iau The abanumzana of competing 
factions, without control of land, persisted in instigating 
fights at weddings and beer drinks in order to press their
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claims for land. Moreover, they did not render any 
assistance to the official induna in tax collections or 
ward administration. Mshokobezi Makoba, of one dissenting 
faction, was able to rally over one hundred families behind 
him to press claims to land and status by invoking a 
millenarian message based on the Bambatha rebellion and 
land restoration. It was only through him that the taxes of 
this group could be collected or that their civil disputes 
could be settled in a court.
While, officially, induna existed only in terms of a fixed 
ward as defined by a chief, clearly landless men like 
Makoba were able to maintain popular support and, to some 
extent, social control over families who lived on land 
ruled by recognised induna. Through the later 193 0s and 
1940s, local officials struggled in vain to restrain the 
abanumzana. The NCs of Nquthu and Mtunzini repeatedly 
called on 'unofficial1 leaders to cease trying civil and 
petty criminal cases and occasionally charged these men 
with extortion.Owing to the '...plethora of unofficial 
Induna confusing administrative matters1 the NC at Eshowe 
stressed to his chiefs and their followers that official 
duties should only be carried out by government appointed 
induna who controlled a fixed sub-ward so that 'If a 
disturbance takes place I will then know on whom to fix the 
blame. ’
By the 193 0s, many Zululand chiefs were no longer powerful 
or 'affluent1 in the customary pre-colonial sense, but were 
rather a heavily indebted class of paid civil servants.
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Indeed, if a wealthier peasant class was to be found in 
Zululand, it was not so much among the chiefs who relied on 
cash stipends and collections of money from migrant 
workers, but among the mission-educated induna.
In general, chiefs were unlikely to undertake cash-crop 
production on land they held in trust for the people (the 
most important remaining customary function of chiefs in
modern Zululand). 'Progressive' official induna, however, 
took advantage of their localised control of land to do
so. DD As Mesach Mkize, an Eshowe school teacher, 
suggested, 'The tribal social organization [embodied in the 
chiefs] is opposed to a progressive being given more land' 
for extending cultivation. D Induna, who survived on more 
limited remunerations than chiefs, tended to invest their 
cash surpluses and, in many cases, practical farming
knowledge learned on mission reserves or white-owned farms, 
in cultivating for the market in the reserves where land 
was more abundant. Dhlumbi Mthetwa, a former induna and 
police pensioner, controlled over 2 00 acres of land and put
his money into maize production for local white sugar
1 f\ ftfarmers m  Mtunzini. DO Similarly, two Nongoma induna, 
Timoti Khumalo (who owned a car) and Mkwintye Mthetwa
learned farming skills on white farms in Vryheid, and 
produced 80 and 200 bags of mealies for sale 
respectively.169
By the end of the 1940s, chiefs in Zululand relied on 
externally derived support from the state both for their 
material well being and their political status. Their
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ability, to maintain a certain amount of popular support 
rested largely on their continued control of diminishing 
communal land in the reserves and their attempts to capture 
the popular imagination with re-invented Zulu nationalism. 
Chiefly authority did not however, remain un-contested in 
the 193 0s and 1940s. On the one hand, 'radical' African 
political organisations like the ICU and popular reserve 
leaders like the abanumzana threatened the chiefs' hold 
over popular mobilisation. On the other, hand a new class 
of educated but largely frustrated induna undermined chiefs 
and insinuated themselves between the people and the state. 
As will be argued in the chapters below, however, it was 
only through an alliance with segregationists and the 
forces of state and capital that Zulu chiefs secured their 
control of the reserve political economy, although, for a 
brief time they did support popular opposition to the state 
during the 1940s.
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The two pillars of the pre-colonial Zululand economy were 
agriculture and cattle-keeping. In the twentieth century, 
however, the male Zulu domain of cattle-keeping managed to 
survive far better than the predominantly female domain of 
agriculture. Although reserve agriculture remained an 
integral part of African subsistence, the cattle economy 
was better able to withstand the onslaught of white 
commercial farming demands and adapt to the wider 
capitalist economy than agriculture. As Africans produced 
progressively less of their food requirements, they managed 
to increase their herds. Part of the reason for this 
phenomenon lies in the adaptation of the social relations 
of accumulation and production of cattle in Zulu society 
after 1900. As Ferguson has argued for Lesotho, cattle 
remained a crucial feature of the social system, retaining 
enormous symbolic value despite, or more probably because 
of, the unravelling of Zulu society. The social value of 
cattle, however, was complimentary to the basic productive 
value of herds for milk and meat and as a reproducing form 
of storeable wealth.^
Another reason is related to the changing composition of 
Zulu society. Paradoxically, white settlement initially 
caused an increase in cattle diseases and then provided the 
infrastructure for disease control which stabilized African 
cattle production. Moreover, the penetration of capitalism 
provided a ready outlet for the sale of cattle. Chiefs and
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induna who controlled grazing land were well poised to take 
advantage of the spreading cash economy and their 
increasing herds of cattle acquired a definite monetary 
value. Thus, the trend was towards a distinctly unequal 
distribution of the dramatically increased herds which 
tended to favour the Zulu ruling class.
In the first half of the twentieth century, despite land 
loss, drought, East Coast fever and nagana, African-owned 
cattle in Zululand increased more than threefold; the 
population only increased by twofold. Although cattle 
disease continued to plague Zululand into the late 1940s, 
Veterinary Department policies for the containment of 
African-owned cattle in the reserves and strict enforcement 
of dipping regulations helped the herds to recover. 
African-owned cattle numbers in Zululand soared from 
2 50,000 to over 500,000 between 192 0 and 1926. By the mid- 
1940s the number topped 7 00,000.^ There were however, 
dramatic fluctuations in herds in the intervening years. 
Although they recovered quickly, the herds were decimated 
by drought and disease in 1931-1932, 193 6 and again in the 
early 1940s. The huge increases, however, can also be 
accounted for by cattle developing an immunity to disease, 
the improved grazing conditions and the imbalance in male- 
female ratios following a drought when fertile cows, which 
had the best chance of survival, reproduced calves 
rapidly.^
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THE ENVIRONMENT AND DISEASE
Local reactions to environmental crises characterised much 
of Zululand's economic development in the twentieth 
century. The cattle economy was no exception. Droughts and 
famines of varying severity struck Zululand in 1912, 1916,
1920, 1930-32, 1935-36 and again in 1946. These had
profound implications for the restructuring of African 
stock-keeping. Cattle suffered from a series of problems 
related to the droughts. Pastures became dry and of little 
nutritious value and animals became more susceptible to 
disease in a weakened condition.
As Guy has argued, because of recurrent drought, it was 
necessary for Africans in this part of southern Africa to 
manage herds according to seasonal grazing patterns, and 
more importantly, the extremely variable nature of soil and 
rainfall which transformed levels of grazing nutrition over 
short distances.^ Equally important in Zululand was the 
ability of herdsmen to avoid unhealthy low-lying areas 
which harboured nagana (cattle trypanosomiasis or sleeping 
sickness) infected tsetse flies and the thick amahlanze 
(bushveld) which provided cover for large game hosts of the 
brown tick, the carrier of East Coast Fever
n
(Theileriasis). Zululand's geography provided sources of 
water for cattle in the lower river valleys areas during 
periods of drought. As cattle, already compromised by poor 
nutrition levels in drought stricken middle and high veld 
areas, moved into lower areas to access water they were 
highly susceptible to disease.
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Repeated crises either directly or indirectly related to 
cattle drove Africans to increase their herds whenever 
possible. Naturally, restocking was of paramount importance 
immediately following the ravages of disease, and during 
periods of economic stress. As the only form of capital 
accumulated in Zulu society, cattle were a crucial buffer 
against impoverishment. When Africans restocked in the 
twentieth century, however, flexible grazing patterns were 
severely limited. At the turn of the century, white 
officialdom was poised to take advantage of fluctuations in 
herd size. C. R. Saunders, reporting on Zululand before the 
delimitation, considered that the huge cattle losses from 
rinderpest sustained in 1897 presented advantages for the 
expropriation of African land.
Having lost nearly all their cattle and
consequently requiring less room than they formerly 
did it may be easier to group the people in more 
limited areas than they have hitherto been
accustomed to.®
Africans only gradually experienced the impact of the 
delimitation and its effect on grazing patterns when white 
settlement actually took place from 1905 into the 1920s.^ 
Nevertheless, extensive and, in Africans' eyes, often 
vexatious regulations designed to support white stock 
farming through the prevention of disease were rapidly
implemented. By the 1910s The Veterinary Department's 
restrictions on the movement of cattle and fencing on white 
farms in the southern districts aggravated the shortage of 
pasture land by cutting off paths to seasonal grazing.
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While there is no question that stock-keeping in congested
areas caused erosion, the severity and extent of the
problem was greatly exaggerated. World-wide concern about
soil erosion and compromised agricultural capacities
filtered into official South African circles from the late
192 0s. Combined with racial notions of an African inability
to maintain the rural areas these ideas prompted an almost
1 Dparanoid reaction in the NAD and land department. u During
the 193 0s, the NAD continually pointed to the 'combined
evils1 of overstocking and pasture degradation which it
believed placed the reserves on the verge of collapse.
11Officials made every effort to reduce stock numbers. 1 
Overstocking, however, has to be related to cattle type, 
access to, and patterns of seasonal grazing, soil 
fertility, erosion, geography and climate.  ^The fact that, 
despite the firm belief in official circles that African- 
owned cattle were destined to drop in number due to 
overgrazing, the reserves provided for substantial 
increases in cattle from the 1910s attests to the imprecise 
official views of the effects of erosion.
As elsewhere in southern Africa, Zululand’s developing 
links with the wider political economy, including an 
increase in transport riding and levels of trade in cattle, 
and the introduction of settler-owned stock, contributed to 
the potential for increased animal infections. J The East 
Coast Fever epizootic which spread through Zululand from 
1904 until 1910, prompted the erection of dipping tanks, 
usually concentrated on white farms, to protect cattle from 
the tick-borne disease. The disease was devastating for all
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stock farmers, but was particularly so for undercapitalized 
Africans who could not afford access to the tanks.^ The 
disease tended to reinforce the process of stratification 
as poorer homesteads could ill-afford the high costs of 
protection. The principal means of controlling the disease
applied to Africans prior to the 1920s was a series of
quarantine camps and the wholesale slaughtering of infected 
animals.
Africans suffered twofold from this 'stamping out1 policy: 
once through the loss of their cattle and a second time 
through the measures designed to contain the spread of the 
fever. The quarantine regulations proved particularly 
irksome to homesteads. In Entonjaneni (Melmoth), chief 
Ngobozana felt that the mixing together of all his people's 
cattle under quarantine, whether infected or not, was a 
poor method of control as all the cattle then contracted
the disease. He argued that
. . .what used to be done in the old days, when 
disease broke out, was for the herd boys to be 
carefully warned not to let the cattle mix, and if 
any intermingling occurred, the boys were severely 
beaten.
This procedure allowed people to make use of their cattle 
for the duration of the epizootic. Many chiefs urged that 
infected cattle should be allowed to remain near the kraals 
so that the owners could have the advantage of the cow's
milk while it was still alive as well as the meat when it
1 f\died. G. De Kock, Director of Veterinary Services in the 
Union, later pointed out that Africans who ate the flesh or 
milk of fever-infected cattle apparently suffered no ill-
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effects. He argued that, when starvation threatened, it was
better to risk using milk from infected cattle than to have
1 7no milk at all.
White fears of cross-infection and perceptions of African- 
owned cattle as inherently verminous prompted the 
development of dipping tank facilities in the reserves. In 
1914, all cattle in Zululand were, by an extension of the 
Diseases of Stock Act (No. 18 of 1911), forced to undergo 
regular baths in an arsenic compound to rid them of ticks. 
The NAD called upon chiefs to mobilize free labour for the 
construction of dipping tanks in the southern districts. 
More importantly, Africans had to bear the brunt of the 
costs of the scheme.-*-® In 1914, the NAD introduced a 
'dipping levy 1 of five shillings on every adult male. The 
addition of this rate to the established hut-tax caused 
wide-spread resentment and made tax collections difficult 
for local officials. ^
The following year, the Natal Dipping Tanks Advances Act 
changed the rate to 10s. per kraal, and partially shifted 
the burden of collection and responsibility for payment to 
the homestead head.^® The maintenance of cattle in Zululand 
had, by the 1920s, acquired a definite cash cost. When 
applied across the board to all homesteads this further 
cost strained poorer sections of society as commoners 
effectively subsidised wealthier large herd owners. A stock 
inspector in Nquthu complained that he had dipped over 
seven hundred merino sheep for one man. The approximate 
cost to the government was £32 and yet the owner only paid
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p 1
the basic 10s. supplement to the general tax. x 
Nevertheless, dipping did protect stock, but it had a 
double cost to Africans because of the way it was 
introduced.
While the NAD identified African over-stocking as a serious 
drain on water supplies, local officials expressed concern 
over white settler off-take. During droughts Zululand 
settlers petitioned the administration to water large 
numbers of their cattle in the reserves, which further 
strained tenuous supplies. The NC at Nongoma protested to 
the veterinary department responsible for issuing permits 
for white-owned cattle to enter the reserves. 'It is a fact 
that the water supply in the Native Reserve is being 
threatened by Europeans and the interests of the Natives
p p
must come first.’
Indeed, hundreds of whites dipped their cattle in the NAD 
tanks situated in the reserves, many free of charge. Among 
those whites dipping free or at partial dipping fee rates 
were prominent local white government officials including 
the NC, H.P. Braatvedt, the Rev. Oscroft from the ZNTI, the 
labour recruiter, J.S. Marwick, and Dr. Haupt, a district
p "3 .
surgeon. J Moreover, although their claims were never 
substantiated, chiefs Zombizwe and Siposo, residing near 
the sugar-cane belts in Swaziland and Eshowe respectively, 
complained that white farmer irrigation, drawn from rivers 
which flowed into the reserves, undermined reserve water 
supplies and drained perennial streams.^ A somewhat 
alarmist NC, W. Boast (later CNC), further claimed the
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irrigation problem was serious and caused reserve cattle to 
die or become too emaciated to travel to distant dips 
because of lack of water.
Although African tax-payers subsidised white dipping, many
went without access to dips at all. By the mid-193 0s, herds
in the border and coastal areas of Ingwavuma were suffering
from the combined effects of drought and lack of tanks. The
veterinary department created a 'cattle-free zone1 six
miles wide along the border after reported outbreaks of
hoof and mouth disease in Mozambique threatened to spread
into Zululand.^ This measure included the closure of tanks
and the cessation of planned tank building in the area to
discourage Mozambiquans crossing the border to use reserve
tanks. In defence of Africans, the local NC pointed out the
hardship endured by many people in the area who had paid
both the 'dipping levy' and the local tax for over fifteen
7 7years without receiving any benefit.
Cattle figures given on a district basis do not account for 
disparities within a district nor do they distinguish 
between deaths from disease and deaths from lack of 
grazing. Further difficulties arise in separating the 
efficacy of scientific approaches to disease control and
9 Qindigenous responses to the problem. Although the picture 
is clearer in the case of nagana (see below), Africans 
suggested that 'scientific' methods of controlling the 
fever were less than optimal. Chief Mbata of Mahlabatini 
pointed out, for example, that tick birds, which helped to 
keep the cattle free of vermin, had all disappeared since
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the introduction of dipping. He urged that dipping be
suspended in uninfected areas to encourage the birds to 
9 Qreturn. ^
Disease control for the fever was aimed at supporting white
stock-farmers and did not always take account of local
conditions. The sparse distribution of dipping tanks led to
the over-use of limited pathways by cattle. Thus, local
officials acknowledged that the dipping program was
responsible for severe erosion along the routes to the 
9 ntanks. u Moreover, herds concentrated on white farms often 
appeared to be responsible for localised outbreaks of the 
disease. 1 It is possible that as white stock keepers could 
more easily afford to purchase cattle from further afield 
than Africans their herds were at greater risk of 
infection. In any case, European strains of cattle, with no 
developed immunity, were more susceptible to the fever and 
whites spent more time transporting cattle along infected 
roadways which also increased the potential for 
infection.
While recognizing the overall benefits of the dipping 
programme, many Africans complained bitterly about its 
practical application. People objected to the long and 
arduous treks with their cattle to the tanks, especially in 
the winter months when diminished grazing weakened animals. 
Dipping inspectors often ruthlessly enforced the 
regulations and assessed heavy fines regardless of local
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conditions. Wheelwright noted that,
. . .useful revenue is coining to the state through 
these people not dipping their stock. Practically 
every court day a large number are run in for 
failure to dip their stock, and I can assure you 
that that kind of thing has become rather a severe 
liability to them.^
Moreover, Africans complained that they were forced to dip
their cattle every two weeks or less, even in the winter
months when the risk of infection was lower or in areas 
where there had been no infections for years.^
Drought exacerbated these conditions because the intervals
between dipping were reduced. While more frequent trips to
the tanks added considerably to herding work,
experimentation with the toxicity of dipping bath compounds
occasionally poisoned or weakened animals. 5^ In July 1931,
Abraham Tshoba of Eshowe complained, for example, that not
only were Africans' weakened cattle called to the dips too
often but failure to deliver them also led to destruction
orders from the local tank supervisor. He claimed that
since January of that year 149 head of their cattle had
been destroyed for failure to comply with dipping 
3 f tregulations. In Nongoma, one African sheep-owner was so 
plagued and prosecuted for not having fulfilled his 
obligations under the scab-dipping regulations that he cut
the throats of all his sheep so as to be relieved of his
responsibility.^
Other African complaints included the arbitrary 
confiscation of cattle for petty dipping offences and the 
use of abusive language by white stock inspectors. In
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Ubombo, chief Nkomo (cattle in Zulu) took advantage of his 
official status to intervene in procedures and confiscate
*2 Q
cattle himself. The NAD, concerned that resentment of the
programme would lead to widespread agitation or boycott,
was sensitive to African reactions. It attempted to improve
the situation through propaganda and an unsuccessful
attempt to take over control of reserve dipping from the
*3 qVeterinary Department.
Underlying many of the complaints against the programme 
were serious suspicions about the administration's motives. 
Africans resented the intrusion of officials into so 
central an aspect of their lives. They perceived external 
control of cattle as yet another tactic to undermine 
homesteads, drive more people out into wage labour and 
expropriate more African land. In 1933, they were alarmed 
at the introduction of branding for dipping identification 
purposes in Mtunzini and flatly refused to subject their 
cattle to the overly large crown and "R" brand believing it 
would convey the right of ownership to the government and 
destroy the hides.^ Failure to consult the people prior to 
the planned branding nearly led to open defiance. Violence 
was only averted after the CNC and Solomon personally 
visited the area and dozens of arrests were made.^ -*-
The appearance of new cattle afflictions heightened 
Africans' suspicions of white involvement. In June 193 8, 
the local NAD agricultural officer cordoned off a large 
area of Nquthu and destroyed 8826 cattle, 9634 sheep and 
12 51 goats because of an outbreak of Hoof and Mouth
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disease. Although the state paid out £27,000 in 
compensation, people were understandably shocked at the 
occurrence of such a dangerous new disease. News of the 
outbreak and the cull travelled quickly through Zululand 
and in July, an elderly commoner summed up people's 
feelings.
Why is the Government always talking about our 
cattle? What wrong have our cattle done to the 
Government? It is strange that this new disease 
which comes from countries beyond the sea should 
suddenly break out in the Nqutu [sic] district 
without first having travelled up from the sea or 
through countries such as Portuguese territory. 
What is the explanation for the sudden jumping of 
this disease from England to Nqutu?^
This was the first outbreak of the disease in Zululand. The 
infection was later traced to a shipment of cattle, 
destined for whites, from Cape Town, via Johannesburg and 
Vryheid.^
NAGANA
Whites in Natal perceived nagana as a problem in Zululand 
from at least the mid-1800s, if not earlier. ^  Until the 
advent of white settlement north of the Thukela, however, 
African herders experienced few serious epizootics of this 
disease.^ Zulu settlement avoided the amahlanze (bushveld 
areas) known to harbour the tsetse fly. White settlement 
undermined these safeguards, however, by increasing 
congestion on the land and forcing Africans to move cattle 
into infected areas. The disease then spread out from the 
lower-lying regions and flared up after periods of drought. 
As Ford has argued, it was white settlers and the colonial
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administration which were chiefly responsible for the
■p 46expansion of nagana. u
Settlers somewhat erroneously linked the epidemiology of
the disease to wild game in Zululand. Although the tsetse
fly (predominantly Glossina Pallidipes in Zululand) was
found alongside its main food source, large game, its
habitat was not exclusively dictated by the range of these
animals if substitutes were available. A complex
relationship existed between climate, the bushveld habitat,
game and the fly. A combination of hot, wet summer weather
with an abundance of hosts, either game or cattle, provided
optimal conditions for an increase in fly numbers. Nagana,
however, manifested itself principally during the dry
season. In 1927, Dr. H. Curson, Director of Onderstepoort
(South Africa's principal veterinary centre), found that
the main factor in the seasonal prevalence of nagana was
A 7the deterioration of pastures. There is strong evidence 
to argue that this effect could be exacerbated by 
drought.
Officials believed that the main hosts for the vector were 
harboured in the Umfolozi, Hluhluwe and Mkuzi game 
reserves. The Department of Lands led the crusade to 
safeguard white stock farmers from nagana by pressing for 
the de-proclamation of the game reserves and the wholesale 
slaughter of suspect game.^ Following the establishment of 
the Ntambanana settlement in 1918, settlers were given free 
rein to eradicate all large game in the area. And yet the 
disease persisted and was often reported in areas where it
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had previously been unknown. In a number of areas, nagana 
increased in proportion to the reduction of game as whites 
moved their cattle into the cleared areas.
Finally, in 1928, the Natal veterinarian, Dr. H. Fuller, 
challenged the theory that nagana could be eradicated by 
the destruction of game. He pointed out that the rinderpest 
epidemic which killed off much of the big game in Zululand 
did not stop the tsetse from returning. Despite the huge 
destruction of game in the 192 0s, nagana persisted and new
cattle brought into the fly belt were infected. He argued
further that similar game drives to eradicate the vector 
were equally inconclusive in Rhodesia.^  The wanton 
destruction of game, however, continued. Whites wanted to 
hunt for reasons other than the containment of nagana. The 
NC of Nongoma, E.N. Braatvedt, complained that 'people of 
the poor white class1 were invading the crown lands and 
hunting for commercial purposes.^ The NC at Ubombo noting 
an increase in white hunters, felt that local game should 
be preserved for Africans who could no longer augment their 
food supplies during periods of shortage.
Whites were determined to become stock farmers in areas
which were breeding grounds for the vector: areas which
Africans avoided. As Dr. Curson pointed out, spreading 
nagana '... manifests itself as a result of encroachment of 
the fly area by European settlers rather than that the fly 
has invaded new a r e a s ' S e t t l e r s  often ignored
conventional Zulu wisdom by watering cattle in infected 
lower-lying pools and streams during droughts. Rather than
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allowing the cattle to waste to a certain degree, (a 
condition of the 'poor' Zulu-owned cattle attested to by 
many white observers) whites strove to maintain their herds 
in perfect condition even if it meant exposing them to 
infection.Moreover, settlers and experts believed that 
the purer breeds of cattle purchased by whites in Natal and
C f.
the Transvaal were more susceptible to nagana. The real 
culprits of spreading nagana were not 'ignorant' African 
herdsmen, but rather inexperienced white settlers. During 
the 1920s demobilised soldiers settling in Ntambanana 
purchased cattle from speculators to the northwest and then 
moved them down to the Lower Mhlatuze through the fly- 
infested Enseleni valley. The disease then settled in the 
Ntambanana area and white cattle traders spread it to
c  7
Eshowe.J
Despite, at best, their uneven success with stock-keeping 
in the tsetse areas, the Union government was determined,
C Q
however, to support the new white settlements. Stock- 
farming was, in fact, a substitute livelihood for many of 
the white settlers of northern Zululand. By the early 
1920s, the failure of dry-land cotton plantations at 
Candover and Ntambanana forced whites to consider, albeit 
with generous state support of £20,000, the transition to 
cattle-farming. The powerful Department of Land was able 
to shape much of the crown land policy in the areas 
adjoining the reserves, including continued white 
hunting.^
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R.H Harris of the Veterinary Department's entomological 
section tackled the problem of nagana by focussing on 
controlling the fly vector, and not on the eradication of 
game. He developed a simple, inexpensive but effective trap 
for the tsetse. By June of 193 0, he had proved the trap's 
worth by capturing close to 3,000 flies in a 24-hour
C -1
period. Part of Harris's programme, however, included
thinning out the game around the parks and cutting the bush
F 9back to reduce the fly's breeding grounds. Through the 
193 0s, the Harris trap was used extensively and to great 
effect. Nagana cases were reduced around the settlement 
areas and in the reserves through most of the decade.
Nevertheless, after 1941, there was a serious resurgence of 
nagana when settlers encroached on a corridor established
to contain game between the Mkuzi and Hluhluwe game
Freserves. J By 1942, an estimated 15,000 head of white- and
African-owned cattle in northern Zululand were lost to the
Ft Adisease. * Although aerial spraying of the powerful 
insecticide D.D.T. was introduced in 1945, local 
complications undermined its effectiveness. Initially, 
brief but heavy rains and the density of the bush hampered 
spraying. Between 1944-46, severe drought depleted pastures 
and left cattle weak. Again, white settlers ignored both 
local conditions and restrictions on cattle movement by 
moving almost 2,000 head of cattle into the game corridor 
in search of water. This herd then dispersed over the 
settlement zone carrying infection over a one hundred mile 
area causing a severe epizootic among African- and white- 
owned cattle. The Veterinary Department, with limited
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resources and planes, could not hope to cover so large an 
area with D.D.T. spray. By the end of 1947, over 24,000 
cattle were dead from nagana. Africans, understandably 
bitter because of their losses, correctly blamed the
settlers and, although they did not receive it, demanded 
compensation.^
ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTION
The two most important social mechanisms for the
distribution of cattle in Zulu society were the
institutions of lobola (ukuLobola: bridwealth exchange) and
sisa {ukuSisa: the loaning out of cattle). These
practices remained important in modern Zululand because of
their persistence and adaptation in the capitalist 
fi 7context.' The massively increased herds in Zululand were 
not equally distributed. The commoditisation of cattle and 
stock products reinforced and was reinforced by social 
stratification. More importantly, new cash demands and 
structural constraints changed the manner in which Africans 
accumulated stock, and therefore, their relative ability to 
do so. A rough breakdown of the accumulation of stock by 
class during this period shows the following: wealthy
ruling elites received cattle through patronage, high 
lobola claims and natural increase; the poor barely 
maintained small herds against disease through occasional 
purchases or the sisa custom; the very poor relied on 
substitutes like goats or only sisa cattle.
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That lobola should have survived at all in the face of
repeated environmental assaults and the inclination of
missionaries and the administration to abolish it needs 
some explanation. First, people responded quickly to any
means for preserving and expanding the herds. Cattle were, 
at most times, accessible on the open market for those with 
cash. Africans still focussed on the accumulation of
capital in stock because, as chief Manyala of Nkandhla 
argued, 'Money is like the soil. It is easily washed away, 
but our cattle are always there.100 Moreover, while wage- 
labour enabled younger migrant males to acquire commodities 
outside the confines of rural patriarchy, they invested in 
cattle in order to secure themselves in the reserves 
through the socially accepted accumulation and circulation
/T Q
of livestock.3 Second, the custom was adapted to maintain 
and enhance the position of the older men and the ruling 
elite in Zululand. Despite its concern about overstocking, 
the administration reluctantly accepted these processes in 
order to shore up the crumbling patriarchy. Third, 
congestion accelerated the deterioration of agriculture in
the reserves tipping the balance of production in favour of
7 0 •cattle. ° Overall, the persistence of practices favouring
accumulation in cattle reflected a shift away from
agricultural production in the reserves, partly because
agriculture was more labour intensive than cattle-keeping,
and partly because of the rise of white commercial grain-
farming which undermined the sale of maize to stores by the
Zulu (see below ch. on famine).
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After 1900, the redistributive functions of lobola and sisa 
underwent dramatic changes both in form and content. 
Although continuity with the past was preserved through the 
largely ceremonial aspects of these practices, patterns of 
differentiation based on new adaptations were more 
apparent. Following the rinderpest epizootic most 
homesteads faced the arduous task of restocking. In the 
interim, people turned to substitutes for lobola. Goats, 
blankets, cash and metal implements were introduced into 
the exchange.^ ^ More often than not, however, people simply 
delayed the fulfilment of lobola until the family in 
question could recover from stock losses. The alternate 
items were viewed more as a gesture of goodwill and 
intention to deliver cattle than a complete payment. Once 
the herds had recovered, with the balance of distribution 
probably favouring the ruling elite, trends in accumulation 
established in the 1880s and 1890s accelerated.^
Under these circumstances inflationary local forces shaped
the exchange of lobola. After 19 00, the Zulu patriarchy
demanded increasing numbers of cattle for lobola in order
to redistribute migrants' earnings. The top limit of ten
head for a commoner, although not intended to be the norm,
became the rule, forcing young men to work longer to
7 ”3accumulate the necessary cash for cattle. J By the later
192 0s, as the herds recovered, fathers increasingly
7 Ademanded a return to the payment of lobola m  cattle. 
This reinforced the elders' control of migrant's earnings 
since the older generation controlled the grazing land 
needed to sustain cattle. As Murray and Harries have
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argued, by setting the limit of bridewealth just beyond the 
easy reach of young men, elders and chiefs ensured their
7 c:continued hold over the labouring youth. These
developments caused generational friction as some fathers 
reversed their customary role as purveyors of lobola cattle
and appropriated their son's wage remittances to buy cattle
7 ftfor their own second wives. D Moreover, there was a
tendency for fathers-in-law to demand payment of cattle in
full prior to a marriage which delayed officially
7 7sanctioned marriages.
By 193 0, officials chastised fathers for demanding too high
7 ft ■a number of cattle for lobola. ° The limits established for
lobola by the Natal Code of Native Law extended to Zululand
were as follows: a maximum of ten head for a commoner;
fifteen head for an induna; twenty head for an appointed
7 Qchief and no limit for an hereditary chief. Even Solomon 
acknowledged high claims were a result of fathers selecting
O f)
for their daughters the man most able to pay. The NC at 
Nongoma, a particularly well stocked district, stated that 
he had at least one case of a commoner claiming 2 5 head for
O 1
his daughter. °-L
Chiefs were adamant that they should be allowed to set
o o
whatever level of lobola they liked.  ^ Those who had 
obtained some form of official status within the 
administration, however, benefited most from the inflation 
of claims. Prior to the drought in 1931, some official
p p
induna claimed, and received, up to fifty head of cattle.OJ
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Similarly, other petty officials took advantage of their 
dominant positions. The Natal Mercury claimed that,
The police uniform also gives a Native a certain 
status, and in some cases an enterprising policeman 
has demanded, and received, an induna1s lobola.®^
By the mid-193 0s, the NAD linked the perceived evils of
o c:
overstocking directly to inflated lobola claims. J In an 
effort to reduce cattle numbers officials attempted to 
induce people to use a cash alternative for lobola, thereby 
removing a supposed motivation for maintaining large herds. 
Owing to the effects of rinderpest, the code of Native Law 
allowed for cash substitutes for lobola at a rate of £5 per 
head. At the turn of the century this rate was a fair 
reflection of the market value of cattle. By 1930, however, 
the market value had dropped to between £2 10s. and £3.
Understandably, young men were reluctant to tender cash at 
the inflated rate when they could buy the necessary cattle 
at current market rates. The NC at Hlabisa believed that, 
in the few cases he knew of where the father had demanded 
the cash equivalent, the substitute defeated its intentions 
since the father could convert the £50 received for ten 
cattle into 16 or 17 head.^
There were class and generational differences of opinion 
over the proposed reduction of the cash value for lobola 
cattle among the Zulu. On the whole young male migrants 
favoured a reduction in the rate while older established 
men and the wealthier classes opposed any attempt to 
'cheapen1 the custom. Chiefs claimed it would be 
retrogressive for them to accept less for their daughters
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than they had 'paid' for their wives, and that if the value 
of beasts were to be lowered then the number claimed had to
Q  7
go up. When it was suggested that the object of lowering 
the rate was to help people in congested areas, they 
strongly objected to being placed on the same footing as
p  p
Africans on white farms. Furthermore, when officials 
reminded them of the difficulties experienced in ensuring 
cash remittances from migrant labourers, chiefs responded 
by stating that all lobola transactions should be made only
p  Q
m  cattle and never m  cash.0:7 Rev. Timothy Mate, an
African Zionist minister, pointed out the economic basis of
the transactions in the modern context. Advocating the
retention of the high rate, he noted that raising daughters
was costly in terms of food and clothing and that these
items were never going to be discounted by £2 at the 
Q nstores.
Conversely, young men and commoners complained that the £5 
rate was far too high because the young cattle that fathers 
would accept instead of cash for lobola were not worth that 
amount, and most men earned less than £10 a year. The NC at 
Nongoma, apparently oblivious to the implications of these 
differences, and no doubt holding a firm belief in Zulu 
'traditionalism', summed up the opposing views:
Curiously enough it was the uneducated men who said 
that £5 was too high a figure, and it was the 
Minister of religion who pleaded for that amount. 
It only goes to show that the so-called leaders of 
Native thought are often the most rapacious. I know 
of a famous religious leader who three or four 
years ago claimed and received 7 0 and 50 head of 
cattle respectively for two girls who were not in 
any way related to him, but who belonged to his 
church.
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Women, too, had a stake in maintaining higher rates for 
lobola. Many wives sought to control their share of cattle 
by manipulating lobola as they effectively managed the
Q 9homesteads while the men were absent working. * By the 
193 0s, women in Zululand reinforced lobola as a means of 
maintaining or achieving status by making women from 
marriages unsanctioned by lobola objects of scorn and
Q  "3 .derision. J Moreover, chiefs' wives pressured their 
husbands to maintain high rates for the exchange in order 
to augment family herds. When chief Jantoni was pressed by 
the NC at Ubombo to explain why he was demanding 100 head 
of cattle for his daughter's lobola, he claimed it was his 
wives who demanded the high number since anything less 
would devalue their daughter, and by implication, the wives 
themselves.^
These attitudes helped to reinforc the trend towards the 
concentration of cattle in the upper strata of society 
through lobola-sanctioned marriages, although clearly even 
commoner fathers also benefitted. In part, the state played 
an important role in perpetuating this process by 
officially recognizing the high claims of chiefs and 
induna. Chief Gebemeweni of Mahlabatini, who had seven 
wives, reminded the government of the importance of 
maintaining this practice.
I myself am still ready to take more wives. The 
Government should not object to that, because I 
should get children and these children will pay 
taxes and so increase revenue. With my seven wives 
I pay a lot of revenue to the Government, Sir.^
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In August 1940, when the government was anxious over urban 
African opposition during the war, the NAD intended 
reducing the official value of lobola to £3 to fall in line 
with the recommendations of the Native Economic 
Commission.^ in the face of 'almost universal opposition 
from' Africans, however, the SNA reversed this decision 
stating that, 'In these days we do not want to disturb the
q n
Native unnecessarily.1 Moreover, by the mid-1930s, the 
high rate was reinforced by official recognition that 
induna were not properly recompensed for their increased 
duties. The NAD felt that a combination of cash fees and 
high lobola were necessary to maintain induna as the 
administrative lynchpin of authority, especially in areas
q o
where there were fewer chiefs. ° Clearly the ruling elite 
had convinced the state to maintain a mechanism which gave 
them a substantial portion of their income.
These conditions proved irksome to a number of men who 
claimed, but who by the 1940s, had little popular support 
or state recognition. Although there were no restrictions 
on the lobola they could claim, Mshiyeni and his brother, 
Pita kaDinuzulu complained that many fellow members of the 
royal family were classed as commoners for the purposes of 
lobola, and had to refuse, on pain of punishment,
Q Qsubstantial offers of cattle for their daughters.  ^
Mshiyeni also protested that the rate of two beasts set for 
seduction damages impinged on the 'rights1 of royalty to 
claim more. While the CNC, Lugg, recommended the NAD allow 
for higher claims in seduction cases involving royalty and 
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Noting the proliferation of claims to positions of rank in 
Zululand he argued:
There are hundreds of members of the Zulu Royal
house in Zululand and thousands of persons of rank
in Zululand... Mshiyeni1s proposal would not
benefit anyone except the people of rank who would
be enriched at the expense of the poorer people. It
would only add to our overstocking problem, and
would result in increased litigation and trouble.
Such class distinction would be resented by the
i  n iwhole nation, and would be unfair.
By 1948, other, less influential, men also faced official
censure for 'falsely representing1 their status in order to
receive more lobola. In Nquthu, chief Molife used his
patronage to appoint a number of unofficial induna all of
whom claimed high lobola. The NC was reprimanded for not
having kept the matter in check and reminded that only
officially recognized men should be allowed higher claims
i  n 9than commoners.
SISA
While the herds increased and people appear to have had 
access to an 'over-abundance1 of cattle in Zululand, this
i n-3
did not mean equal ownership and full rights over stock. 
Through the 1920s and 1930s, some families lost the battle 
to maintain any stock at all. By 1945, however, about 10 
per cent of families in Nongoma and Nquthu, for example, 
were cattle owners. This suggests that, with an average of 
six or seven people per family, the majority of Zulu had 
access to cattle. Of this 10 per cent, nearly 40 per cent 
had more than 2 5 head while less than 7 per cent had fewer 
than five head which suggests that many owners in the
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middling ranks held sustainable herds.Nevertheless, 
there is evidence of an increase in the herds of the 
chiefly elite. Through the 1930s, the owners of 
increasingly large herds relied on the sisa practice of 
loaning out cattle to poor kin and commoners heavily, in 
part to make use of their labour for maintaining the herds 
in a reciprocal relation, and probably, in part, to ensure 
some degree of popular support.
In pre-colonial times, the sisa practice functioned for the
mutual benefit of the owner and the recipient. Thus, the
owner could amass larger herds than his family could
ordinarily care for by exploiting the labour of other less
wealthy families. -p^ g caretakers benefited from milk
while the cattle was under their care, and usually an
isiSinga (literally a rope for tying up cattle but known as
i  n f\a gift of cattle) beast from the natural increase. uo From 
this natural increase, a poorer family could build up a 
herd of its own. Ownership of the original cattle remained 
with the lender but long-term arrangements gave some 
security to the recipients. The practice also served as a 
safeguard against localised outbreaks of disease or drought 
by spreading the cattle over a number of different 
geographical zones. In the capitalist context, however, the 
reciprocal functions of the practice were undermined.
In twentieth-century Zululand, sisa lost its social
dimension by taking on a more overtly exploitive role, and
Zulu society perceived recipients of loaned-cattle as 
1 n 7impoverished. ' Implicit m  the loaning out of cattle were
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1 0  8notions of charity and status associated with largesse.
The poor and cattle-less refugees ejected from white farms
still received sisa cattle; now however, the retention of
any natural increase was often contingent on a cash
payment. -^9 chiefs with massive herds jealously guarded the
productive and reproductive capacities of their cattle.
Chief Mtubatuba reportedly owned 15,000 cattle which were
spread out among his people. It was claimed, however, that
commoners could not inspan the oxen lest they be
overworked; that only the chief could slaughter the cattle
for meat for himself; and that while his people could drink
the milk, they could not retain hides or natural 
110increase. u
With the advent of white settlement within and on the 
fringes of Zululand, sisa was no longer an exclusively 
African practice. Despite the political drive for 
segregation both nationally and locally, many whites were 
an integral part of the African cattle economy. When it 
suited them, they easily overcame their prejudice against 
'unhealthy1 African-owned cattle, to take advantage of both 
labour clientage and grazing in the reserves. The sisa 
practice provided a convenient legal and social precedent 
for whites to gain access to these productive assets. A 
number of cash-strapped white families could not afford to
employ labour for cattle herding or to pay the NAD's fees
111for grazing and dipping cattle m  the reserves.111 Other 
whites simply did not have access to enough varied grazing 
land in the areas of white settlement. The delimitation of 
Zululand had cut both ways in restricting access to
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pastures. Thus, whites turned to Africans who were entitled 
to use free grazing land in the reserves, and, more 
importantly, who could provide free labour to care for 
their cattle-herding.
By the mid-1920s, substantial numbers of white-owned cattle
were under African care in the northern districts. Close to
3,000 head of white-owned cattle were spread out over
Mahlabatini, Hlabisa and Ubombo and a further 3,500 were
119grazed m  Nongoma alone.  ^ Concern about pasture
degradation led the NAD to eject these cattle to 'save'
1 1 ^Africans from their own 'folly' in allowing them in. The 
underlying motive was to reduce the number of white-owned 
cattle cared for by Africans which were being dipped at the 
expense of the NAD.
Understandably, Africans were reluctant to admit they were 
in possession of white-owned sisa stock and the practice 
went largely unreported. Administrative caution meant 
officials were hesitant to interfere with a custom accepted 
by the people and codified in 'Native Law’ since the 
Shepstone era.-'-^ Initially, the NAD was prepared to make 
exceptions for cases in which sisa cattle were found to be
11C
'essential to the welfare’ of a family. In 1931,
however, as concern over erosion increased, the CNC 
promulgated much stricter regulations against the practice 
and encouraged chiefs and induna to turn in fellow reserve 
dwellers if they had white-owned sisa stock 'in excess' of 
an area's carrying c a p a c i t y ^  Once again, the ruling 
elite were favoured: sisa cattle considered 'excessive'
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were white-owned and not theirs. In 1932, in Nongoma alone, 
whites were forced to remove over 3,000 head of cattle 
which they had loaned to impoverished inhabitants.117 By 
1950, officials had ejected all white-owned cattle and 
closed the area to any more loaned herds.118
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CATTLE SALES
The transformation of cattle exchange from a form of barter 
to a saleable commodity accelerated the gulf in its 
differentiated ownership. Setswana sophistry put it 
succinctly: 'money eat c a t t l e T h e  introduction of
direct cash costs to cattle-keeping and the manipulation of 
social institutions surrounding cattle changed the value of 
stock in the capitalist context. Few people could look to 
herding as a means of accumulating wealth although it was a 
mainstay of subsistence. The accumulation of cattle 
increasingly depended on differentiated access to 
diminishing resources. The commoditisation of cattle not 
only intensified conditions of impoverishment for Africans, 
it reflected wider processes of stratification. For large 
herd owners the sale of cattle was an entree into the 
market and enabled them to purchase goods; for the rank and 
file it was a last resort in the struggle to resist 
dislocation from the rural economy.
It is difficult to trace the first occasion when Africans 
in Zululand sold cattle for cash on a wide-scale. Certainly 
barter and exchange relations based on cattle pre-dated the 
colonial era.-'-^  Initially white store-keepers in the 
reserves bartered cattle against grain. However, 
limitations on grazing when store-sites were leased 
prevented store-keepers from dealing in large numbers of 
cattle. The advent of cash markets for stock added a new 
dimension to the cattle economy by redirecting 'surpluses' 
outside the local economy. Moreover, the administration's
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demand for tax to be paid in cash rather than in goods from
1896, forced many families to sell off the occasional 
1 91beast.  ^ Certainly the development of road and rail 
infrastructure aided the movement of cattle for sale. A 
testimony to both the value of African-owned cattle and the 
demands of the expanding regional economy was that, in 
essence, the market came to Zululand rather than that 
Africans sought the market.
It was not until Solomon began his notorious cattle
collections in the late 1920s that regular markets for Zulu
cattle developed, however. His ambiguous dependence on the
outside world extended beyond the white state. Through the
later 1910s and 1920s, he was embroiled in a series of
embarrassing financial dealings. Through the convergence of
the mostly self-interested motives of the emerging petty
bourgeois and members of the Zulu royal family, Solomon
began a series of cattle and cash collections under the
12 2auspices of the nationalist organization Inkatha kaZulu.^^ 
Invoking the custom of royal tribute grounded in a long 
history of chiefly exactions, Solomon was able to service 
his mounting debt through the offerings of the Zulu 
'nation'. The administration, however, fearing a 
recrudescence of Zulu royal power, considered his actions 
to be a dangerous manipulation of 'tradition1.
He has been allowed to act in a manner which would
not be tolerated in the case of any other official,
European or Native. I refer to the many levies made 
by him on the Zulu Nation. There is no precedent 
for these levies... A general levy on the Nation 
was never resorted to. The practice that has sprung 
up is, therefore, an entirely new one.^^
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From the mid-192 0s until 1932 some thousands of head of
cattle and over £20,000 in cash was collected, most of
19 4.which went to maintain Solomon's decadent lifestyle. 
Although local officials derided the cattle offered as 
'scrub1, la Hausse has remarked the subscriptions were a 
'...remarkable testimony [to] the willingness of drought- 
stricken Zulu commoners to respond to the appeals of the 
Zulu Royal House. The cash value of this collected
cattle was never realised by the subscribers and so did not 
constitute a real participation in the market. What was 
significant for commoners was the advent of a number of 
white and African cattle speculators, associated with the 
royal collections, who fuelled cattle sales.
Central to Solomon's collections and general cattle 
speculation in Zululand was A. S. Blackhurst. Appointed as 
court messenger to the royal house in 192 8, he established 
a hides and skins business in the reserves and developed 
this into a thriving livestock trade. Blackhurst, was '... 
a peculiarly unsavoury individual who had an intimate
1 2 ftknowledge of Solomon's precarious financial position'. ° 
Along with other, perhaps somewhat less predatory, white 
traders, he established a network for the purchase of 
cattle from cash-strapped Africans. -^7 Blackhurst gained 
legitimacy and access to Zulu cattle not only through 
connections to the royal house but also through alliances 
with a number of calculating African entrepreneurs. Men 
like Petros Maling, the founder of Abaqulusi Land Union, 
Simpson Bhengu and Gideon Msimang exhibited remarkable 
energy in scouring the reserves for people willing to sell
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cattle.-*-2® After Solomon's death in 1933, the combined 
efforts of these men remained focussed on Zululand's cattle 
as they transformed the cattle collections into widespread 
small-scale purchases.
While a number of itinerant traders and speculators worked 
the kraals and dipping tanks of southern and central 
Zululand, Blackhurst concentrated on his established 
territory, the northern districts. He set up the 'Zulu 
Cattle Trust Fund' more commonly known as the 'cattle
1 9 Qbank’. x  ^ An insidious variant of established speculating 
practice, the 'cattle bank' was Blackhurst's own 
modification of his earlier collections for Solomon. Under 
the scheme, he promised money to any 'subscriber' who 
placed cattle in his care for later sale. The purported 
advantage of this plan was that the cattle could be 
fattened for sale on the better pastures of Blackhurst's 
Melmoth farm. Complications arose when Blackhurst 
experienced highly suspect 'cash flow1 problems and claimed 
he was unable to pay out the promised money. A number of 
subscribers sued him for failure to fulfil his contract and
I Tf]won their cases. Under fire from the local NC, and
threatened with prosecution, Blackhurst nevertheless 
continued his dubious practice. -^1
Despite their often tenuous financial dealings and the 
decided antipathy of the NAD, (which was latterly partly 
because of its introduction of cattle auctions, see below) 
cattle speculators thrived in Zululand. Part of the reason 
for their success was the impoverishment of many
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homesteads. Speculators, in general, and Blackhurst in 
particular, were well poised to take advantage of the
devastating effects of the drought and famine which hit 
Zululand in the early 1930s. The latter freely admitted
that his 'bank' had its origins in the depression and
famine. Claiming that he provided a ready market for the
very poor class of Zulu 'scrub' cattle he argued:
Long before any move was made by the [NAD] , their 
stock, which had become a liability, or at least a 
potential loss [became] a profit to themselves and 
of course to me.... In the absence of any adequate 
demand for labour, the natives have only their 
cattle as a means of discharging their obligations. 
Many natives have no cattle fit for the Government 
sales, and it is the natives with the scrub cattle, 
whom I have specially catered for all along.
Moreover, an important reason why the Zulu turned to the 
speculators was that they occasionally traded younger 
cattle in their reproductive prime, often in a two to one 
ratio, to Africans for older but heavier oxen which could 
be sold easily to the abattoirs for slaughter. This
allowed the Zulu to increase the reproductive capacity of 
their herds in less time than normal natural increases 
would provide for.
Support for the speculators was also based on political 
affiliations and cleavages in Zulu society. The ruling 
elite, who associated with Blackhurst because of his 
proximity to Solomon, maintained their patronage, partly as 
a form of opposition to the government. Thus, Mnyaiza Zulu, 
one of Solomon's chief advisers firmly supported 
Blackhurst, while Mabhoko Ntshangase, formerly a 
distinguished Zulu general, expressed resentment at the
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local NC1s exhortations to abandon Blackhurst in favour of
NAD sales:
You are speaking to us as if we were on a par with
those people who hide away in the forests from
their tax obligations, knowing quite well that we
have endured a very severe time of food scarcity,
and shortage of money and means generally. We don't
like this kind of threatened expression- to be
grabbed by the throats in this way and told the law
will be put in motion against us. [echoing
Blackhurst] I personally have no sons worth talking
about- my children are my cattle and long before
the Government came to our assistance we had been
associated with a European in this very effort to 
134get money.
Speculators often offered the only ready market for Zulu
1 ”3 C
cattle considered to be unfit for normal markets. J A co­
operative scheme for selling cattle direct to the Durban 
abattoir, set up by Gideon Msimang with E. N. Braatvedt' s 
support, was undermined, for example, by the rejection of 
many diseased cattle.^ 6  similarly, Mr. D. Pretorius, an 
agent for the Union Cold Storage Company in Durban, was 
frustrated in fulfilling a large contract for the Italian 
Army with Zululand cattle as they were found to be
1^7
underweight. Moreover, speculators saved people from
having to drive their cattle long distances across possibly 
infected areas to a rail-head or an auction site.
By the early 193 0s, both African- and white-owned cattle
from Zululand were stigmatised for originating in 'Black 
1 3 ftAreas'. Sellers often incurred an added capitation fee
from the abattoir to cover potential losses from beef
13 9measles or had consignments rejected out of hand. At
least Blackhurst was prepared to accept 'poor' cattle and 
fatten them himself. Furthermore, he had access to grazing
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farms in the Vryheid district and so could obfuscate the 
origins of his consignments.-*-^
CATTLE AUCTIONS
The widespread sale of cattle by Africans intensified
during the serious drought and depression of the early
193 0s. A combination of reduced labour demand, crop
failures and general economic distress forced many
homesteads to sell cattle to meet subsistence needs. In the
early phase of the severe drought in 1931, however, local
traders were unwilling to take emaciated cattle for maize,
fearing they would have difficulty selling them while
141prices were down. *-*- Africans immediately felt the pinch. 
Rugeni Ndwandwe, an induna in Nongoma, protested that, 
'Unless the authorities give us a good market for our 
cattle, all the gaols will be full.’-*-^  The failure of 
private enterprise to meet the demands of the crisis forced 
the NAD to consider alternative means of getting cash and 
therefore food into African hands.-*-^
Following the lead set by white speculators and African 
entrepreneurs, the Department turned to auctions as a means 
of reducing cattle numbers. Braatvedt's involvement in 
Msimang's co-operative marketing scheme proved to an 
influential official that Africans were willing to sell 
independently of local speculators.-*-^ Apparently a number 
of the aspiring petty bourgeois were no longer prepared to 
suffer the vagaries of Blackhurst's operation. The CNC, 
J.M. Young, endorsed Braatvedt's enthusiastic suggestion
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that they hold their own sales since government auctions
neatly coincided with administrative desires to wrest
control of the 'surplus' productivity of Zululand away from
an independent free market which, it believed, undermined
its control of the Zulu, and to save the reserves from 
145erosion.
In late 1931, Braatvedt organized and vociferously promoted
NAD sales for African-owned cattle in Nongoma. He was
convinced that the people would turn out in large numbers
to sell their stock, at least as long as the famine
lasted. Indeed, by the end of the winter, over 1,300
head had been offered. Prices, however, were low, averaging
14 7£2.4.9. a head and only 224 cattle were sold. * Undaunted 
by the poor results, the NC rationalised the situation by 
pointing out that few buyers had actually turned up and 
people had offered only thin 'scrub' cattle. It was
clear that if the auctions were to succeed officials would 
have to persuade Africans to sell some of their best cattle 
at government sales and to persuade whites to attend the 
remote sales and consider thinner and presumably cheaper 
stock.
It was difficult for the NAD to achieve these aims 
considering the level of competition which surrounded 
cattle production in the Union. With the introduction of 
the Beef Bounties Act in 1923, aimed at improving cattle 
for the international export market by preventing the 
importation of underweight stock from neighbouring 
countries, white-stock farming in South Africa entered a
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protectionist period which was intensified by the
d e p r e s s i o n . B y  the later 1920s, the department of
agriculture hoped to eradicate all 'scrub1 stock held by
both whites and Africans.
Paradoxically, during the 192 0s, whites struggling to
improve their livestock, perceived African-owned cattle as 
both a commercial threat in a developing but tenuous market 
and a health threat to white-owned European breeds of 
cattle. Whites tended to favour cross-breeds of Hereford 
and Africander cattle which achieved weights which were 2 50 
lbs. greater than most African breeds except for select 
herds of Zulu nyonikayiphumuli (white cattle principally 
held by the royal family).151 During the 1930s, as 
agricultural officials recommended areas of northern
Zululand for the expansion of white cattle farming, 
settlers placed an even greater emphasis on segregating 
white- and African-owned herds, which were increasingly 
perceived to be the source of 'scrub' breeds and
disease. This did not prevent speculators from
purchasing reserve cattle, however, and re-selling it as 
white-owned cattle once it had been moved to a white farm 
and fattened.
By the 1930s, agricultural officials were concerned with 
more than the threat that African-owned cattle posed to 
white marketing. They believed that the dramatic increases 
in African herds undermined the land's carrying capacity 
and threatened the reserve economy.-^4 Veterinarians, 
moreover, argued that while more African 'scrub' cattle
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survived drought and disease than European breeds, they 
were carriers of infection and produced less milk.^~^ 
Although African-owned cattle may have carried disease, the 
Zulu knew that their animals had resistance to disease and 
that larger numbers of cattle provided more milk than a few 
select ones.-^^
A number of factors undermined the state auctions. First, 
Africans were decidedly disappointed in the prices offered. 
It seemed pointless undertaking an arduous trek to the 
sales to be insulted with bids of under £4 for an ox which 
they felt should have fetched £10 or even £25.^^ Secondly, 
a brief respite in the drought allowed for a better maize 
and corn crop in 1932 thus reducing cash demands for food. 
Thirdly, and most importantly in the eyes of the NAD, 
Blackhurst and his cohorts were thought to be undermining 
the sales. Rumours circulated that the government would 
charge a 6s. penalty for any head of cattle offered and not 
sold and that if people did not respond willingly to the 
NAD sales they would be forced to sell later for lower
1 CO
prices. JO Finally, the NAD linked African fears of 
prosecution and the attachment of cattle for failure to pay
-ICQ
taxes to the poor support for auctions.
The auctions picked up considerably in 1933. The numbers of 
cattle offered and sold increased dramatically, and a
higher proportion of the cattle presented by Africans was
1 fi Dsold. u This was due both to the improved condition of 
cattle offered and the willingness of Africans to accept 
lower prices. More significantly, it was a reflection of
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more desperate financial need. Indeed, a graph of cattle 
sales for the Nongoma district reads like a time-line of 
economic distress. People sold heavily during the winter 
months when food was scarce. Sales fell off considerably 
during both the planting season and in periods when food 
was more abundant. ■*■ ^^ Africans nevertheless responded 
shrewdly to the market. During the mild drought of 193 5, 
when cattle prices were up and disease less prevalent, the 
NC at Nongoma commented that
Surprisingly the enterprising Zulu managed to 
produce many animals which were quite fat having 
been grazed in the lower Ivuna and Mkuze 
valleys. °
No records of the number of sellers and how many cattle 
each offered were kept.. Some indication of how widespread 
participation was can be gleaned from the comment of the 
Zululand Cattle Auction Committee that at the original Mona 
sales over 1,200 cattle were offered, 'by almost as many 
sellers'.163 picture is further complicated by the
changing ownership of herds, however. As we have seen, by 
1945, 10.5 per cent (just over 3,000 people) in Nongoma
actually owned c a t t l e . A s  a general rule, people offered 
cattle for sale in proportion to their holdings. Thus, 
while small herd owners probably only sold infrequently or 
in dire circumstances, those commoners with five to twenty- 
five head, and chiefs and induna with larger herds probably 
sold more regularly. It would appear, then, that those 
selling at the auctions were among the middle and upper 
ranks of the cattle-owning classes. Commoner families with 
smaller herds, however, probably sold, on occasion, to 
local farmers and speculators. While there was a slightly
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more equal distribution of cattle in the early 1930s, with 
most if not all families owning at least a few head, and 
more commoners sold stock during the depression, the 
auctions were best supported by government-appointed chiefs 
and induna while Solomon, the royal family and chief Bokwe 
of the Mandlakazi, who were probably the largest herd- 
owners, preferred to deal with Blackhurst.
The auctions had an uneven effect on the local economy.
Only those with cattle could benefit directly. 
Increasingly, many families had to meet regular cash 
demands through migrant wage labour. When the NAD extended 
the sales to southern Zululand, it met the concerns of 
local whites with ironic assurances.
Farmers should not be apprehensive that their 
labour supply will be adversely affected. Labour 
agents in Nongoma district state that the labour
supply has, if anything, improved since the sales 
were introduced - probably because the Native 
begins to aspire to a better standard of living, 
and because the people are better fed and
consequently in better physical condition. D
While the auctions did mean the infusion of substantial 
amounts of cash into the local economy it did not reach all 
impoverished commoners. Between the start of the sales and 
the middle of 1933, sales revenue amounted to £4355. By
1937, the sales were bringing in well over £25,000 a
1 f\ 7year. D/ Braatvedt, however, mistakenly attributed high 
rates of tax collection and the reduction of the mealie 
debt to these sales. On the contrary, most of the debt 
repayment and taxation were met by increased labour 
migration.-^9 Nevertheless, the NC eulogised the effects of 
the sales:
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From being the worst tax paying District in Natal,
Nongoma has become the best. We have paid off
£10,000 of our mealie [maize] debt, and the whole
of Solomon's levy [over £4,000 assigned to the
Usuthu by the NAD after it covered his debts]. The
result is more contentment, a better fed people,
and a better feeling between European and Native. 
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In fact, as Cope has shown, it was the NAD itself which
came to the rescue of the Usuthu and wrote off much of the
'tribal levy* in 1937, although much of the maize debt 
remained.Moreover, Braadvedt admitted that the majority 
of cattle sold came from chiefs, the large herd owners who 
'did not need to sell at all'.-*-^ Since it was the 
impoverished cattle-less Zulu who incurred most of the 
maize debt, the sales could not have helped them.
The NAD was so convinced of the value of the Braatvedt' s
sales that it rapidly extended them to the southern
districts, where problems of congestion and overstocking
were at their worst, and later to Natal and the Transvaal
17 3in a country-wide effort to reduce overstocking. While 
these auctions failed to attract any significant support, 
the NAD's persistence indicates a rather desperate attempt 
to provide some material viability to African rural areas.
By 1935, auction yards had been erected in Eshowe, Nquthu, 
Nkandhla and Melmoth. Overall, the sales were a complete 
failure in these districts. Most people sold directly to 
speculators and butchers who had easy road access to the 
southern reserves. ^ ^  The advantage that the NAD had of 
securing a relaxation of East Coast Fever restrictions for 
their sales was lost when butchers bought and slaughtered
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stock in the reserves and simply removed the meat.^^ White 
stock-farmers in the inland districts often bartered 
mealies directly for African-owned cattle. Many people in 
Nquthu and Nkandhla were scared off from the government 
auctions by the threat of prosecution for tax-default.^^ 
Through the 1940s, despite persistent efforts to increase 
sales the auctions failed to achieve the stated goal of 
reducing stock numbers. Although higher prices prevailed 
during World War II, in 1946, after a serious drought and 
disease with the consequent loss of over 20,000 head of 
cattle, sales dropped until the herds recovered.-*-^ The
introduction of an auction tax of 6s. per head in 1945 did 
not help the s a l e s . M o r e o v e r ,  by the mid-1940s, 
polarisation between Africans and the state had increased. 
Braatvedt, exhibiting the typical hostility of Natal 
officials to African politicians, claimed that the poor 
attendance at the sales was a result of 'The ill-will
towards the White man which is being preached in season and 
out by prominent Native leaders.' and that:
One is frequently met with the argument that the
encouragement given to cattle sales is for the
purpose of impoverishing the Native by depriving 
him of his cattle and land.
The failure of the auctions should be seen in the context 
of the state's underlying desire to contain Zulu cattle and 
prevent erosion. Moreover, the total market for African- 
owned cattle has also to be taken into consideration. There 
was an increase in the number of speculators circulating 
through the reserves and redirecting the sale of cattle
i on
into private hands when the auctions slumped. Moreover, 
the Zulu believed that speculators had no agenda other than
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the profit motive, to purchase African-owned cattle. It is
not possible to gauge the total off-take of cattle through
sales in Zululand without accurate figures for private
sales. Overall, the numbers sold, slaughtered or lost to
drought and disease did not keep pace with the rates of
1 ft 1natural increase, however. °
The evidence suggests that, even at their peak, cattle 
sales in Zululand never threatened to undermine herd 
maintenance. During the 1930s and 1940s, the number of 
cattle sold in the drier low-potential grazing areas of 
Nongoma, Hlabisa and Ubombo averaged around 6 to 8 per cent
-1 o o
of the total herds m  these districts. According to
model herd projections developed for East African 
pastoralism, this level of sale does not usually cause an 
overall reduction in herd size unless severe drought or
-1 Q O
disease strike. In southern Zululand, where auctions
were poorly supported, sales constituted less than 0.5 per
1 ft 4cent of local herds.-LOU
Moreover, the bulk of the cattle offered for sale consisted 
of animals which were not crucial either to the 
reproduction of the herds or the provision of milk. In 
Nongoma, for example (the only district for which there are 
accurate figures), between 1934 and 1948, only between 1 
and 3 per cent of cattle sold at the NAD auctions were 
heifers with the potential to calve in the next few years. 
Close to 60 per cent of the animals sold were older 
slaughter and draught oxen; these fetched the best sale 
prices at Durban abattoirs. The remaining animals sold were
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split equally between older cows, bulls and 'tollies' 
(young, un-castrated m a l e s ) . F o r  the whole of Zululand, 
available figures for the period 1945-1950 suggest that 
mature slaughter oxen and older cows constituted the bulk 
of sales, ranging from 60 to 80 per cent of animals sold. 
Heifers and 'tollies' never accounted for more than 15 per 
cent of cattle sold and were usually about 5 to 10 per cent 
of animals offered.^
It was unlikely that, apart from a few wealthy chiefs, the 
Zulu gained any ground in their struggle against 
impoverishment through the sale of cattle. Sales were, on 
the one hand, a means to delay or escape entering into wage 
labour for a very few. Most families, however, could not 
count on establishing ownership of their own viable and 
reproducing herd from which to make regular sales to meet 
cash needs. On the other hand, chiefs, induna and men of 
status could generate substantial incomes from the sale of 
cattle without undermining their herds. The overall trend 
was for the vast majority of Zulu to get poorer while the 
few who owned cattle got richer.
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Opportunities and experiences of wage labour for Africans 
in and around the fringes of Zululand were an important 
part of the labour story in industrialising South Africa. 
Employment on sugar and wattle farms, coal mines and 
government works projects formed a link in the wage 
employment 'chain1 between rural peasant production and 
those fully engaged in migrant labour in the urban areas. 
The advent of white commercial agriculture in Zululand in 
the early 1900s often provided the first foray into 
capitalist relations of employment for the Zulu and was, 
equally often, the remaining recourse for men burned out by 
the mines. Moreover, Zululand was a transitional region for 
men moving along the 'chain1 in either the direction of 
more stable urban employment or back into rural 
'retirement1.-'- Workers from as far afield as the Transkei 
and Nyasaland resorted to contracts in Zululand when other 
avenues of employment were closed to them or if they 
desired shorter periods of employment.
From the 1910s, the development of white commercial farming 
in Zululand, predominantly sugar plantations, failed to 
attract local Zulu labour.2 Labour migration from Zululand, 
which began in the 1880s and increased dramatically in the 
first half of the twentieth century, was primarily directed 
beyond the confines of the old Zulu Kingdom. 3 Even before 
the turn of the century, the majority of the Zulu male 
migrant population had developed strong links with the Rand
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mines and industry in Durban. Chronically under­
capitalised, but with a political strength disproportionate 
to their role in the South African economy, the sugar 
planters replicated the processes and problems the mines 
had in recruiting Zulu migrant labour, although they were 
far less successful in solving them.4
'ZULU’ LABOUR
The 'ethnic specialisation’ of labour, evident on the Rand 
and in Natal by the 1890s, allowed for the development of a 
Zulu migrant consciousness. Most Zulu at least aspired to 
take better-paid jobs on the Rand and Durban rather than 
rely on poorly paid local employment and they carved out 
niches for themselves as 'washermen’, dock workers, and 
slightly later, police men on the mines.5 Although, as will 
be seen below, this consciousness changed over time and was 
often appropriated by a range of ethnic groups, it was an 
important element in local resistance to work in the sugar 
industry. At the same time, the number of Zulu engaged in 
migrant labour steadily increased through the first four 
decades of the twentieth century as impoverishment drove 
more of them into the burgeoning industrial and 
manufacturing centres of South Africa.6 By the 1930s, 
pressure on land, the rapid deterioration of reserve 
agriculture and the concomitant necessity to purchase food 
were crucial in driving out migrant labour (see ch. on 
famine).
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This thesis cannot deal adequately with the experience of 
Zulu migrants in South Africa's industrial centres. It 
does, however, attempt to survey the priorities of the Zulu 
worker in terms of work experience and job preference. In 
an important article, William Beinart has underlined the 
importance of the rural background in shaping migrant 
workers' consciousness. 7 In the Zulu case too, this was 
important. At the same time, aspects of ethnic 
differentiation deeply permeated the mind-set of people in 
the reserves, both as a result of their migrant experience 
and the nature of local labour opportunities.8
Rates of formal labour migration from Zululand rose 
steadily during the 192 0s, reaching an average annual total 
of approximately 45,000 out of a total population of 
32 0,000 during the depression. Approximately 3,500 of these 
were women. The majority of migrants sought work in Durban 
and other urban centres and about 3-4,000 worked on the 
coal mines. The balance (totals available for Natal and 
Zululand were 5,094 in 1920, 6,034 in 1930, 16,163 in 1936 
and 18,472 in 1939) of male migrants were contracted by the 
Rand mines or found their way into other work in 
Johannesburg.9 The overall demographic effect of this 
predominantly male migration was reflected in the reserves 
masculinity ratio. By 193 6, 49 per cent of the African male 
population between the ages of 18 and 54 were absent from 
the reserves.10 This substantially increased the burden of 
homestead labour on women and children as the potential for 
agricultural productivity on congested land decreased. ^
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The number of people seeking work peaked during years of 
economic and environmental crisis, such as in 1930-32, 
1936, and 1942. When these peaks coincided with a shortage 
of labour opportunities in urban areas many Zulu men were 
forced to turn to local work. In 1931, for example, due to 
the depression, the Enyati and Hlobane coal mines in Natal 
retrenched over 3,000 men and the Rand mines cut back on 
recruiting, forcing the workers to seek employment on white 
farms, albeit for a short period.12 During a milder drought 
and depression in 1942, unskilled Zulu migrants, competing 
with increased numbers of foreign workers, were again 
reluctantly forced to turn to the sugar farms for relief 
employment.13 Moreover, during drought, older, 'retired' 
men who had re-established themselves in the reserves were 
forced out in search of wage labour to buy food.14 Rejected 
by the mines as 'unfit', older men often resorted to local 
work on the cane farms or occasionally on state relief 
projects after the 1930s, to earn cash.^ By the late 1930s 
and into the 1940s, not only was the age of 'retirement' 
for men rising; the frequency with which 'retirees' had to 
find some form of low-paid local work also increased.16
The involvement of the majority of Zulu families in migrant 
wage labour had a considerable impact on the rural 
political economy and the reconstruction of social 
relations. By the late 192 0s, the atomisation of larger 
kin-supported families was apparent. The Zulu developed a 
new reliance on migrants and the remittance of wages which 
contrasted with earlier generations' ability to sustain 
themselves solely from agriculture in the reserves. By the
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early 193 0s, this reliance was an acute symptom of the 
deterioration of the rural economy.^
Through the 1920s and 1930s Zulu migrants resisted state 
efforts to get a portion of their earnings. Tax arrears in 
Zululand mounted steadily during the 192 0s to reach over 
£90,000 by 1936.18 Although officials attempted to 
prosecute tax defaulters, most of them escaped the short 
reach of the law. Following the precedent set by 
magistrates who were reluctant to prosecute deserters, 
since they perceived the breach of contract to be a civil 
law matter, the NAD found a far more effective way to prise 
taxes from migrants. In 1932, the NC of Nquthu started 
suing defaulters and attaching their families' property. 
This method also tended to reinforce rural-urban linkages. 
As the NC stated,
The writs appear to have very far reaching effect 
and many defaulters have been discovered in labour 
centres by the importunity of the home relatives 
who fear the threat of the sale of stock.19
It was this threat to family property in the reserves which 
prompted migrant remittances.
Despite increasing urbanisation, the majority of Zulu 
migrants preferred to enter wage labour on the mines under 
the Assisted Voluntary Scheme (AVS), established in 1928.20 
As Crush has argued, employment through the AVS was one 
indication of strong rural links and family control over 
migrants since they could select the time of year when men 
were sent out.21 Moreover, crisis situations highlighted
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the links, both social and economic, between the migrant 
labour force and rural families.
DIFFERENTIATION, ETHNICITY AND LABOUR MIGRATION
The contrast between those Africans engaged in local 
employment and those migrating, which was blurred in the 
1910s, was brought into sharp relief in the 1920s and 30s. 
Specialised employment in the local state administration, 
as clerks, interpreters, police, and dipping inspectors, 
tended to be reserved for men of rank. Although, as Beinart 
has argued, pre-colonial forms of rank and authority were 
to some extent translated into the new context, by the 
192 0s, work experience was an important factor in 
determining the ability of migrants to secure better jobs 
and pay.22 Labour touts in Zululand often made cash 
advances above the £2 limit to men 'whose antecedents were 
known1 and who had a proven work record. 23 Between these 
two groups, mission-educated literate Africans found a 
niche on mission stations, as teachers, or in service to 
the ruling elite. Lesser paid local jobs, in agriculture or 
later in state relief works (see ch. on 'Betterment1)/ were 
the domain of commoners who ultimately sought jobs in the 
cities.
Zulu male workers firmly believed in their 'superior1 
status as labourers ascribed to them by the Zulu patriarchy 
and white officials. Shaped in part by the gendered 
division of labour in Zulu society, and in part by wider 
work experiences, Zulu men clung to ethnic identities
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which, as Guy and Thabane have argued in the case of the
Sotho, protected them in a hostile and rightless
9 Aenvironment. It was with a certain degree of
embarrassment that men interviewed about their working 
lives reluctantly admitted to working on sugar farms, and 
then added that they had only done so for a few years as 
young boys.2 5 Most men prided themselves on not having had 
to resort to agricultural labour, which they perceived to 
be 'woman's work1. When questioned about working conditions 
in local agriculture by the Herbst Committee, appointed to 
consider the labour needs of white farmers, the regent, 
Mshiyeni replied:
I do not know anything about the treatment on the 
cane fields as my people don't need work there. 
They only work for one to three years as boss boys 
on the mines [and] some work for the Government.26
These claims to a superior status were so resounding that 
officials accepted them as the reason for the Zulu refusal 
to work in the cane belt. Acknowledging their preference 
for work as clerks, policemen and domestic servants in 
urban centres, the Native Affairs Commission of 1933 
emphasized that 'The Zulu looks upon himself as an 
aristocrat and consequently it is his habit to choose his 
work.’27 Thus, because it served their interest in 
controlling labour along ethnic lines, the state and 
employers accepted the mythology of Zulu superiority and 
martial skills, and provided many men from the region with 
jobs as police or labour recruiters.28 The state's belief 
that Africans were averse to local work because of 
'cultural habits', however, served to shift attention away 
from the poor conditions of employment in Zululand, and
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helped to justify the perpetuation of cheap migrant labour 
in the sugar industry.
The Zulu gained definite material benefits by manipulating 
these ethnic stereotypes.^ Kinship links with fellow Zulu 
and the establishment of informal 'Zulu guilds' on the 
mines assured many of them better jobs. Moreover, other 
ethnic groups in the region quickly associated themselves 
with these identities. By the later 193 0s, most southern 
Mozambiquan migrants, for example, appropriated a Zulu 
isibongo (surname) and spoke fluent Zulu while their wives, 
who remained at home, still spoke Shironga.30 The object of 
this ethnic camouflage was two-fold. First, Zulu speech 
facilitated their recruitment by predominantly Zulu­
speaking labour touts. Secondly, the appropriation of a 
Zulu identity made it easier to avoid recruitment by the 
sugar industry which targeted Mozambiquan labour and to 
gain access to better-paid jobs on the Rand.^ -*-
LABOUR IN ZULULAND
A major theme in the sugar-cane planters' professed
struggle for local labour was their belief that the Zulu
were at once too wealthy in terms of cattle and land (ie.
too productive with the diminishing resources available to
them) and too indolent and averse to agricultural work to
provide the necessary seasonal contingents for the sugar 
3 pindustry.  ^As Kimble has shown for the origins of migrancy 
from Basutoland, the rise in mobile or 'free' labour 'had 
dramatic repercussions' for labour relations on the land
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for under-capitalised white farmers, and this was 
particularly true for Zululand's sugar planters. 3^
Undercapitalised, and uncompetitive on world markets, sugar 
farms were notorious for the poor wages and appalling 
working conditions for their African employees.^ Different 
groups of workers moved into and out of Zululand in 
overlapping phases as they struggled to free themselves 
from migrant farm labour. While other farming and rural 
fractions of white capital, most notably wattle farming and 
coal mining, vied with the planters for labour, the sugar 
farmers' lobby was the most successful in focussing 
attention on its labour needs.
The powerful planters' lobby won concessions and support 
from the state, in part because of the over-representation 
of rural constituencies in national politics after 1910, 
and in part because of the state's determination to achieve 
agricultural self-sufficiency in food staples, a policy 
which favoured protection for sugar producers.George 
Heaton Nicholls and his successor as M.P. for Zululand in 
1934, Leif Egeland, helped the weakest producers in the 
industry, the Zululand planters, benefit from substantial 
state price supports and protective tariffs. Moreover, the 
planters' insistence on their agricultural status ensured 
they were free from most official regulations for labour 
under the Native Labour Regulation Act, No. 15 of 1911.^ 
The control of what Jeeves has called a 'malleable', 
'rightless and poorly paid' migrant labour force was 
crucial for the sugar planters.^
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While the Natal sugar industry was developed on the backs 
of indentured Indians, Zululand planters benefited from 
access to this cheap source of labour for only a brief
T O
period, from 1906 to about 1916. The combined effect of 
the Immigrants Regulation Act, No 22 of 1913 and a major 
strike by Indian indentured labourers affecting much of 
southern Zululand and Natal in the same year forced sugar
2Q ,
farmers to seek labour elsewhere.  ^ As the availability of 
Indian labour dropped in Zululand after 1913, white 
planters struggled to secure replacements among local Zulu 
for the rapidly expanding sugar, cotton, tobacco and wattle 
plantations. Although it has been argued that various Natal 
commercial farmers were aware of the impending removal of 
Indian labour from their grasp and prepared for alternative 
labour supplies, none of them, least of all the sugar 
planters, were prepared for the wide-spread aversion of 
Africans to local employment.^
Local Zulu, well aware of the poor conditions on the cane 
farms and wattle plantations managed, on the whole, to 
avoid long-term employment in Zululand. They preferred the 
better conditions, opportunities and, especially, pay
offered on the Rand and in Durban. ^  Frustrated by what
they perceived to be the unreliable local labour supply, 
sugar farmers joined the well-established wider southern 
African recruiting nexus.^ From the late 1910s, southern 
Zululand planters, following the practice of Natal estates, 
formed recruiting syndicates and engaged organisations such 
as the Natal Coast Labour Association to hire migrant
labour from the Transkei and Basutoland. ^  Even the
224
Secretary of the African Workers' Union of Durban supplied 
planters with labour until competing white agents had him 
closed down.^ By the 192 0s, these workers, far from home 
and kin support networks, were suffering the worst effects 
of neglect in the cane fields.
White notions of the 'unreliability' and relative ability 
of particular labourers related directly to their 
availability and long-term commitment to the sugar farmers. 
Farmers anticipated that once out of indenture, Indian 
' free' labourers would be as irregular as Zulu men were 
considered to be.^^ Similarly, Zulu from the southern 
districts, where the vast majority of the work force was in 
regular migrant labour, were considered to be indolent 
'kraal-loafers' compared to the Mozambiquan 'Shangaans' who 
offered themselves for longer periods. Replicating mine 
strategies for securing labour, the sugar industry found 
long-distance migrants were more easily controlled.^
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUGAR BELT
A distinction should be made between the various classes of 
sugar farmers in Zululand and their relation to labour. 
Under the original settlement schemes in the fertile, 
relatively well-watered 'cane-belt' of southern Zululand, 
the government offered whites 99 year annual leases at 2s. 
and Is. per acre for first- and second-class farms
/ n
respectively. Before World War I, planters who settled 
closer to the rail-line were able to take advantage of the 
burgeoning Union markets and preferential rates over
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A Rcompeting Mozambique sugar. ° Thus, sugar production 
expanded rapidly between 1905 and 1915. A particularly 
favourable climate and consistent rains between 1909 and 
1911 also ensured rapid expansion. These planters acquired 
a fairly consistent supply of local labour to off-set 
diminishing Indian labour by offering competitive wages 
which ranged from 20s. to 30s., occasionally rising to 60s. 
per month, and female 'togt' labour (engaged on a daily 
basis only and often for some cash and some food) received 
between 3d. and Is. a day.^
After 1918, white settlements at Ntambanana, the Nkwaleni 
valley, Hluhluwe and Mkuzi developed more unevenly under 
the state's returned soldiers scheme which provided 
settlers with Land Bank loans for farms and machinery. On 
top of structural supports for sugar pricing and rail 
development, they relied on state grants for irrigation 
schemes, price subsidies and crop insurance.^ 
Nevertheless, initially, the employment of Africans was 
erratic and beyond the means of many new farmers.
In the 1920s, established growers pressured new settlers to 
put most of their land under cane in order to bolster the 
Zululand growers associations and to ensure that cotton and 
stock farming, which, although they failed (see ch. on 
cattle), initially competed for well-watered land, did not 
threaten cane farming. With limited resources they now 
suffered the combined effects of a down-turn in the sugar 
market, drought, and limited labour supplies owing to the 
ravages of influenza.^ -*- Similar problems surfaced during
226
attempts to settle returning soldiers after 1945.^ While 
the most telling blow to the fragile white settlements at 
Ntambanana and Hluhluwe was undoubtedly drought, 
competition with established farmers for reluctant labour 
further compromised their development. Moreover, until the 
later 192 0s, the relative abundance of land in the reserves 
meant a few dissatisfied African farm tenants could escape
C. "3
pernicious labour-tenancy arrangements. J
The new under-capitalised farmers were determined to exact 
the greatest possible productivity from each contracted 
worker. Labour relations on sugar farms took on the style 
of more highly industrialised employment. In an effort to 
attract Mpondo and Sotho labourers, who were used to the 
contract system, many planters offered Africans informal 
thirty-shift tickets modelled on mines contracts under the 
1911 Labour Act. These contracts, which provided for 
payment only on completion of set 'tasks', were illegal on 
sugar farms and local officials refused to enforce them. 
They were, however, common among recruited workers on the 
poorer class of sugar farms by the 192 0s and planters also 
turned to the Masters and Servants legislation, which 
regulated agrarian labour, to control their workers.^ In 
order to bind deserting workers more fully to their farms, 
planters often paid their 20s. fine for desertion under 
Masters and Servants laws themselves and added it to the 
amount workers owed for the repayment of advanced money.
Although, as Jeeves has argued, the recruitment of the 
infirm and disabled was not formal policy for the farming
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sector; it was de facto practice, this did not prevent many 
farmers from railing against the poor state of labour 
available to them.~^ As part of a larger strategy to secure 
government support, or at least avoid the regulation of 
sugar farming, planters, competing with other employers, 
cried foul at every turn. They repeatedly claimed that they 
bore the brunt of the cost of sick labour burned out by the
CO
mines. ° Despite regular complaints about the poor quality 
of their labour, however, planters steadfastly refused to 
improve conditions and even balked at instituting their own 
medical screening, ostensibly for fear of scaring off 
recruits, but more probably because they did not want to 
pay the cost.
Duplicity operated on both sides of the recruitment
process. While there is no doubt that many migrant workers,
especially from the Transkei, suffered from illnesses
contracted in the mines, planters' complaints were, in
part, used to deflect criticism of their own shortcomings.
In fact it was more often the case that conditions on the
farms caused or exacerbated health problems. Farmers had no
compunction about driving sick workers to the point of
exhaustion or even death, and they encouraged employees
f t  nrequiring medical aid to leave the farms. u They sought out
private recruiters who would present the sugar industry in
the best possible light. Unscrupulous recruiters often
misrepresented the conditions on farms, and trapped workers
f 1with cash advances and ready transport. -1- As Hobsbawm has 
argued, labour contractors flourish where there is a large 
demand for labour from a population group ignorant of
228






Area of white sugar-cane 
farms, c. 1930
__ .  Endemic malaria 
after 1933 
(probable)
—  Endemic malaria
(1927)







Sources: CNC 16A, 13/2/6 (9), GES 2628, 6/56 
and Le Seur, D, Sharp, B. Appleton, C. (1993).
229
conditions of employment. And this was undoubtedly true 
on the sugar plantations of Zululand
THE STRUGGLE FOR ZULU LABOUR
Convinced that the reserves still provided Zulu
subsistence, cane farmers were slow to react to the 
changing circumstances of the wider South African labour 
market and the upward pressure on wages.63 Moreover,
ineffective state controls on labour recruiting by outside 
agencies such as the Natal Coast Recruiting Corporation and 
the coal mines meant that the surreptitious touting of 
labour was rife in southern Zululand.64 Recruiters for 
Natal sugar farms and coal mines often entered Zululand
with ready cash for substantial contract advances or
loitered just outside the districts which the state had 
closed to recruitment by urban industry, prepared to entice 
any willing worker away with up to £8 or £10 and a rail 
ticket.^
While white farmers argued that Africans were 'single 
target workers1, and claimed that any increase in wages 
would necessarily diminish the length of time worked, 
Africans consistently pointed to the inadequate wages paid 
by farmers in contrast to the rapidly increased cost of
fkliving. ° Simeon Zulu, an ' induna' on an Eshowe cane farm,
for example, noted that 'Things are different now...
fi 7Medical fees, education, clothing, all require money.1
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During the 192 0s, the Zululand Planters Union (ZPU)
repeatedly complained to the state about the loss of local
labour and called for the closure of all the Zululand sugar
ftfarming districts to outside recruitment. As cane
planting expanded northward, increasing numbers of Africans
were forced off the sugar-cane land. Once back in the
reserves, Zulu workers often preferred to engage only in
'togt1 labour, making the provisions of the Masters and
Servants legislation difficult to enforce.^ There were,
however, exceptions to this trend, most notably among the
better capitalised sugar farmers, who held two farms and
followed the Transvaal practice of using one as a source of 
7 Dtenant labour. u
There was little state support for the planters’ demand for 
protection. In order to secure labour for the mines, the 
Native Labour Department repeatedly refused to close any 
more districts to outside recruiting, on the grounds that 
it was not in African interests. In 1919, the Director of 
Native Labour stated that only in those districts where the 
majority of Africans resided on white farms would he 
consider closure. Noting that in Eshowe there was a 
substantial 'free Native population1, he argued that,
local employers of labour should, by reason of 
their proximity to the place of residence of the 
Natives, be able to compete with other labour 
markets on favourable terms if their conditions of 
employment approximate those elsewhere. Labourers 
are entitled to sell their services in the best 
market available and I see no reason to afford 
protection to the Eshowe Farmers’ Association at 
the expense of the Natives resident within the 
District.^
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Zululand farmers responded to this policy with further 
calls for measures to bind local labour to the region. 
These included the tightening of pass controls, reduced 
taxation for local men who proved they had worked for 
whites for at least six months, a limit to the rate of cash 
advances offered and the re-imposition of the isibalo 
forced labour system, which the Union government had
abolished in 1910 to prevent Natal bottling-up its
7 9 •labour.  ^ While some lip service was paid to these
requests, the state did not implement any of them. The poor
conditions of work and low wages offered on most farms
were, in fact, self-defeating. By 1929, while Zulu workers
in urban areas could usually count on wages of over £3 a
month, cane workers often received less than £2 for a 180-
shift ticket which could take up to two months to 
7 7complete. J
The uneven supply of labour can, to a certain extent, be 
attributed also to the uneven capitalization of individual 
farmers. African perceptions of labour conditions in the 
cane belt were affected by the worst cases. While some 
farms, generally unnoticed exceptions, did provide adequate 
food and competitive wages, on the majority of farms 
conditions were appalling. Sugar farmers were notorious for 
exacting long shifts, often twelve or fourteen hours in the 
fields, and providing inadequate housing and food rations, 
consisting principally of mealie meal with only the 
occasional meat, fruit or vegetable supplement, and this 
made workers more susceptible to disease.^
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As the area under cane expanded and labour requirements
increased, the cost of housing became an issue even for
better-off farmers. Shifting demands for migrant labour
were reflected in the provision of accommodation. In 192 5,
as official concern about malaria in the cane belt rose,
Dr. G.A. Park Ross, Assistant Health Officer for the Union
and in charge of the anti-malaria campaigns in Natal and
Zululand, outlined a plan for the conversion of Indian
indentured family housing into mosquito resistant barracks
for African labourers.^ A significant feature of the
conversion was the provision of space for twelve African
7 fworkers in homes built for a family of four.
Yet the farmers united to resist the changes recommended by
both the Department of Health and the NAD. According to
William Beinart, Natal's NAD was largely indifferent to the
plight of Mpondo workers in the cane fields; nevertheless,
some Natal officials, most notably Park Ross and Frederick
Rodseth, Inspector of Native Labour in southern Zululand in
the 192 0s and later instrumental in anti-malaria campaigns,
assiduously tried to convince planters of the benefits of
77improved working conditions. The ZPU, however, cognizant 
of the uneconomic position of many farmers, appeared to 
accept the lowest common denominator as the rule for 
conditions of employment. Thus, it robustly declared
We cannot hope as individual planters to hold or 
control our labourers unless we have uniformity of 
treatment, not only as regards wages, food, degree 
of punishment, but as regards task work and 
advances. The schedule of wages and the scale of 
food, will present no difficulty provided we are 
loyal to each other.
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Nevertheless, competition between sugar farmers over cash 
advances to Africans remained strong until 1922 with the 
implementation of the Native Advances Regulation Act No. 18 
of 1921 which limited cash advances to £2. South Africa's 
rural farm lobby had been successful in pressuring the 
state to implement this act in order to limit the flow of 
labour to the more competitive and better capitalised 
industries.^
The enforcement of the Act was far from efficient, however, 
and both well-established sugar farmers and many recruiting 
agents for the Rand mines, in collusion with prospective 
employees, found ways around its operation, mostly through 
obfuscating cash advances in the form of separate loans. 
One effect of the Act, however, was to force the rate of 
wages for workers in the cane belt up from 25s.-3Os. per 
month to 40s.-50s. per month, since Africans still demanded 
higher wages whether or not they were in the form of
o n
advances.ou
Given these conditions the sugar industry experienced a far 
more rapid labour turnover than did mining. While about 
half of the 10-12,000 plantation workers originated in 
Zululand, their employment in the sugar industry was
O 1
erratic.-1- Planters and millers struggled to overcome the 
shortcomings of its short production season, and they 
relied on a highly inefficient system of local labour 
recruitment.
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The seasonal nature of sugar production (the short cutting 
and crushing season ran from May to September, with milling 
occasionally extending into December) meant that planters 
needed a much larger pool of labourers than did more stable 
forms of urban employment since Zulu workers were bottled 
up in the reserves. Although Jeeves has suggested that 
planters required access to roughly 25,000 to 30,000 
workers a year to fulfil the two six-month contracts of 
seasonal work, it seems likely that an even larger labour 
pool was n e e d e d . early as 1918, the ZPU, in support of 
new settler farmers, complained of inequities in employment 
practice between better off-farmers who controlled and 
contracted labour, not only on their farms, but in the 
reserves, and poor farmers who could not compete. It 
attacked those who 'nurse a gang at their kraals for future 
use and for contingencies’, and continued:
Why should a man who requires a complement of 3 0 
tie up say 50 or 60 boys? There is something 
essentially wrong in a system which permits boys 
under contract of service to laze at their kraals 
because others also bound by their service can beo o
found to take their place. J
Through the 192 0s and 193 0s, established planters continued 
advancing cash to bind contract workers to future service. 
They claimed they had to maintain from 2 5-60 per cent more 
labour on their books than actually worked at any given
QAtime to ensure an uninterrupted supply. This is not to 
suggest that all the Zulu workers in the reserves were 
engaged only in homestead production for most of the year. 
Many workers on the planters’ books were simply in between 
jobs in urban areas. Moreover, the high rates of attrition
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from worker illness, including malaria, and desertions also 
contributed to a rapid turnover.
Most of the Zulu labour available to sugar farmers was on 
the fringes of the mainstream wage working population. Most 
Zulu men only worked on the cane fields in their youth, old 
age or at moments of economic stress. Often youths would 
engage in one or two six-month contracts to earn enough
O C
money to make their way to Durban or the Rand. Labour 
also came from families suffering eviction from white 
farms. In 192 6, for example, the Natal Tanning and Extract 
Company in Melmoth planted wattle trees on 23,000 acres of
p  C
land delimited in 1902, evicting its African occupants. 
The company was not able to absorb their labour immediately 
as the trees took ten years to mature. Hundreds of evicted 
families with weak links to the reserve economy or kinship 
networks had no access to land or grazing. In order to re­
stock, make payments to chiefs for rights to land or simply 
to purchase food, they sent out a proportion of their 
members to seek wage employment. Many had no choice but to
o 7
take the poorly-paid jobs on cane farms or coal mines. 
ALTERNATIVE LABOUR SUPPLIES
Frustrated in their efforts to capture a malleable and 
consistent supply of local labour, Zululand planters turned 
to alternative sources. Resigning themselves to accepting 
marginal workers, many planters called for labour from 
local jails. This proved unworkable, however, since a rise 
in the number of tax defaulters, the principal source of
236
inmates, tended to coincide with periods of economic stress 
when labour was plentiful. Conversely, few defaulters could 
be found when conditions improved and local labour was
o o
scarce.°
In suggesting other, equally problematic, sources of 
labour, farmers had to contend with the almost overwhelming 
power of the urban areas and mines to attract African 
labour. Although the severe malaria epidemic of 1929-32 
improved the planters1 control of malaria-tolerant labour 
which the mines previously recruited, a 'gentlemen's 
agreement' , between the Chamber of Mines and the ZPU for
2 000 workers a year, still gave the mines the best of
Q Q
Zululand's labour.^ Mine recruiters argued that the 
planters should not complain about competition since over
3 0 per cent of the mine recruits were rejected as 'unfit'
Q Q
and were therefore available for local employers. u By the 
193 0s, farmers, still desperate for workers, revised their 
public views about 'unfit' labour. The Candover Cotton 
Farmers' Association stated that they accepted 'unfit' 
labour, and claimed that Africans 'need only be 50%
Q 1proficient to work on a cotton plantation’. -L Most farmers 
admitted that they actively sought 'unfit' workers, and 
that over half their work force was compromised in some 
way. The sick, the lame, even the blind and of course 
'deserters' from the mines formed a significant number of 
recruited labourers in the cane fields. One luckless sugar 
farmer who contracted 466 men in 1931, had five dead within 
a week of arrival, 34 hospitalised with malaria, 21
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suffering from TB, and 12 6 deserted by the following 
92year.
Sugar farmers looked to the real and perceived advantages
of engaging the newly proletarianised sectors of the
population. By the 1910s, if not earlier, changing
circumstances in the political economy of Zululand, as
elsewhere in southern Africa, had released women and
Q 3children into the wage labour force. J Increasing cash 
demands and the growing independence of family members 
engaged in migrant labour forced those who remained in the 
reserves to develop new strategies to meet shortfalls in 
wages themselves, now that they were forced, increasingly, 
to be self-reliant for subsistence.^
The exploitation of women and children as wage labour can, 
to a certain extent, be seen as the diversion of domestic 
labour power away from customary forms of accumulation and 
its adaptation to new demands in the capitalist context. 
Its use on the sugar fields in Zululand seems initially to 
have been less of a drain on household production in the 
local reserves than in Pondoland where migrants travelled 
longer distances.^ Until the 1910s, occasional work on 
local white farms provided a useful means of overcoming 
shortfalls in subsistence production while still allowing 
women and children in Zululand to maintain, albeit 
decreasingly, the homestead. By 1914, however, the DNC for 
Zululand was noting with concern that 'togt' labour on 
white farms by women and children curtailed homestead
Q C
production. ° As husbands spent increasing periods of time
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away from the reserves, women often bore the brunt of the
failure to meet tax demands and many women sought
Q 7alternative means of getting cash.
White farmers found the employment of women and children
Q Radvantageous, particularly for specific jobs. Women were 
largely employed on the cane fields to weed, a task thought
N . QQto coincide with their traditional' domestic work.
Cotton farmers preferred to employ inexpensive African
children since they could pay them 10s. to 12s. per month
with less rations than for men and they '...found that [the
children] make expert pickers, and are freely available so
that the labour bogey will not affect things1 . ^ 0  Planters
claimed, moreover, that they provided a form of
'apprenticeship' (an ominous term in the history of South
African labour relations, and considered a form of tied
labour) for youths and children which prepared them for
1 n 1future work m  the capitalist sector. U1 In 1935, the Natal
Agriculture Union petitioned the Natal Department of
Education to develop a scheme, ironically under the Child
Protection Act, whereby 'juvenile delinquents' and
destitute children between the ages of 13 and 15 could be
10 9tied as 'apprentices' to the sugar estates. uz The 
underlying motive, however, was to bind over labour to 
agriculture before it became aware of the poor conditions 
on farms or the alternatives. As a ZPU representative put 
it:
...if you can get these umfaans [sic abafana; boys, 
young people] when they are young, afterwards they 
become very much better labourers than if you get 
them when they are older. All my best boys have 
been boys I have caught young, [my emphasis] . 103
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A major reason why planters rejected the application of the 
Native Labour Regulation Act in Natal was its prohibition 
on the recruitment of under-age labour.^ 4
To a certain extent farmers' demands for a more 'rightless'
labour force (both women and youths were considered legal
minors under the revised Natal Code of Native Law)
coincided with administrative and African patriarchal
desires to control the effects of social change in the
reserves. -*-^5 short-term or daily agricultural labour in
Zululand allowed women and children to remain closer to
home and maintain at least some of their own production.
White farmers, however, had to be careful not to undermine
male authority over the labour of 'dependent' women and
children. If the employment of sections of families
responsible for the maintenance of the homestead was not to
threaten the reproduction of the adult male migrant labour
force then, in theory, men had to retain some control.
Thus, in 1932, the former CNC, C. A. Wheelwright, now a
Melmoth farmer, noted with surprise that he was, for the
first time, able to employ women on his fields and that
women wage-labourers were increasing in numbers throughout 
1 n f\Zululand. UD He was under the impression that local chiefs 
had forbidden women to go out to work and his concerns were 
eased only after he established that his women workers were 
the wives or relatives of men already employed on his farm.
By the 193 0s, however, women and, to a lesser extent young 
people, were also more independent and able to take 
advantage of wider opportunities in industrialising South
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Africa. Farmers, therefore, had to strike a delicate 
balance between attracting this less costly labour and 
placating male authority. They believed that '...fathers 
are beginning to realise that their children will not 
tolerate [having to give their wages over to them] and so 
are the e m p l o y e r s ’ . -^7 Although the latter had started to 
pay children directly, to avoid inciting the opposition of 
fathers they were forced to turn over a portion of the 
wages to the families. The Zulu patriarchs resented 
children becoming partially independent wage-earners and 
yet still relying on their families. As chief Mtembu 
complained:
They [children] do not provide us with the means 
for buying food... and we may be in want. And here
we are landed with our children, who are proving to1 AO C
be of no use to us. uo
Through the 193 0s and 1940s, the trend for farmers to 
employ women and children shifted in favour of children. By 
and large, women were able to find other niches in the 
local economy or in the urban areas. When not engaged in 
homestead labour they often preferred the more flexible and 
more remunerative informal sector activities in the cane 
belt, particularly beer-brewing, and to a lesser extent the 
sale of dagga and the practice of prostitution (see
b e l o w ) . T h e  employment of children was, moreover, less
threatening to the productive and reproductive capacities 
of homesteads than the employment of women. Thus, even with 
access to imported labour, planters recruited a substantial 
number of male children.-*--^  While the number of women 
formally employed by the sugar industry in Zululand never
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exceeded 1000 (about 6 per cent) for the period 1930-1946,
111children numbered over 3,400 (roughly 20 per cent).
Before this happened, the Zululand planters were so 
desperate for labour that Heaton Nicholls, the ideologue of 
segregation, suggested a supply scheme which illuminates 
the tensions created by white labour policies. In 192 5, he 
called for government subsidies to restructure the
employment of semi-skilled Africans in Zululand sugar
119 ■mills. He pointed to the effects of the radicalisation
of white workers on the Rand in the early 192 0s and the
move towards an industrial labour colour bar to gain
government support for the exclusive employment of whites
in the m i l l s . H i s  proposals even extended to the
employment of whites in the fields. While they would use
tractors and heavy machinery, the 'unintelligent labour of
114cutting cane by hand1 would be left 'to the Native'.
Most Zululand planters were sceptical of the scheme, 
fearing that white worker demands for high wages and state 
intervention to ensure decent working conditions would 
prove too costly. Heaton Nicholls argued, however, that 
owing to high rates of desertion and the attrition of 
disease, '...not to mention other undesirable features' 
African labour was not 'nearly as cheap as it appears to 
be'.-*--*-5 in the end, the ZPU once again proclaimed its 
poverty and refused to support the plan. Despite strong 
support from senior government officials, perhaps 
influenced by the Hertzog administration's campaign against 
white poverty, and the availability of subsidies, only a
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handful of white apprentices were assigned to the sugar 
mills around Empangeni. Overall, white employment in
agriculture in Zululand grew little between 1920 and 1948. 
Between 1925 and 193 0 whites employed on farms in the 
region increased by only 89, from 926 to 1015.^“^  While 
intermittent employment for white supervisors increased on 
the Pongola irrigation works, only another 180 whites found 
permanent employment on new sugar farms in northern 
Zululand between 1930 and 1948.
ETHNICITY, DIFFERENTIATION AND FRICTION ON THE CANE FIELDS
The failure of planters to improve working conditions in
the 1920s led to a major crisis in labour supplies in the
1930s. Undoubtedly the greatest problem relating to labour
during this period was malaria. Zululand planters accepted
state and medical recommendations for the importation of
'malaria-tolerant1 labour since they defined health
problems in terms of inherent African immunity or lack
thereof, thus deflecting attention away from working
conditions. Packard has similarly argued that the Chamber
of Mines definition of 'tropical1 workers provided the
mines with renewed sources of labour without incurring the
1 1 Qcosts of reform. Although tolerance to particular
strains of malaria does not necessarily imply complete 
immunity, crude statistics and expert medical opinions of 
the day suggested a definite difference between the 
resistance of Mpondo workers and that of local Zulu and 
Mozambiquan labour. -^0 Suffering from malnutrition and
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overwork, Mpondo workers without previous exposure to 
malaria succumbed to the disease in their thousands.
While non-tolerant labour succumbed more quickly to malaria 
than did the Zulu, both groups suffered high rates of 
mortality when working for long periods in the sugar 
industry. Thus, the invention of the 'tolerant' worker was 
only partly based on reality. Nevertheless, increasing 
pressure from Natal and Transkei NAD officials combined 
with mounting evidence from the Department of Health to
curtail the recruitment of non-malaria-tolerant labour by
191farmers. ■L*-L
There is compelling evidence to suggest that by the mid-
192 0s, prior to the most intense epidemic, Mpondo and
Basuto workers (who peaked at 5,000 in 1929) were moving
1 9 9from the most notoriously malarial sugar farms. The
fledgling wattle industry was more appealing to many 
workers since, although the food and pay were also poor, it 
was situated in the less malarial interior. By the early
193 0s, some wattle farms were staffed almost entirely with
1 9 9Mpondo labour. J The bitter experiences of many cane 
workers had, moreover, filtered back to the Transkei. In 
one well-publicised case, F. Konigkramer, a Gingindhlovu 
planter, had so abused his workers that he was charged with 
criminal assault. Despite the reluctance of Department of 
Justice magistrates, in contrast to NAD officials, in 
Eshowe, Mtunzini and Empangeni to prosecute white farmers, 
they were forced to do so in this case because it was so
1 9  Ascandalous.^* Not only was Konigkramer himself unable to
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attract any more Mpondo labour; farmers of 'every class' in 
southern Zululand experienced shortages of recruited labour
IOC
as a result of his actions.
In the early 1920s, planters, frustrated by the rapid 
attrition of Mpondo workers from malaria, agreed to cease 
active recruiting in the south.^ 6  Many Cape workers, 
however, still made their own way to cane farms, with dire 
consequences. Moreover, threats to the supply of 
Mozambiquan migrants under the revised 192 8 Mozambique 
Convention between the Portuguese and Union governments for 
the regulation of migrant labour, spurred the recruitment
1 97
of Cape and Basutoland workers for a brief time.
However, the devastation of the malaria epidemic of 1929-32
among Mpondo workers finally provided the Department of
Health with enough ammunition to ban their employment north
of the Thukela in 1935. The restriction on non-tolerant
labour was reaffirmed in 1944, despite claims from farmers
1 0 ftthat malaria was no longer a threat.
As a quid pro quo for the loss of Mpondo labour the
planters demanded government assistance to regularise the 
flow of Mozambiquan labour into Zululand. With the 
recommendations of the Welsh-Barrett Committee, appointed 
to consider the shortage of labour in Zululand, malaria
tolerance became the defining feature of labour sought for
the Zululand cane belt.^^
Initially, the Department of Health attempted to refuse to 
allow Mozambiquan migrants south of the Mfolozi River
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i 1 n
fearing that they carried potent strains of malaria. 
Health officials had grave concerns that uncontrolled 
migration from Mozambique might include 'tropicals' from 
Nyasaland and areas north of 22 degrees who were carriers 
of sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) which could infect 
the Zululand tsetse fly.^^ In 1920, however, after 
assurances from Dr. Park Ross that there was no danger of 
the infection being transferred, and that the benefits of 
malaria tolerance for workers in Zululand out-weighed any 
hazards of spreading trypanosomiasis, the restrictions were
1 "3 Orelaxed. This coincided with the reduction of non-
tolerant Mpondo labour. Twenty years later, Heaton Nicholls 
relied on this policy to support an unsuccessful scheme to
-1 *3 "3
import malaria-tolerant labour from South West Africa.
Labour migration from 'Maputaland1 in north-eastern 
Zululand and Mozambique into Natal dated back to the mid­
nineteenth century.-^4 Until the twentieth century, 
however, there was nothing to hold these workers in 
Zululand. Historically this movement was related to wider 
state intervention in the supply of labour and a compromise 
between the two dominant sectors of white capital: mining 
and farming. On the ground, however, African migrants moved 
according to their own initiatives and their ability to 
avoid structural controls. The clandestine immigration of 
Mozambiquans into Zululand, beginning in the 192 0s, was by 
the 1930s the mainstay of the plantations, particularly the 
new northern white farms. African workers from southern 
Mozambique were quick to take advantage of blurred frontier 
relations and ethnic identities to gain access to
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employment in the Union. The pre-colonial Maputan Kingdom 
in northeastern Zululand, so long overshadowed by the Zulu 
Kingdom's power and Zulu ethnicity (a tradition continued 
even by latter-day historians) provided unique 
opportunities for migrant workers.^^ Migrants and 
recruiters alike subverted Portuguese and Union immigration 
controls by bribing border police, purchasing false 
documents, especially Union passes, and misrepresenting 
themselves. 6 Maputan kingdom fell on both sides of
the long uncontrolled border running through dense bush 
between Zululand and Mozambique. It was, therefore, often 
impossible for a handful of Union officials, a number of 
which were local African police, to distinguish which 
Maputans belonged on which side of the border.
Once in the Union, however, migrants still faced a series
of hurdles before reaching their ultimate goal: employment
in the urban areas. Sugar farmers and their recruiters
loitered along the border, ready to pounce on illegal
migrants using a mixture of threats of violence and
coercion and promises of cash advances and ready transport
(often at an unspecified cost which the recruit had to pay
1 ft ftfor out of his wages) to trap workers. J Many of the 
inexperienced endured one or two years working for low 
wages on the marginal northern farms until they could gain 
the contacts and knowledge needed to pass through Zululand 
to the urban areas. ^ 9
From 192 8 until 193 6, Zululand farmers faced threats to the 
flow of Mozambique labour as the provisions of the 1928
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convention helped funnel workers to the Rand and tightened
the controls over clandestine immigrants. The depression
also forced the NAD to reconsider its earlier policy of
turning a blind eye to illegal immigration. In 1932, the
SNA, Herbst, instructed Natal's CNC to stop the flow in
order to guarantee jobs for Union Africans. Perhaps with
his eye on Heaton Nicholls's role in parliament, Herbst
warned, however, that ' . . . you will have to be very careful
that the farmers do not get wind of any instructions... or
141we will get the reaction m  the House at once.1 The
planters1 lobby did 'get wind1 of the new policy, probably
due to a reduction in migrants, and pressured the NAD to
keep the border open. The CNC then often relaxed the
regulations to allow Mozambique workers into Zululand
despite protests from the Chamber of Mines about the
14 9potential diversion of 'their1 labour supply. ^  On the 
ground, surreptitious recruiters and farmers once again 
moved into the border area to spirit away truck-loads of 
men in the night.
Once again the sugar farmers could not hold their labour, 
however. Through the 1930s, their continued efforts to 
maintain the cheapness of African labour served to drive it 
away. During the height of the drought and depression in 
Zululand, farmers, suffering from a drop in the price of 
sugar, pushed African wages down by between 5s. and 10s. to 
3 0s a month. They claimed that government subsidies for 
mealie meal and a general reduction in the cost of living 
meant that the drop in wages ' . . . could be done without any 
injustice to the Native or taking undue advantage of the
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abnormal increase in the labour offering' . In an effort
to compensate for the lower wages they paid, farmers made
marginal improvements in food rations and conditions, still
only partially meeting those advocated by NAD and health
officials. Initially, some farmers found that increasing
food rations gave them an affordable competitive edge over
others, although this way they risked the enmity of their
poorer neighbours. In the long-term, this strategy did not
attract many workers: improved food, however nutritious,
could not be sent home. They wanted higher wages. Moreover,
during the 1940s, the cost of food had risen sharply and
few farmers could afford to maintain consistently decent 
1 A  ftrations. D
By the late 193 0s, migrant labour from outside the Union
started to circulate out of Zululand. While farmers agreed
that, following the revised Mozambique Convention of 1934
and the recommendations of the Welsh-Barrett Committee,
they now had sufficient supplies of labour, they complained
that the workers merely 'drifted1 through Zululand. At
Mtubatuba, the Zululand Native Farm Labour Committee
complained to the Herbst Committee that, in the first six
months of 1937 alone, over 2,000 imported workers had left
14 7Zululand for work m  Natal and Durban. Moreover, between
193 4 and 1937, the Portuguese Government, concerned about
the loss of migrants and their tax money to the Union,
demanded the implementation of a labour registration system
1 4 ftat a cost to farmers of 5s. per worker. By the end of 
the 1940s, planters deemed Mozambiquan labour to be totally 
unsatisfactory for, among other reasons, it was using
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Zululand as a stepping stone to the Rand (see below). 
Once they gained access to the Union through farm labour, 
migrants quickly moved to the better employment 
opportunities and other attractions of the cities. As a 
consequence of this rapid circulation and the improved 
methods of malaria vector control, by the late 1940s, the 
NAD considered allowing non-tolerant labour back into 
Zululand.-^0
Migrant labourers benefited from differential treatment and 
improvements in the conditions of employment as sugar 
farming stabilised in the 192 0s, and the industry shifted 
away from using local and indentured Indian labour. Zulu 
labour had already proven its antipathy to the cane farms 
and, for many of them 'malaria-tolerance1 was achieved by 
avoiding the most malarial areas during the height of the 
infectious period, which coincided with heavy work in the 
cane fields.Planters favoured migrants who took long 
contracts by offering larger cash advances than for local 
men, and provided them with better food.
Although the sugar industry as a whole apparently did not 
query the availability of reserve subsistence which was the 
basis for differing treatment, at least one farmer 
questioned 'If better rations have to be given to imported 
labour, then why in all conscience should not the same 
apply to the labourers we have at our doors. *152 Farmers 
believed that migrant workers had expert skills in cutting 
cane and 'enjoyed1 the intense summer heat, qualifications 
which they had initially attributed to Indian and Zulu
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workers. Planters in Mtubatuba often placed Nyasalanders in 
better-paid jobs, believing them to be smarter and better 
able to adapt to complex tasks. Moreover, 'Bein[g] of the 
Mohommedem [sic] faith,1 it was asserted, 'they despise 
liquor. ’153 tjie 1940s, farmers complained that police
raids on their migrant employees for illegal liquor and 
prostitution, problems they railed against a decade 
earlier, should cease since they drove workers away.^~^
Local African men were increasingly concerned with the 
threat posed by a large migrant labour force in their 
midst. As van Onselen has shown, worker consciousness is 
not only articulated through more formal structures such as 
trade unions. Although Zulu men did not take employment 
on the cane belt often, they still constituted a 
substantial portion of the work force. Moreover, as we have 
seen, they relied on occasional short-term contracts with 
farmers during times of stress, or when 'retired*. By the 
early 1940s, Mozambiquan and other 'foreign* labour 
accounted for between 9,000 and 10,000 of the total work
1 cz:
force of 16,000 men. DD In addition, an unspecified number 
of Mozambiquan women and children filtered into Zululand in 
search of work or to accompany husbands and fathers. Chief 
Zungu of Mahlabatini pointed to the underlying tensions 
caused by the resulting competition:
We don't know why the Portuguese natives come and 
work here,... we don't know how they live in their 
kraals. Some of our people have hardly got a 
blanket in which to sleep, and they must work, but 
they want more wages. These Portuguese boys will 
work for anything. ^
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On a more desperate note, during the drought of 1945, chief 
Mtetwa, whose ward was adjacent to an Eshowe cane farm, 
initiated a particularly violent 'faction fight’ by 
rallying his men to drive farm employees out of the 
district. In defence of his actions, Mtetwa argued that he 
could not restrain his men because they vehemently objected 
to Mozambiquans moving into the ward, 'taking jobs, 
flaunting money, consorting with local women and driving
1 CO
the price of store goods up’.
One Zulu witness, questioned by the Herbst Committee about 
the importation of labour, stated: 'We would not like
outside natives to receive our money. With what should we 
pay our taxes?’ In a militant tone, chief Mankereke pointed 
to the inequities of the government's support of the 
migrant labour system.
We will provide the labour for the farmers if the 
wages are more attractive. The Legislature has the 
authority to fix good wages. We would all like some 
agreement between the farmers and the natives, some 
sort of compromise about the wages.
During the 1940s, other forms of social change struck at 
the heart of Zulu patriarchal attempts to maintain stable 
family relations in the new context. Zulu women sought 
alternative associations with wage-earning men in the 
region. Much to the alarm of chiefs, induna and male 
commoners in Mtunzini for example, women, occasionally 
widowed but commonly estranged from husbands and, therefore 
probably without access to their wages, established
themselves as 'kraal-heads' along the boundaries of sugar
i fi nfarms. DU In many cases, migrants built huts adjacent to
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their place of work and then established liaisons with
these local women who could claim the right of residence
for the huts. Chiefs and officials complained that these
mutually beneficial relationships were for the sole purpose
1 61of selling intoxicating liquor to foreign workers. Zulu 
men further complained of an '...alarming increase of 
immorality and venereal disease1, due, they claimed, to 
'...their women being bought by the foreigners brought here 
by the Europeans’ The Zulu perception that migrants'
sexuality threatened local society was an important sign of 
rising ethnic tensions, and not dissimilar to white
1 f i  ^society's fears of African sexuality and disease.
By the 1940s, Mozambiquan workers migrating to the sugar 
plantations, accompanied by a host of their compatriots who 
were anxious to supply their needs, had established 
themselves firmly in Zululand. Mozambiquan men and women 
became traders and hawkers in Zululand towns, sold liquor, 
engaged in prostitution, appropriated Union tax passes, 
received medical treatment at provincial hospitals and, in 
effect, became Union African ' citizens'. The state,
however, certainly did not contemplate the advantages won 
by migrants, the cost of administration and medical 
services, and the problems of friction between migrants and 
reserve inhabitants when it supported the cheap migrant 
labour system in Zululand.
Following a short but severe drought in 1943, Mozambiquans 
came into Zululand, in increasing numbers. In 1946 alone, 
border police issued 7,649 formal entry permits, and
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clandestine migrants continued to move in a p a c e . T h e  NAD 
responded to the problem by targeting informal women
migrants for deportation. Despite warnings from local
officials that the removals would lead to further friction
between local men and migrants on the grounds that 
Mozambiquan men would then seek out local women, Natal's 
CNC persevered in the repatriations.-*-®® Echoing the 
concerns voiced over migrant women on the Rand, the NAD 
believed it could prevent the problems of social
dislocation in a migrant labour industrial environment by 
preventing the stabilisation of families, rather than by 
supporting them.-*-®^  In 1948, the NAD bussed large numbers 
of Mozambiquan women, and some men suffering from 
infectious diseases, to the border for repatriation.-*-®®
White commercial farmers in Zululand developed unevenly and 
were unable to attract a reliable supply of local labour. 
The Zulu, preferring the better-paid jobs in urban areas, 
on the whole, successfully avoided working in the harsh and 
unhealthy cane farms. Whites experienced a crisis in labour 
supplies after indentured Indians were withdrawn from the 
sugar industry, and the gap was only partially filled by 
women, elderly men and children. Imported labour from 
within South Africa also proved problematic as the planters 
refused to improve conditions of pay and work in the areas 
of endemic malaria.
The use of large numbers of migrants in the cane fields 
heightened labour and ethnic tensions in Zululand. Beinart 
has shown the importance of ethnicity in patterns of
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1 rn
migration from rural to urban areas.  ^ I have argued here
that ethnic patterns of employment and ethnic tensions were 
also evident in rural Zululand. While imported labour from 
Mozambique proved to be more reliable through the 192 0s and 
1930s, by the 1940s the problems of social instability 
which had plagued the urban areas surfaced on the cane 
belt. Migrant wage labour remained important to the Zulu 
through the 192 0s, and with the rapid decline of reserve 
agriculture in the 193 0s, it became crucial. In the final 
analysis, the under-capitalised sugar cane industry 
contributed to the Zulu awareness of differential 
employment opportunities and conditions of work which fed 
into wider patterns of 'ethnic specialisation’ in 
employment, and ultimately undermined a unified worker 
consciousness.
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For a further discussion of the theory on the 'continuum' 
of proletarianisation from the rural peasantry to permanent 
urban employment see the interesting debate between J. 
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(London 1984), pp. 1-18 and the following chapters and S. 
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1971) , pp. 230-240.
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paper delivered to the CAAS Conference, Toronto, May 1991.
 ^ See Guy, 'Destruction and Reconstruction1.
 ^ A. Jeeves, 'Planters' pp. 2-4 For the rise of the 
Zululand planters in Union politics see Marks, Ambiguities, 
pp. 132-33 and A. Duminy, 'The "Natal Sugar Interest" and 
the Smuts Government, 1919-24', in Collected Seminar 
Papers, 'Natal and the Union, 1909-1939', Department of 
History Workshop, University of Natal, July 1978.
 ^ C. van Onselen details a fascinating account of the rise 
and fall of the Amawasha in his 'The Zulu washerman's guild 
of the Witwatersrand, 1890-1914.' in C. van Onselen, 
Studies in the Social and Economic History of the 
Witwatersrand 1886-1914, Vol 2, New Nineveh (Johannesburg, 
1987) pp. 74-110. For the ethnic dimensions of labour 
categories in Durban see, D. Hemson 'Class Consciousness 
and Migrant Workers: Dock Workers of Durban’ Ph.D. Warwick, 
1979 and 'Dock Workers, Labour Circulation and Class 
Struggles in Durban, 1940-59', JSAS, Vol. 4, No. 1, Oct 
1977, pp. 88-124. See also K. Atkins, The Moon is Dead! 
Give Us Our Money! The Cultural Origins of an African Work 
Ethic in Natal c. 1943-1900 (London, 1994), pp. 18-20, 114- 
124. For the Zulu police force on the mines see A. Jeeves, 
Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy. The
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(Kingston and Johannesburg, 1985), p. 181. J. Crush, The 
Struggle for Swazi Labour, 1890-1920 (Kingston, 1987), p. 
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C. van Onselen, Chibaro, African Mine Labour in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1900-1933 (Johannesburg, 1980) p. 139.
 ^ See Hemson, 'Class', ch. 3 and J. Crush, A. Jeeves and D. 
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Thers is not the scope within this thesis to cover the 
background to labour migration from Zululand but see 
Appendix for labour supply figures and rates of migration, 
Hemson, 'Dockworkers', Atkins, The Moon, pp. 88-98 and 
Marks, Reluctant Rebellion pp. 128-152.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DECLINE OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN THE RESERVES
Although there is some controversy over when reserve 
agricultural production declined in South Africa, it is
clear that, before 1920, and possibly even before 1910, in 
the Zululand reserves Africans produced less than 50 per 
cent of their food requirements. There is evidence that,
by the 1930s, the non-capitalist means of subsistence in
the reserves had deteriorated dramatically, and close to 60 
per cent of grain requirements had to be imported.
Although Simkins has argued that Zululand remained one of 
the most self-sufficient reserve areas in South Africa, 
producing from 2 5 to above 75 per cent of its subsistence 
food needs between 1927 and 1960, his aggregated analysis 
obscures regional and class differences in both production 
and entitlement.^ A more detailed look at production 
figures for different districts in Zululand in the 1930s 
and 1940s, suggests that the picture for African 
agriculture in the first half of the twentieth century was 
rather more bleak for the majority of commoners than 
Simkins suggests. Nor does he consider the unequal effect 
of the rapidly expanding white-dominated market on 
Africans, producers or consumers, which certainly caused 
the gulf between rich and poor to widen in Zululand.
Despite Simkins's figures for the overall levels of 
production from 1927-1960, the 1930s and 1940s were years 
of extreme want and suffering for most Africans. Simkins 
argued that '...unless the terms of trade in the reserves
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deteriorated consistently or the production of output 
traded increased (it may have done a little with the shift 
towards livestock production)', production per head would 
have remained the same.^ Yet, the very nature of the 
isolated Zululand market, and its extreme volatility could, 
in Simkins words, make 'Africans production worth less in 
terms of subsistence requirements1 than he estimated.-*
African production of the principal crop, maize, fluctuated 
dramatically over time. The overall trend, however, at 
least until 1948, was a shortfall in even the most 
conservatively-estimated food needs. In 1923, total maize 
production in the reserves was approximately 241,000 2001b. 
bags. In 1927, production dropped to 196,000 bags and 
bottomed out at below an estimated 100,000 bags in 1931. 
Occasionally reserve production did rebound. Following the 
severe drought and depression from 1931-1933, maize 
production peaked at 27 8,000 bags, a testament to the 
resilience of African producers. Yet, by 1937, with the 
intensification of state relief and the reliance on the 
market, production had dropped to a decade low of 118,800 
bags or 66 lbs. of maize per person. Nor did production 
recover in the 1940s. While the population of Zululand 
increased by 39 per cent between 1921 and 193 6, from
257,000 to 357,000 and by 10 per cent between 193 6 and 
1946, to 391,000, production peaked at 242,300 bags or 123 
lbs. per person in 1944. By 1946, admittedly a drought 
year, production had again dropped to 167,000 bags (36,000 
bags less than ten years earlier) or 85 lbs. per person.^ 
Moreover, while drought was unquestionably the overriding
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factor in short-term food shortages, it did not account for 
the overall decline in reserve agriculture. The reasons for 
this lay in the unequal distribution of land and resources, 
both between whites and Africans and among sections of the 
reserve population, the rise in wage labour, and the impact 
of the white dominated market.
It is worth noting that for a population of roughly equal 
size, Africans in Zululand produced substantially smaller 
quantities of maize, less than half as much, than Africans
n
m  Pondoland. Part of the reason for the difference 
undoubtedly relates to the rougher, more drought- 
susceptible terrain in Zululand. Another possible 
explanation could be that, to a certain extent, a greater 
population density in Pondoland, (84 per square mile vs. 42 
in Zululand in 193 6) meant more intensive use of the land 
for agriculture. More importantly, as has been argued 
earlier, the Zulu placed a greater emphasis on increasing 
their cattle herds, which were a valuable source of food. 
Thus, the estimated mean herd size in Zululand between 1937 
and 1951 was approximately 2 6 head per family compared with 
13.4 head per family in the Transkei.^  Nevertheless, the 
substantially lower levels of crop production in Zululand 
suggest a rather greater reliance on the market for 
vegetable food supplies than was evident in Pondoland.^
Between 1934 and 193 9, the average per capita output of 
maize in Zululand was estimated at .51 bags per person per 
year.11 During the 1946 drought, this dropped to .27 bags 
and only increased to .42 bags per person during the
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'bumper crop' year of 1948. According to the Mine Wages 
Commission, the average annual minimum requirement of grain 
per worker was 2.75 bags, (or roughly 1.5 lbs. per working 
male per day) and this was only considered adequate if 
taken with other foods. Clearly Africans in Zululand were 
producing considerably less than this even if children and 
the elderly required only half a worker's minimum.
By the 1940s, the sale of maize by Africans to local stores
represented only a small fraction of their total
production. Africans felt the unequal terms of market
exchange most acutely through the sale of food. As
Whitehead has argued, the poorer you are the more
1 ^coercively you experience the sale of food. J Delayed or 
insufficient remittances from family members in urban 
centres meant that many reserve dependants, predominantly 
women, older men, and even children, were forced to sell 
maize early in the agricultural cycle for low returns and 
re-purchase it late in the year, before the next harvest, 
for high prices. As Whitehead has further argued, 'There 
should be no suggestion that subsistence needs [for food] 
are met before surplus is marketed’ This calls into 
question the whole notion of subsistence production and 
just what could rationally be considered a surplus since 
the market value of grain sold during the harvest was often 
considerably lower than the market cost of buying smaller 
amounts of grain during a time of scarcity. Even in 
favourable years, surplus production was limited, and many 
families were forced to sell what was in fact 'subsistence
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food' to meet cash demands only to have to re-purchase food 
later at higher prices.
The amount of maize Africans traded or sold to local stores
varied from district to district and from year to year. In
1939, a poor to average year for crops, Africans in the
drier northern areas sold less than 6 per cent of their
1 fmaize crop. D Most grain was sold in small amounts over
long periods of time as the need arose. In southern
districts, Africans managed to sell close to 12 per cent of
what they produced. This figure belies the unequal levels
of productivity between households in the more congested
south. Africans in the south sold larger percentages of
grain, however, they also imported larger amounts from
17 •outside the reserves. Although it is difficult to 
distinguish 'surplus' grain from subsistence requirements, 
it is more likely that the importation of larger amounts of 
grain in average years meant that southern households
produced less of their subsistence requirements than their 
northern counterparts.
Apart from the principal crops of maize and corn, cash 
cropping included, in descending order of value, sugar­
cane, tobacco, groundnuts, potatoes and lessor and probably 
insignificant amounts of oats and barley.-*-® The cash value 
of produce is difficult to ascertain. The unequal terms of 
trade, however, meant that Africans received only between
2 0 and 40 per cent of the re-sale value of grain they sold
1 Qto white store-keepers. y Informal trade with speculators 
and farmers ranged from cash purchases to trade in cattle
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and differed considerably from individual to individual
depending on the condition of cattle and proximity to the
farmer. The market and informal sectors are therefore not
strictly comparable, and exact figures cannot be 
9 ncalculated. Tobacco, grown m  modest amounts by women in
nearly every district in Zululand probably contributed only
a small percentage of total cash coming into the reserves.
Nevertheless, tobacco played an important role in providing
cash to women, who sold it to white tobacco farmers at well
below market value, partly because it could be grown with
less labour and on smaller plots of land than m a i z e . T h e
importance to the family of women's cash-cropping in
conjunction with subsistence production should not be
9 9underestimated.^
In the 1930s, the introduction of what can be described as 
itemised costing for grain supplies, as part of the trend 
in the commoditisation of food stuffs, played a part in 
increased food costs. African consumers were at a 
disadvantage in both the sale and purchase of maize when 
central suppliers started making separate charges for the 
burlap bags the grain was shipped in. J Store-keepers set 
lower purchase prices for African maize when they had to 
buy it in small quantities and then bag it themselves, 
which was usually the case. While the Maize Control Board 
(established in 1931 to regulate the sale and distribution 
of grain. See ch. on famine) set profit margins for the 
sale of 200 lb. bags at 6d. per bag there were no limits on 
prices charged for smaller quantities. Cash-strapped 
Africans, often forced to buy food in small quantities as
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immediate demands dictated, were charged as much as 4s.3d. 
more for the equivalent of a bag doled out in smaller tins. 
When store-keepers had to incur the cost of bags for grain 
supplies, they then extended the practice of doling out 
maize in paraffin tins to sales where the purchaser wanted
a full bag and even demanded Africans bring their own
4- ■ 24containers.
Other, predominantly women's', cash-cropping within the 
informal sector, was probably more significant in cash 
terms than food or tobacco. Women contributed to family 
income through the sale of 'dagga' or insangu (cannabis), 
utshwala (beer), ubusulu (palm wine) and isishimeyane 
(alcohol, also termed itshimiyana) though the amount cannot 
be estimated. ^ 5 Certainly in the 1940s, some local 
officials complained that the combined effect of young men 
earning 'high wages' in the cities and 'illicit' 
agricultural activities such as alcohol and dagga 
production had undermined food production as '... more and
more people are abandoning the tillage of the land in
9 f\favour of these more lucrative pursuits'. ° These illegal
activities were, however, not without hazards. NCs were
constantly on the look-out for Africans selling illicit
dagga or liquor along the reserve roadsides, and did not
hesitate to prosecute those caught, even in times of
9 7economic hardship.
Official concerns that cattle herding also undermined 
agriculture were not entirely accurate. There was no direct 
cause and effect relationship between an increase in cattle
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herds and a reduction in crop production. Cattle used for 
ploughing actually increased agricultural production and 
many Africans without cattle, but with cash, could hire 
cattle to plough. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest 
that agriculture decreased because cattle increased. It is 
perhaps more accurate to suggest that agriculture decreased 
as a product of the unequal distribution of cattle and land 
since wealthy chiefs with their large herds displaced 
potential farmers. Despite repeated and vociferous 
criticisms from white officials to the contrary, cattle did 
not contribute significantly to reduced agriculture through 
erosion and did not necessarily compete with crops for the
O Q
same type of land. ° Indeed, the two greatest constraints 
on agriculture in Zululand, as elsewhere in Africa, were 
labour shortages as men were siphoned off to the mines and
0 Qthe disadvantaged position of Africans m  the market. 27
Pastoral products contributed a substantial portion of
reserve income. In 193 7, the sale of wool and hides brought
in over £20,000 (£5,200 and £15,000 respectively) and the
sale of cattle through NAD auctions alone a further 
3 n£25,000. u These figures are, however, somewhat misleading.
By the 1930s, the bulk of Zululand's stock was unevenly
distributed regionally and some men controlled
disproportionately large herds. Wooled sheep for example
were almost exclusively maintained by chief Hlubi's people
in Nquthu and chiefs and royalty, in the north owned some
3 1herds of cattle m  excess of 500 head.  ^ Thus, some 
sections of reserve society were better poised to benefit 
from stock product sales than others. As in East Africa, in
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Zululand Africans rarely slaughtered their cattle for 
consumption because they relied on amasi (milk) as a
dietary staple, and because the value of cattle for 
ploughing, lobola, and from potential cash sale was greater 
than the value of the meat. Africans with small herds, 
however, were reluctant to sell or trade this form of
accumulated capital in any but the most dire
circumstances. While the sale of hides from cattle which
died from drought or nagana probably helped some cash- 
strapped Africans to purchase food a more significant by­
product of dead cattle was the edible meat (see famine ch. 
below).
AFRICAN PEASANT PRODUCTION
African peasant production in Zululand remained limited and 
in small pockets in the twentieth century. The Zululand 
peasantry can be simply defined, following Bundy, as a 
class of rural producers using family labour who struggled 
to meet their food and cash needs from agro-pastoral 
production on the land. Many peasants, however, often 
relied on alternative sources of cash, such as employment 
in the administration, to support themselves and their 
production. There was a broad range of producers along a 
spectrum which illustrated the phenomenon of transition, 
predominantly from rural producer to proletarianised wage 
labourer, or the 'peasantry as a process'. A very few, such 
as the Khuzwayo family in Melmoth, became wealthy 
capitalist farmers, and eventually employed other Africans
n c
as labourers. 3 The majority of Africans in Zululand,
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however, were split between those that followed a more 
strictly 'peasant' path, producing mostly for the local 
market and those who followed a more 'capitalist farming' 
path by producing crops, mostly sugar-cane, for cash sales 
to commercial concerns outside the reserves.^
By the 193 0s, there were only a few African peasants,
mostly kholwa, in Zululand who maintained themselves on the
land through special relationships with the chiefs and
induna, though the exact number is unknown. As Guy has
shown, most of them had their origins outside the region.^
In 1931, there were only eight African farmers'
associations in southern Zululand districts, mostly
concentrated outside the cane-farming areas, with a total
membership of less than 250; and not all their members were
3 ftattempting to produce for the market. ° Roughly one third 
of these so-called 'progressive' farmers were what can be 
termed 'producer-traders', that is they grew their own 
produce, were actively engaged in the market on a regular 
basis and had taken out official licences in order to trade 
legally with local store-keepers or other commercial
3 Qconcerns. Overall, as has been argued earlier, cattle- 
keeping remained the most productive and profitable form of 
peasant endeavour, partly due to the climate and geography 
of Zululand, and it was largely restricted to male Zulu 
within the rigidly defined gendered division of labour.
Prior to the 1930s, the state gave little support for 
African agriculture in general and, only limited 
encouragement to peasants. Competing whites were as hostile
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to both official and African efforts to advance 
'progressive1 African fanning in the 1920s as their Natal 
compatriots were a generation earlier.^ The Zululand 
Native Agriculture Show, started in 1923 as a small exhibit 
within the local white agricultural show had, by 1927, 
grown substantially but segregated from the white show 'to 
prevent the undesirable intermingling of Europeans and 
Natives'. ^  In 1928, the Zulu show was taken over by the 
Zululand Native Show Society which was dominated by members 
of the local wealthy elite, including A. Mpanza (later 
Secretary of the Zulu Society) and prominent members of the 
Kuzwayo family, who were less interested in promoting 
African agriculture than their own accumulation and Zulu 
'nationalism'.^ By 1933, the NAD shifted financial support 
away from African agricultural shows and into 'stimulating 
the growth of Native industries and handicrafts' for which 
there were no possibilities for export and only a very 
limited local market.^
Africans and concerned whites complained that the greatest 
constraints on African peasant production related to the 
fragmented and unequal nature of the market. For most 
aspiring peasants in the congested reserves, access to land 
remained crucial, although at least some were able to 
overcome the constraints of chiefly control over land, 
usually by escaping to mission reserves, through bribery, 
kin ties to a chiefly family or as induna. As Beinart has 
argued for the late nineteenth century Pondoland, for this 
class,
282
It was the very dependence on the wider colonial 
economies in which the terms of trade turned 
against the peasant, rather than the absence of
involvement in markets, which first constrained the 
development of peasant agriculture. ^
Thus, by the early 1930s, some local officials believed 
that the 'very small percentage' of Africans engaged in
commodity production was
experiencing the disabilities occasioned by the
absence of an accessible and suitable market for
produce.The surplus production is inconsiderable,
yet the absence of a suitable market tends to 
• d Rretard production m  excess of personal demand. J
Of this class, three peasant producers in Nongoma stand 
out, partly as a function of sources but partly also
because they were exceptional examples of a wealthier 
peasantry: Shiyabane Mncwango and Mkwintye Zulu, both
induna under chief Bokwe of Nongoma and Timoti Khumalo son
A C
of chief Sibindi, also of Nongoma. D These mission-educated 
men had gained farming experience on white farms in Natal 
and all believed that the principal obstacles to progress 
in agriculture were the power of chiefs and induna to
allocate land and the insufficiencies and inequities of the 
local market.^
They protested to the Native Economic Commission that their 
trade was limited, almost exclusively, to reserve Africans, 
and that local white store-keepers would not deal with
them. Khumalo was engaged in a cycle of trade which 
ultimately relied on cattle as the object of exchange. He 
produced maize, ground nuts and cow-peas and traded most of 
this to cash-strapped reserve Africans for cattle. He then 
sold the cattle, for cash, back to other Africans in the
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reserves or occasionally to Durban speculators. He believed
that he was not able to compete effectively on the open
market since local store-keepers offered poor prices for
A ftmaize and preferred to give only goods and not cash.
Clearly these peasant traders were far more flexible than
the store-keepers, and probably served the needs of a wider 
cross-section of the community, including the very poor who 
had little cash or cattle, and the wealthier class who 
either had cattle or earned a wage.
All three men apparently made a good living from the trade 
and sale of their produce; Khumalo and Mkwintye both owned 
automobiles and Khumalo hired four other men to work his 
fields. Nevertheless, they still found local marketing 
difficult. As Mkwintye put it:
During the last season we worked hard and got a
very good yield, but it is plain that much of what
we have reaped will go to waste through lack of 
markets.. We have no financial refuge when we
a q  3
cannot sell all our produce. J
In general, the reserve market appeared to be more 
favourable than the unequal terms African producers faced 
on the wider market. Although Mcwango sold hides and 
poultry to Durban buyers, he complained that they were 
white buyers and gave him poor prices for his 'Native' 
produce, a stigma which also affected African-produced 
cattle and wool.^  Mkwintye also stated he would not sell 
his maize to Durban buyers because, 'That would be 
unprofitable. The money received just now [1932] in Durban 
for a bag of mealies is only 7/- [shillings]. 1 African 
peasants were undermined more by the unequal terms, lack of
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capital and the lack of state support than the absence of a 
market itself. The playing field was far from level.
In 1933, in Nongoma, a small number of kholwa producers 
called on the NAD to provide the people with proper storage 
sheds for their grain to improve marketing and reduce their 
reliance on store-keepers. The petitioners argued they 
needed a place to sell their maize for cash since local 
stores only offered them goods in exchange. The NC 
supported the petition, arguing that without cash sales 
there was no longer any incentive for people to grow food 
in excess of their own family needs. ^ 3 The CNC, T. Norton, 
embodying the standard racism and hostility to African 
agriculture, replied that the formation of a cooperative 
society would probably serve the people's need, '... but no 
doubt the Natives concerned are insufficiently advanced for 
such an undertaking’.^ The NAD was only prepared to 
support the formation of a local 'thrift society', and 
advised Africans to develop more 'thrifty habits' while 
relying on local stores for the sale of their grain.
By the end of the 193 0s, the terms for marketing turned 
even more sharply against African peasants. Africans 
complained that the introduction of the Maize Control Act 
(No. 39 of 1931, amended in 1937) which imposed a levy on 
all grain sold in the Union, including small amounts 
destined for local markets, made store-keepers reluctant to 
purchase African maize at a fair price (see below).^ 
According to the SNA, D. Smit, the NAD had attempted to 
secure concessions from the control board for maize
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produced in the reserves, but that the board had maintained 
it was impossible to differentiate between white and 
African producers since it would mean higher sales in the 
reserves and outside producers (ie. whites producing for 
export) would suffer. ^
The sale of maize also highlighted tensions between 
conservative and 'progressive' factions in Zulu society. On 
the one hand, Rev. John Dube and Natives Representative 
Councillor for Vryheid and former Nkandhla resident, 
William Ndhlovu, condemned the operation of the Act for 
preventing women and children from selling small amounts of
[T  O
gram when they needed to buy goods or clothing. ° Bishop 
Vyvyan of the Anglican Diocese of Zululand joined their 
criticism and pointed to the paradox that, while the NAD 
implemented schemes to improve African crops, the central 
state undermined their sale.-*^  On the other hand, Mshiyeni 
believed that the sale of maize was undermining the entire 
fabric of Zulu life. Although he acknowledged that the 
practice continued, he had tried to prevent women from 
selling maize to the stores because, he claimed, food only 
had to be bought later at higher prices and many women 
squandered their money on clothing.^ Despite Mshiyeni's 
protestation, the tensions between these two viewpoints 
heightened in the 1940s, when, it was claimed, women were 
abandoning farming to pursue more remunerative work.
African endeavours to participate in the market fared 
slightly better in the 1940s. They began selling tropical 
fruit in the southern coastal districts as roads slowly
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penetrated the reserves and more affluent whites travelled 
through the area. For example, a cooperative marketing 
organization supported by the NAD, the Gingindhlovu Native 
Produce Market, boasted ten members in 1942.^  Since local 
fruit was not normally traded at stores, because of storage 
problems, in general, African fruit growing was not
initially opposed. By the mid-1940s, however, with a
growing white population and rising racial tensions,
objections to African markets along roads in white areas 
were more frequent. The local white health committee
demanded that the market stalls be closed for being 
'unhygienic' and an 'eyesore'^ Nevertheless, the NC at 
Mtunzini refused to comply with the request, on the grounds 
that since the produce was always fresh and turnover rapid, 
he could not deny people one of their last remaining market 
outlets.^ Similar market gardening schemes for pineapples 
in southern Zululand and Natal districts bordering the 
Thukela also proved to be relatively successful in the 
later 1940s.^
Perhaps the best hope for many aspiring southern Zululand 
peasants was the commercial production of sugar cane. While 
African sugar-cane farmers cannot, strictly speaking, be 
defined as peasants since all their produce was for cash 
sale, in Zululand most also grew their own food. Zulu cane- 
farmers fall more neatly into Bundy's category of 'small 
scale commercial farmers', although their experience with 
the white dominated-market was not so different from that 
of the standard peasant as Bundy would suggest.^ African 
cane-growing for domestic use dated back before 182 0 and in
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the twentieth century was undoubtedly the principal source 
of income for a number of prosperous and politically active 
Natal African families, such as the Lutulis and Gumedes.^ 
African cane farming in Zululand, however, was on the 
whole, limited, declined in the 1930s and 1940s, and did 
not contribute to the formation a stable class of 
commercial farmers.
There is little mention of African cane-production in the 
records for Zululand through most of the 1920s. In the late 
192 0s, however, the ever industrious Frederick Rodseth, 
Superintendent of the Reserves and Inspector of African 
Labour from 1924 to 1932, developed a cane-farming scheme 
on divided lots in Eshowe.^ Under Rodseth's scheme, the 
inequities in land allocation which hindered commoners 
elsewhere in the reserves were entrenched for would-be cane 
farmers, although it appears that the central NAD had 
rather more to do with these restrictions than Rodseth. In 
terms of the scheme, chiefs were allowed up to fifty acres 
of land for cane in Eshowe compared with only fifteen for 
commoners.^ As Natal's CNC, T. Norton, pointed out, 
fifteen acres hardly sufficed to meet most families' food 
and cash needs, so that the scheme would force growers to 
become purely commercial farmers:
I assume that the growth of cane would, in the 
course of time, supersede the growth of Native 
foodstuffs by those engaged, as we could hardly 
afford to allot land for both purposes.^
Nevertheless, the NAD pressed ahead with the plan and, 
under Proclamation No. 42 of 1931, tried to stimulate 
African interest in cane production. Moreover, under a
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revised Sugar Act in 193 6, the NAD won a set quota from the
7 nsugar industry for African producers. w
NAD support was limited, however, and Zulu cane-farmers
could not overcome the problems of under-capitalization and
strong white hostility. White cane-growers were constantly
at odds both with the NAD over labour supplies and the
sugar industry over payment schedules and were, therefore,
7 1 .prejudiced against African growers. African cane-growing
threatened their monopoly and their efforts to take over
the remaining fertile reserve land. In contrast to African
growers' schemes in Natal, however, the NAD in Zululand
prevented milling companies from setting aside mill-site
land for African production. Since the mid-1910s, Zululand
officials had been concerned that non-performance clauses
for African mill-site contracts would alienate more reserve
land to white capital since the millers often stepped in to
7 7take over production if Africans had a poor season.
In 1932, Rodseth recounted the difficulties most Zulu 
growers faced: their plots were too small to provide a
sufficient cash return for subsistence, let alone an 
adequate profit for re-investment; they had no access to 
trucks to transport cane to the mills; and many whites 
pressured mills not to accept African cane at all or to buy 
white growers' consignments first, leaving little scope for 
African cane in the local production quota. Even when 
African cane was accepted by the mills, often through 
official intervention, it was invariably crushed after 
white growers' cane so that the sucrose content (the basis
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of payment) dropped well below freshly cut consignments."^
It was no wonder then that the NC at Mtunzini reported in
1932 that African growers were 'unstable' and suffered from 
7 Amounting debt.
African endeavours to overcome these obstacles drew a sharp
criticism from the Zululand Planters' Union (ZPU). Thus,
the Secretary of the ZPU complained to the local NC about
the 'insolent behaviour' of African growers and that,
'These boys are actually seen running with their cane carts
in front of members [ 1 ] trucks trying to beat them to the
rail siding.’^  As a result of Zulu complaints of the white
monopolisation of mill consignments and rail sidings, the
NAD built its own segregated rail depot in Eshowe for
7 fiAfrican-grown cane.
Although Russell Thornton, the Director of Native 
Agriculture for the NAD, thought that African cane-growers 
were quite remarkable, for no white cared for his fields 
better or produced better cane, market constraints and 
white grower hostility forced African production down.^ 
Between 1935 and 1946, African cane production in Natal and 
Zululand dropped from over 51,000 tons to under 3 6,000 tons 
while white production increased by nearly 750,000 tons 
from 3,869,442 to 4,618,454 tons. African production per 
capita dropped even more for there were 3 5 more growers in 
1946 than in 193 6.^ in Zululand alone, Africans accounted 
for less than 1 per cent of the total cane production in 
1946 although they constituted 37 per cent of the
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on .
growers. u Conditions for African growers did not improve 
in the 1940s.
Despite increased African quotas set in the revised Sugar 
Industry Act under the Fahey Agreement of 1943 which fixed 
regional production limits for the Union, Zulu production
O 1
continued to decline. There was, moreover, a rapid 
turnover of growers. During periods of drought a number of 
Zulu growers lost their individual quotas at the mills for 
failing to deliver the set amount of cane, and their
o p
contracts were turned over to other Africans.^ Nor were 
they entitled to state relief under the Drought and Relief 
to Primary Producers Act of 1940 which extended one-year 
interest free loans to white growers who produced less than 
400 tons a year.^
In the final analysis, the rapid decline of African 
agriculture in Zululand was a product of the impact of 
white settlement, the concomitant over-crowding of the 
reserves and the rise of white commercial farming. While 
most Zulu families still produced some of their food 
requirements by 193 0, they increasingly relied on cash to 
meet subsistence needs. Local white farmers were 
consistently hostile to African peasant production of food 
and cash crops. The Zulu, therefore, concentrated their 
efforts on cattle herding and wage labour. These conditions 
had significant implications for how the Zulu and the state 
met the crisis of drought and famine in the 193 0s and 
1940s. Thus, as will be argued below, commoners faced the 
declining stake they had in crop production in the reserves
291
by developing a greater reliance on the wider economy and 
state support.
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1 For a brief discussion of the controversy over 
periodisation see J. Iliffe, The African Poor: a history
(Cambridge, 1989), p. 124. Simkins dates the inability of 
reserve Africans to produce their subsistence requirements 
from 1918, largely on the basis of available reliable 
agricultural census data. See C. Simkins, 'Agricultural 
Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918- 
1969', JSAS, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1981, pp. 256-283. J. Knight
and G. Lenta give a slightly less severe picture, dating 
rapid decline from the early 1920s in their 'Has Capitalism 
underdeveloped the labour reserves of South Africa?1, 
Oxford Bulletin of economics and statistics, No. 42, 1980
pp. 157-210. See also Bundy, Peasantry, pp. 221-225. For 
Natal and Zululand agricultural decline and crises prior to 
1910 see J. Lambert, 'African Society in Crisis, c. 1880- 
1910, in Duminy and Guest, Natal and Zululand, pp. 345-372, 
pp. 384-385 and p. 397. For contemporary selective 
comparisons see U.G. 32-'46 Report of the SEPC.
 ^ See Hemson, 'Class1, p. 284.
 ^ Simkins, 'Agricultural Production1, pp. 266-269.
4 Ibid/ p. 265.
Ibid.
 ^ For full statistics see appendix.
 ^ For approximate comparisons with a population of about
350.000 in 1936, Zululand produced just over 152,000 bags 
of maize compared with a population of 326,338 and over
500.000 bags of maize produced in Pondoland. See Beinart, 
Pondoland, pp. 166, 173.
® Ibid. p. 167 and appendix here.
 ^ Simkins, 'Agriculture Production', p. 274. NB these 
estimates do not account for the differential herd size 
which Simkins estimated. In Zululand, it would appear that 
by 1951 over 51 per cent of reserve families owned no 
cattle and close to 70 per cent owned fewer than 10. See 
also the cattle ch.
See Beinart, Pondoland, pp. 161-162.
44 This is based on figures in the statistical appendix and 
the Report of the SEPC, p. 14.
The SEPC estimated Zululand production at nearer .7 bags 
per person per year, slightly higher than my estimate, but 
nevertheless still below the recommended daily requirement. 
See SEPC, p. 49 and statistical appendix.
This was particularly true for of women in Zululand, the
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majority of whom sold or bartered small amounts of grain 
during the harvest season and then re-purchased food when 
scarcity hit during the late winter. For a discussion of 
women's agricultural production and market exchange see A. 
Whitehead, 'Rural Women and Food Production in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, in J. Dreze and A. Sen, The Political Economy of 
Hunger Vols. 1-3 (Oxford, 1990-1991) Vol 1, pp. 424-473, 
pp. 435-436 and H. Moore and M. Vaughan, Cutting Down 
Trees. Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the 
Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990 (London, 1994), pp. 
46-50, 82-88.
Whitehead, 'Women and Food', p.435.
This was already evident in 1906 when the rebellion 
occurred. See Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 88-92.
The figures available for 1938-1939 were: 200 lb. bags
North
produced sold % imported by stores
Ingwavuma 8000 100 1 400
Mahlabatini 7000 800 11 na
Nongoma 16,800 1000 5 na
South
Nkandhla 20,000 3, 500 17 10,000
Nquthu 25,000 4, 000 16 2, 000
Melmoth 9, 000 200 2 6,000*
Source: NTS 9386 5/385 2, NCs' replies to CNC circular on 
maize control, Aug. 1939.
* this was the average number imported. During a good 
season as few as 1000 bags were imported and in poor 
seasons as many as 15,000 bags were imported.
NB, these figures are estimates by store-keepers and do not 
account for any sale or trade to local farmers or 
speculators. The production and sale estimates are subject 
to a considerable margin of error, as indeed are any 
official estimates, often based on approximations of land 
under tillage, or the potential labour output of an 
'average' family of one male, 2 females and 4 children. For 
a discussion of the inaccuracies of crop estimates see 
Beinart, Pondoland, p. 175.
^  See above statistics and NTS 9386 5/385, 2 NC Melmoth to 
CNC, 2 5 Aug 193 9.
xo For crop estimates and the largely insignificant 
production and cash value of crops (other than sugar-cane) 
produced by Africans in comparison to whites in Zululand 
see variously, Agricultural Censuses for the Union, entries 
for Zululand (for the years in brackets), U.G. 53-1919 
(1918) [first full agricultural census for the Union], U.G.
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25-1925 (1922-23), U.G. 4-1926 (1924), U.G. 13-1927 (1925), 
U.G. 37-1928 (1927), U.G. 41-1929 (1928-29), U.G. 35-1930,
(1929-30), U.G. 12-1932 (1931), U.G. 44-1935 (1934-35),
U.G. 59-1937 (1936), U.G. 31-1940 (1939-40), and Union
Department of Agriculture, Handbook of Agricultural 
Statistics, 1904-1950, (Pretoria, 1960). See also the SEPC, 
pp. 12-16. NB there are apparently no crop estimates for 
sorghum or millet for Zululand. Potatoes and pulses 
accounted for a limited amount of reserve production in 
Zululand in 1946 at 4,200 150 lb. bags and 1,800 200 lb. 
bags repsectively. See SEPC, p. 15
See for example NTS 9386, 5/385, part II, NCs1 replies
to CNC circular on maize control, 16 Aug. 1939.
9 n For a discussion of this problem see J. Guy, 
'Destruction and Reconstruction', fn. No. 39, p. 192. and 
J. Ferguson, 'The Cultural Topography of Wealth: Commodity 
Paths and the Structure of Property in Rural Lesotho1, 
American Anthropologist, Vol. 94, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 
55-73, pp. 56-58.
24 See NTS 10150 22/419, CNC' s report on the agricultural 
and pastoral conditions of the reserves, undated, 193 0, and 
oral interview with Mrs. Tozo Zwane. See also K. Hart, The 
Political Economy of West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 
1982), pp. 70-71 for the relatively lower labour inputs and 
land demands for tobacco.
22 see for example, P. Hayes, 'The "Famine of the Dams": 
gender, labour and politics in Colonial Ovamboland, 1929- 
1930', paper delivered at the seminar on containment and 
mobility in Namibia at the ASA conference, Toronto, Nov. 
1994, Whitehead, 'Women and Food1, pp. 434-435, Walker, 
'Gender and Migrant Labour’, pp. 192-195.
22 See CNC 94A, N7/8/2 (X) , minutes of meeting of Zululand
traders with CNC, 13 Nov. 1931 and NTS 9836, 5/385, part II 
G. Moore to NC Ingwavuma, 22 Aug. 193 9.
24 NTS 9836, 5/385, part III, NC Nkandhla to CNC, 22 April
1942 .
22 There are no known local cash values for the sale of 
these products since trade in dagga and shimeyane were 
illegal. Informants suggested that while the sale of these 
products alone was rarely enough to live on, the income 
they generated was important to women for both dry goods 
and food, especially for those without the land and labour 
needed to produce maize. Oral interviews with Mr. M.S. 
Shandu and Mr. N. Dube. Mr. Shandu said he believed his 
mother grew dagga in amongst tobacco plants and sold it 
along the roadside. On the sale of informal rural produce 
see la Hausse, 'Drink1, pp. 85-86.
26 NTS 9387, 5/385 2 , part V, NC Ubombo to CNC, 29 May
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1944.
27 See for example 1/NGA, 3/3/2/6, 2/26/6 annual report of
the NC for 1932 and 1/ESH 3/3/2/8# 12/54, NC to CNC, 12
March 1935.
7 ft The criticisms were widespread, but perhaps the best 
examples are found within the NEC report and the NEC 
evidence of F. Rodseth, p. 1935, written evidence of A. 
Stanford (NC Eshowe), p. 4, C. Wheelwright, p. 1733, and in 
the Director of Native Agriculture, R.W. Thornton's speech 
delivered to the Bantu-European Christian Conference at 
Fort Hare, 27 June 193 0, published as an NAD pamphlet, 'The 
Agricultural Position in Native Areas of South Africa' 
(Pretoria, 1931). For the role of cattle in alleged 
constraints on land for agriculture see Richards, 
Revolution, pp. 13 6-37, D. Tapson, 'Overstocking and the
off-take controversy re-examined for the case of KwaZulu', 
ODI Pastoral Development Network Paper, 31a, 1991, pp. 1-
22, pp. 19-20 and cattle ch.
7 9 See Richards, Revolution, pp. 51-52 and Hart, 
Agriculture, p. 48.
30 SEPC, p. 75. 
ft 1 See chapter on cattle and the following chapter on
'betterment' for wooled sheep in Nquthu.
ft 7 See Kerven, Customary, p. 12. For the rare occasions
when cattle were slaughtered, mostly by wealthy chiefs, see
A . T. Bryant, 'A Description of Native Foodstuffs', 
unpublished pamphlet, MS Bryant, KCAL, p. 8.
See J. Ferguson,'Bovine Mystique', pp. 647-674.
3  ^See Bundy, Peasantry, pp. 7-10, esp. p. 9.
33 See la Hausse, 'Ethnicity', p. 348.
“3 £
For a discussion of a distinction between 'peasants' and 
capitalists in agriculture see Bundy, Peasantry, p. 10 , K. 
Hart, The Political Economy of West African Agriculture 
(Cambridge, 1982), p. 11, and A. Hopkins, An Economic 
History of West Africa (New York, 1973) pp. 8-9.
ft 7 NGuy, Destruction and Reconstruction', pp. 178-179.
33 See NEC, evidence of A. Lee, pp. 1455-1456 and CNC 63A 
N8/3/2 (9), CNC to SNA, undated, re 'Native Agricultural
Societies'.
ft 9 This number of course does not account for those who 
worked informally or illegally without licences, although 
considering the attitude of white traders to African 
sellers it is unlikely that many managed to trade
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successfully without licences. See NEC, Lee's evidence, p. 
1456.
4 6 Bundy, Peasantry, pp. 186-188.
41 CNC 63A N8/3/2 (9), CNC to SNA, 24 March 1927 and see
the programs for the Zululand Native Show Society contained 
in this file.
4  ^ Ibid. see for example the annual prize list for the 
Zululand Native Show, containing a list of patrons and 
executives, 3 0 June 193 0 and see la Hausse, 'Ethnicity' for 
the role of Mpanza and the Kuzwayos, p. 173, fn. No. 17 and 
p. 348.
43 CNC 63A N8/3/2 (9), CNC to NC Eshowe (the centre for the 
shows), 2 June 1933 and NTS 10150, 22/419, CNC' s report on 
agriculture, 1930, p. 2.
44 See Pondoland, p. 3.
45 1/NGA 3/3/2/11, 2/91, NC's annual reports for Nongoma,
1931.
4 6 There were remarkably few African peasant accumulaters 
in Zululand as opposed to commercial farmers such as Zulu 
sugar-cane planters. For the background to this class 
elsewhere see Beinart and Delius' 'Introduction' to Putting 
a Plough to the Ground, p. 15.
4  ^NEC, evidence of Mkwintye, p. 1700.
4® Ibid. evidence of Khumalo, p. 1716.
49 Ibid. p. 1719.
c n
Ibid. evidence of Mcwango, p. 1712, and see ch. on 
cattle for the stigma on African cattle and the ch. on 
betterment for price limits on 'Native' wool.
^4 NEC, evidence of Mkwintye, p. 1719.
5^  See CNC 113A N8/1/5, 108/40, minutes of NC' s meeting
with Nongoma residents, 4 Jan. 1933, p. 2 and statement of 
Captain Ngcobo of the Salvation Army and unsigned petition, 
undated.
53 Ibid. NC Braatvedt to CNC, 23 Jan. 1933.
54 Ibid. CNC to NC, 30 Jan. 1933.
55 Ibid.
56 CNC 110A Nl/15/5, 94/19A II, minutes of meeting between 
SNA, Smit, CNC, Lugg and Natal and Zululand chiefs, 31 July 
1939. See also Packard, White Plague, p. 116 for the effect
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of the Act on African agriculture.
57 Ibid. p. 2.
58 Ibid. p.3.
NTS 9386, 5/385/2 V, Bishop to Min. of Native Affairs,
16 June 193 9.
CNC 110A Nl/15/5, 94/19A, II, minutes of meeting between 
SNA, Smit, CNC, Lugg and Natal and Zululand chiefs, 31 July 
1939, p.5.
61 See 1/MTU 3/4/3/2, 2/18/3, NC to CNC, 28 Aug. 1942.
62 ibid. Secretary of the Gingindhlovu Health Committee to 
NC Mtunzini, 18 Feb. 1944 and 25 March 1945. See similar 
complaints from the Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Farmers Union and 
the Melmoth Health Committee to CNC in KCAL, MS MEL, 
89/22/1 minute book, resolutions for 1944, KCM 91/15/6 
Gingindhlovu-Mtunzini Farmers Association, resolution of 14 
Feb. 1937 and MS ESH, Eshowe Health Committee minute book, 
KCM 88/23/2, 24 Feb. 1940.
63 l/MTU 3/4/3/2, 2/18/3. NC to Gingindhlovu Health 
Committee, 25 Nov. 1948.
64 Mr. N. Otte described an ambitious pineapple growing 
cooperative he helped develop in Mapumulo and Eshowe in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s which sold over £1,000 worth of 
pineapples a year. Oral interview conducted by the author, 
20 Sept. 1993
66 For this distinction see Bundy, Peasantry, pp.92-93.
6 6 For the background to African cane growing and cane 
farmers see Bryant, 'Foodstuffs' p. 10 and Etherington, 
Preachers, pp. 180-181 For the rise of leading African 
political families and cane growing see Bundy, Peasantry, 
p. 180 and S. Marks, Ambiguities, pp. 49-51, 59, 65 and fn
Nos. 3 5 and 36, p. 140 and her 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and 
Purity 1, p . 222.
6^  See NTS 10150 22/419, Thornton's report on agriculture 
in Zululand, 1929, p. 7-9 and the Natal Witness, 31 Jan. 
1931.
6^  Ibid. SNA Herbst to CNC, 12 Dec. 192 9 and the Natal
Witness, 31 Jan. 1931.
69 Ibid. CNC to SNA, 25 Oct. 1929.
7 n See a copy of the revised Sugar Industry Act, No. 28. of
1936 and U.G. 51-'50, NAD Report for 1948-49, p. 14.
71 See ch. on labour for the struggle for Zulu labour and
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the Zululand planter's intransigence. Zululand planters 
were also at the forefront of the struggle to shift the 
basis of payment for their cane from weight to sucrose 
content since Zululand cane matured faster and had a higher 
content than much of Natal's cane. See for example SASJ 
Vol. 33, April 1949, article on the opening of Zululand, 
pp. 157-162, p. 158.
72 See NEC, evidence of Rodseth, p. 1748.
7  ^ Ibid. pp. 1945-47.
74 1/MTU, 2/1/2/3, 1/336, NC to CNC, 12 Dec. 1932.
7  ^ Ibid. Secretary of the ZPU to NC, 2 Feb. 1932.
76 NEC, evidence of Rodseth, p. 1947.
77 NTS 10150, 22/419, Thornton's comments on Rodseth's
scheme in Eshowe in his report on agriculture in Natal and 
Zululand, 1929, p. 6. For details of Thornton and his role 
in African agriculture see the following chapter on 
'betterment *.
7® Total Production for Natal and Zululand 1935-1945, tons 
crushed.
1935/36 1944/45 1945/46 +/-
Africans 51,899 42,253 35,641 -16,258
Whites 3,869,442 NA 4,618,454 +749,011
Source: SASJ, Vol. 31, April 1947, p. 195 and SEPC, p. 15.
7 ^ See NEC, Lee's evidence and E. Roux, 'Land and 
Agriculture in the Native Reserves' ch. VII in SAIRR, 
Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa (Cape Town, 
1949), pp. 178-198.
on .Hulett and Sons crushing mills at Felixton and Amatikulu
in southern Zululand, where the majority of African
producers supplied cane, reported the following figures for
cane production at their two mills:
number of planters tons produced per cent
Whites 216 900,876 81.34
Africans 126 9,019 .81
Indians 97 32,033 2.90*
The mill - 165,595 14.95
Source: SASJ, Vol. 30, April 1946, pp. 187-190.
Whites accounted for 1,066,471 of total 1,107,523 tons 
crushed or 96.29 per cent of total production. Africans 
produced an average of 71.57 tons each, whites produced
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4170.72 tons each, 58 times more cane than Africans.
* NB Indian growers were actually located close to Stanger 
in Natal proper and only delivered to the Zululand mills 
across the Thukela.
8  ^ SASJ Vol. 30 Sept 1946 Under clause 26(b) of the 1943 
revised Fahey Agreement on sugar production new 'Bantu 
Growers Schemes' were introduced and quotas set for African 
producers. Government Notice no. 1286, 16 July 1943.
82 See SASJ, Vol 30, Sept. 1946, p. 439.




A severe drought hit Zululand in 1931. Less than 2 inches
of rain fell in northern Zululand between March and
December of that year and officials estimated that less
than 50 per cent of the arable land normally cultivated by
*1
reserve Africans was being planted. By the time that the
planting season arrived, Africans in all districts of 
Zululand were reported to be facing severe food shortages, 
and famine threatened. Chief Mtembu of Empangeni reported 
that his people had turned to eating grass in the fields 
for want of food and, claiming that 'We have exhausted the 
little land left to us1 he asked officials if '... perhaps 
you can show us a way to climb up to the sky to develop
"3
t h e r e . I n  Hlabisa starving people had to walk for five or 
six miles to stocked stores 'just to buy a tickey's worth 
of mealie meal'.  ^ The most vulnerable sectors of African 
society, the elderly, children and infants and nursing 
mothers, suffered untold hardships as they tried to forage 
for wild foods. Many suffered from poor nutrition, 
dysentery and malaria.^
These tragedies were repeated in Zululand through the early 
1930s and again in 1935-36, 1942-43 and 1945-46. By the
mid-193 0s, even in years of relatively favourable rains, 
local observers commented on annual seasonal food shortages 
and African want.^  The extent of human suffering during 
these droughts is difficult to gauge. It is significant 
that, because of state intervention and market mechanisms,
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these were not famines which killed outright: few cases of
n
actual starvation were reported. It is clear that for 
Zululand, as Sen and Watts have argued elsewhere, 
impoverishment was a crucial component of famine in terms 
of people's relative ability to acquire food or their 
'entitlement' to food, but famine did not necessarily
o
result from abject poverty.
Iliffe has shown that modern colonial states could
dramatically reduce famine mortality.^ The corollary of
food scarcity, however, was endemic poverty associated with
indebtedness and a widening gap between the poor, who were
balanced precariously on the brink of deprivation, and the
wealthy who, unlike their pre-colonial predecessors who
occasionally suffered from drought, no longer suffered from
lack of food during famines. This was as true for Zululand
1 nas for Southern Rhodesia. w Moreover, the impact of under­
nutrition on African health was drastic. More importantly 
for the purposes of this chapter, the threat of famine in 
twentieth century Zululand accelerated the unequal 
integration of reserve Africans into the wider capitalist- 
dominated food market.
It has been surmised by contemporary observers and latter 
day theorists that Zululand never really recovered from the
drought and famine of the early 193 0s which coincided with
1 1world-wide depression. Moreover, beginning m  the early 
1930s, colonial officials all over Africa came to believe 
that intensified state intervention could overcome African 
impoverishment.^ Alliances between the African elite and
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white merchants accelerated the transformation of well- 
placed subsistence producers into wealthy peasants. At the 
same time, congestion on the land combined with the 
intensified control of the local market for food by white 
store-keepers, forced increasing numbers of Africans to 
rely on cash incomes for subsistence.
FAMINE RELIEF AND MARKET MECHANISMS
Until the 192 0s, the South African grain market was highly 
unstable. Seasonal price fluctuations, insufficient 
transport links, problems with long term storage and a 
controversy over the balance between export and local 
consumption hindered the development of efficient delivery
systems for grain throughout the Union's non-grain
1 *3producing areas. J The contrast of shortage and glut, 
rampant speculation and state control were, as Keegan has 
argued, largely a product of problematic relationships of 
exchange and inefficient agencies of distribution.^
In 1933, drought led to serious shortfalls in the Union's 
maize crop. Estimates for the year were ten and one half 
million bags which was nearly one million bags short of the 
original estimate and close to four million bags short of 
the low average of normal years. As a result, the Union 
Maize Control Board, set up in 1931, did not set an export 
quota for 1933-34. By the later 1930s, however, overall 
maize production in the Union increased substantially to 
the point where the Department of Agriculture declared 193 9 
a year of 'over-production' at 14 million b a g s . -*-5 The Grain
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Marketing Board set a levy of 4s. per bag on all maize sold 
in the Union which was applied as an export subsidy to 
enable South African maize to compete on the world 
market.-*-^  The Maize Board, however, refused to 
differentiate between small African producers in the 
reserves and larger white commercial farmers producing for 
export. The result was that many Africans, unable to 
compete with better capitalised whites in the payment of 
levies, were squeezed out of the market.
In rural Natal and Zululand, maize markets developed 
unevenly. Scarcity in the reserves was, until the later 
192 0s, overcome mostly by the local informal market 
supplied by northern Natal farmers who could easily 
transport grain surpluses into the adjacent Zululand 
reserves. Coupled with limited maize supplies from local 
white store-keepers in the reserves, the sale of grain 
remained a predominantly barter or credit exchange with 
whites speculating in African cattle. With the advent of 
consolidated bulk maize marketing, however, the white
commercial farming sector came to dominate the market and
1 7changed the way it met African food demands.
THE THREAT OF FAMINE BEFORE 193 0
Even before the 193 0s, periodic droughts which struck 
Zululand provided important precedents for later relief 
measures. In 1913, for example, drought threatened local 
food supplies in northern Zululand. Recognizing the 
potential threat to the most vulnerable Africans, the
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magistrate at Ubombo advocated ordering out young men to 
work since he believed
Only by adopting such a course would it be possible 
to protect the aged, women, and children from the 
direst [sic] distress and disaster. As long as the 
young men, who are not actually responsible for the 
maintenance of the kraals, remain at their homes, 
their claims on the resources of the kraals take 
precedence, to the exclusion of all consideration 
for the weaker inmates.-*-^
From the NAD1 s point of view, the benefit of the crisis in
mobilizing Zulu labour was three-fold. First, it served the
interests of white capital both in the urban industries and
on commercial farms by pushing out African labour.
Secondly, it was hoped that wage labour would provide the
cash necessary for rural residents to buy food when famine
struck. And thirdly, young men sent out of the reserves to
work could be fed at their place of work rather than drain
the diminished resources of homesteads. As Beinart has
argued for Pondoland, the central government increasingly
saw the solution to drought crises primarily in terms of
1 Qincreased rates of labour migrancy. ^
Local officials appear to have felt little sympathy for the 
plight of families hit by famine. In 1912, Natal's CNC, R. 
Addison recorded coldly,
Whilst it is a matter for regret to learn that the 
crops in the Ingwavuma District are a total or 
partial failure this season, I can only repeat what 
has already been stated that, the Natives concerned 
should plant such crops as sweet potatoes, beans 
etc. and thereafter send out all their young men to 
work.^ 0
Moreover, some local officials believed that food scarcity 
could help them overcome labour shortages. Prompted by the
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destruction of crops by floods, the Magistrate at Nkandhla 
claimed that food shortages would provide 'improvident' 
Africans with 'a salutary lesson' for failing to store up 
food and refusing to respond to the call-up for service in
o 1
the war effort.
In 1916, the NAD, under a more sympathetic CNC, C.
Wheelwright, recommended ways of getting around the
restrictions on advances to contracted migrants to ensure
that their families had food. Although legally Wheelwright
could not allow recruiters to give more than £2 in
advances, whether in cash or grain, in fact he arranged for
local magistrates to give men seeking passes an additional
supply of grain as a form of advance on the condition of 
9 9repayment.  ^ Thus, the precedent for the NAD's involvement 
in famine relief had its origins in the labour recruiting 
system. Nevertheless, the NAD did release bags of grain on 
credit for the needy during periodic food shortages, 
largely ostensibly because of its concerns for African 
welfare but also because of fears of possible rural unrest.
Unfortunately these arrangements often led to the financial
collapse of African families when repayments were set to
9 3coincide with following harvests when taxes were due. J In 
1914, despite a report that all available men were out 
working for wages, Africans feared they would be unable to 
purchase food from the local stores because store-keepers 
refused to sell grain until old debts were settled. 
Consequently, many women abandoned their own fields to work 
on cane farms for a daily food ration.^
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Although the drought of 1916, considered mild by comparison 
with later droughts, reduced the amount of food available 
to Africans, Wheelwright believed it was a product of the 
Department of Agriculture's export policy. Despite 
assurances from the government that the quantity of grain 
exported posed 'no danger of reducing supplies [or 
creating] a shortage', Wheelwright warned of the dire 
consequences for Africans of high local prices. 3 Again in 
192 0, the issue was not, as the SNA argued, the question of 
an actual 'shortage' of maize, 'but merely of high prices' 
caused by the high price prevailing m  Britain. D
Nevertheless, during the 192 0 drought, the NAD retreated
from providing food and instead relied on market mechanisms
to safeguard against shortage. The Senior Inspector of
Native Reserves warned all local officials not to imply to
the Zulu that the department would 'come to their rescue'
again; people should go out to work and rely on the local
2 7store-keepers to supply maize. The new NAD role was 
merely to watch the prices at the stores and ensure that 
they did not rise too high. The CNC argued that the 1920 
crisis afforded the NAD the opportunity to rally rural 
Africans into a more cooperative form of crop production. 
He believed that by sharing oxen, ploughs and labour 
resources, along the lines of the best features of pre­
colonial African agriculture, the crisis could be overcome 
and that
The gospel of self help should be impressed on 
Natives on every available occasion and the present 
scarcity serves as an excellent opportunity for 
impressing this on them.^®
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With increased impoverishment and congestion in the 
reserves, however, 'self-help' fell far short of meeting 
African needs.
THE 'DUMPING' CONTROVERSY
Within the white commercial sector involved in producing 
and supplying food, farmers and store-keepers had different 
interests. From the late nineteenth century, white farmers 
had entered Zululand to trade maize and other foodstuffs
for cattle during times of scarcity. After 1904, the
practice was then sanctioned by the local administration, 
and farmers and speculators regularly entered the reserves 
to 'dump' maize at kraals in a highly lucrative trade.^9
Maize 'dumping', the derisory term applied to the practice 
by the central NAD, occurred when whites, who were legally 
restricted to limited sojourns in the reserves, obtained 
NAD licences to leave large consignments of grain at an 
induna or chief's homestead for them to exchange with 
reserve residents for cash or barter. There were distinct 
advantages for the chiefly class of Zulu distributors 
because they invariably controlled the amount of grain 
allocated to individuals and received payments, part in 
cash and part in grain, for the work. In contrast to the 
'regular' supply of grain produced by large commercial 
farms on the highveld and sold through stores, 'dumping'
was carried out informally and irregularly by local under­
capitalised whites farmers. These local farmers suffered 
from some of the same constraints on production as many
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aspirant African peasants and faced stiff competition from 
large-scale producers. As white store-keepers were often, 
though not exclusively, tied to large grain suppliers, and 
attempted to monopolise the trade in food, however, 
conflicts between competing suppliers in the reserves were
"2 f)
soon evident.
Africans claimed that these farmers were often more
responsive to their immediate food needs and moved maize in
their wagons to the areas of greatest need more quickly
-2 -1
than the stores could. x In contrast to the local store­
keepers, who demanded cash or labour contract advances for 
food with increasing frequency in the 193 0s, white farmers 
offered Africans a wide range of alternatives. Thus, they 
would accept emaciated Zulu cattle for maize since they 
could fatten them on their better pastures or they would 
offer Africans food in exchange for daily labour.
During the severe drought of 1931, Africans complained 
bitterly that the store-keepers with their limited grazing 
land, would not accept Zulu cattle in exchange for grain 
and demanded only cash.  ^ Until government relief supplies 
were delivered late in 1931, and at various other times of 
scarcity, reserve residents with at least some cattle to 
trade turned to speculators and farmers to meet immediate 
food needs. In the 1940s this safety valve was no longer 
available. By the mid-1930s, fixed trading concerns in 
Zululand constituted a considerable political lobby and, 
with the support of the Zululand Chamber of Commerce (ZCC), 
had put the NAD under pressure to limit maize dumping which
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undercut their sales. The state ngourously enforced the 
restrictions on maize trading to control country-wide 
supplies. Africans engaged in the trade were required to 
take out licences even if it was only to receive 'dumped'
maize for distribution for a nominal fee. Chiefs then 
complained that they could no longer get food because 
farmers, unprepared to face fines for trading with
unlicensed Africans, no longer brought wagon-loads of maize 
into the reserves.^
Even before the 1940s, however, there were strict limits on 
the dumping practice. The NAD extended the general rule of
monopoly over areas of trade granted to white settler
store-keepers under the Zululand Trust to restrict dumping 
in the reserves.^ It did not allow dumping by white 
farmers, or their agents, including Africans, or any white 
representatives of African producers, within five miles of 
a white-owned store or within two miles of the next nearest 
chief's kraal where maize was dumped. Local farmers could 
only sell small lots of mealies in the reserves if they 
could prove that they grew the produce themselves and had 
not purchased it from elsewhere, especially from local 
Africans. ^ 6 Part of the object of this legislation was to 
limit competition between farmers or with chiefs who 
managed to make a small profit from the trade and to 
protect the store-keepers.
The Union government apparently believed it was a 
fundamental right of settler store-keepers to gain a 
'decent living, befitting their station in life' from trade
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m  the reserves.J Indeed, a number of Zululand traders 
managed more than just a decent living. Charles Adams, the 
renowned Eshowe trader, cattle dealer and financial agent 
for Solomon owned several cars and trucks, traded
vigourously in cattle hides, meat and maize and owned a 
number of stores in Eshowe, Nongoma and Mahlabatini. By the 
1940s, his family home in Eshowe boasted a crystal
chandelier.^ According to Norman Bond, a store-keeper at 
Nongoma, his father had had a precarious start in the
business, but by the time he took over, he had a thriving 
operation delivering direct to people's kraals using
*3 Q
transport riders, wagons and later trucks. ^
Informal traders and speculators ranged from the more 
respectable and, on the whole, more honest farmers to men 
such as Blackhurst, who were notorious for their predacious 
activities in the cattle trade. Threatened by the NAD's 
famine relief scheme, Blackhurst set about undermining 
local agents in order to ensure that his own trade in maize 
for cattle went unchallenged. In one incident, he attempted 
to charge NC E. N. Braadvedt with selling underweight bags 
of maize to Africans. Although nothing ever came of the 
charge, Blackhurst1s agitation certainly served to raise 
suspicions in the minds of Africans about the NAD's 
intentions.^
Most white farmers struggled unsuccessfully to maintain 
their barter of grain for African-owned cattle in the face 
of the NAD's active discouragement. With the advent of the 
NAD cattle auctions, and high official hopes of reducing
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' overstocking' , the NAD encouraged people to sell their 
cattle for cash in the belief that this would realize a 
greater return.^ This pressure on Africans to shift into 
the cash economy intensified in 193 5 when the CNC directed 
that white farmers would only be allowed to dump maize in
A O
the reserves for cash sale. The administration hoped this 
would draw even more Zulu into wage labour. By the later 
193 0s and into the 1940s, white farmers faced even greater 
restrictions on their trade as the NAD supported local 
white store-keepers more fully.
In the same way that the administration tried to monopolise 
cattle sales by prohibiting speculators from entering the 
reserves to buy cattle except from their official auctions, 
the NAD worked to undermine farmers and speculators in the 
maize trade.^ Although applications from white farmers to 
dump maize in the reserves increased as African production 
fell in the later 1930s, the NAD tightened the 
restrictions. In 1937, many northern Natal farmers 
complained that the NAD was artificially depressing their 
trade by limiting the amount of maize they could trade in 
the reserves to below 100 bags each and 2s. per bag less 
than the going market rate.^ The CNC countered that local 
stores, which dealt in reduced cost bulk shipments, were 
able to sell for as little as 15s. a bag and since he 
received an overwhelming number of complaints from store­
keepers about unfair competition he could not increase the 
limits or profits for farmers to the detriment of Africans 
and store-keepers alike.^
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STORES, STATE RELIEF AND THE COURSE OF FAMINES
Tensions between the NAD and local store-keepers over the 
provision of maize for the Zululand reserves led to a 
dangerous brinkmanship in which Africans suffered near­
starvation. When, in 1931, the NAD announced it would 
supply maize to Africans at cost (NAD costs were lower than 
traders partially owing to preferential rail rates) many 
store-keepers, who normally anticipated increased demand 
during drier years and the winters when food supplies were 
low, did not order extra provisions for fear of being
A (T
unable to sell them. The NAD was, however, unprepared for
the enormous demand for food from Africans. Not only did it
order insufficient amounts of maize for most districts, its
reliance on the slow and inefficient South African
Railways, which did not give any priority to relief
supplies, meant that what little food was forthcoming often
arrived weeks or even months after local officials reported
A  7acute demand and cases of starvation.
The Natal Mercury, in an article unequivocally supporting
white traders, condemned the NAD scheme not only for
undermining white commerce but for putting many African
A  Rtransport-nders out of work. ° It claimed that the
'presumptuous' scheme forced store-keepers to retrench the
many African transport-riders who delivered maize to rural
areas and that in Mtubatuba alone thirty families who
relied on this work, especially in times of drought, were
A  9left destitute. Similarly, other sectors of African trade 
were undermined or fluctuated along with white trader
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interests. Many Africa store clerks, for example, were left 
temporarily unemployed during the state relief programme.^
White commercial interests in Zululand immediately declared 
the relief scheme a 'threat1 and 'injustice to the normal 
operation of commerce’ and Heaton Nicholls warned the SNA 
that the NAD did not have the 'necessary intimate knowledge 
of the economic conditions of Natives’ to make it a 
success.^ The ZCC called on the NAD to turn over all grain 
stocks held for famine relief to store-keepers for sale at 
an agreed upon controlled rate of profit. It claimed that 
if the state were prepared to waive restrictions on grazing 
entitlements for white store-keepers in the reserves their 
members would accept emaciated African cattle in exchange 
for grain. Store-keepers were previously hampered by 
grazing limitations around store sites in contrast to 
neighbouring farmers who could 'fatten1 African cattle up 
to the requisite weight for sale (see ch. on cattle). Thus, 
they saw the crisis as an ideal moment to move into the 
lucrative reserve cattle trade.
The SNA responded to these criticisms by suggesting that 
the NAD had no intention of undercutting 'fair trading 
practice’ in Zululand; however, the isolation of many 
stores, inadequate transport facilities, and a lack of 
organised cooperation among traders had led to a crisis 
which the department could not ignore. He maintained that 
many store-keepers were charging exorbitant rates with 
usurious interest -upwards of 3 0s. at 2 5 per cent interest 
per month per bag of maize supplied on credit- and the NAD
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would not countenance the 2s. 6d. profit per bag that the 
ZCC suggested for handling state relief supplies. ^ 3
In November 1931, the state proclaimed Nongoma, Hlabisa,
Mahlabatini, Eshowe, Nkandhla, and Nquthu famine relief
districts under the Drought and Famine Relief Act, No. 2 5
of 1927.^ Although Union-wide grain supplies were
controlled by the central state's marketing board (governed
by the Maize Control Act, No. 3 9 of 1931) the NAD was able
5 5to arrange its own relief consignments for the reserves. 
The treasury authorised an NAD purchase of 40,000 bags of 
mealies for famine relief in Zululand in late 1931 to last 
through the whole of 1932. By December of 1931, however, 
this supply had been exhausted and further supplies were 
issued. Under the NAD programme, local officials
supervised the distribution of maize to the needy on a 
credit basis.^ In contrast to Natal proper, where eleven 
of fourteen state food relief depots were run by local 
store-keepers and others willingly accepted price controls 
'through the troublesome time1, Zululand store-keepers 
refused to co-operate with the NAD.-*® As store supplies ran 
low and the NAD grain shipments were seriously delayed, 
tensions mounted in the reserves.
The control act undermined the only insurance mechanism 
that most reserve families had. Effectively, it prohibited 
store-keepers from purchasing any maize from Africans, even 
in small amounts, since licensed grain traders were not 
allowed to buy any amount of maize beyond the quotas set by 
the board. Africans in Nongoma claimed that, despite the
315
differential between the selling price and later re­
purchase price of maize, sales to store-keepers acted as a 
form of insurance since they found it difficult to predict 
drought. If they were struck by drought in a following 
season they could then buy their food back from the stores
C Q
where grain appeared to be unaffected by rot or weevils. J
Store-keepers claimed people were not aware that the maize
nthey sold and what they bought later was not the same. In 
this way stores could act as a regulating mechanism by 
evening out the supply of local maize throughout the year 
even though demand was highest from October to December, 
and the sale of grain usually occurred at the end of 
harvests from April to June.
In most districts, officials were flooded with complaints
that women and children were starving or had to spend days
fi 1travelling to and from stores.1 Missionaries pleaded for 
state relief for the elderly and for nursing mothers, some 
of whom were wandering far from their homes in search of
fi 0food. NCs in Nquthu and Nkandhla reported long lines of 
women, up to 300 in one day, at magisterial offices, all 
wanting food. A dramatic rise in the number of 'garden' 
boundary disputes and 'faction fights1 occurred at the 
height of the drought as contending communities attempted 
to gain access to fertile or well-watered land.^ A number 
of families under chief Mtshakela Nyawi, for example, 
pressed claims for land against neighbouring chiefdoms on 
the Lebombo mountain ridge where perennial springs were
/r nr
located.3 Although officials rarely linked disputes to 
congestion or drought and depression, relying instead on
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the theory of African 'tribal' rivalries, many conflicts 
appeared to 'smoulder1 on during relatively better 
conditions only to flare again in the mid-193 0s and again 
in 1942-43 and 1946 when droughts recurred.^
Much of the public criticism for the famine situation in
Zululand focussed on the NAD and the alleged inefficiencies
f \ 7of its relief scheme. Store-keepers insisted that the 
situation in Natal was not nearly as acute as local 
officials and missionaries made out. Charles Adams claimed 
that less than 5 per cent of Zulu families were 'absolute 
paupers1 deserving relief.^® The critical difference 
between the NAD’s supply of grain and the standard practice 
of store-keepers was in the provision of credit for food 
purchases. Adams and other store-keepers admitted to the 
NAD that less than 2 per cent of their customers were 
allowed to purchase on credit, and these were exceptional 
people who, the store-keepers believed, could assure 
repayment. Contrary to the views of a number of 
missionaries and other white observers (see below) Africans 
did not generally buy or barter non-foodstuffs during times 
of scarcity. Store-keepers protested that if they were cut 
out of the grain trade, they would have practically no 
business at all during droughts.^
Sugar planters were equally concerned about the NAD relief
scheme. The Zululand Planters Union (ZPU) protested that
'free food1 was given away too easily 7^ 'A little work
would go well with these mealies’ claimed the sugar 
71lobby. There were, however, differences of opinion
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between sectors of Natal's white fanning community. In 
contrast to the sugar planters, the Natal Agricultural 
Union (NAU), which, while the parent organization for the 
ZPU also represented struggling maize farmers, believed 
that the government should ensure a steady supply of maize 
to the reserves. Emphasising official concerns over 
urbanisation, the NAU warned that without adequate food 
Africans would abandon their homes in droves and flock to 
the cities.^ Underlying their concern were fears that if 
rural Africans could not sustain themselves either through 
their own production or through the market then white 
farmers would lose a considerable source of potential 
labour. These same arguments resurfaced in the 1940s as 
drought-stricken farmers called for preferential access to 
food supplies in order to feed their African tenant labour 
(see below).
Although the drought eased during the 1933-34 rainy season
and many Africans set about planting new crops, finding
7 3food remained a problem. The prolonged severe dearth of
subsistence food forced many families to strip their crops
7 4as soon as they were edible, often while still green. It
was, however, very unlikely that even with more intensive
planting than had occurred during the drought Africans
could have produced enough to meet their needs throughout
the year. Moreover, while many women and children foraged
for wild foods, even the few remaining patches of wild
berries and edible 'weeds' in most districts were struck by 
7 3drought. Compounding the crisis, vast swarms of locusts 
descended on northern Zululand in early 193 5 wiping out the
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remaining maize crops and 'severely demoralizing' the
people so that 'many [were] in despair and [would] not
7 ftplant even if the rains arrived'.
The decimation of cattle during the drought had an
ambiguous effect on food supplies. In the short-term,
droughts struck hard at African herds: between 193 0 and
1933, over 70,000 cattle were lost in northern Zululand 
7 7alone. On one hand, the emaciation and death of cattle, 
drastically reduced milk supplies which were an important 
source of food especially for infants and children, and 
undermined long-term survival strategies by reducing the 
number of available draught animals.
On the other hand, when cattle died they provided meat as
an emergency food alternative for many adults, although
only temporarily. J. Kaplan of the South African Medical
Corps stationed at Nongoma, reported that during the
droughts of the 1930s Africans in that district killed off
10,000 head of emaciated cattle each year, which
7 Rrepresented about one lb. of meat per adult per day.
Similarly, the District Surgeon in Nkandhla reported that
Africans had been 'feasting on putrefied [cattle] carcases
for the past few months, apparently without any ill- 
7 9effects'. y Many destitute families requested the 
government to provide them with more cattle to supply milk 
and some district surgeons also recommended that the 
government buy up and re-distribute cheap 'scrub cattle' 
which, although emaciated, could still provide people with
o n
milk.ou Local officials rejected these suggestions because
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of their assumptions about overstocking and their 
conviction that the Malthusian check of stock numbers would
O 1
lead to improved herds.
The world-wide depression further affected the supply of 
food during the drought of the early 193 0s. Migrant workers 
found it particularly difficult to support impoverished 
families in the reserves at a time when employment was 
greatly reduced.Late in 1931, the Enyati and Hlobane 
coal mines retrenched between 3,000 and 4,000 workers, many 
of whom had been unable to find work elsewhere, especially 
as the Rand mines were reducing their number of 
contracts.^ Despite their constant calls for labour even 
the local sugar planters, usually the last recourse for the 
Zulu, were cutting back their work force until more
consistent rains arrived. The Umfolozi Co-operative, for 
example, discharged 323 of its 523 workers in November 1931 
and in 193 3 Africans in Ingwavuma complained that coastal 
farms were 'overrun' by migrants from Mozambique leaving no
O A
work for them.* Rural employers everywhere were unable to 
absorb any more workers despite that a number of Zulu
o c:
offered four months labour for one bag of maize. As the 
NC at Nquthu stated:
...the problem in this district is not one of food 
supplies; there are ample supplies at reasonable 
prices. The distress arises from deeper causes - 
the restriction of industrial and commercial effort 
due to the depression, the closing of avenues for 
Native labour by employment of Europeans in place
of Natives ...[all] have led to a diminished Native
income.®^
Nevertheless, prices for bags of maize delivered to the 
reserves rose substantially from 1933-1935. Production
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estimates for the total Union crop dropped in 1934, 
although this did not necessarily mean a shortfall in 
actual production.®^ Africans in Zululand faced price 
increases from 14s.-15s. a bag up to 18s. to 20s. a bag,
o o
and some remote stores sold as high as 3 0s. a bag.
Moreover there is evidence to suggest that some farmers
were hoarding supplies in early 1934 in the hopes of
selling for a higher profit later in the year when African­
er Q
produced supplies dwindled. oz>
African responses to the food crisis fluctuated with the 
acuity of the seasonal circumstances.^ Late in the 
agricultural season of 1931-32, when NAD grain supplies 
finally arrived in northern Zululand, people desperate for 
food flocked to grain trucks and trains to grab maize. At 
Mahlabatini and Nongoma a large crowd of women who were 
unsure of the amount of food available mobbed grain trucks 
and the police were called in to recover the food. Once it 
was clear to the assembled crowd that sufficient quantities 
had been sent people '...gained confidence and awaited
q -i
their turn in an orderly way*. x During periods when 
homestead food supplies were somewhat more abundant 
immediately after a meagre harvest, Africans were able to 
exercise slightly more control over the market. In 
Mahlabatini, Africans instituted a short-lived boycott 
against store-keepers they considered had maintained an 
'uncharitable attitude1 and extorted exorbitant prices 
during the crisis. ^  Bill Freund has suggested that such 
consumer action could signify an important trend in the 
emergence of 'remarkably modern1 forms of African
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resistance, but the evidence for this in Zululand is 
9 3tentative.
In many respects, the state relief provided in Zululand was 
exceptional for South Africa. Between 1931 and 1932, the 
NAD spent £35,800 for relief of famine and distress in 
Zululand and Northern Natal alone which was over 80 per 
cent of the total relief expenditure for the whole of the
Q  /Union. In the context of African riots m  Durban m  1929- 
193 0, the government was, undoubtedly, concerned about 
another possible Zulu rebellion. ^  Considering the 
segregationists' attention on Zululand it was, moreover, 
significant that state relief intervention in Zululand was 
more developed than in other parts of the Union where the 
open market and incorporated African political structures 
were widely used to distribute food. In 1932 the SNA, Maj . 
Herbst, wrote to Natal's CNC that,
I am instructed that the Government will not be 
able [in the case of the Transvaal and 
Bechuanaland] to go in for bulk feeding as we did 
in Zululand and that the tribes should, by means of 
a levy get credit, as a tribe, with the traders. 
Then also we are not allowed to feed Natives on 
farms or in town.^
While the NAD's emergency relief programme had been 
reasonably effective in delivering food supplies to rural 
areas, local officials and the limited infrastructure could 
not long sustain consistent supplies for a region which was 
increasingly unable to meet its subsistence food 
requirements even in favourable years. Magisterial offices 
had no adequate storage facilities for bulk shipments and 
weevils and fungus often ruined stores of grain left
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outside. Transport costs, even at concessionary rates, were 
too high.^
In the mid-193Os, an even more severe drought than the one 
at the start of the decade hit Zululand and the NAD again 
made overtures to store-keepers for support in alleviating 
food shortages. It attempted to assuage store-keepers by 
retreating from an overwhelming control of grain supplies, 
and offered to provide them with government bought maize to 
sell at a set price of 15s. Id. plus a commission of Is. 
This would have enabled them to overcome the restrictive 
control board quotas. Under the new programme, however, the 
NAD intended to restrict the sale of relief maize to cases 
of 'verifiable' need only, to be ascertained by officials 
who would issue the needy with special purchasing
Q O
permits. ° Most store-keepers again steadfastly refused to 
participate in the scheme. They argued that they had full 
stocks of grain purchased at higher prices than the NAD 
supplies, and if they were seen to be selling low-cost 
grain to some Africans they would not be able sell their 
existing stocks profitably. Some traders bitterly recalled 
having taken on extra maize in 1931, only to be left with 
their stockpiles them when cheaper NAD supplies arrived, 
and they vowed never to take state grain at cost.^
AFRICAN TRADERS
Very few Africans had a foothold in formal commerce in the 
reserves. Lack of capital and the overwhelming monopoly of 
white traders worked against them. Although chiefs and
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induna traded maize on behalf of white farmers, as noted
above, this avenue was restricted and declined after 1935.
While there is no way to gauge the number of other Africans
in the reserves engaged in trading maize for a living, the
evidence suggests that their number in the reserves also
declined during the 193 0s when store-keepers pressured the
state to restrict them.^^ Charles Adams complained to the
NEC that African competition with the smaller white trading
concerns in Zululand made 'just the difference between a
1 o 1payable and unpayable business proposition’. By 1938,
Natal1 s CNC felt he had no choice but to follow the edicts
of the Maize Control Act and call upon the police to
i  n 9intensify prosecutions of unlicensed African traders.
African traders relied mainly on maize produced in the 
reserves. When local grain production dropped in Nquthu, 
for example, the number of licensed African traders slipped 
from over twenty in 1920 to three in 1931. -*-^3 Although the 
number of African traders appears to have re-bounded
somewhat by the end of the 1940s, they had a 
disproportionately small share of trade in the reserves. 
According to the Tomlinson Commission, while over 45 per 
cent of the registered traders in all the reserves were 
African, they controlled only 10 per cent of the total 
trade. Moreover, while the Native Affairs Commission
advocated the grant to Africans of trading site leases in 
remote areas of the reserves where there were no white- 
owned stores, it recommended only ten acre lots, whereas 
white store-keepers were granted 100 acre sites to enable 
them to graze cattle. -*-05 It was unlikely that an African
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trader could sustain a family on trade and such a small 
site during depressed times.
THE CRISIS OF THE EARLY 193OS AND RELIEF WORKS
In November of 1931, the NAD embarked upon a new strategy
for relief which constituted a major shift from welfarism
to 'self-help' and 'food for work1. ^-06 rp^ g decided to
abandon established grain depots at various centres in the
drought-stricken districts altogether, and now made 'every
effort to absorb natives in connection with irrigation
1 07schemes, road work and anti-malarial works'. u The relief 
works were to be co-ordinated with the needs of the Natal 
Provincial Council, and more importantly, white farmers who 
had been crying out for African labour for twenty years. As 
the Natal Witness claimed,
It is the duty, indeed the interest, of the white 
man to succour the natives in this time of 
exceptional tribulation: it is desirable in the
natives own interest that this succour should not 
take the form of indiscriminate... dole in kind, 
but should be m  return for work. wo
As the depression deepened, the NAD attempted to find local 
work for unemployed Africans, largely because they resisted 
employment on farms, especially in the sugar cane belt. 
Older men, women and children were employed to build roads, 
drain swamps, and erect contour banks at the rate of 30s., 
15s. and 3d. a month respectively.-*-^ Although the NAD 
tried to enforce payment in maize at the rate of 1 lb. a 
day for men and half rations for women and children, 
erratic supplies and an African preference for cash 
payments meant that only about half of the relief works
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projects paid labour in grain at any time.^® Wage and 
'food for work’ labour on relief projects played an
important part in relieving distress for some destitute 
families. For the most part, however, young men avoided the 
projects where alternative means of procuring cash, such as 
work on the coal mines, were available. On average, only 
between 3 5 and 100 people, mostly elderly men and a few 
women and children, were employed a month in each district 
during the famine between 1931 and 1933.^-^
By the mid-193 0s, pressure from white rural employers 
forced the NAD to refine the relief works schemes to ensure 
that no able-bodied Africans who could work on white farms 
were escaping private employment through public works. In 
1936, the CNC informed all officials that 'under no
circumstances are you to authorise employment on relief 
works for Natives for whom work is available on European 
farms or elsewhere.1
A major problem with relief works for both Africans and the
NAD was their lack of continuity. The NAD engineers
complained that even during drought, when the ploughing
season approached, many men abandoned road works, long
before completion, and that absenteeism jumped considerably
113m  years of better rainfall. J Moreover, apart from a core
group of older and unfit men, the wages offered by the NAD,
Is. 3d. a day in the 1930s, did not attract a sufficient 
supply of labour. Africans were also concerned with
problems of employment continuity. While the NAD perceived 
the road works as a movable feast, providing short-term
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relief throughout the reserves, the Zulu were wary of 
becoming dependent on projects which could rapidly move out 
of their neighbourhood. A number of my informants suggested 
that when a section of road was completed and the project 
moved to another location, it defeated the advantages of 
the food supplement to low wages as they were no longer
11C
able to share out food with family members.
State relief works added to racial tensions during the
depression. In 1932, a Natal Witness correspondent declared 
that government relief was '...striking at the roots of 
white prestige and authority in inter-racial commerce1; 
while Africans loafed at their homes and received generous 
'hand-outs1 of food, a new road project in Nquthu was being 
completed by poor white labour.
A fine sight for the natives, whose greatest worry
has been shouldered by the Government, to see11Europeans doing pick-axe work near their huts... 
he remarked sarcastically.
African nationalists also voiced concern over this
perceived misdirection of white labour to the reserves. 
Thus, councillor William Ndhlovu protested that Africans 
were far from indolent, and 'hordes' of them were seeking 
work. Referring to the Nquthu works, he argued that it was 
a harsh policy to allow whites to work in the reserves when 
plenty of African labour was ready to work. White labour 
policies throughout the Union were causing undue hardship
327
for Africans and Ndhlovu claimed that while they were
pushed out of skilled work and now at our very
doors, Europeans are engaged to do unskilled
work... there is no place for us either in the town
117or the country.
Nevertheless, the relief works had difficulties with the
local labour market. African objections to the state's
structural intervention in the reserves focussed on issues
of land control which foreshadowed resistance to betterment
schemes (see ch. on betterment). They also resisted state-
relief work because of the low wages offered and fears of
coercive labour recruitment. Rumours abounded that anyone
who undertook relief work would be forced to work on local
11ftfarms after the projects ended. -LJ-° One informant believed
that people refused to work on government roads because,
they claimed, the roads were only for the benefit of white
farmers.Others from the cattle-owning class, complained
that they could not supplement their incomes through relief
schemes since there was no grazing for their trek-oxen
1 9 nalong the road-works. It would appear, however, that
during times of economic crisis and food scarcity,
objections to work on relief schemes were temporarily
171abandoned, especially by the most needy older men. Thus, 
the state was partially successful in establishing its
hegemony in the reserves by appearing to destitute Africans
1 9  9as a purveyor of 'largesse and generosity’.
Despite obvious difficulties with mobilizing the desired 
labour, the NAD maintained relief works through the 193 0s 
and 1940s to provide marginalised members of Zululand1s 
labouring class with some recourse to wages. When drought
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and famine struck in 1936, local officials claimed relief 
works were needed in the reserves for the destitute. The 
SNA reassured Zululand officials that 'development' in the 
reserves would provide work for the elderly and unfit for 
years to come.^^ By 193 9 with the advent of 'betterment' 
schemes, relief works for food and cash were a permanent 
fixture in the reserves.
DIFFERENTIATION AND RELIEF SUPPLIES
Famine and food scarcity in Zululand had an uneven impact 
on African society. As suggested earlier, the most striking 
feature of famine in twentieth century Zululand was that 
the handful of wealthier Africans no longer struggled for 
subsistence although the vast majority did. Even within 
families and particular classes, especially among those 
groups who lost employment, there were differences in
i n c
entitlements for individuals. z3
The distribution and entitlement of food was unequal even 
within African communities. In Nquthu, for example, four 
'tribes' established 'provident funds' and drew a combined 
total of £320 in 1931 against the funds for the purchase of 
maize. The distribution of the money and the maize was in 
the hands of the chiefs, however, and many of the worst 
cases of suffering received no aid since the money or maize 
was issued as loans and 'was practically limited to those 
who possessed stock1. -^6 Clearly this practice sharpened 
the divide between the poor and the impoverished since
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those families without cattle could not even rely on their 
own insurance mechanisms.
Other later attempts by African communities to make bulk
purchases through cooperative funding schemes also proved
difficult. In 1941, hoping to avoid the extra costs of the
Maize Control Act levy, chief Mqiniseni Zungu's followers
attempted to organize a collective bulk order for maize but
failed to come up with the necessary 50 per cent down- 
197payment.  ^ Part of the problem for the Zungu community was 
that most people could not estimate their exact needs 
before reaping their own crops. Many felt unsure of the 
amount of food needed for a coming season and without 
proper storage and with limited funds, they were not 
prepared to risk purchasing beyond their immediate 
requirements. Thus, when drought struck and crops failed in 
1942 those who were already on the borderline of 
impoverishment were forced to spend a higher percentage of 
their income buying grain in small amounts, absorbing the 
costs of bags, levies and the attendant insecurity of price 
rises. Government rebates were only allowed for amounts 
greater than five bags and since this was often beyond the 
need or ability of a family to purchase they never 
benefited from cost savings.
Regional variations in the impact of famine appear to have 
related to the way market forces had eroded pre-colonial 
forms of reciprocity. There is evidence to suggest that the 
ukuthekela custom of 'begging for food’ was maintained 
longer in remote Ubombo and Maputalancjl than in the southern
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districts where competition for cultivable land and food 
was greater.^ 8  Destitute Africans were often reluctant to 
rely entirely on ukuthekela since there were new underlying 
expectations to 'repay' the charity with work at some 
future time. Thus, a Lutheran Missionary in Hlabisa 
reported:
I have had a number of elderly Native men and women 
asking for food .[and] complaining they can no 
longer beg for food. . . all have said they have 
"worries" that if they take the food they will have 
to work in someone else's gardens until they die... 
One old woman complained that she is now the dog 
and messenger of the headman for only a hand-full 
of mealies.-^9
To some extent, older social and familial ties did moderate 
problems of food shortages for those reserve residents 
still linked to wider kin networks. There were, however, 
striking contrasts between some chiefdoms in the operation 
of what has been termed variously the 'economy of 
affection' or the 'moral economy'. -^0 While chiefs in 
Hlabisa and Ubombo were reported to be loaning out large 
numbers of cattle for milk and ploughing, at least during 
the early parts of the drought, Solomon's Inkatha 
collectors pressed supporters to deliver large numbers of 
cattle and amounts of cash to ease his debts.
Frustrating government regulations perpetuated supply 
problems in the drought-stricken north through 1932. 
Artificially high official crop estimates for Nongoma, 
Hlabisa and Mahlabatini meant that local traders were 
unable to apply for further permits to bring in grain. By 
February of 1932, Ingwavuma and Ubombo were still not 
declared famine relief districts and thus could not benefit
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from reduced rail-fares for grain. Added to their already 
higher rail costs, Africans in these districts faced paying 
5s. to 8s. more per bag of maize than their compatriots in 
the south.-^2 Stores in the towns and villages received a 
disproportionate supply of grain. In the Lower Umfolozi 
District, for example, white-owned stores in Empangeni 
received over half the quota consignment for the whole 
district. Moreover, urban grain traders tended to supply 
local employers of labour, who could provide their own 
truck transport for grain, before supplying stores in the
1 "3 "5reserves. In addition, northern store-keepers complained 
that the Zulu had to pay more for grain than their 
neighbours in Swaziland where the 'export' levy was set at 
3s. a bag less than in the Union. Africans in the north 
often made the journey across the Swaziland border to 
purchase and smuggle cheap maize into Zululand.^ 4
Social stratification played an important part in food 
entitlements. As Vaughan has argued for Malawi, 'formal 
employment' was a critical factor in ensuring entitlement 
to food.-^^ Yet there were differences of entitlement even 
within the ranks of the formally employed. Wherever it 
could, the NAD tried to ensure that the hierarchical 
structures of the local African administration were used 
for the distribution of grain. Chiefs, induna, African 
constables and dipping assistants often received 
preferential treatment in grain distribution in amounts 
according to their rank. During times of extreme shortage, 
chiefs and induna were given credit to buy, in advance, up 
to four and one bags of maize respectively. Commoners,
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however, were limited to daily rations apportioned in 
paraffin tins, which contained about enough grain for a
1 *3 f ifamily of four for one day. At least part of the
official rationale for this differential treatment was 
based on NAD perceptions of differing class lifestyles, 
expectations and responsibilities. In 1932, the NC at 
Mahlabatini felt that, although chiefs and NAD employees 
received better wages and credit terms than commoners, he 
should issue relief maize to both rich and poor since
The well-to-do native, including police constables, 
as a rule, have numerous wives and children and 
during such times as experienced last year I felt 
justified in issuing a ration of maize to all and 
sundry.137
Within commoner households, the wives of migrant labourers 
had more control over food when their husbands were away 
working than when they were resident or 'retired' at home. 
Thus, one of my informants believed that she had been able 
to distribute food more evenly to her children and to their 
elderly grandfather when her migrant husband 'abandoned' 
her for two years to work in Johannesburg in the 1940s,
x 1 TO
than when he was at home demanding his father's share'.
Similarly, chief Qwazamatole of Empangeni believed that
food relief should not be given to young men since they all
could be fed at their place of work; it was the women and
children of the rural areas who were starving. The Chief
added that he encouraged anyone who could to seek work in
1 3 9the urban areas. 3
Young Zulu migrant workers who remained in the urban areas 
tended to fare the best among the commoner class of
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Zululand. Even with rising unemployment in formal sectors 
during the depression it was more likely that those who 
remained in the urban areas had better access to informal 
employment and food than the majority of those in the 
reserve. Although Ferguson has argued that on the Zambian 
copperbelt during the same period, for many workers 'a 
return home1 was not a good alternative, the South African 
state forced many Africans back to the countryside by 
tightening up the pass laws because of its concern over 
urban unrest in the 1930s.
African tenants on white farms benefited from the official 
recognition of their formal employment. Prior to the 1920s 
when Africans had a more flexible relationship with white 
farmers in Zululand and neighbouring northern Natal,
'indigent1 or elderly Africans were often granted refuge on
i/iwhite farms where they had k m  during famine. Ostensibly
humanitarian this succour usually resulted from their fear
that if they did not support reserve dependants during a
i/ocrisis they might lose all their labour. During the
1930s and 1940s, however, when, after widespread evictions, 
white farmers were, as Cope has argued, 'more thoroughly 
exploiting the labour they chose to retain1, food 
entitlements were restricted. During the 1946 famine
crisis the NAD issued special permits for grain quotas to 
white farmers in order to ensure a steady supply of food to 
farm labourers. The extra supply was granted only for those 
Africans and their immediate family actually engaged in 
work on the farm, not for rent tenants or squatters. The 
CNC believed that if farmers could not get their own supply
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of grain during droughts their employees would roam the
district in a vain search for food because store-keepers
with limited supplies were often reluctant to take on new
customers who might exhaust their stores. He feared that if
the labourers had to leave the farms in search of food, it
would lead to a 'serious dislocation of the farmer's labour
supply at a time when it should be fully occupied in the
1 4 Sproduction of fresh crops.11
Although some officials warned the NAD that there was a
danger of abuse if chiefs and induna were the sole agents
for the local distribution of relief, it appears that
African agents were at least as fair as the officials.-^*’
In an effort to improve relations between the NAD and
store-keepers, and to ensure that the opportunity to send
out more labour from Zululand was not lost, NCs often
relied on store-keepers and labour agents to determine who
was entitled to relief. When grain was distributed in
northern Zululand in 1932, officials experienced difficulty
in 'sorting out genuine cases [of need] from shirkers' but
they believed that this was overcome when the Labour Bureau
14 7and local store-keepers were consulted.
Thus, those who had a stake in controlling African labour
and determining credit worthiness were given the power to
direct relief to those they felt best able to repay. This
was possible because the NAD's stated intention, after
pressure from the ZCC, was merely to tide families over
1 4 ftuntil they could purchase grain from the stores. While 
most Zulu struggled to purchase cattle, officials
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repeatedly admonished those receiving state relief to pay 
their taxes settle their store debts as soon as possible 
and return to using the stores to purchase food.^^^
Following the early phases of famine relief, only the
destitute were to be issued grain by the NAD. Applicants
for 'pauper relief' had to report to the nearest magistracy
and subject themselves to a lengthy interrogation for the
purposes of 'means testing'. -^0 once satisfied that an
applicant was not a 'shirker' and could not find formal
employment an NC could issue up to one lb. of maize per day
1 R1 ■for a month m  advance. Officials recorded family
particulars and Africans were given nine months to repay 
the cost of the food; no further amounts of maize were
-1 c n , .
issued within the month. Significantly, the NAD
recognised only male household heads as responsible for the 
credit of maize for other family members. Thus, the state 
reinforced the patriarchal control of food distribution
which forced women and children into a greater dependence 
on men during a time when male authority was under threat,
1 Cl
than before the crisis.
By the 1940s, however, in keeping with trends in America 
and Britain, the state implemented welfare schemes with 
cash payments to individuals in order to relieve economic 
hardship for the most vulnerable members of rural 
society.-*"^ During the 1930s, Zululand officials had some 
discretionary funding for cash relief to 'identifiable and
1 cc
legitimate paupers' JJ By the mid-1940s, the state began 
providing some direct relief for the elderly and disabled.
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State welfare, old-age pensions and disability grants 
provided some limited change in entitlements for destitute 
Zulu on the fringes of society. -^6 As with famine relief, 
however, welfare payments were based on a means test and 
were woefully inadequate, standing at £6 per annum. 
Pensions and grants were payable only to the very destitute 
who could claim no more than three head of cattle or a 
yearly income below £9 and could prove they had no family 
to support them.
These restrictions were strictly enforced. In Eshowe, for 
example two elderly blind Africans had their grants revoked 
when the NC discovered that one owned four head of cattle 
and the other had a monthly income of £5 as a dipping 
assistant. ^-*8 In Nongoma, the NC told Andalini Myeni, an 
old age pensioner, that she would have to severe ties with 
her family across the border in Swaziland because no ex­
patriot South Africans were entitled to a pension. ^ 9  
Similarly, the state cut a disability grant to a man in 
Eshowe until he moved out of his son's home because the son
owned 23 head of cattle and was expected to care for his
1 6 nfather, although he was unemployed. °
Zulu applications for state welfare increased following the 
Second World War despite attempts by local officials to 
chisel away at both the number of rural Africans who were 
entitled to receive welfare aid and the amounts that they 
received.When welfare payments started in 1946, only 48 
Africans in Zululand received old age pensions and 
disability grants. By the end of 1947, over 210 people
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received welfare payments and, as Lund has argued, they 
were to become one of the few consistent forms of cash 
infusion into the rural areas of South Africa for elderly 
and disabled poor by the 1970s.
The kholwa generally fared better than other commoners 
during the famine through their association with white 
missionaries. Africans directly involved with mission work 
on stations or hospitals benefited from access to immediate 
relief supplies, often provided by patron agencies and
1 ft ^European metropolitan congregations. Although the money 
was not intended solely for kholwa, the Native Recruiting 
Corporation also granted £1000 for emergency relief to 
missionary societies in Zululand in 1933.-*-^ Certainly the 
Anglican Church's provision of emergency relief and pension 
schemes for African catechists and their widows helped to 
ease their burden of buying food.-^^ Mission societies were 
often able to manipulate state officials for special relief 
supplies. Despite concern from some officials that if 
missionaries were granted relief supplies only Christian 
Africans would benefit, special consignments of powdered 
milk were made available to most mission stations for wider
1 f t  f idistribution to nursing mothers and infants. OD 
RELIEF, DEBTS AND DIFFERENTIATION
By the end of the 193 0s Africans in the worst drought 
stricken districts had accumulated a total debt of close to 
£43,000 for state food relief. The hardest-hit
districts, Nongoma and Mahlabatini, owed the NAD £22,000
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and £12,000 respectively while Hlabisa owed £3,500. The 
southern districts, where crops were less severely affected 
by drought and local stores were more numerous and more 
regularly supplied, owed less than £1,000.-*-^ Payments to 
the NAD through the 193 0s accounted for well over half the 
total debt incurred in most districts, and are a remarkable 
testimony to the resilience of African communities. Even 
the NCs at Nquthu and Nongoma commented on the efforts made 
by families to find cash, predominantly through the sale of 
their labour, but also, more reluctantly through, cattle- 
sales and some limited sale of produce.
It has been a matter of some amazement to all who 
are interested in the economic powers of the 
Natives to understand when and how the population 
had obtained the money it has needed for its
1 fiQmaintenance and subsistence....
remarked H. Ashdown of Nquthu. His words were echoed by E. 
Braatvedt.
The Nongoma Natives have responded magnificently to 
the appeals made to them. . . to discharge their
liabilities. To have paid about £17,000 of the debt
in four years is a great achievement. This has been
done with very little police assistance.
It would seem, however, that the burden of debt was not
discharged equally. While there was no official breakdown 
of who owed what, it appears that the commoners incurred 
smaller debts but constituted the majority of those
receiving relief. In 1939, of the remaining £1000 of debt 
owed by over 12 00 men, £650 was owed by only 65 of
Nongoma' s 'leading men’ The NC commented that 'The
labourer class has responded very well [to calls for
repayment] but some men of standing have made a poor
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effort.' He further noted that, since 1932, several
affluent individuals, including chiefs Bokwe and Solomon,
all with herds in excess of 200 and some in receipt of
substantial government stipends, had not paid their 
17 9debts. This suggests that while poor cattle-less,
commoners relied on wage labour to meet at least part of
their subsistence requirements, wealthier men with large
herds were reluctant to discharge their debts even though
they could easily convert their cattle to cash, possibly
partly because cattle prices were depressed during the 
17 3drought
FOOD SCARCITY AND FAMINE IN THE 1940s
By the 1940s, unresolved problems with the delivery of 
grain, the quota system for traders under the Maize Control 
Act and recurring shortfalls in local African production 
heightened the differentiation of supplies and 
entitlements. Increased state intervention had profoundly 
ambiguous effects on Africans. On the one hand, famine 
relief was effective in almost eradicating cases of 
absolute starvation. On the other hand, indebtedness, 
poverty and related health problems were endemic. The 
fragile nature of reserve agriculture forced Africans into 
a greater reliance on the wider South African grain market 
which was, by the 1940s, dominated, from production to 
point of sale by whites.
The bureaucratic maize control board instituted a rationing 
system of 'mealie product units' for every store-keeper in
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Zululand based on levels of average local production, 
overall Union production and desired levels of export.
In order to ensure an equal distribution of grain, store­
keepers had to re-apply every month for supplies, and there 
were chronic delays in approvals and shipments. Official 
estimates of reserve crops were, almost without exception, 
below actual production, and consequently the number of 
units apportioned to each store in Zululand was well below 
the people's needs. Moreover, during times of drought the 
control board considered it necessary to drastically reduce 
rations to 'non-working' reserve residents. Effectively, 
this meant that ration estimates were halved for women and 
children who were not considered part of the formal work 
force.
State intervention and restrictions on the areas that 
whites could trade in worked against both white store­
keepers and Africans consumers at this time. In Eshowe, for 
example, one store-keeper had a control board limit of 16 
bags per month to sell to 5,255 people. Not only was he 
unable to turn a profit; his store was unable to provide 
enough food for local people. The next closest stores which 
had an adequate supply were in Eshowe township over 2 5
miles away, which was much too far for people to walk
1 7 f \to. Similarly Nkwaleni Valley store-keeper L. Jenkinson
complained that he received less than 10 per cent of his
needed supplies and questioned why women and children
should have to walk twenty or thirty miles to buy food from
17 7stores m  areas with higher quotas.
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By late 1945, famine again threatened Zululand even though
only moderate drought conditions prevailed, partly because
of demographic pressure and partly because of inefficient
17ftfood deliveries. ° Most districts suffered food shortages
and near-starvation conditions even though close to 75 per
17 9cent of local crops were harvested.  ^ In December of 1945,
the NC at Melmoth reported having to turn away 3 0 women in
1 ft Dsearch of food from his office. Local officials were
unanimous that food shortages were a result of the
operation of the control act. The NC at Empangeni stated
that 'Prior to the institution of the Act I never heard the
1 ft 1calls of starvation from the people the way I now do.,J-
The NCs at Empangeni and Ubombo claimed that the control
act undermined women's agriculture stating that prior to 
the its implementation the average woman
...planted her fields, and whatever was redundant, 
she could sell to the trader and purchase her wants 
without being beholden to her husband, now she has 
curtailed her plantings and nothing is left when 
times are tough.
and
Today the Native girls no longer work on the fields
but earn their livings in other ways simply because
people cannot use the trader as a means of getting 
cash.
The act, however, was not the only, or even main reason why
women often set out to find wage employment in the urban
areas. Employment provided them some freedom from the
constraints of patriarchal control in the countryside and a
means to sustain themselves independently of fathers and 
1 ft fthusbands. °J
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By early 1946, store-keepers themselves were protesting 
about the effect of the act on African grain sales. The ZCC 
called upon the NAD to exempt all reserve Africans from the 
act to allow them to sell small surpluses.-'-®^ Strict quota 
restrictions and delays in deliveries forced many store­
keepers to try to augment their supplies with locally 
produced maize. Despite the protestations of the CNC that
Its hardly necessary to point out the importance of 
providing a market for the surplus of maize
produced in native areas, in the absence of
adequate storage facilities among the Native 
producers.185
The central state and the control board refused to relax 
the restrictions on the sale of maize in order to protect 
white grain farmers.1®^
In 1945, the NAD managed to use its political leverage to 
purchase its own supplies of grain for relief despite the
control board claims that the Union was suffering a severe
shortage. 7 6,000 bags of maize were shipped to Zululand in 
that year and for the remainder of the decade the NAD 
successfully negotiated for improved monthly quotas of over
-1 o 7
26,000 bags. ° Although local officials continued to 
protest that grain supplies remained inadequate for the 
people of Zululand, they were at least fractionally better 
than other areas of South Africa's reserves, possibly 
because reserve agriculture there had declined so rapidly, 




While the drought and depression in the 193 0s and 1940s 
undoubtedly contributed to food shortages in the reserves, 
famine was largely a structural problem. State relief was 
crucial for preventing outright starvation for most Zulu, 
but it was generally inefficient and led to chronic 
shortages of food in the reserves. The unequal nature of 
the white-dominated market and the advantages white 
commercial farmers had over under-capitalised producers, 
both Africans and white, however, meant that reserve 
Africans faced increasing debts for food. Moreover, social 
stratification, gender and employment were significant 
factors in the differential entitlement of Africans to 
food.
Equally important was the growing realisation by the state 
that the reserves could no longer provide Africans with 
subsistence and that white commercial farming would have to 
provide food for reserve inhabitants. Thus, officials 
sought to overcome the deteriorating reserve economy by 
directing its intensified intervention more towards stock 
improvement than agriculture. There has not been the scope 
in this chapter to consider the implications of under­
nutrition on the reserves, but it would seem to be an area 
in need of further research.
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RECLAMATION AND ' BETTERMENT1 IN THE ZULULAND RESERVES
In September 1944, chief Isaac Molife, the son of the 
government-appointed chief Hlubi from Basutoland, was 
suspended from his position as 'tribal chief' in Nquthu 
district. The pretext for Molife's suspension was his 
supposedly impudent and recalcitrant behaviour towards the 
NC and his resistance to 'progressive1 schemes for the 
'betterment' of his ward. He then retreated to his urban 
home in the Clermont Township outside Durban. Clermont, a 
'model' township developed in 1931 by leading members of 
Natal's African aspiring petty bourgeoisie and Inkatha, and 
supported by the central NAD, represented a convergence of 
interests for a practical application of state 
segregationist thinking.
Although Molife was not an active member of the Natal 
Native Congress, the ICU yase [of] Natal or Inkatha, whose 
respective founding members J.L. Dube, A.W. Champion, and 
W. Bhulose, struggled with Hamba Kahle (to go well or go 
safely) opposition politics, he allied himself with them as 
a fellow land-owner when he purchased land in Clermont. It 
was probably the fundamental principles of African self- 
government and of the inviolability of African land under a 
segregated 'Zulu nation’, espoused by these organizations, 
which appealed to Molife when the state intervened in his 
ward.J
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For over thirty years Molife had successfully balanced the 
needs of the densely packed population of his ward against 
the unremitting pressure from the NAD to manage the ward in 
conformity with the demands of industrialising South 
Africa. Despite his staunch support from the central 
administration, Molife was constantly at odds with local 
officials and had, on more than one occasion, drawn serious 
censure for recalcitrant behaviour. Before his suspension 
he had absented himself from the ward for long periods, 
ostensibly because of illness, in order to avoid direct 
confrontation with local officials.^ His suspension was, 
however, far from a forgone conclusion to the protracted 
struggle with the local agents of the white state. As has 
been shown earlier, he was remarkably effective in 
resisting the demands of local officials, even apparently 
precipitating the replacement of one NC.-’ His replacement 
as acting chief by the 'progressive1 kholwa Wellington 
Buthelezi, tipped the balance of popular sentiment against 
the NAD and galvanized local opinion against ward 
improvement and 'betterment1.
'Betterment1 in Nquthu was part of Union-wide state efforts
in the 193 0s to shore up the crumbling reserve economy, and
was based on 'scientific1 trends in conservation and stock
control. These efforts were, however, also motivated by the
exigencies of segregation in an industrialising society.^
The pronouncements of the Native Economic Commission in the
early 193 0s to save the reserves from ruin can be seen as a
fuller articulation of policy concerns which were
ftdeveloping at least ten years earlier. This policy was
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refined over the next twenty years, most notably as a 
result of the work of the Social and Economic Planning 
Council and the Tomlinson Commission, which were both 
devoted to rural reconstruction. Nevertheless, the 
maintenance of Africans at a tenuous sub-subsistence level 
in order to provide white farmers and industrialists with
Qlabour remained essential.
The Molife case highlights the tensions and paradoxes of
intensified state intervention in the rural areas of South
1 oAfrica which followed the crisis years of the 1930s. u 
Intervention pitted conservative chiefs and induna against 
ambitious local officials and 'modernising' kholwa, in a 
context of dire impoverishment and increasing economic 
differentiation both between whites and Africans and within 
African society.
Although state attempts at ward reorganization and
agricultural improvement dated back to the late 19th
century in Zululand, as has been argued in the previous
chapter, the depression and impoverishment of the 193 0s
provided the NAD with an unprecedented opportunity to re-
1 1configure rural African society. It was the
contradictions between the drive of the central NAD to 
maintain conservative chiefly authority, centred as it was 
on customary control of the land, and the policy of 
'progressive' reserve reclamation which ultimately led to 
the failure of 'betterment'. Chief Molife had, at best, an 
ambiguous relationship with the people of his ward. He was 
often corrupt, and favoured the conservative elite induna,
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ran rough-shod over commoners and was openly hostile to 
'progressive' Christian Africans. Nevertheless,
intensified NAD activity in ward reclamation, the 
prevention of soil erosion and stock control precipitated 
widespread disaffection and led commoners to rally around 
their chiefs in the hope that they could defend the last 
vestiges of the reserve economy.
In Zululand, the NAD considered Nquthu, Mahlabatini and
Nongoma in greatest need of intensified state intervention
for political and structural reasons which will be
discussed below. Although historians have tended to focus
on the period of more intense and broad-based African
opposition to state intervention following the introduction
of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, there is ample
justification for considering antecedents to the formal
1 3political restructuring of the reserves m  the 1950s. As 
Beinart and Bundy have shown, although it was mostly
fragmented and lacked substantial links with political 
organizations, there was localized rural resistance to 
state intervention even before the 1950s, and it often
indicates the issues which Africans were prepared to rally 
around later.
Reserve reclamation and 'betterment1 in Zululand before
1950 occurred in roughly three phases. From the 1890s until 
the 1920s the state attempted to control settlement, define 
grazing and agricultural land and provide for an increased 
African population in the reserves despite the loss of Zulu 
lands.During the 1920s and 1930s, local officials, the
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NAD Engineering Department and the NAD Agriculture 
Department, formed in 1929 under the directorship of R.W. 
Thornton, made efforts to control human settlement, stock, 
and erosion, and to improve water supplies and agriculture. 
From the start, Thornton focused NAD attention on stock 
management, as he had been the former Director of the 
Department of Agriculture's Animal and Field Husbandry 
division and had spent a great deal of time studying the 
'problems' of African 'overstocking' and erosion in the 
Transkei.-*-® From 1939 to 1948, the combined threats of 
declining agriculture and potential famine prompted a 
intensified programme of 'betterment'. At the heart of the 
new philosophy behind 'betterment' was a shift in emphasis 
from attempting to manage the reserves alongside existing 
cattle-keeping practices to active intervention in order to 
reduce stock numbers and improve breeds. Underlying this 
was an official acknowledgement that reserve agriculture no 
longer provided for the subsistence needs of most Africans.
Reserve reclamation in Zululand began in earnest in the 
mid-1930s when African society was probably at its most 
vulnerable since the aftermath of conquest. State 
intervention, therefore, occurred in a context where 
officials perceived their efforts to be both the greatest 
hope in saving the people from absolute ruin and the best
opportunity of re-configuring a compliant and grateful
1 7African society. While much of the story of reclamation 
and betterment in Zululand is familiar and followed 
patterns developed elsewhere in South Africa, if not 
Africa, there were significant differences.-*-® First, the
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politics in Zululand were perhaps more problematic for 
state officials. As Beinart has argued, the discourse of 
conservation and reclamation was bound up with, and I would 
add, served to underpin the political imperatives of 
segregation.-^ Certainly the NAD faced a serious challenge 
over the implementation of its improvement schemes which so 
threatened chiefly control of the reserve political 
economy. Moreover, the SNA, Major Herbst, felt that the 
success of 'betterment' in Zululand would reflect
positively on state efforts in the Transkei and visa
9 nversa. u Thus, the contrasts and comparison made between 
Zululand and Natal's other adjoining African areas, so 
important to the introduction of cattle sales and the local 
council scheme, were maintained.
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT
The NAD's drive for the infrastructural development of the
reserves highlighted the isolated nature of the African
areas of South Africa. Because their aim had always been to
serve white farmers and particularly the sugar industry,
linkages with the wider Union economy were disjointed and
uneven. Rail links with Durban and the Rand supported the
rapid development of Zululand's predominantly white-
inhabited small towns, and provided points of embarkation
for migrant labourers. x Until the 192 0s, however, the
movement of people and supplies to and from the reserves
was less of a priority for the railways than moving sugar- 
9 9cane.  ^ Zululand's rail network did not provide the distant 
reaches of the reserves with the links necessary for
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struggling African entrepreneurs and producer-traders to 
participate in the wider market. More importantly, African 
consumers, increasingly involved in the money economy, were 
unable to purchase much-needed cheap food.
When considering the most appropriate ways to spend the
limited funds available for improvements in the reserves in
192 8, Natal's CNC, T. Norton, recommended that roads be
given priority. He argued that, contrary to the tenets of
the department which earmarked NAD expenditure for Africans
only, more roads be built on the grounds that they not only
served white store-keepers, they benefited all the people
and '... unless the wants of the Natives are increased, one
of the largest markets for South African trade is
restricted.1 J Moreover, local officials and district
surgeons complained they were unable to collect taxes or
vaccinate effectively without access to the whole of the 
24reserves.
Herbst, however, maintained that 'considering the present 
stage of development of the Native people1 the NAD should 
not countenance the expenditure of funds for roads that 
appeared to serve whites only.
What the Department requires from you [he
instructed Norton] is a suggestion on which to
formulate a policy of agricultural and other
development to serve the greatest number for the
good of the many- not the dissipation of funds on
small schemes for the benefit of the more9 Rprogressive few.
In the context of repeated threats of famine, however, the 
essence of this policy was to attempt to keep the local
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population at, or below, subsistence level with little hope 
of improving their position in the commercial economy.^ 
Few roads were built in the reserves and most of those that 
did strike into the distant reaches of rural Zululand ended 
up, as Herbst predicted, serving white store-owners.
With the advent of the NAD's Department of Native
Agriculture in 1929, Natal officials undertook extensive
surveys of the reserves and drew up plans for their
development. ' Norton's revised 192 9 recommendations took
Herbst's admonitions into consideration. The CNC still felt
funding should be found for road development, especially
since it could provide needed occasional employment for
those rejected by the mines' and the 'retired'. He did,
however, agree to
...include only such recommendations as fall within 
the aim of using the funds at our disposal in 
promoting the interests of the masses of the people 
who have for so long been left largely to their own 
device.
Two local agricultural demonstration centres were planned, 
one for Eshowe to serve the southern districts and one in 
Nongoma, close to the Royal Kraal to serve the north. Other 
over ambitious, and largely unfulfilled, programmes 
included medical aid schemes, agricultural training 
scholarships and the development of a series of 'Native
7 QAgricultural schools'.  ^Norton believed, however, that for 
any programme designed to improve African agriculture to 
succeed it had to contend with two physical obstacles in 
Zululand: the very poor state of land left to Africans in 
the reserves and the problem of continued drought and
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consequent need for irrigation. On balance, however, it
would seem that through the 193 0s, repeated claims of
drought and 'abnormaly' low rainfall suggest that problems
with water supplies were not merely a product of freak
droughts, but the combined effect of normally intermittent
and poor rainfalls with the congestion of people and stock 
3 Don the land. Nevertheless, Norton and many officials 
subsequently involved with attempts to improve the 
reserves, stated unequivocally that Zululand could not 
sustain any further closer settlement or more intensive 
agriculture unless more land was made available. ^
Development policy for Zululand was not simply intended to
provide for the partial subsistence needs of the existing
reserve population in order to maintain a ready supply of
3 omigrant labour. When, in 193 6, the SNA, Smit outlined 
plans for overcoming the 'present deleterious methods of 
cultivation and overstocking1, in the reserves to 'save 
them from absolute ruin’, he implied that a greater concern 
was the need to provide for their increased population in 
future. J Smit was not, however, only referring to the 
anticipated natural increase of the African population, but 
also to the flow of 'surplus1 urban dwellers and evicted 
African tenants into the reserves. It would seem, then, 
that the 19th century Natal arguments for creating a vast
labour reservoir in Zululand, had by the 193 0s, come full
-i 34 circle.
Smit made recommendations for the definition of arable and 
grazing areas in the reserves, anti-erosion measures, the
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preservation of timber and water supplies and the
O C
imposition of any 'necessary limits1 on African stock. 3 
Local officials were quick to counter his concern that a 
re-definition of chiefs’ wards directed by white officials 
would ruin the last remaining central feature of chiefly 
authority (ie. their control of land) and '...practically 
kill the chiefs’. Zululand officials were adamant that 
there was no question of their undermining chiefly 
authority by defining arable and grazing lands in 
conjunction with agricultural officers.
Thus, the NCs E. Braatvedt of Nongoma, H. Ashdown of Nquthu 
and G. Cunningham of Hlabisa, reassured the SNA that while 
they would define the wards in accordance with 'scientific' 
principles, the actual public announcement of any changes
o  7
would be made by the chiefs. Moreover, chiefs would still 
be allowed to allocate sections of land to individuals 
within the overall planned areas. In this way the officials 
ensured that chiefs would not only be an integral part of 
the reclamation projects; they would also, if they 
participated, bear the brunt of popular opposition.
AGRICULTURAL 'IMPROVEMENT’
Despite the severity of the food crisis of the 1930s, 
agricultural improvement schemes were extremely limited in 
Zululand. While the NAD focused on the 'problems’ of large 
and increasing cattle herds, it did not give due 
consideration to differentiation in herd ownership and the 
problems of cattle-less cultivators. Yet its own officials
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were not unaware of these issues. Thus, in Nongoma, for 
example, the NC noted that many reserve families were
"3 O
without any draught stock at all. ° He argued, however, 
that since there were large numbers of oxen in the district 
it was merely a matter of encouraging cooperation between 
commoners without cattle and the large herd-owners to 
ensure that arable land was ploughed for all to use. 
Braadvedt rejected the introduction of NAD tractor- 
ploughing schemes for commoners in the belief that,
Community cultivation is unknown to the Zulu, and 
we should simply be upsetting them if we brought 
tractors in and ploughed up large areas. Such a 
step would probably be suspected of contemplating 
more land for European farmers.^
By contrast, in Mahlabatini, the NC authorised white 
farmers to enter the reserves with tractors to plough lands 
for those with cash or cattle to exchange for the service. 
He noted, however, the 'unfortunate1 trend in the district 
was the growing divide between those 'very few progressive 
men1 who could afford ploughing and could grow enough crops 
to sell and those who 'lived in the rough, scratching their 
small stony gardens with hoes and sticks’. ^  By the 1940s, 
commoner cultivation was in crisis as fewer large herd- 
owners were prepared to loan or rent out draught stock and 
increasingly ploughs and wagons were rented for a cash fee 
rather than loaned. ^
Following restrictions on petrol and machinery during World 
War II, the NAD introduced limited tractor ploughing 
schemes in Nongoma, Mahlabatini and Melmoth. These Zululand 
districts were the only places in Natal where this was
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done. The ultimate paradox was that the schemes were 
applied to the two districts, Nongoma and Mahlabatini, 
which were constantly cited as the most badly overstocked. 
Clearly, differentiation in herd ownership meant that, 
during periods of crisis, there were not enough cattle 
rather than too many. Tractor ploughing did not, however, 
improve commoner agriculture. In contrast to the NAD 
schemes, the state made loans of up to £600 to white 
farmers for the purchase of tractors.^ When the tractors 
arrived, the NAD charged 10s. per morgen (approximately 4. 
12d. per acre) for ploughing which was beyond the means of 
many poor families.^ Moreover, NAD agricultural 
supervisors directed that ploughing be carried out only on 
land designated by chiefs as arable.^ It was unlikely that
much of the ploughed land would remain for commoners1 use
\ A  f\after 'tribal leaders1 had planted their share. D The
scheme does not appear to have had any substantial impact
on reserve food production. Owing to drought, only half the
acreage ploughed in 1948 was actually planted by a few
kholwa who sold the surplus produce to a local hospital.^
In keeping with trends elsewhere in Africa, the NAD
attempted to develop separate individual tenure farming
A  Rschemes m  Zululand. As with the African sugar-cane 
farming schemes noted earlier, however, these 'progressive1 
or 'master1 farming schemes largely failed. Thus, the 
individual Impapala plot-holders in Eshowe had, by the 
1940s, fallen on hard times. Most plot-holders could not 
sustain the lease and improvement costs of remaining on the
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land by trying to grow cane. By 1946, of the original 105
A Qlot holders only 2 8 had not defaulted on payments. ^
It would appear that the most successful agricultural 
improvement programmes in Zululand were small scale 
projects aimed at helping women. O. Oftebro, the Melmoth 
NC, reported to the Tomlinson Commission that the most 
effective work agricultural demonstrators carried out was 
not in co-ordinating arable and grazing lands among the 
district men, to which their was always resistance, but 
simply in showing women how to increase their small plot
n 1
production. ± When the demonstrator moved out of Melmoth,
however, many women complained that they would not be able
to carry on the 'improved work1. Although Oftebro
attributed this concern to the women's supposed 'ignorance'
and his belief that they would simply forget what they had
been taught, the demonstrator claimed otherwise. He argued
that the women's progress was not a function of what they
were taught: they 'knew perfectly well how to grow food'.
It was rather that only with the official presence of the
NAD were the women able to alienate larger areas of
productive land from male control. Without the demonstrator
present, the district men took over the land for grazing 
52again.
DROUGHT AND WATER SUPPLIES
For Africans and the NAD alike water supplies were a 
central development issue. Although portions of the inland 
districts and the river valleys which cut across most of
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Zululand provided adequate water supplies for nearby 
communities, much of the coastal lands and the arid plains 
of the north suffered perennial shortages. Droughts of 
varying severity, thought to be 'abnormal1, appeared with 
alarming frequency during the 1930s and 1940s. From the 
early 1920s, the state was panic-stricken over the 
potential impact of drought. Although principally
concerned with the needs of expanding white stock-farmers, 
the Drought Investigation Commission Reports of 1922 and 
1923 also suggested, by implication, that water supplies in 
rural African areas should be improved to make way for 
white settlement and to improve the condition of South 
African stock overall. The commission reported that 
Zululand had a particularly poor potential for irrigation 
and that its catchment zones were far more limited than 
Natal’s.56
In the dry winter of 193 0, partly in response to improved
technology for bore-hole drilling and the construction of
stock dams, numerous requests from northern district
officials for the development of water supplies arrived in
the CNC ’ s office. ^  NCs in Nongoma, Ubombo and Ingwavuma
reported startling stories of misery and hardship due lack
of water: of African women, destined to walk ten miles a
day for the meagre supplies that they could carry, of most
children suffering from dysentery, and of the devastation
of cattle herds from drought and disease.^® Moreover,
officials argued that the congestion of stock around the
few sources of water was responsible for wide-spread 
59erosion.J
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In 1931, Thornton laid down plans for the provision of a 
series of bore-hole and stock dams in the northern 
'undeveloped' areas of Zululand.^ Two main objects were to 
relieve the congestion of cattle around the few existing 
stock dams and to enable the population to disperse into 
poorly watered areas in order to make way for proposed 
white settlement in the Pongola irrigation zone.^ In 
consultation with local officials, an ambitious series of 
5 00 bore-holes and half as many dams were planned for the 
driest districts of Ingwavuma, Ubombo, Mahlabatini, Hlabisa 
and Nongoma. The stated goal was to provide at least one 
bore-hole or access to a dam for every 1500 reserve 
residents.
Initially Africans welcomed the scheme, and chiefs whose 
people were suffering from the drought even approached 
officials to apply for dams in their wards. Chief Zombizwe, 
who complained that the water off-take by white sugar 
farmers in Swaziland had made the Ingwavuma river run dry 
applied for twenty dams in his ward.^ Similarly, chief 
Msekeni protested that all his people's cattle were dying 
of thirst since the Mkuzi Falls irrigation works were 
developed to serve white settlers. Although there is no 
evidence to prove that irrigation for white-owned farms had 
caused the rivers to dry-up, Africans remained 
unconvinced.^
Considering the large stake that these chiefs had in 
cattle, however, (they held over 500 head between them) it
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is not surprising that their pleas for relief were directed 
toward the provision of stock dams. In areas where further 
white settlement was contemplated commoners were deeply 
suspicious of plans for irrigation schemes. In 193 5, 
irrigation surveys of crown land adjacent to the Pongola 
river occupied by Africans in Ubombo and Ingwavuma, 
prompted one elderly man to state that 'These [demarcation] 
flags look red but really they are white. They are for the
white man. The white man is coming and we will lose our
fi Aground1.  ^The flags disappeared mysteriously over the next 
few nights.
Dam construction proved difficult for the Engineering 
Department despite initial chiefly enthusiasm. In early 
1933, chief Matole Buthelezi approached the local NC with a 
request for a series of stock dams in the thorn-veld of his 
ward. The NAD Engineer for Zululand, S. Malcolm, perhaps 
overly-sanguine about the chief's enthusiasm, his offer of 
free labour and his high social standing, boasted that he 
was sure to get every assistance of his people.03 He felt, 
moreover, that the project would be a 'valuable lesson' to 
the Zulu who had endured severe drought the previous year. 
By the end of the 1933, following a ward meeting at which 
almost all the men refused to render free service for the 
project, Matole had apparently lost his enthusiasm, and 
'placed a number of genuine and imaginary obstacles' in the 
way of the works.^ Elsewhere, however, dam construction 
carried on apace, especially at the height of the 
depression when, probably owing to extreme impoverishment, 
some older wage-labourers could be found. As E. Braadvedt
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stated in Ingwavuma, 'I am considering these works as a
means of relieving distress and the Natives are now
7desperate enough to do it. 1 °
By 1933, the improvement of water supplies had achieved
only mixed results. While many bore-holes had proved 
outright failures, drying up or turning brackish within 
months, those that did work tended to focus cattle
congestion in very circumscribed areas leading to further
f\ fterosion.00 At a conference of officials in 1933, although
the NC at Nongoma lauded the dams for providing over 900
cattle with water in a previously barren area, senior
officials reviewed grave NAD concerns about the problems of 
f\ Qover-stocking.  ^ Although the two contradictory issues of 
de-stocking and the provision of improved pasture and water 
supplies for stock had yet to converge, as they would in 
the culling programmes of the 1940s, the signs of stress 
were evident.
If some chiefs and their followers remained guardedly
optimistic that stock dams could improve their cattle
during the droughts of the 193 0s, their view was to be
tempered during the Governor-General1s visit to Eshowe in
July of 1937. In his address to the people of Zululand, Sir
Patrick Duncan renewed promises of more boreholes and stock
7 ndams for the Zulu. w He pointed out, however, that the main 
aim of the dams would not simply be to alleviate congestion 
in the reserves, but to provide an 'asylum' in Zululand for 
refugees from other desiccated areas.^
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RECLAMATION AND EROSION CONTROL
The NAD had been refining its conservation policy for over
thirty years by the time that ward reclamation and erosion
control projects began in earnest in Nquthu in 1934, and
7 7were later extended to the coast and the dry north. In
the early years of white encroachment on land defined as
African, fences were not always completely rejected by
reserve residents. As Hofmeyr has argued for the Transvaal,
the NAD often engaged in negotiations and even the
accommodation of African interests when conflicts on the
ground ensued from the introduction of fences and 
7 3boundaries. J In the context of land segregation and the 
dominance of white farmers over land outside the reserves, 
fences may have both protected Africans as well as 
constrained them.
In the 193 0s, tensions between Africans and whites over 
stray stock increased as white farmers endeavoured to 
improve their cattle. While most Vryheid farmers complained 
repeatedly to Zululand officials about the destruction of 
their crops by African-owned cattle and expressed fears 
about their cattle breeding with reserve cattle, Africans 
protested against the exorbitant fines and the pound fees 
they faced while recovering stock which wandered onto white 
farms. ^
The principle of using fences not only to define grazing 
areas but also to improve stock-breeding contributed to 
official distinctions between white 'progressive' cattle-
376
*7 c
owners and 'conservative Zulu scrub herders’ 3 If external 
fencing helped differentiate African and white cattle- 
owners, internal fencing and reclamation schemes served 
some of the same functions by highlighting tensions between 
reserve cattle-owners and agriculturalists. The broader 
pattern which emerged was that those whose life strategies 
revolved around migrancy and the struggle to maintain 
subsistence from the land and cattle tended to reject 
improvements while those who could profit from trade and
commerce or were directly tied to the state supported
7 fichange.
In July 1934, the NAD started anti-erosion works in Nquthu
and demarcated a series of 100 acre sites for contour banks
and fenced paddocks to allow the pastures to recover from
'overgrazing1. The department employed over a hundred local
men, predominantly older, impoverished and cattle-less, for
£1 2s. 6d. a month, to build up the banks and fence in
7 7grazing and arable land on each site. New stock dams were
built and close to 10,000 gum trees were planted to
conserve the soil. While chief Mdhlalose, who had close
ties with the administration and the local Anglican Church,
initiated the soil reclamation project in his ward, chief
7 ftMolife immediately objected.
By 193 5, Molife and his induna were leading a ward-wide
resistance, and the NC, F. Ahrens, was forced to call a
special district meeting in order to overcome the people's 
7 9objections. Ahrens' condescending attitude could not have
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helped matters. After some discussion about the importance 
of curbing soil erosion, Ahrens pronounced:
No one can expect a herd boy to give wise words in 
the councils of Chiefs... Therefore, none of you 
men here today can speak wise words in connection 
with soil erosion, because as far as soil erosion 
is concerned, you are all herd boys. Is that quite 
clear?®®
Molife and other leaders, however, raised a series of 
salient issues.®^ Induna Mazaba Buthelezi argued that, in 
the short-term, when planting was crucial to maintain food 
supplies, the contour banks did not help agriculture since 
people were unable to plough or plant in the project areas. 
He added that, in effect, all the land used up for the 
banks would be forever useless because any seed planted on 
the exposed tops would either be blown away by wind or 
washed away by rain. A number of men explained that the 
banks had been constructed without any understanding of 
African farming techniques and were too close together to
o o
allow oxen and a plough to pass between.^ Molife protested 
that his people were not responsible for erosion, since 
'dongas' [gullies] were the fault of the NAD who allowed 
roads to be built in the wrong places.
Molife maintained his opposition to rehabilitation over the 
next few years, and employed a number of different
O  "3
strategies to resist the undermining of his control. He 
petitioned the NAD to suspend the works which, he claimed, 
were not only ineffective at containing Zululand's 
occasional torrential rains, but also hampered grazing and 
cultivation. He was not mollified by the CNC's reassurances 
that the programme was for the benefit of the people, and
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he requested permission to take his concerns directly to 
the Union government.®^ Although the CNC refused this and 
labelled Molife 'impertinent' for circumventing local 
authority, the chief proceeded to Pretoria to confront Smit 
only to be sternly reprimanded for the 'affront1. Smit 
refused to hear his complaints and more importantly, set 
the CNC against Molife by condemning the Natal 
administration for its inept handling of the chief at a
p C
'particularly sensitive1 time.
For the next two years, Molife suffered constant harassment 
from local officials. In official correspondence, Ahrens 
characterised him as '...clearly weak, simple, secretive, 
suspicious and stubborn1, adding that 'It has been
suggested that these qualities may be inherited: his father
p  C
died m  the Mental Hospital here.1 It is not surprising 
that Molife later brought a civil suit against the 
government-supporting chief Mdhlalose for alleged 
defamation when the chief claimed that Molife’s rejection 
of reclamation was 'lunacy1 and would prevent 'progress' in
p n
the district. By 1938, the pressure on the chief was too 
great. Claiming only that he could '... no longer serve
[his] people', Molife requested leave, this time to seek 
treatment for bronchitis in Durban. Again, permission was
o p
refused.00 Nevertheless, m  December 1938, Molife 
disappeared from Nquthu and returned only intermittently 
over the next few years. Although he never confirmed it, 
the NC suspected that Molife went to Durban to meet members
of the ANC, possibly members of the Youth League who were
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to help organize more radical resistance to 'betterment' in 
Nquthu in the 1950s.
That Molife left Nquthu when Foot and Mouth disease struck 
and the Veterinary Department was forced to cull large 
numbers of cattle is not surprising. ^  The NC, E. Lowe, 
considered that the slaughter of diseased stock must 
finally have sealed Molife's illusion of chiefly control of 
the land and summed up the context of his departure:
It is known he took grave exception to anti-soil 
erosion measures in his ward, and despite many 
conversations with him, he undoubtedly considers 
his ward inviolate - however, there being a 
progressive section of his tribe the whims of Chief 
Isaac could not be reasonably sufficient cause for 
retarding progressive measures ^
Unlike his father, Molife was openly hostile to Christian 
Africans and 'progressive improvements' in his ward. After 
the chief's nemesis, NC Ahrens, had moved, possibly due to 
NAD pressure to relieve tensions in the district between 
the administration and the chief, Molife selected two new 
induna. These loyal men replaced kholwa induna which Ahrens 
had supported, and the change led the Anglican Archbishop, 
A. Lee, to claim that Christianity in Nquthu was under 
attack.^ In 1943, the chief refused permission for the
Q "3Church of Sweden Mission to set up a station m  his ward. J 
He also defied official directions for the reorganization 
of his ward, allowing favoured induna to 'plough
Q /indiscriminately' m  the reclamation sites.
Elsewhere in Zululand state erosion control and ward 
reclamation intensified between 1934 and 1940. The NAD
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targeted Nongoma and Mahlabatini for improvement schemes, 
in part because of the large cattle herds and increasing 
congestion in the area, and in part because the NAD 
believed that Mshiyeni, whose royal family base was at 
Mahashini in Nongoma, was malleable and would, as regent, 
provide leadership crucial in the application of 
reclamation elsewhere in the country.^ Solomon had, after 
all, argued that in order for the chiefly strata of 
Zululand to contend with 'progressive' African farmers and 
the kholwa, they would have to develop a practical 
knowledge of cultivation.^
According to the NAD, the arable and pasture conditions in 
Nongoma were very poor and production was on the verge of 
collapse. Between 1921 and 1936, the district population 
had doubled and stock numbers soared to near 200,000 (small 
stock included) causing considerable pressure on the 
land.^7 Officials estimated that 80 per cent of the Usuthu 
ward, which had attracted substantial numbers of refugee 
tenants from northern Natal, suffered from erosion while 40 
per cent of the less densely populated Mandhlakazi ward was 
eroded. Moreover, up to 30 per cent of the whole district 
was considered uninhabitable by both Africans and
Q O
officials, due to aridity, malaria and nagana.
In Nongoma, Both Mshiyeni and chief Matole Buthelezi 
demonstrated a remarkably detailed understanding of the 
supposed value of fencing off grazing areas. They also 
raised relevant objections to each benefit officials 
claimed.^ Mshiyeni argued that while paddock areas might
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improve pastures, they tended to limit cattle in some
areas, causing people who relied on sisa cattle for milk to
worry about getting access to cattle. Buthelezi pointed out
that congestion and erosion were not his people's fault,
but rather the fault of refugees, and he could not
understand why the government sought to punish them for the
misfortune of others. When the NAD Engineer announced that
the 'tribe1 would have to provide free labour for the work
since they received free dipping tanks, Buthelezi countered
that since the reserve residents were an asset to the
country, paying taxes, school fees and licence fees, it was
only right that they should receive welfare support and be
paid a fair wage.^^ By 1939, after no labour was
forthcoming, the Engineering sub-Department initiated a
wage payment for reclamation works in Nongoma and then
iniincreased it from Is.3d. a day to ls.6d. a day.
Partly because of his political standing and, perhaps,
partly because of his repeated entreaties and explanations
to engineers about local conditions, Mshiyeni was able to
win some concessions over reclamation. In 1939, he objected
strongly to the introduction of 'veld observation plots' on
10 9the higher grazing areas of his ward. He argued that no
mention of the plots, delimited to check the recovery rate
of pastures excluded from grazing, had been made at initial
meetings and he had a difficult enough time convincing the
people to accept the plans promulgated. The Regent also
suggested that it was unfair of the NAD to expect the plots
to show that the rest of Nongoma could not sustain 
1 f) 3cattle. He may have been correct. As some environmental
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historians have argued, there is a marked difference 
between short-term shifting patterns of pasture grasses 
under recovery and indications of irreversible and 
spreading deterioration in productive capacity. -^4 once 
Mshiyeni protested that no further alienation of grazing 
land should take place on higher ground until malaria had 
receded from the lower areas, the Engineer reconsidered his 
policy. Malcolm agreed not to establish any more plots on 
high grazing ground and, in contrast to the fragmented
approach in Nquthu, to formulate a more comprehensive plan
for the whole district which would take into consideration
IDSseasonal gazing patterns. u
Towards the end of the 193 0s, official concern about 
erosion reached a state of panic. Increasingly, the NAD 
linked the success of ward improvement to a reduction in 
African-owned stock and the drive both to de-stock wards 
and improve breeds was central to policy in the 1940s. 
Natal's CNC was influenced by developments in the Transkei 
where stock improvement policies had already gained 
c u r r e n c y . -*-06 L0cai officials in Natal and Zululand were 
given copies of an article by N. King, the Transkei' s
Conservator of Forests, which placed a heavy emphasis on 
the evils of 'overgrazing' and supposedly 'poor' African 
pasture management. -^ 07 ^he root of the problem of soil 
erosion, according to NAD experts, was congestion of 
cattle. Although not explicitly stated, most technical 
officers in the NAD believed that since stock sales had
failed to reduce the number of cattle, the best alternative
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was to allow natural Malthusian checks to take over. As the
NAD Engineer Malcolm stated,
...where no dipping facilities exist, the numbers 
of cattle are comparatively small, the cattle are 
tick-infested and the country remains intact. On 
the other hand, in areas which are free of ticks, 
the herds are large and the country is being torn 
to pieces.
Malcolm even went so far as to recommend that dipping tanks 
on the coast of Zululand be destroyed to reduce both the 
costs of dipping and cattle numbers, though this was never 
carried out.
White pressure on the NAD to tackle the problem of African- 
owned cattle in the reserves mounted through the 193 0s. 
Much of the evidence presented by whites was, however, like 
the NAD programme, contradictory.^^ While an article in 
the Natal Witness claimed that most of Zululand could hold 
only one head of cattle to ten acres, it acknowledged that 
many areas held twice the density and numbers of cattle 
were increasing. As these contradictions played themselves 
out in practice, many Africans were clearly frustrated by 
NAD policy. In 1934 for example, J. Reinecke, who replaced 
Thornton as Director of Native Agriculture, criticised 
African communities from Mtunzini to Mtubatuba on the 
Zululand coast both for clearing land in forested areas 
which led to erosion and for abandoning plots of land under 
shifting cultivation which allowed thorn trees to encroach 
and take over pastures.-*-^
Finally, in 1939, the NAD undertook a comprehensive aerial 
photographic survey of erosion in Natal and Zululand.
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Although the evidence of serious erosion was ambiguous the
NAD directed close to half its development budget for
illZululand for erosion control m  four districts. 1 The
overall impression given by the erosion survey was that
surface and sheet erosion of arable land was minimal and
was often contained by Zulu through indigenous practices
119such as leaving select trees on arable land. In many
inland areas, however, where people were heavily congested 
and often forced to cultivate on stony and steep hillsides, 
many gullies developed. The fact that erosior^ was reported 
to be in its early stages in some areas suggests that, as 
Africans themselves had protested, the problem was 
exacerbated by the recent influx of refugees. As Beinart 
and others have argued, official perceptions of the extent 
and potential impact of erosion in rural areas need to be 
treated with caution.-*-^
The Zululand erosion survey report frequently mentioned 
problem areas which some local officials and residents 
disputed. Some Nquthu residents, for example, felt that 
ploughing up and down hills (a labour saving strategy) was
only a short-term problem which would be overcome when more
114land was apportioned.-*-* Some officials claimed, moreover, 
that dongas were limited to dipping tank areas and did not
1 1 c
constitute a threat to cultivation.XXJ A consistent theme 
in the report was that everywhere cattle movements caused 
gully erosion and cattle overgrazing caused sheet erosion. 
The NAD set priorities for reclamation accordingly. Despite 
very poor agricultural production reports for the northern 
districts during most of the 193 0s, no improvements were
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planned there since cattle-induced erosion was considered 
limited. Moreover, certain sections of the interior which 
were considered 'badly eroded’ were not scheduled for 
action since they did not threaten 'European areas’
The NAD approved soil improvement works for sections of 
Mahlabatini, Nquthu, Nongoma and Nkandhla. Measures 
included fencing, tree-planting to prevent drift sands, and 
the control of paths to dipping tanks; in extreme cases,
people were prevented from moving into areas susceptible to
117erosion.11 On the whole, there appeared to be little 
organized resistance to the works except for a general 
refusal by young men to work on the projects. In most 
areas, Africans were able to overcome the restraints on 
grazing areas by ignoring official directives. Erosion 
control banks were trampled by cattle or planted upon, and 
most people simply carried on the struggle to maintain
1 1 o
limited cultivation wherever they could. While some
peasant producers embraced contour ploughing and 
agricultural improvement, the majority of reserve dwellers 
made muted protests about congestion on the land and 
expressed fears of losing what little ground remained. It 
was not until the introduction of 'betterment schemes' for 
the rehabilitation of the reserves that widespread 




The application of the Livestock Improvement Proclamation
No. 31 of 193 9 (as provided for by the Natives Trust and
Land Act of 193 6) to Mahlabatini and Nquthu in the 1940s
provoked immediate Zulu resistance and heightened their
1 1 Qresentment of state intervention. During the 1930s,
chiefs and induna had attempted to press their advantage
over land control to make the most of opportunities for
increasing their herds through reclamation projects. In
Mahlabatini for example, chief Buthelezi and his induna
selected choice hill pastures for paddocks for their own
cattle while most commoners were left with the nagana-
19 0infected lowveld. By the 1940s, however, when commoner 
agitation undermined paddock schemes and all African stock 
were threatened, many chiefs supported resistance. By 1942, 
chief Buthelezi’s paddock had been stripped of wire, no 
labour was forthcoming to repair it and it fell into 
disuse. -*-21 Agricultural officers could not understand why 
the chief and his people, who had initially claimed to 
understand and approve of the measures designed for their 
benefit, then demonstrated the 'usual innate conservatism’ 
when stock-improvement measures were planned.
By 1948, most of the erosion control measures planned for 
Mahlabatini were completed and it only remained for the NAD 
to implement the culling of 'scrub stock’ and cattle 
improvement. It was at this point that the magnitude of the 
problem in the reserves became clear to officials. Although 
over 2 00 0 acres of land in Mahlabatini had been 'reclaimed'
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through fencing and contour banks, the agricultural officer 
for Zululand believed that 'only the fringes of the problem 
[had] been touched1 and for long-term improvement to be 
realised, 'betterment would have to carry on for at least
1 TO .
100 [sic] years'. Such long-term policy projections were 
problematic for two reasons. First, the state's commitment 
to 'betterment' was caught between its objectives and a 
lack of funds. Second, and perhaps more importantly, long, 
drawn-out projects could not satisfy Africans' immediate 
need for arable and pasture land while large stretches of 
the reserves were removed from effective productivity for a 
time.
These concerns notwithstanding, the central issue for the
Zulu was planned culling. On one hand, cattle-owners were
understandably concerned about plans to reduce their large
herds and to replace them with fewer 'improved' and
1 o A
commercially productive cattle. On the other hand, small 
stock-owners, and especially impoverished commoners who 
held only a few goats, sheep or donkeys, feared that they 
were the ultimate target of culling. Their fears were 
substantiated. While the NAD believed that cattle should 
remain the mainstay of the reserves, especially in view of 
their wider social and economic significance, it had no 
compunction about trying to wrest small stock from their 
owners. NAD experts considered that non-wooled sheep, goats 
and donkeys were a menace to the land. With smaller hooves 
to break away soil, a tendency to eat grasses almost to the 
root and no obvious commercial value small stock were seen 
by officials as the enemy of erosion control.
388
Resistance in Mahlabatini effectively delayed further work 
on 'betterment' and culling until well into the 1950s. Most
of the men refused to present their stock for assessment,
and stated that they would not discuss the matter further
ITT
until chief Mshiyeni was called to represent them. ° 
Bekinkosi Mbata, a commoner known to the administration for 
resistance to dipping, asked,
Why does the Government want to undertake this
scheme. Who has gone to complain about conditions?
We live on our goats and donkeys. We use donkeys as
draft animals and we sell goats to buy mealies and107 3 J
to pay Inyangas.
The people would not countenance the removal of their stock
when they believed the real problem lay with in
government's refusal to grant them more land. Chief
Mhlolutini, in an attempt to meet the interests of the NC
at least part way, agreed that '...the country is being
washed away [and] our stock has nothing to eat', but argued
that the answer to the problem lay in providing more land
for the overcrowded people and not in stripping them of
19fttheir 'wealth in stock'.
WOOLED SHEEP AND 'BETTERMENT' IN NQUTHU
As elsewhere in southern Africa, after the ravages of
Rinderpest and East Coast Fever, Africans in Nquthu re-
19 Qbuilt their pastoral holdings with small stock. Goats 
and especially sheep were readily available in southern 
Zululand at affordable prices from neighbouring white 
stock-owners and were an important substitute for poorer 
families unable to maintain c a t t l e . T h e  development of
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wooled sheep in Nquthu and Nkandhla, however owed as much 
to the industry of the immigrant Hlubi as to local 
circumstances.-'-^ While most Africans in the drier northern 
districts tended to keep indigenous or cross-bred 'black' 
sheep which, they were told repeatedly by white officials, 
had little value outside the reserve economy, the keen 
Hlubi sheep pastoralists rapidly extended their flocks of 
'wooled' merino sheep.
In 1924, Africans in Nquthu and Nkandhla produced over 
190,000 lbs. of wool from just over 50,000 wool-bearing 
merino sheep; over 80 per cent came from the Hlubi in 
Nquthu. By 1939, their flocks had increased to 63,000 and 
had produced and 22 6,000 lbs. of wool to a market value of 
over £5,60 0.-'--^  The importance of the wool industry for 
Africans in Nquthu, and the impact it had on other non- 
wooled sheep-owners should not be underestimated. Wooled 
sheep in Nquthu constituted over half the total of the 
African-owned sheep for all of Zululand, and more than 
double the number of white-owned wooled sheep.Moreover, 
like the NAD's scheme for developing African grown sugar­
cane, merino sheep and the sale of wool presented local 
officials with an important potential basis for an income- 
generating scheme within the reserves. African wool 
production, however, was prone to the same sorts of 
obstacles and pitfalls as agricultural and cattle 
production. African-owned sheep suffered from the stigma of 
the 'Native Produce' label which meant they received 
substantially lower prices for their wool than whites, and
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from the resistance of fellow reserve residents without
commercially viable flocks.
In 1934, the NAD agricultural supervisor from Nongoma, C. 
Peachy, who had been involved with Braatvedt's development 
of cattle auctions, introduced state-funded support for
- I O C
wool marketing in Nquthu. The NAD provided a wool-
shearing shed and instruments for weighing, sorting and 
preparing wool for sale, and encouraged the district's 
'progressive1 wool-producers to present their sheep for 
classification and shearing. Previously, many sheep-owners 
had struggled to make a fair return on their wool since 
they relied on local white farmers to shear, collect and 
sort the wool for a fee or part of the produce. One
cooperative of four Africans that relied on a white 
Babanango farmer realised a total profit of only £46 from 
the sale of over £55 worth of wool on the Durban market. 
Still, the NC considered this a far better return than the 
men could have achieved through local sale, and he hoped to 
improve on it.
The NAD scheme immediately ran into problems. Africans who 
sold through the NAD lost the relative benefits, which 
often outweighed the costs, of funnelling reserve produced- 
wool through white farmers to overcome the stigma of the
label 'Native produce1 at market.-^7 Jack Molife, a 
mission-educated induna and distant relation to chief 
Molife, complained to the local NC that
When we consign our wool to Durban we get letters
from the buyers on which is written 'Native Sheep’.
We cannot understand it. We keep European Sheep. I
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bought 12 0 Sheep from a farmer. I thought my wool 
would not be termed 'Native Wool', because I bought 
it from an European. It makes us think our effortsI T O
are m  vain.
Moreover, local officials exacerbated tensions between 
wool-producing sheep owners and the rest of the reserve 
residents who kept herds of the popular, and less 
expensive, 'black' sheep. Through his constant entreaties 
to all sheep-owners to improve their flocks and do away 
with the non-commercial indigenous sheep, the NC threatened 
what appeared to be a working balance between the numbers
1 TQ
of wooled and non-wooled sheep.
Indigenous sheep played an important role in the local
political economy and the social interaction between people
and the inyanga (herbalist-doctor). Sheep provided meat for
families and, more importantly, were a central feature of
the [ukujbethela custom (to sacrifice a beast for
protection from lightning or for spiritual guidance) . A
number of commoners protested that sheep 'stock
improvement' would undermine their valuable 'black' sheep,
which were the only means of securing the services of
diviners and herbalists who used the tail-fat and oils of
1 4.1the sheep for various remedies. Moreover, until the
advent of district-wide marketing schemes, there was little 
competition between indigenous and merino sheep-owners for 
appropriate grazing ground. While the hardier 'black' sheep 
were better suited to the drier low thorn veld, merino 
sheep thrived on the better grazing available on Nquthu's 
higher grassy plains.
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Tensions increased between the majority commoner class who 
held small flocks of indigenous sheep and the minority of 
merino-herders as the NAD pressed for the commercialisation 
of wooled sheep. The lines of conflict reflected a growing 
rift between merino-owners, who tended to be Christians, 
and those who followed the customary accumulation and use 
of sheep. Merino-owners quickly followed the advice of 
local agricultural supervisors in condemning the 
intermingling of 'black' and merino sheep which was 
believed to impair the quality of wool. Jack Molife, for 
example, claimed that all indigenous sheep were useless and 
their owners ignorant. Samuel Molife, Jack's brother, added 
that only merino sheep had any value and that, ' I cannot
even buy a shirt for a black sheep. We merino sheep owners
buy shirts, soap and paraffin.' Job Selepe proudly 
declared, 'I am not going to keep sheep for the purpose of 
enriching Inyangas but to help myself.'143
Commoners who owned indigenous sheep protested sharply when 
the NAD introduced financial support for the acquisition of 
merino rams and schemes for fenced grazing areas to isolate 
merino sheep in 1935. It can be argued however, that
commoners were not a priori against the improvement and 
commercialisation of sheep. It was rather that their 
experience with cattle control had shown them caution was 
needed. Most commoners were concerned with the closure of 
communal grazing areas for their own sheep. Some people
argued that paddocking for rams would remove valuable 
grazing land from access by the majority, and believed that 
chiefs would never allow the land to be so divided by
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individuals; Others protested that the district was already 
over-crowded and the introduction of more sheep would
reduce grazing for everyone. Moreover, the regulations
governing funding allocations prevented indigenous-sheep 
owners from getting support. As Naphtalie Nxumalo pointed 
out, funding for rams was provided on the basis of the
amount of quality wool sold so that those aspiring to 
develop a merino herd could only qualify for support if 
they had substantial capital. Qoboza Ngobese voiced a
more general suspicion of government motives: 'I say that
if the Government brings in these rams will they not claim 
the lambs?1
Despite the warning signs that wide-spread commoner
disaffection with sheep improvement would ensue, the NAD
expanded its programme for wool marketing and the
acquisition of merino rams in 1936. An annual allocation of
£100 was set for the purchase and distribution of rams to
'black' sheep owners to enable them to improve their
flocks. In 1938, a full-time agricultural officer was
appointed for Nquthu to train African assistants in
1 A Rbreeding and sorting wool for the market. A small number 
of 'black1 sheep-owners slowly shifted their flock 
composition to take advantage of cash sales of wool. In
193 6, 2 8 new merino-owners sold wool for profits of between 
£2 and £24 each. By 1939, 72 new merino-owners were selling 
wool for profits ranging from as low as 5s. 8d. to over 
£ 1 5 0 . Individual flock sizes, however, varied 
considerably: some men held less than ten sheep by 1940,
and others, such as induna Nbongolo Ngade, had enormous
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flocks of over 500.^^ It appears, then, that the same 
process of differentiation that held for cattle-ownership 
also applied to a growing gap between small and large 
flock-owners.
It was at this time, and using the auspices of NAD 
intervention in sheep herding, that chief Molife started 
agitating against the state reclamation of his ward. When 
additional shearing huts and sorting pens were erected in 
his ward Molife wrote a bitter letter to the SNA, D. Smit, 
protesting that he had never been informed of this proposed 
alienation of his land, nor had he been apprised of state 
action in regard to erosion control and grazing
1 R1 xrestrictions. D± Molife condemned the 'anti-Zulu' actions 
of 'progressive' Christians in his ward for their support 
of reclamation and the eradication of 'black' sheep for the 
sake of merinos. The allegedly 'liberal' SNA effectively 
drew the battle lines in his reply to Molife by stating 
that the improvements were for the good of all people and
-1 ir p
that the matter was no longer open for discussion. The 
greatest paradox of 'betterment' schemes for Africans, 
however, lay in the contradictions of NAD efforts to 
encourage and improve stock, be it sheep or cattle, while 
simultaneously planning for the culling of large numbers of 
'poor' African-owned 'scrub' stock. -*--*3
The NAD, strapped for resources, and reliant on compliant 
and supportive African labour to carry out the project, was 
only able to tackle problems in the district on a piecemeal 
basis. Initially, only one-fifth of Molife's ward was
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targeted for fencing and erosion control. Local officials
argued that stock-culling should precede fencing, in
contrast to the NAD view that culling could only be
undertaken once fencing had been erected. The NAD believed
that if the culling was undertaken before grazing areas
were delimited, people would simply re-stock at will, or
take over sisa stock from wealthier neighbours. Nquthu
could not be completely isolated from other stock-owning
1 54communities m  the region. J
In 1945, the NC made a mockery of even the mostly hollow 
attempts at gaining consensus from reserve residents. 
During Molife's suspension he called a ward meeting with 
acting chief Wellington Buthelezi, the kholwa induna, and 
only 580 of 6500 reserve residents. All those in attendance
1 cc
accepted the 'Tribal Resolution' for reclamation. 
Similarly, chief Mdhlalose oversaw a meeting in which his 
ward residents were railroaded into accepting 'betterment' 
with only 130 men out of potential 1800 eligible voters
1 r r
agreeing. Having achieved his 'consensus' the new NC, V. 
Leibrandt, objected to the planned re-instatment of Molife 
arguing that
...it would be most unfortunate if Isaac were to
return now... with his peculiar mental makeup he
will do everything in his power to antagonize the
Natives against the reclamation of the Molife 
15 7ward.
Ironically, the NAD, nevertheless, re-instated Molife, 
principally in the hopes that he would contain popular 
resistance, and the chief returned to the ward to carry on
the struggle against state intervention. ^ 8
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The parcel of land initially targeted for betterment
consisted of 27,000 acres of rolling hills and small stream
valleys. The NAD assigned a carrying capacity of eight
stock units to one acre of land and recommended that
culling take place on a sliding scale according to the
number of stock units an individual held.-*-~^  The assessment
of the carrying capacity was quite arbitrary, and gave no
consideration for varied seasonal grazing needs. The
Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, J. Every,
admitted that his sub-department was unable to assess the
carrying capacity of the undulating veld accurately with
due consideration for long-held grazing practices and
consequently recommended a more stringent culling scale
1 fi Dthan was initially planned. DU
Owners who held more than 3 6 stock units (a 'stock unit' 
equalled one head of cattle, or one horse, or five goats or 
four sheep) faced a cull of 66 per cent while owners with 
less than five units were to lose only 2 5 per cent in order 
to achieve an overall reduction of 45 per cent. Smaller 
stock units, predominantly goats and sheep, which officials 
believed to be responsible for the worst erosion, were a 
priority for the culling scheme. A stated aim of the scheme 
was to attempt to even out the distribution of cattle in 
the district. Africans who held few or no stock wold be 
allowed to purchase up to three head of cattle only, and it 
was estimated that over seventy men would be eligible to 
buy. Officials gave special consideration to draught stock 
in order to allow people to carry on ploughing land 
wherever possible. Although the NAD recommended that
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culling take place over five years, the NC counselled 
against this:
Whether a Native loses 2 head or 2 0 head the 
psychological reaction will be the same and it will 
be difficult to face the yearly opposition that is 
bound to occur if culling is carried out in
1 fs 1stages.
Owners were, moreover, allowed some time through the rainy 
season to fatten animals targeted for removal with better 
grazing.
Despite warnings from senior NAD officials familiar with
other attempts at culling not to attempt to do the whole 66
per cent cull at once, the NC and the CNC believed this was
the best way to show how quickly improvement could be
achieved. ^he Natal officials pressed ahead with the
culling procedures arguing that,
To stage out the cull would only be a continual
irritant to the people and a sign of hesitancy and 
weakness on the part of Government.
Molife's people were then given from April to the end of 
November of 1948 either to remove the designated stock from 
the district through sale or to face an enforced
slaughter.
The culling procedure, started in March of 1948, 
represented all of the ambiguities of state intervention in 
rural South A f r i c a . I m b u e d  with 'scientific1 
presumptions about poor African pastoral management and 
firmly convinced that Africans would see the 'wisdom' of 
state officials, the NAD officer in charge of culling
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operations described the desired procedure as follows:
The owner is given the chance to make his own 
selection of the type and class of animals he wants 
to get rid of. If the culling officer feels that 
his selection is not in his own interest, or that 
of the community, it is then explained to him so as 
to persuade him to change his selection. Invariably 
the Native will agree with the culling officer.
Paradoxically, 'scientific' assessments of the allowable
number of units were abandoned. While in some cases the
minimum number of stock to be culled was lowered, the
culling officer warned that 'The minimum must not be
revealed to the natives as that is an arbitrary figure for
1 7official use.1 Following the assessment all animals
designated for the cull were branded and families who were 
to lose goats and sheep were encouraged to re-stock only 
with cattle.
The evidence suggests that while the intention of the cull 
was to have the least impact on owners with fewest stock, 
the actual impact was more severe. Since goats and sheep 
were the prime target of the cull, small stock-owners could 
lose nearly all their accumulated wealth. State concern 
about the possibly explosive reaction of the majority small 
stock-owners to a widespread and immediate cull of all 
their sheep and goats prompted Reinecke to countermand the 
previous order to eradicate small stock altogether. He 
recommended instead that the 'displacement of sheep and 
goats in possession of the poor man by cattle must be done 
circumspectly1 to allow them time to accumulate cash for 
cattle purchases.-*-^ As he pointed out, this change would 
be in keeping with culling policy elsewhere in South Africa
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and Southern Rhodesia. Given the general constraints on 
accumulating cash for cattle and the tendency of larger 
cattle herd-owners to take over and monopolise grazing 
land, it was unlikely that many poor goat herd-owners would 
be in a position to develop a viable herd of cattle after 
the cull.-*-^ It was probable then, that culling accelerated 
the division between those people without stock and those 
with.
RESISTANCE TO 'BETTERMENT'
For Africans who wished to do so, out-right confrontation 
was not always necessary to undermine 'improvement'. Over 
the short-term the tactics of delay -withholding labour, 
removing survey markers, allowing cattle to stray into 
works areas, shifting cattle from one area to another, and 
withholding oxen for draught power- could all slow the pace 
of change without provoking retaliation from the state. 
Africans also resisted or provided false information for
the agricultural censuses and stock enumerations which
1 7 nofficials relied upon to plan 'betterment'. Moreover, 
Africans, on occasion, demonstrated an apparently 
enthusiastic acceptance and understanding of stated policy
at meetings, only to turn around and 'neglect to co-
171operate' later. ^
At least part of the controversy over 'betterment' resulted 
from the very public nature of 'consultations' with the 
affected people. Official reports of district meetings, 
required by the Proclamation to gain the 'consent of the
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people' before 'betterment' could start, belied popular
sentiment. Thus, at one such meeting in Mahlabatini, chief
Buthelezi and his induna claimed that 'the entire tribe is
in favour' of the scheme; yet only 600 out of 6000 members
showed up, and of those only a bare majority voted in
17?favour of the programme. On top of this, officials often
pressed ahead with plans despite popular opposition.
Liebrandt, for example, proceeded with culling operations
in one section of Nquthu without the consent of the people
because, he believed, '...consultation... does not mean
agreement... it means you are going to tell them what you
1 7 7are going to do' . J Thus, m  contrast to Transkeian 
officials, the Natal administration often 'manufactured 
consent' in its heavy-handed effort at gaining popular 
acceptance for intervention.
African objections to the scheme went beyond complaints of 
impoverishment resulting from the loss of animals to the 
way the cull was carried out. The Nquthu people asked for 
the project to be delayed until drought abated and that if 
they were forced to move that they be paid a cash 
compensation. They also criticised the intensified 
bureaucracy relating to cattle-keeping which came with 
'betterment'. They complained that not only did the
branding of cattle destroy hides destined for sale, but 
that the introduction of strict record-keeping for natural 
increase and a plethora of new permits for the movement of 
cattle also meant people no longer owned their cattle and
goats since they were '...always in the books of the Native
1 7 fiCommissioner’. ° Moreover, both branding and comprehensive
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records undermined the flexibility Africans needed to move
17 7cattle to avoid loss.
In the Molife ward stock-owners met the initial calls to 
produce their cattle for culling with quiet assurances that 
all would comply. On the day of the cull, however, they 
refused to show up, and the NC immediately telephoned the 
local police to call for reinforcements to protect the 
local officials. He intended to proceed with the cull 
'...whether the people liked it or not1.-*-^® In anticipation 
of fierce resistance the S.A.P. sent 35 men to the 
magistracy to prepare for a confrontation with the people. 
Thirty African men were served the first notices to present 
their cattle for culling and they arrived in a 'belligerent 
mood' at the culling site along with seven hundred
followers, both men and women. The culling procedure at
this stage was simply to identify the cattle to be removed
from the district. It was only after chief Molife
intervened and warned his people that they would be heavily 
fined if they failed to comply with the cull that their 
unanimous objections to branding were overcome. Officials 
then felt it prudent to allow stock-owners to oversee the 
branding of cattle and some men were allowed to brand their 
own stock, probably to ensure that only minimal damage was 
done to the hides.
By the end of 1948, the culling process had stalled. 
Liebrandt had only managed to get the people of Molife Ward 
A (the first parcel to come under 'betterment') to part 
with 38 per cent of their stock through sale.-*-®^  The people
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of Ward B, the next parcel planned out, refused to attend 
any meetings about culling. R. Moran, an agricultural 
officer in Nongoma, discussed African resistance:
Normally at any agricultural meeting the attendance 
may be a hundred, but if at any time a rumour has 
been spread throughout the district that stock 
limitation is to be discussed, we have had up to 
two thousand natives in [a] fairly arrogant mood 
come to the court house, and if you force the issue 
on the people. . . the policing would have to be 
terrific in order to enforce your regulations.
Large herd-owners were at the forefront of the opposition
to the culling register and the threat of stock removal.
They did their utmost to convince fellow members of the
'tribe' that the intentions of the NAD were detrimental and
that they should resist the schemes and culls. Some chiefs
even promised to lend commoners cattle for milk or
1 ft oploughing m  order to win support. Local officials
remained convinced that while the 'Chiefs and the masses1
raised objections to the scheme 'the progressive few'
wanted the projects to continue. The decreasing number of 
voices heard in favour of 'betterment' was attributed by 
the NAD to the fear of the 'progressives' of the animosity
1 OT
of the chiefs and people. Despairing of any further
'betterment' in Nquthu, Leibrandt concluded that,
It has long been clear to me that no amount of 
persuasion or argument will convince these people 
that what we are doing is for their benefit. All 
claim they will starve without their cattle and1 o /
that the Government desires to kill them.0*
Upon reflection, Leibrandt stated before the Tomlinson 
Commission, which had been set up to consider what
strategies were necessary to ensure the 'Human welfare, 
Preservation and Development of Bantu Civilisation', that
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it would only be through 'diplomacy and perhaps other
methods' (ie coercion) that anything further could be
achieved.1®^ He had already been undermined in prosecuting
people who refused to cooperate with the cull because they
had hired a white Vryheid lawyer to challenge the writs of
prosecution.1®® Other officials noted that many wealthier
herd-owners simply viewed the fines associated with culling
as an added tax to be incorporated into the overall cost of
1 R 7cattle-keeping. For many poor cattle owners, however,
these tactics were not a sustainable option in the face of 
state determination to force culling. As Leibrandt argued 
for the future of African resistance to 'betterment1,
I think that they will be forced economically to 
either bring their animals to the culling race or 
adopt other means of defiance.-*-®®
Finally, Leibrandt stressed the need for the NAD to achieve
a better understanding of the customs, practices and
desires of Africans relating to their cattle and the
reserves. He recommended ideas that had been mooted over
twenty years earlier, including the suggestion that trained
anthropologists be employed to advise local officials on
1 ft QAfricans and their potential reactions. His hope was to 
contain resistance at the local level where 'tribal
leaders1 could be employed to bring pressure on the
people.190
By the end of the 1940s, however, it would appear that the 
NAD was unable to head off the emerging African national 
opposition to state intervention in the rural areas of 
Zululand. Both the African National Congress Youth League
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and members of the All African Convention had taken up the
rural struggle and had started advising reserve residents
1 91m  southern Zululand on tactics of resistance. For a
time, then, both urban African national leaders and some 
'conservative' chiefs were united in their opposition to 
state intervention.
This combination presented the state with a formidable 
threat of potential mass resistance which it had been 
working to avoid since the inception of segregation. Thus, 
the NAD was forced to retreat from culling operations in 
order to defuse resistance and to restore order and control 
in the countryside. Moreover, the ruling National party, 
faced with considerable urban unrest in the late 1940s, 
implemented the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, partly to 
encourage chiefs in Zululand and throughout the country to 
less ambiguously embrace their role in supporting the 
state, and the common space between chiefs and national
i on
African leaders disappeared. ^
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1 1/NQU 3/4/2/1, 2/1/2/1, Acting NC Martin to CNC, 20 Sept.
1944.
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151 Sandford, 'Management', p. 2.
162 NTS 7568 88/327 I, SNA to CNC ,re report of Director of 
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Source: NTS 7568, 880/327, NC to CNC 26 May 1948
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betterment with the Transkei, Ciskei, Lesotho, the Free 
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1/NQU 3/4/2/3, 2/11/1, 18 April 1948.
Interview with Mr. N. Otte.
See for example NTS 7836, 9/336 IV, Engineer Malcolm to 
CNC, 31 Oct. 193 5.
172 NTS 10212, 7/423, NC's report, 7 Sept. 1948.
^72 CAD, K-2 0, Evidence before the Tomlinson Commission on 
the Socio-Economic Development of Native Areas in the Union 
of South Africa], Vol. 56, p 4650.
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418
4^9 ibid. S. A. P. Inspector's Report and see NC to CNC, 3 
May 1948.
48  ^Tomlinson, Evidence, p. 4664.
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490 Ibid. pp 4649-4650.
494 Ibid. Evidence of NC at Melmoth, p. 4657. For the 
background to the All African Convention see Bundy, 'Land 
and Liberation1, T. Karis and G. Gerhart, From Protest to 
Challenge, Vol. 3 (Stanford, 1978), pp. 100-118, Hirson,
'Rural Revolt1 .
1 Q  9  . . . .For the wider implications of these developments see 
for example Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 18-21, 110-112
Hemson, 'Dockworkers1, pp. 110-121 and Nuttall, 'Class', 
pp. 128-132. The role of Bantu Authorities and new programs 
of state intervention in the reserves in the 1950s and 
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In the concluding pages of his seminal work Colin Bundy 
commented:
Connections and conclusions are most usefully 
introduced by restating the arguments [of the
thesis], reduced to their bare essentials. Thus 
filtered out, the arguments stand free of the
fleshy surrounds of qualifications and details: 
skeleton-like, they are starker than, yet are the 
essential core to, the body of the whole.
These words have guided my own following conclusions.
This thesis has argued that, by 1950, the forces of state
and capital had fundamentally re-moulded the political 
economy of Zululand through a policy of segregation. This 
policy had ambiguous effects. On the one hand, in different 
ways it served the various interests of commercial farmers, 
urban industry and white society in general to control 
African labour, remove the threat of African competition 
and contain the possibly explosive forces of African 
society. On the other hand, segregation supported the 
development of members a small rural Zulu elite who 
exploited the limited resources available to them and 
struggled to gain a secure political footing, caught as 
they were between the demands of the state and Africans.
Class interests crystalised during the period studied and 
those Zulu who could accumulate in the reserves stood in 
increasingly stark contrast to impoverished commoners. How 
these interests were consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s is 
an area in need of further study, but Shula Marks has 
pointed the way forward, in part by looking back from the
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position of the KwaZulu leader M. Buthelezi. The patterns
of labour migration and social differentiation, which were
evident in the early 1900s, intensified with the crisis and
acute rural impoverishment of 193 0-1950. The Zulu ruling
patriarchy sought enhanced power through state recognition
and support in an effort to control the processes of
proletarianisation and individualisation which threatened
its rule in the reserves. Thus, an uneasy and often
shifting alliance developed between Zulu chiefly
authorities and the state as they sought to dominate the
reserves. Thus, this thesis has attempted to provide a
picture which captures the complexities of differentiation
in the reserves and leave an impression which differs from
Bill Freund's view of similar developments in the Transkei
which he argues was one of a
remarkably effective administration secured through 
African allies that enjoyed wide acceptance,
required little coercion, and experienced little
challenge.^
There was however, some limited room for African mobility 
within the ranks of the dominated classes. The state's 
often contradictory administration left scope for a few 
appointed African officials and enterprising community 
leaders to take advantage of productive possibilities in
the reserves to enhance their wealth.
The government's implementation of a reserve system had 
profound implications for the way in which the political 
economy developed in Zululand. White land expropriations 
exacerbated the rapid decline of subsistence agricultural 
production, which forced the vast majority of commoners
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into a deeper reliance on wage labour, and especially on 
oscillating labour migrancy to the urban areas. Underlying 
the decline in household agriculture were different gender 
interests in Zulu aims for household production. While 
women struggled to maintain agricultural production in the 
reserves, men increasingly turned to earning wages which 
they invested in cattle, thereby reducing their 
contribution to cultivation.
On top of this, white settlement constrained commoner Zulu 
homestead production, cattle-keeping and peasant 
cultivation while the chiefly elite monopolised the limited 
resources available for herd accumulation. Soon after the 
delimitation, white sugar-cane planters moved into the 
coastal belt to farm intensively, and forced thousands of 
Africans into the already congested reserves. Further state 
support, in the form of favourable land-leases and 
financial grants enabled whites to entrench their control 
of land and win an advantage over African agriculturalists.
The reserves were the foundation of the state's segregation 
policy. Although land expropriations undermined chiefly 
authority by subsequently removing their principal resource 
in ensuring their people's loyalty, and by setting them at 
odds with the Zulu living on white farms, the state also 
intervened to shore up chiefly rule. The Zululand trust was 
based on Natal precedents where communal land tenure and 
the recognition of 'tribal' authority pre-dated later 
national legislation. Africans who struggled to escape 
these controls were subordinated by the exactions of white
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farmers who sought to undermine competitive African 
producers, or by the state which sought to contain 
potentially threatening opposition movements.
Paradoxically, as chiefs were embraced by state power, they 
became less effective for the administration. There were 
inherent contradictions in the state's use of reconstructed 
chiefly authority, as chiefs simultaneously attempted to 
maintain popular support while intensifying their control 
over commoners. The self-aggrandising tendencies of chiefs, 
and their accumulation through the extraction of cattle and 
cash from commoners, pitted them against the state on the 
one hand, and their followers on the other. Both 
conservative chiefs and the leaders of mass political 
movements re-invented Zulu 'traditions' as they vied for 
popular support. While neither group was able to overcome 
the constraints imposed by the demands of industrialising 
South Africa, they both developed significant ideologies 
with which to mobilise commoners in their struggles with 
the state and agrarian capital.^
Although pre-colonial forms of authority provided 
significant legacies for Zulu rulers in the twentieth 
century, the wider capitalist economy re-shaped local 
African leadership and accelerated the processes of social 
stratification. Segregation did not necessarily transform 
the political authority of hereditary rulers, and this was 
true of the Zulu royal family. Hereditary rulers who 
represented an idealised past had enormous symbolic
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importance for rural Africans struggling to defend 
themselves against the pernicious effects of capitalism.
Chiefs still exerted some control over their followers, 
especially through the collection of 'tribute' in urban and 
rural areas. This was possible largely because the Zulu 
continued to rely on chiefly patronage to secure themselves 
in the reserves. It was not necessarily contradictory that 
chiefs and headmen sought material benefits by supporting 
popular rural struggles against the forces of state and 
capital. Although chiefs were careful to justify their 
material aggrandizement on the basis of 'pre-colonial' 
practices and to couch their activities in a reconstructed 
Zulu ethnicity, commoners also embraced these symbolic
institutions as a means of defending their interests in a
racially and class divided society.^
Nevertheless, the widening gulf between chiefs and 
commoners left a vacuum in local leadership. Many white 
officials relied on induna who were more efficient, and
initially less corrupt than many of the chiefs, to 
implement policy. Often through an alliance with these 
officials, induna took advantage of the state's new 
recognition of their importance to control 'tribal' wards 
in the absence of chiefs and to expand their agricultural 
and pastoral production for profit. At the same time, 
abanumzana, who were far more responsive to popular 
sentiment than chiefs or the NAD, challenged chiefly rule 
by mobilising support from disaffected commoners. 
Administration in Zululand then fell into disarray as a
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growing number of 'unofficial' leaders competed with the 
state and chiefs for control.
Nowhere was accumulation by the Zulu more starkly evident 
than in the cattle economy. Following the ravages of 
disease, cattle herds made a remarkable recovery. Despite 
settler disparagement of indigenous herding practices, 
shrewd Zulu herdsmen were largely responsible, for the 
recovery of their cattle, although it was also due, in 
part, to veterinary advances. These were not an unmixed 
blessing. Dipping imposed by the state had a double cost in 
the economy in terms of cash fees and in terms of increased 
stratification because the poor subsidised wealthier 
cattle-owners. Veterinary disease control was principally 
aimed at supporting white stock-keeping. It was only 
because of the intermingling of white- and African-owned 
cattle, predominantly through trade and cash exchange, that 
the state was forced to safeguard African herds. 
Nevertheless, Africans were deeply suspicious of state 
motives to further its control in the reserves through 
intervention in the cattle economy.
By the 193 0s, there was a trend towards an uneven 
distribution of cattle despite the 'explosion' of the 
herds. The chiefs transformed social practices and 
institutions such as lobola and sisa by maintaining a 
continuity of form while changing their redistributive 
functions. The Zulu patriarchy, chiefs and especially the 
royal family re-directed cattle, and migrant earnings (used 
to purchase more cattle) into their own hands by demanding
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high rates for bridewealth. Moreover, they introduced cash 
considerations to the loaning of cattle. They were able to 
maintain their rapidly expanding herds through their 
largely unchecked control of grazing land. In contrast, 
fewer and fewer commoner families had control of sufficient 
grazing land for large herds, and some could not afford the 
cost of establishing a reproductive herd of their own. 
Nevertheless, a significant feature of cattle distribution 
in Zululand was that the majority of commoners were able to 
keep some cattle, or they at least had access to cattle 
through sisa. Although wealthy cattle-owners were among 
those Zulu best able to resist a reliance on migrant wage 
labour, they did require cash and labour to maintain their 
herds, albeit probably less of both than was required for 
accumulation through agriculture.
Although chiefs sought to concentrate the accumulation of 
cattle in their own hands, the fact that most commoners had 
cattle probably played an important part in their continued 
support of chiefly authority. The accumulation of cattle by 
the Zulu was not, however, simply a defence against 
capitalist assaults on a remaining element of the pre­
capitalist economy. By 193 0, African-owned cattle were 
already an important commodity on the wider South African
n
stock market. While many Zulu with small herds traded and 
sold a few cattle to meet subsistence requirements, large 
herd-owners exploited a ready and growing cash market for 
their stock.
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More importantly, despite negative white perceptions of 
'emaciated' Zulu cattle and an industry-wide effort to 
improve the condition of cattle for export, Solomon's
cattle collections precipitated the widespread rise of 
white cattle-traders and speculators in Zululand's 
reserves. These often unscrupulous men, nevertheless, 
helped Africans negotiate the complexities of a market 
divided between the Zulu offerings of 'scrub' cattle and 
the demands of the white urban buyers of heavy slaughter 
stock. The sale of cattle was important not only because it 
meant the commoditisation of a product central to the 
social relations of production in the reserves, but also 
because it accelerated social differentiation. It has been 
argued that the off-take of cattle through sales and
mortality did not threaten the size or reproductive
o
capacity of the herds. By the 193 0s, however, there were 
relatively few wealthy Zulu who 'owned' cattle, as opposed 
to simply caring for them, and who could, therefore, depend 
on sales to meet cash demands.
In an effort to reduce the perceived overstocking of the
reserves, by the 193 0s, the NAD was attempting to exploit
cattle sales. Local officials believed they could alleviate 
pressure on the land, improve subsistence agriculture and 
'rationalize' African cattle-keeping through cattle 
auctions. Yet, the state's intervention in the market 
served to further polarise African society by heightening 
suspicions that whites wished to alienate more land. 
Moreover, the sales exacerbated tensions between the 
hereditary chiefs who held the largest herds and preferred
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to support speculators on the one hand, and the government- 
supporting chiefs, induna, and lesser African officials who 
held smaller herds and supported the NAD auctions on the 
other. Although the state failed to reduce cattle numbers 
through these auctions, the NAD considered the Zululand 
sales a model for their expansion throughout South Africa.
Labour migrancy and the availability of cheap food were
crucial for the subsistence of the majority of Zulu 
commoners. Without access to sufficient arable land, 
pastures for cattle or enough cash to invest in rural
production, they could not make a living off the land. Zulu 
workers, however, created ethnic identities to defend 
themselves in a rightless, coercive labour environment. The 
Zulu used their 'superior' status as industrial labourers, 
which the state was largely responsible for developing and 
reinforcing, in order to resist their diversion into
poorly-paid and unhealthy employment. Moreover, Zulu men 
rejected appeals by chiefs to apply their alleged martial 
skills, and therefore gain state recognition, during 
recruitment drives for the war, in part because of the low 
wages offered in contrast to the money they already earned 
in urban industry, and in part because the white state lay 
behind the effort.
The refusal of most young Zulu men to work on the sugar 
plantations was important for the way that fraction of 
agrarian capital developed. While established planters were 
able to attract some people from the reserves into
employment for short periods, new under-capitalised sugar-
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farmers could not compete with urban industry for Zulu 
workers, despite the considerable state support they 
received. It is significant that the sugar industry in 
Zululand developed and prospered without a reliable supply
Q
of local adult male labour. Few young men m  the reserves 
would take rural employment unless it could compete with 
the better wages and conditions in the urban areas. Women, 
children and to a lesser extant older men, however, 
comprised a significant and severely exploited part of the 
Zululand sugar industry's workforce. Whether these same 
patterns were evident in the development of the wattle and 
forestry industry in Zululand during the 1950s and 1960s 
remains to be seen.
Zulu in the reserves experienced similar pressures to those 
faced by Africans in industrial centres. When sugar 
planters imported migrant labour, however, the sugar 
industry was far less successful in overcoming the problems 
associated with migrant labour than the mines and the 
arrival of large numbers of Transkeian and Mozambiquan men 
and women on plantations adjacent to the reserves led to 
tensions between established Zulu residents and migrants. 
In the event the state forced planters to phase out the 
'non-immune' Transkeian workers because they suffered the 
worst effects of appalling working conditions and malaria. 
The planters then pressed the state to regularise the 
clandestine immigration of replacement Mozambiquan labour.
'Foreign' workers re-configured African society as they 
attempted to find a niche in Zululand. Both the state and
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the Zulu patriarchy, however, had an interest in preventing 
Mozambiquan settlement. On the one hand, the state 
perceived migrant workers and their compatriots as a threat 
to social stability and did not want to incur the cost of 
supporting them. On the other hand, Zulu men felt 
threatened by the migrants who were prepared to accept low 
wages and who established relationships with Zulu women. In 
the long-term, however, Mozambiquans did not settle in the 
region, partly because they sought the same types of urban 
employment the Zulu did, and partly because the state 
refused 'informal' migrants the right to settle in South 
Africa. It is probable that further research would show 
that more concrete and widespread ethnic differentiation 
and tension developed between migrants and residents in 
Zululand during the 1950s and 1960s.^
Although most reserve families still produced some of their 
food requirements, by the 1930s African agricultural 
production in Zululand had declined to such a low point 
that it led to a crisis when drought struck. Relegated to 
the over-crowded reserves, the Zulu could not compete with 
state-supported white agriculture. Although some well- 
placed induna were able to produce crops for the market, 
the majority of impoverished commoners sold grain under 
duress on a limited seasonal basis. While some women 
developed alternative cash-crops, this did not undermine 
the availability of food in the reserves since large-scale 
white grain farming ensured that South Africa had ample 
maize supplies. x In contrast to commercialising white 
agriculture, African peasants generally and would-be Zulu
430
sugar-farmers in particular, faced insurmountable obstacles 
to agrarian accumulation. Only a few men with privileged 
access to land could make a living in the reserves. This 
small group could certainly not produce enough to feed 
their fellow Zulu.
The 'myth' of reserve agriculture became abundantly clear 
when drought struck in the 1930s and 1940s. The threat of 
famine led to acute problems as the NAD and store-keepers 
competed for control of food supplies. While local
officials were successful in fulfilling the welfare
obligation they felt to ensure that Africans did not 
starve, the central state preferred the white-dominated 
market and private enterprise to alleviate food shortages. 
It provided neither the funds nor the infrastructure 
necessary to ensure that Africans had consistent food 
supplies. The government was, therefore, predisposed to 
rely on limited infusions of cash, initially through work-
relief schemes and later through welfare payments, to
provide Africans with some means of purchasing food and, 
not coincidentally, white store-keepers with a captive 
market.
Differentiation in Zulu society had significant
implications for relative food entitlements. The most 
striking feature of famines in Zululand was that the 
wealthy no longer struggled for subsistence along with the 
poor as they had during past droughts. Moreover, employees 
of the state, such as chiefs and induna, could inevitably 
count on a fairly regular supply of food from the local
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administration. Commoners, however, had limited and 
irregular access to food supplies, and this varied even 
within families. While regularly employed male migrants 
were usually provided with adequate rations at their place 
of work because their white employers could bring pressure 
to bear on the state to ensure regular supplies of food, 
elderly retired men, women and especially children, often 
suffered from reduced supplies.
Famine had an ambiguous effect in Zululand. While few, if 
any, Zulu actually died from starvation, largely because 
the state and store-keepers provided sufficient, albeit 
erratic, supplies, most commoner families faced mounting 
debts from the increased cost of food. The picture that 
emerges, then, was not of outright catastrophe for the 
majority of the Zulu, but of pervasive and deepening want, 
and this stood in harsh contrast to the circumstances for 
wealthy chiefs and whites living in the same region.
The crisis of the 1930s highlighted the fragile nature of 
rural African society for the NAD and precipitated its 
intensive intervention to shore up the crumbling reserve 
economy. Government schemes for the 'betterment' of 
Zululand, like those elsewhere in South Africa, had two 
ideological bases. First, from the late 1920s, the NAD 
shared world-wide concerns about soil degradation and 
espoused the use of 'progressive scientific1 measures to 
halt and reverse decline in the reserves. Secondly, the 
imperatives of the state's segregation policy meant that
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the NAD had to find some viable means of providing
subsistence for Africans in the reserves.
The South African government, which faced considerable 
pressure from capitalising white grain and stock farmers, 
provided little support for African agriculturalists. Thus, 
individual-plot farming and 'master farmers1 schemes failed 
to provide even a few reserve residents with a living, let 
alone to feed the masses of hungry Africans in Zululand.
Although the NAD attempted to improve infrastructural
support for African cultivators, it could not surmount the 
constraints on production from overcrowding and chiefly 
control of land. Nevertheless, NAD agricultural officers 
believed they could resolve the problem by controlling
erosion and reducing 'overstocking1. They claimed that, 
since 'primitive' pastoralism had replaced cultivation on 
large areas of reserve land, they could re-establish at 
least subsistence production for commoners by removing most 
of the Zulu-owned 'scrub' cattle.
The NAD's stock improvement measures, however, ran into 
staunch African resistance. While some 'progressive' kholwa 
and wooled sheep-owners supported 'betterment', chiefs and 
commoners perceived the state's intrusion into cattle- 
keeping as a threat to Zulu society. Indeed, it appeared to 
the Zulu that the NAD's proposed stock-culling plans, 
ostensibly designed to improve African cattle and the 
chance for cattle-less commoners to acquire 'good' stock, 
were simply intended to release more land for whites.
433
Tensions between the state and Africans in the reserves 
heightened as commoners resisted the NAD culling programme.
The controversy over 'betterment' intensified during the 
1940s as the state insisted on convincing the Zulu of the 
benefits of stock improvement and called for a popular 
consensus. The NAD's repeated efforts to explain the value 
of its 'scientific' proposals not only fell on deaf ears 
among the experienced Zulu herdsmen, they also tended to 
exacerbate tensions between the kholwa 'progressives' and 
chiefs. These tensions allowed chiefs to regain some of the 
popular support that they had lost as they challenged the 
state over culling.
In the final analysis, this thesis has argued that the 
penetration of capitalism into rural South Africa during 
the first half of the twentieth century fundamentally 
changed three major components of the reserve political 
economy in Zululand: land, labour and cattle. If one effect 
of capitalist penetration into rural areas was to 
accelerate fissiparous tendencies within the reserves, then 
the effort of segregationists to entrench chiefly authority 
was, in essence, also hostile to African development, and 
this was certainly true in Zululand.
While there was undoubtedly a dominant racial cleavage in 
South Africa between Africans and whites, social 
stratification was crucial in shaping relations between the 
•component parts of Zulu society and the white state, and 
between chiefs and commoners, men and women, and old and
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young. The historical processes of change provided the Zulu 
with both a view of the past, and resurrected forms of a 
'traditional' African society, and of their future in a 
racially and class-divided society where created ethnicity 
and re-invented social practices served, simultaneously, to 
protect and subordinate them. These were woven into a 
complex ideology of Zulu ethnic nationalism which still 
exists today. These processes had significant implications 
for the way in which the state perceived the Zulu and how 
the Zulu related to Africans in the wider segregated South 
African society. The important question of how Zulu 
'ethnic1 nationalism became a far more militant form of
mobilization for the rural and urban underclass in Natal
1 9and Zululand remains.
Some of the current predicaments that South Africa faces in 
relation to the modern quasi-state of KwaZulu under the 
leadership of chief Buthelezi are rooted in the earlier 
processes considered here. In order to fully understand the 
present situation in Natal-Zululand we need to look to the 
intervening years when state intervention in rural South 
Africa intensified and the lines of conflict between the 
conservative chiefly class and the majority of Africans 
became clear.
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See his Peasantry, p. 237
 ^ See her Ambiguities, pp. 114-125.
See Freund, 'Rural Struggles' p. 172
 ^ For how these ideological elements were shaped and 
pointed the way to future struggles see la Hausse, 
'Ethnicity1, p. 285-288 and Bradford, A Taste, p. 277.
c:
Bemart reached the same conclusion m  Pondoland, p. 131.
c
Similar patterns were evident for chiefs elsewhere in 
South Africa. See Beinart, 'Chieftancy and Articulation', 
p. 187.
n
S. Milton is now completing a study of the South African 
cattle industry for a Ph.D. at ICS, University of London 
and his work has greatly helped my understanding of the 
Zulu cattle economy.
® See Dahl and Hjort, Having Herds, p. 12.
 ^ For the demographic implications of this see Fair, 
Distribution of the Population of Natal, p.64-65.
ID M. Murray is working on some of these issues for the 
north-eastern Transvaal. Some indications of these 
developments for a later period are found in D. Webster,
'"Abafazi Bathonga Bafihlakala" Ethnicity and Gender in a 
KwaZulu Border Community’, African Studies, Vol. 30, 1991,
pp. 243-271. R. McIntosh of SOAS is currently undertaking 
research on policy formulations for a Ph.D. which may shed 
light on this. See his 'State policies in rural South 
Africa, c. 1948-C.1960: policy formation and local
responses', project paper delivered to the AHS, SOAS, 3 May 
1995.
1 1 Further research is needed on the role of African women 
in reserve households during this period.
Marks has considered some important features of this in 
'Patriotism', pp. 215-216, 233-234. There is a wide scope
for further research on issues related to Zululand during 
this period. Although C. Ballard has done some important 
work on them, the position of the so-called 'coloured' 
community in Zululand should be considered in relation to 
their fellow reserve residents and the state. Moreover, the 
nature of rural retirement and the place of older 
generations in the reserves deserves more attention. 
Questions relating to, welfare and work-relief schemes, 
generational differences and what 'retired' workers 
actually faced in the rural areas could throw more light on 
the actual subsistence base of the reserves. Other areas of 
possible enquiry have been noted in the text and include an
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examination of the under-researched role of white store­
keepers in rural areas and possible comparative work on 
Namibia which exhibits a number of features of change which 
resonate with the Zululand case, -and probably with the 
rest of the South African countryside- especially because 




1. POPULATION, LAND AREAS AND LABOUR STATISTICS
A. Population of Zululand
year African White
1911 214,969 3, 000




compiled by the author from Union of South Africa, Bureau 
of Census and Statistics, Union Statistics for Fifty Years 
(Pretoria, 1960)




North sub-total 2,589 3,486 3,486 *
Ingwavuma 1,405 1, 609 -
Ubombo 618 1, 065 -
Hlabisa 566 812 -
Inland sub-total 3,236 3,558 3,573 #
Nongoma 692 868 868
Mahlabatini 458 606 606
Emtonj aneni 329 311 311 Sc
Eshowe 557 557 572 /\
Nkandhla 627 626 626 $
Nquthu 573 590 590
Coastal sub-total 715 617 617
Lr. Umfolozi 459 358 -
Mtunzini 256 259 -
Zululand Total 6,540 7, 661 7, 676
* This did not constitute an addition of land, but rather 
that land thrown open was not occupied and then turned back 
over to the Trust
# Much of this additional land can be accounted for by the 
re-drawing of the Nongoma/Hlabisa/Ubombo districts.
& Loss of a wattle farm
A confirmation of mission station site in the Trust 
$ Land included in white township
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@ Loss of land to sugar farmers, most traded off for poor 
land in inland districts
C. Population and Densities, 1916-1936
African Population pop./sq. mile
1916 1936 1916 1936
North sub-total 68,700 80,600 26.5 23 .1
Ingwavuma 32,200 39,200 - -
Ubombo 17,500 21,200 - -
Hlabisa 18,000 20,000 - -
Inland sub-total 134,900 193,200 41.6 54.3
Nongoma 16,300 29,400 - _ *
Mahlabatini 14,000 20,000 - _ *
Emtonj aneni 10,000 16,000 - -
Eshowe 36,700 47,300 - -
Nkandhla 30,900 42,800 - _
Nquthu 27,000 36,100 - -
Coastal sub-total 37,600 44,500 - ~
Lr. Umfolozi 14,900 17,000 - -
Mtunzini 22,700 27,400 - -
Zululand Total 241,100 318,300 36.8 41.6
* large increase accounted for partially by influx of 
refugees from northern Natal districts
Source: SEPC Report, No. 9, p. 8
D. Population Growth/ per centage increase/decrease for 
Africans and whites in Zululand
Population % change % change
1921 1936 1946 1921-36 1936-■46
Ingwavuma 26,588 39,707 40,134 + 39 + 1
Ubombo 15,747 22,608 21,931 + 44 - 3
Hlabisa 18,226 24,312 29,513 + 33 + 21
Nongoma 16,885 30,048 37,875 + 78 + 26
Mahlabatini 15,570 21,206 28,121 + 36 + 33
Emtonj aneni 18,451 24,850 26,850 + 34 + 9
Eshowe 38,803 50,707 54,151 + 31 + 7
Nkandhla 33,056 44,680 42,431 + 35 - 5
Nquthu 29,609 36,955 38,278 + 25 + 4
L. Umfolozi 18,223 26,842 33,771 + 47 + 26
Mtunzini 25,827 34,989 37,789 + 36 + 8
Total 256,985 356,769 390,844 + 39 + 10
NB the highest rates of increase are found in either the 
sugar farming districts or districts adjacent to white 
farms in northern Natal. The net decreases for Nkandhla and
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Ubombo between 193 6 and 1946 can partially be accounted for 
by increased rates of migrant labour to other districts of 
Zululand, predominantly in the coastal sugar belt or the 
upland wattle plantations in Emtonjaneni.
Source: compiled by the author from T.D. Fair, Natal
Regional Survey No. 3: The Distribution of Population in
Natal (Oxford, 1955)
E. Labour migration from Zululand, 1904
Estimates of African male migration from Zululand Districts 
and their ranking for all 29 Natal Districts
migrants population* rank
Eshowe 4100 40,000 3
Nkandhla 3015 26,000 6
Nquthu 2716 24,420 9
Ingwavuma 1968 26,160 11
Mahlabatini 1595 14,058 12
Emtonj aneni 1289 12,257 16
Ubombo 1025 12,750 19
Hlabisa 1012 15,000 20
Lr. Umfolozi 868 14,000 23
Nongoma 414 13,450 28
Totals 18,002 198,095
The Natal districts of Vryheid(4769) and Mapumulo (4234) 
ranked numbers one and two respectively.
source: Based on NAP, Natal Colonial Papers, Vol
8/1/13/2/11, Blue Books on Native Affairs for 1902-1905 and 
rankings given in D. Hemson, 'Class Consciousness and 
Migrant Workers1, p. 54
F. Labour migration from Zululand for 1919.
workers non-workers pop. in: Natal : Union
Emtonj aneni 2400 1000 10,000 2300 100
Eshowe 4280 720 44,006 1650 2630
Nkandhla 3946 6517 31,200 3946 nil
Mahlabatini 1900 1100 14,100 1900 nil
Mtunzini 2783 1855 26,000* 2783 nil
Hlabisa 3000 450 19,000 3000 nil
Nquthu 7300 3350 30,340 2700 4600
Ingwavuma 2650 3750 33,200 2650 nil
Lr.Umfolozi 4400 600 7,000* 4100 900
Nongoma 4100 400 24,000 2000 1400
Ubombo 4400 3600 17,000 4000 400
Totals: 41,259 23,342 295,846 31,029 10,030
NB population figures are for the reserves only.
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* indicates reserve figures only and division of the 
district into two; Lower Umfolozi and Mtunzini.
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Location of Employment for Africans in Zululand, 1919:
Industrial sugar farm work domestic misc.
Emtonj aneni 20 nil 1200 200 -
Eshowe nil 400 500 500 250
Nkandhla 172 693 970 1000 -
Mahlabatini - - - 48 56
Mtunzini nil 2360 229 187 -
Hlabisa nil - - 150 -
Nquthu - - - 200 -
Ingwavuma - - 30 100 50
Lr.Umfolozi 450 3250 450 550 150
Nongoma - - - 150 550
Ubombo - - - 50 -
Totals: 642 6703 3379 3135 1100
Only 16 per cent of the Zululand workers worked in the 
sugar industry.
G. Employment for Africans from Zululand, 1932
workers non-workers pop. in: Natal Union
Emtonj aneni 3300 1800 16,600 2800 500
Eshowe 5250 1230 36,700 2220 3030
Nkandhla 4475 5440 30,900 4150 325
Mahlabatini 2430 1450 14,000 2200 230
Mtunzini 3980 1855 22,700 3675 305
Hlabisa 3650 650 18,000 3450 200
Nquthu 7980 3050 27,000 2400 5580
Ingwavuma 3050 3150 33,200 2750 300
Lr.Umfolozi 5280 760 14,900 4180 1100
Nongoma 4750 800 16,300 2750 2000
Ubombo 4900 2800 17,500 4200 700
Totals: 49,045 22,625 318,300 34,775 14,270
NB. these figures are not entirely reliable. The dramatic 
increase in workers, however, compared to 1946, can be 
attributed to the effects of the drought and depression.
Employment for Africans from Zululand, 1946:
workers non-workers pop. in: Natal Union
Emtonj aneni 3120 1200 26,850 2700 420
Eshowe 4280 865 54,151 2800 1480
Nkandhla 4410 4240 42,431 4025 385
Mahlabatini 2200 912 28,121 2200 -
Mtunzini 3470 899 37,789 3275 195
Hlabisa 3100 750 29,513 3000 100
Nquthu 7250 2850 38,278 3110 4140
Ingwavuma 2825 3200 40,134 2525 300
Lr.Umfolozi 4630 800 33,771 4180 450
Nongoma 4125 500 37,875 2755 1370
Ubombo 4023 1900 21,931 3780 243
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Totals: 43,433 18,625 390,844 34,345 9,093
Based on CNC 359, 1667/1919
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H. Absentees from the reserves 193 6:
M/F total % of pop. male %
North : 9417/424 9841 12 .2 49.0
Inland: 23,782/1876 25,658 13 .3 51.2
Coast : 4540/610 5150 11.6 41.6
Total : 37,739/2,910 40,649 12.8 49.0




Coast : 139.1 * 
Source: SEPC, p.3 6
* this high rate is due to employment of migrant males in 
the sugar industry.
Compared with and average masculinity ratio of 74 per 100 
in 1901 based on Colony of Natal, Blue Book on Native 
Affairs for 1899-1901, NCP, 8/1/13/2/9 and in 1919 an 
average masculinity ratio of 66 per 100, based on averages 
from Union of S.A. Report of the Native Affairs Department 
for 1919, U.G. 7-19.
I. African workers in the Sugar growing and milling 
industry in Z-land, 193 8
District PEA workers Union Workers
Empangeni 1,988 4, 857
Eshowe 399 1, 872
Hlabisa 389 1, 583
Mtunzini 1,444 2,305
Total: 4,220 10,617
NB, most of the Union workers would be normally resident in 
the northern Zululand districts of Ubombo, Mahlabatini, 
Hlabisa and Ingwavuma, areas considered to hold populations 
with high malaria tolerance.
Based on: CNC 121A N3/13/4 (X)
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J. Labour on White Farms in Zululand 193 0
Whites Indian African Totals
M/F M/F M/F M/F
Emtonj aneni 79/10 1 /- 916/132 986/142
Eshowe 123/10 31/9 1875/67 2029/88
Nkandhla 52/ 2 -/- 290/80 242/82
Mahlabatini NA
Mtunzini 120/150 221/43 4487/52 4607/95
Hlabisa 112/30 11/1 1623/14 1745/45
Nquthu 33/4 -/- 22/50 55/54
Ingwavuma 4/- -/- 6/- 10/-
Lr.Umfolozi 195/18 280/72 5927/190 6402/280
Nongoma 23/4 -/- 17/4 40/8
Ubombo 45/3 -/- 186/17 231/20
Totals: M/F M/F M/F M/F
784/231 544/125 15,329/816 16,657/1172
compiled by the author from Union of South Africa, 
Department of Census and Statistics, Agricultural Census of 
the Union for 1931, no 13, U.G. 12-'32, Table 17.
2. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS FOR ZULULAND
A. Production for 1923: Maize/200 lb.bags
White Farms Africans on 
White farms
Reserves
Emt: 4,924 2,960 1,983
Esh 4, 523 303 9,274
Hla - - -
Ing - - -
Lum 1, 893 88 4,146
Mtu 1,372 42 5,208
Nka 2,782 1, 069 49,565
Non 3,139 72 113,203
Nqu 1, 658 152 38,228
Ubo - - 20,000
Totals 20,291 5,296 241,600
Source: Union of South Africa Report on Agricultutral and 
Pastoral Production for 1923, Agricultural Census No. 6, 
1923, U.G. 25-25.
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B. Production for 1927: Maize/200 lb. bags
White Farms Africans on Reserves cornXresevres
White farms 200 lb. bags
Emt: 6,737 3,496 5,186 2, 072
Esh L1, 979 316 9,497 -
Hla 1,822 11 4,200 -
Ing 40 - 11,000 -
Lum 4,995 120 11,236 3, 674
Mtu 1,172 66 15,192 -
Non 1,625 84 76,918 46,201
Nka 2,3 07 1, 354 24,868 -
Nqu 2,241 155 13,555 -
Ubo - - 15,000 [ approx.]
Total 25,918 5, 602 195,652 [est.]
C. African Maize and Corn Production 1934-39 (200 lb. bags'
Maize
Region 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Zululand
total 278,500 169,400 152,300 118,800 133,600 127,500
North 35,100 19,300 56,600 17,800 17,500 24,400
Inland 213,000 119,500 79,100 89,300 98,600 84,600
Coastal 30,400 30,600 16,600 11,600 17,500 18,500
Corn
Region 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Zululand
total 117,200 74,600 57,600 33,100 38,700 55,000
North 30,900 22,300 28,500 6,100 6,400 19,400
Inland 73,100 42,500 22,500 23,300 27,100 29,400
Coastal 13,200 9,800 6,600 3,700 5,300 6, 000









NB according to the Mine Wages Commission, the average 
annual minimum requirement of grain per worker was 2.75 
bags, (or roughly 1.5 lbs. per man per day) and this was 
only considered adequate if taken with other foods. In 
Zululand, people were producing only enough for less than 
.70 of a bag per person per year, (or .38 of a lb. per
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person per day) a shortfall of over 2 bags per person. See 
SEPC, p. 49
E. Other food crops grown: Average Annual Production 1934- 
39
Region Wheat Potatoes Peas and Beans
Zululand
(150 lb bags) (200 lb. bags)
total - 4,200 1, 800
North - 600 200
Inland - 1,300 1,200
Coastal - 2,300 400
Other Cash Crops grown
Region Tobacco (lb.s) Groundnut s (lb.s)
Zululand
total 14,000 201,700









accounted for: Dagga, beer and
F. Cash Value of Animal Products in £, 1937
Zululand
wool hides skins total
total 5, 200 15,000 1, 000 21,200
North - 4,400 300 4,700
Inland 5,200 8, 600 600 14,500
Coastal - 2,000 40 2, 040
G. Maize Production in 2 00 lb bags , 1941-1948
Region 1941 1944 1945 1946 1948
Zululand
total 230,200 242,300 253,200 108,600 167,100
North 29,800 33,800 44,100 13,600 19,700
Inland 181,000 167,800 182,300 83,800 131,100
Coastal 25,840 30,763 26,800 11,800 16,800
Average annual production of maize per person:
1946: .27 bags per person
1948: .42 bags per person
Based on SEPC, p. 16, U.G. 34-'50, Agricutural and Pastoral
Census of the Union, 1950 and estimates by author
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3. AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLE POPULATION, 1921-1948
District 1921 1948 % chan
Ing 25,400 85,000 + 225
Ubo 12,400 22,800 + 00 o
Mtub 28,000 72,500 + 156
Nga 56,000 98,800 + 74
Mhla n . a 64,000 n. a.
Mel 24,200 44,000 + 70
Esh 45,000 85,200 + 86
Nka 30,000 85,400 + 186
Nqu 34,000 65,000 + 87
Lr. Umf 16,200 47,500 + 187
Mtu 15,300 44,800 + 183
Totals: 285,500 710,000 + 148
Based on U.G. 25-'25, Agricultural and Pastoral Census of 
the Union, No. 6, CNC 97A, 112/110, and some estimates of 
district herd growth of nine per cent per year.
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interviewed 13-15 Sept. 1993.
(ix) Mr. N .A Otte, Clerk of the Court, Nongoma, 1937-42, 
Acting Magistrate; Ubombo, 1946-48, Springs, 1948-51, 
Mapumalo, 1951-56, Eshowe 1959-61, Mahlabatini, 1961-65, 
Nongoma, 1965-77. Born 17 May 1919 at Hlabisa. Son of the 
Revd. H. Otte of the Lutheran Mission at Hlabisa. 
Interviewed 16, 19-20 Sept. 1993 at Eshowe.
(x) Mr. Jonathan Muntukaphathwa Shandu, former textile 
worker in Durban, Mabedlana, Mahlabatini. Born 1933, 
interviewed 9 July 1993.
(xi) Mr. Mkoko S'guda Shandu, labourer, Kwa Zulu Monuments 
Council, Ondini, Mahlabatini. Born 24 Nov. 192 0,
interviewed 5-7 July 1993.
(xii) Mr. Tamuza S'gwili Qwabe, sugar cane farm labourer, 
Kwa Bulawayo, Eshowe. Born c. 1922, interviewed 14-15 Sept. 
1993.
(xiii) Mr. Henry Charles Nkomo Mpimiseni Zulu, retired 
migrant construction worker, Isandlwana, Nquthu. Born 1918,
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interviewed in his old school house at the battle site 
monument, 10-11 July 1993.
(xiv) Mr. P'oyi Enoch Zulu, retired farm labourer, 
Makwagaza, Eshowe. Born 1915, interviewed 12 July 1993.
(xv) Mrs. Tozo Zwane, mother and housewife, local Inkatha 
women's Brigade leader, Mahlabatini. Born 1922, interviewed 
6 July 1993.
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